Cyberdyne

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

What it actually is. Cyberdyne sells and leases wearable cyborg-type exoskeletons under the HAL brand, built on founder Yoshiyuki Sankai's "Cybernics" research (a fusion of neuroscience, robotics, IT and AI). HAL reads faint bio-electric signals on the skin (the wearer's intention to move), then drives motors at the hip/knee/joint to assist motion — the differentiator vs. pre-programmed exoskeletons is that the patient's own nervous system is in the loop, which the company markets as inducing neuroplasticity rather than just mechanical support.

Product lines (FY2026 lineup): Medical HAL (Lower Limb Type; Single Joint Type) — the regulated, reimbursable rehab device; non-medical / Well-Being HAL (Lower Limb, Single Joint, Lumbar type — the lumbar/back-support unit for caregivers and industrial lifting); HAL peripherals; and two adjacent robotics lines — cleaning robots and transport robots for factories/offices/indoor logistics.

How it makes money. Three streams, none of them large: (1) device leasing + per-session "Cybernics Treatment" at hospitals/rehab centres (the recurring, B2G/B2B2C core — strongest where a national insurer reimburses); (2) outright sales of medical and non-medical units; (3) maintenance/peripherals and the small cleaning/transport-robot business. Revenue is ¥3.85B (~$26M) for FY2026 — i.e. this is a micro-cap-revenue company wearing a frontier-tech name.

Customers. Rehabilitation hospitals and national social-security bodies are the anchor buyers. The flagship recent customer is Malaysia's PERKESO (SOCSO) — the national social-security organization — which deployed 50 sets / 65 HAL units at the new National Neuro-Robotics & Cybernics Rehabilitation Centre in Ipoh (opened 16 Jun 2026), described as "one of the world's largest-scale deployments at a single facility". Other footprints: Japanese hospitals (reimbursed since 2016), Germany/Sweden/Singapore hospitals, a Taiwan partnership (Mar 2025), and a US clinical facility. The customers.csv scaffold is empty — none of this is research-layer-grounded.

Contract structure / payment terms. Predominantly lease + treatment-fee in medical (recurring but volume-thin and reimbursement-gated), plus lumpy government/hospital capital deals (PERKESO-type). No take-or-pay; no large concentrated commercial contract base disclosed. The recurring portion is real but small — this is the crux of why two decades of revenue never reached operating breakeven.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Cyberdyne does not publish a supplier map; this lens is necessarily named-where-possible, generic-where-not (web-only, no filings).

• Upstream inputs → Electric actuators/servo motors (hip/knee drives), bio-electric surface sensors (the proprietary signal-pickup electrodes — the differentiating IP), batteries, frames/structural materials, embedded controllers/MCUs and the control software. Japan has a deep domestic supply base for precision motors and sensors (Nidec, Maxon-type, Yaskawa-adjacent component makers) — Cyberdyne almost certainly sources motors/encoders from Japanese/Swiss precision-motor suppliers, but specific vendors are not disclosed → n/a.
• → Cyberdyne (Tsukuba, Ibaraki): in-house integration, the Cybernics control stack, clinical validation, and its own CYBERDYNE STUDIO training/treatment sites.
• → End customer: national insurers / social-security bodies (Japan MHLW reimbursement; Malaysia PERKESO), rehabilitation hospitals, care facilities, and a thin industrial channel for the lumbar unit.

Chokepoints / single-source risk. The genuine dependency runs the other way: the binding constraint is demand and reimbursement, not input supply. The one input worth flagging is the bio-electric sensor / signal-processing stack — it is the company's own IP and the thing a copycat would have to replicate; it is not a third-party chokepoint. Manufacturing is low-volume enough that component scarcity is not the issue. Names-or-it-didn't-happen caveat acknowledged: on a web-only basis I cannot name the actual motor/sensor vendors, so this lens is honestly incomplete — a filings-grounded refresh (if Japanese securities reports were ingested) would be needed to fill it.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The real moats (such as they are):

1. Regulatory + reimbursement estate. HAL is one of very few exoskeletons with Japanese national-insurance reimbursement (MHLW, since 2016, for eight intractable neuromuscular diseases) and a stack of US FDA 510(k) clearances — original spinal-cord-injury clearance (K171909, 2017), expanded May 2024 to cerebral palsy, HTLV-1-associated myelopathy (HAM) and hereditary spastic paraplegia, plus clearance of a smaller pediatric model (patients ≥100 cm). Regulatory clearances + reimbursement codes are slow to win and do protect the medical niche.
2. Bio-signal / neuroplasticity differentiation + clinical evidence base. The "wearer's-intention-in-the-loop" mechanism and the neuroplasticity claim are a genuine technical/clinical differentiator vs. pure mechanical exoskeletons, backed by a long clinical-publication trail. Industry surveys group Cyberdyne with Ekso/Lifeward as the incumbents with "broad clinical evidence".
3. Founder/IP control. Sankai's Cybernics IP + the University of Tsukuba research centre + dual-class control (Lens 9) make the company effectively un-takeoverable and tightly held.

Why the moat is narrow / leaky:

• A moat that protects a business that loses money at the operating line is not creating value — it is defending a niche too small to cover the cost structure. ~22 years in, the moat has not produced pricing power sufficient to reach operating breakeven.
• Bargaining power is weak on both sides: suppliers are commodity-ish but Cyberdyne's volumes are tiny (no scale leverage), and the buyers are national payers who set reimbursement and can say no (Germany's insurers refused coverage pending "well-founded data"). The customer needs Cyberdyne far less than Cyberdyne needs the customer.
• Competitors (Lifeward/ReWalk 7, Ekso Indego Personal, Wandercraft's self-balancing "Eve," Myomo, Chinese entrants) are converging; some are pushing into the personal/home market and FDA personal-use clearance — a vector where HAL's clinic-bound model is less advantaged.

Verdict on moat: real but defensive and value-neutral — it preserves a small niche, it does not compound earnings.

Lens 4 · Segments

Hard requirement check: segments.csv is an empty scaffold — there is no research-layer segment data. The company reports segments in its Japanese disclosures (medical robot business; non-medical/welfare; cleaning/other robotics), but the WebFetch to the official kessan PDF returned 404 and the English summaries do not break out the split. So:

• By product: Cyberdyne discloses Medical HAL, non-medical/Well-Being HAL (incl. Lumbar), HAL peripherals, cleaning robots, and transport robots. The per-segment revenue split is n/a on a web-only basis. Directionally, the medical/rehab line is the anchor and the cleaning/transport robotics are small adjacencies; I will not invent the percentages.
• By geography: Japan is the core market; overseas spans US, Europe (a German entity — see LeyLine below), Middle East/Africa and Asia-Pacific (Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan). Quantified Japan-vs-overseas split: n/a.
• The one segment fact that IS sourced and matters: total revenue fell 12.3% YoY in FY2026 to ¥3.85B, and management explicitly attributed part of the decline to the prior-year divestiture of LeyLine GmbH, the German subsidiary. So the consolidated top line is shrinking, and part of that is the company shedding a problem overseas unit (Lens 9/10) rather than organic contraction alone.

Trend: revenue arc is ¥2.15B (FY22) → ¥3.29B (FY23) → ¥4.35B (FY24) → ¥4.38B (FY25) → ¥3.85B (FY26). It built toward ~¥4.4B and then rolled over (−12%) — decelerating-to-declining, exactly the wrong shape for a "frontier robotics" multiple.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: FY2026, ended 31 Mar 2026, reported 14 May 2026)

All figures `` unless noted; FY-end 31 March.

The single most important line in this dossier: FY2026 swung to a +¥153M net profit while the operating line stayed at a −¥601M loss. The move "into the black" is not the business turning — it is non-operating (the FY26 net result improved ~¥730M YoY despite revenue falling, with operating losses still deeply negative). Analyst coverage labelled it precisely: "One-Time Gain Masks Core Growth Stagnation … profit misses revenue". The drivers are non-operating/extraordinary items — investment and FX-type gains plus the absence of prior-year LeyLine drag — not a structural improvement in the HAL franchise.

• vs. consensus: Japanese micro-caps have thin sell-side coverage; a clean beat/miss-vs-consensus number for the print is n/a. The cleaner read is guidance vs. actual (Lens 11): FY27 management guidance is a slender ¥75M net profit vs. a ¥292M analyst consensus — management is guiding below the Street, i.e. conservative or signalling that the FY26 non-operating tailwind doesn't repeat.
• What drove it (business lines): revenue −12% YoY, partly the LeyLine divestiture. Gross margin actually improved to 58.9% (mix/cost), so the operating-loss narrowing is partly real cost discipline (capex collapsed to ¥13M, opex down) — but the absolute operating loss is still −¥601M on ¥3.85B revenue.
• Margins & why: GM up ~480bp (favourable mix away from low-margin LeyLine/overseas + cost cuts); operating margin improved to −15.6% on opex restraint, not revenue leverage (revenue fell).
• Balance-sheet flags (these are the bull case): Equity ratio ~81%; total equity ¥39.6B, cash & ST investments ¥8.99B, total debt just ¥467M, total assets ¥49.1B. Operating cash flow turned positive ¥195M in FY26 (first positive in 4 yrs) and FCF +¥182M (helped by capex falling to ¥13M). So the company is no longer bleeding cash at the consolidated level — but that is as much capex starvation + non-operating items as it is operating health.
• Market reaction / what's priced: the stock sits ~¥309–338, down ~87–94% from the ¥2,629 June-2016 peak (all-time low ¥147, Apr 2025). The market has already de-rated this from "robotics dream" to "asset-backed micro-cap." P/B ~1.67, 0% dividend, analyst consensus PT ~¥305 (≈ flat-to-down vs. spot).
• Unusual vs. its own history: a net profit on a revenue decline with operating losses persisting is itself the anomaly — flag it as low-quality earnings.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ is empty and Japanese micro-caps rarely post English earnings-call transcripts that scrape clean (Fool/Insider-Monkey do not cover 7779). So this lens is web-only and thin — I will not fabricate a multi-quarter sentiment series.

What is observable from disclosures and IR cadence:

• Management's stated focus has shifted from the old "HAL will be everywhere" growth narrative toward (a) balance-sheet/"solid financial base" language (they lead with the ~81% equity ratio) and (b) a platform pivot — "human-cyber-physical space (HCPS)," "Society 5.0," "Physical AI." The June-2026 launch of a ¥10B ($60M) corporate VC fund with Pegasus Tech Ventures to invest in robotics/Physical-AI/healthcare startups is the loudest recent signal of where management's head is. Translation: the founder is positioning Cyberdyne as a Physical-AI platform/holding entity, not just an exoskeleton OEM.
• Phrases recurring: "Cybernics," "neuroplasticity," "peaceful purposes," "Society 5.0," "HCPS." Things they've stopped emphasizing: unit-growth and revenue-ramp guidance for HAL itself.
• Tone: institutional/visionary and defensive on fundamentals — the messaging now sells the balance sheet and the vision, which is what companies do when the P&L isn't the story. Sentiment-trend confidence: low (no transcript series).

Lens 7 · Comps

Listed medical-exoskeleton peer set:

• 5-yr avg ROE / EV/EBIT / P/E for the peers: mostly n/a (these are loss-making micro-caps; P/E and EV/EBIT are meaningless/negative for all of them, Cyberdyne included — FY26 P/E ~470x on ¥0.72 EPS is a non-operating artifact, not a valuation input). Dividend yield: 0% across the set.
• The two ways to value Cyberdyne:

1. Naïve operating multiple — ~17x EV/Sales (¥67–72B ÷ ¥3.85B, before netting cash). This is absurd for a 12%-shrinking, operating-loss-making device business; on this lens Cyberdyne is the most expensive name in the peer set by an order of magnitude.
2. Asset/sum-of-parts read — ~1.67x P/B, or seen differently: market cap ¥67–72B vs. ¥39.6B equity (of which ¥9B is cash/ST investments). So ~¥28–33B of the market cap is "everything above book" — i.e. the market is assigning the operating business + IP + the cash-optionality a premium over net assets, just a much smaller one than the headline EV/Sales implies. Simply Wall St's model even flags a fair value ~¥668 on an asset/excess-returns basis vs. a ~¥309 price — i.e. one model thinks the assets are worth more than the price, while the analyst consensus PT ~¥305 says flat-to-down. I surface this conflict rather than pick a side: the asset-value bulls and the cash-flow bears are looking at two different companies (a balance sheet vs. a P&L). That tension is the thesis.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~last 5 yrs)

Granular intraday move-attribution for a Tokyo micro-cap is ``-thin, but the structural arc and the named catalysts are clear:

• 2014 IPO → Jun-2016 peak ¥2,629: peak "robotics + aging-Japan" hype; the dual-class IPO itself was a market event.
• 2016 → 2025 secular de-rating to ¥147 (Apr-2025 all-time low): the dominant driver is chronic unprofitability — "EPS fell ~60%/yr over 3 yrs, net margin ~−0.1%". The market repriced from dream to micro-cap.
• LeyLine GmbH overhang (2024–25): disclosure of loan-recoverability risk to former German subsidiary LeyLine and a ¥252M doubtful-accounts allowance, then the Feb-2025 LOI to sell 63.6% of LeyLine — a clear negative-news cluster around capital-allocation/overseas missteps.
• FDA expansion (7 May 2024): clearance for cerebral palsy/HAM/HSP + pediatric model — a positive de-risking event for the US opportunity.
• PERKESO Malaysia (16 Jun 2026): 65-unit deployment, "world's largest single-site" — the most concrete recent positive.
• Pegasus ¥10B CVC fund (Jun 2026): ambiguous-to-negative for value investors (cash going into VC, not buybacks/dividends).

What the pattern reveals: the market reacts to (a) profitability/cash-burn trajectory (the dominant secular driver) and (b) capital-allocation/overseas-misstep headlines far more than to product/clearance news. HAL clearances and big deployment PRs have not re-rated the stock; the balance sheet and the loss line drive it. This is a "show-me-the-money / show-me-the-discipline" tape, not a momentum/story tape.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO / founder: Yoshiyuki Sankai — University of Tsukuba professor, coined "Cybernics," invented HAL, founded the company in 2004, took it public in 2014. Archetype: scientist-founder / mission-driven academic, not a commercial operator. That is the defining fact about this company.
• Track record: Scientifically, genuinely pioneering — first bio-signal medical exoskeleton, real FDA/MHLW clearances, real clinical evidence. Commercially, ~22 years and never a sustained operating profit, revenue stalled at ~¥4B and now shrinking, stock −~90% from peak. The science is the achievement; the business is not.
• Tenure & skin in the game / control: extreme. Via dual-class shares (Class B = 10× votes), Sankai + two foundations he controls held ~85% of voting rights (Class B = 41.7% of shares but 87.7% of votes as of the IPO-era disclosure). The stated purpose is to keep the tech "for peaceful purposes and prevent military misuse." Implication: this company cannot be taken over, cannot be forced to return capital, and cannot be redirected by activists without Sankai's assent. Massive alignment on mission; poor alignment for a minority shareholder who wants the ¥9B cash back.
• Capital-allocation history — the weakest part: (1) Overseas expansion destroyed value — the LeyLine GmbH episode (loan-recovery risk, ¥252M doubtful-accounts allowance, fire-sale of 63.6%) is a textbook failed-foreign-subsidiary capital sink. (2) No dividend, one ad-hoc ¥1.19B buyback (FY23) — i.e. capital return is minimal and sporadic despite a ¥9B cash hoard. (3) The new ¥10B Pegasus VC fund (2026) commits a huge slug of the balance sheet to venture investing in third-party startups rather than returning it or proving the core unit economics — defensible as a "Physical-AI platform" bet, but for a company that can't make its own product profitable, deploying ¥10B into other people's robotics is a real governance flag. ROE/ROIC have been negative-to-negligible the whole listed life; the FY26 positive ROE is the non-operating artifact.
• Red flags: related-foundation control of votes; serial overseas write-downs; cash-into-VC while core loses money; promotional "Society 5.0 / cyborg" branding that outruns the financials.

Net: a brilliant founder-scientist running what is, financially, a subscale, founder-entrenched, cash-rich research company — trust the science, do not trust the capital allocation, and accept that the structure removes the usual shareholder remedies.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Earnings quality is the headline forensic issue, not fraud. Web-only (no filings to tie out line items), so claims are flagged.

• Low-quality earnings / non-operating dependence: FY26 net profit (+¥153M) sits on top of a −¥601M operating loss — the profit is manufactured by non-operating/extraordinary items, not the business. This is the #1 flag: do not capitalize this "profit." Management's own FY27 guide of just ¥75M net profit tacitly concedes the tailwind doesn't recur.
• Revenue recognition / leasing: a lease-plus-treatment-fee model with government counterparties can flatter or smooth revenue timing on large institutional deals (PERKESO-type). Cannot verify rev-rec policy without the Japanese securities report → flagged, not concluded.
• Receivables / doubtful accounts: the ¥252M LeyLine allowance is a concrete realized credit problem on an intercompany/related loan — exactly the "related-party loan that goes bad" pattern a forensic analyst watches for. It's disclosed and now largely behind them, but it tells you the controls/judgment on overseas exposure were weak.
• Cash vs. earnings divergence: historically operating cash flow was more negative than net loss isn't the case here — FY26 OCF (+¥195M) actually exceeds net income quality-wise because capex was slashed to ¥13M; the worry is the opposite — capex starvation (¥13M on a "robotics" company) may be under-investing the product to flatter cash flow.
• Goodwill/intangibles & SBC: with serial overseas restructuring there is impairment/write-down history; specific goodwill/intangible and SBC figures are n/a web-only.
• Going-concern: not a concern — ¥9B cash, ¥467M debt, ~81% equity ratio. Solvency is the strength; the risk is value-erosion, not insolvency.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section).

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): none — Cyberdyne has no CIK and is not an SEC filer, so no EDGAR enforcement search is possible. (This is the one file on disk I'm citing as research-layer.)
• Non-SEC web search ("Cyberdyne" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR consent decree OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement): no material enforcement, consent decree, fine, or penalty surfaced. FDA appears only positively (510(k) clearances 2017/2024), not as enforcement. The LeyLine matter is a commercial/credit dispute and divestiture, not a regulatory action.
• Japan (FSA/TSE): no disclosed securities-law action or restatement found web-side.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal enforcement findings — verified via the on-disk SEC EDGAR EFTS check (LR, AAER; n/a — no CIK) and web search across FTC/DOJ/FDA/Japan-FSA as of 2026-06-30. The forensic issue is earnings quality and capital allocation, not legal/regulatory liability.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2027–FY2029, FY-end March)

Built bottom-up from FY26 actuals + the only disclosed guidance; outputs ``, every input labelled. No forecast.ts create is logged (watchlist/unattended rule + I am not committed to a base case on a web-only read).

Anchors (all ``): FY26 revenue ¥3,846M, operating loss −¥601M, GM 58.9%; FY27 management net-profit guide ¥75M; FY27 analyst-consensus net ¥292M. Note net income here is non-operating-dominated, so EPS projection is low-confidence by construction.

The point the table makes: even the bull case does not get the operating line positive within the projection window — every realistic path is "smaller losses subsidized by a ¥9B cash pile + episodic non-operating gains." There is no credible 3-year path to a self-funding operating business on current trajectory. FY28–29 are extrapolations of the same (flat-to-slightly-up revenue, perpetual sub-scale operating losses) → n/a — not modeled with conviction beyond the directional statement.

Brier forecast (not logged, but stated for the record): "7779 reports a positive FY27 (Mar-2027) operating income — probability ~15%." The operating line, not the net line, is the honest binary; I'd put it low.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. This is not a robotics-growth story — it's an asset/optionality story. You're buying ¥39.6B of equity (incl. ¥9B cash, near-zero debt, 81% equity ratio) for a ¥67–72B market cap and getting, for free-ish: (1) a globally-unique, FDA- and MHLW-cleared bio-signal medical-exoskeleton IP estate with two decades of clinical evidence; (2) a structural tailwind — aging Japan + global rehab demand + the secular exoskeleton market ($6.8B 2026 → ~$24B 2031 at ~29% CAGR ); (3) operating leverage if it ever scales (58.9% gross margin means revenue past the fixed-cost hump drops hard to the bottom line); (4) embedded optionality in the Physical-AI/"HCPS" pivot and the ¥10B Pegasus fund; (5) a floor — at ~1.67x book with a fortress balance sheet, downside is cushioned, and one Simply-Wall-St model even pegs asset fair value above the price (~¥668 vs ~¥309). The contrarian bull: the market has thrown this away as a "perpetual loss-maker" and is mispricing the balance-sheet floor + the takeover/recapitalization optionality.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. Structural sub-scale. ~22 years, ~¥4B revenue ceiling, never an operating profit, and revenue now declining. The most likely future is not "inflection" but slow value-erosion — a great science project that the market is right to price as a cash-box, with the cash slowly consumed by R&D and VC bets. The bull's "operating leverage" never triggers because the revenue ramp never comes.
2. Founder entrenchment locks in the value gap. With ~85% of votes held by Sankai/foundations, a minority shareholder has no lever to force a buyback, dividend, sale, or strategic change. The ¥9B cash and ¥40B book can stay trapped indefinitely, deployed into ¥10B VC funds rather than returned. The asset-value bull case is real on paper and unrealizable in practice.
3. Competitive convergence + reimbursement dependence. Lifeward/Ekso/Wandercraft/Myomo + Chinese entrants are closing the clinical gap and pushing into personal/home use; HAL's clinic-bound, reimbursement-gated model is exposed if payers (already skeptical in Germany) tighten, or if a cheaper personal-use rival wins the home market.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): "I bought it for the balance-sheet floor; revenue kept fading toward ¥3.5B, FY27 printed another operating loss with no non-operating bailout, Sankai committed more cash to the Pegasus VC fund and a new overseas push, the book quietly eroded, and with 85% voting control there was nothing anyone could do — the 'asset value' just sat there at a permanent 30–40% discount-to-vision and a permanent premium-to-cash-flow."

Are multiples too high? On any operating metric, yes, absurdly (~17x EV/Sales, ~470x P/E, operating losses). On asset value, roughly fair-to-cheap (~1.67x book). The stock is simultaneously wildly overvalued and modestly undervalued depending on which company you think you're buying — and the founder structure means the cheap version may never be unlocked.

Contrarian view of what the market refuses to see: Bears see "perpetual loss-maker, avoid." What they may be under-weighting is that the cash + IP floor is real and the downside is genuinely cushioned — this is not a zero, it's a slowly-deflating asset bag. But the symmetric truth the bulls refuse to see is that founder control makes the floor un-monetizable, so "cheap on assets" is a value trap, not a setup.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• "Fortress balance sheet" = trapped capital. ¥9B cash earning nothing, ¥40B book, no dividend, one buyback in five years, and now ¥10B headed into a VC fund. With 85% voting control, the balance sheet is the founder's to deploy, not the shareholder's to harvest. A cash-box you can't open is not worth book.
• The "turnaround to profit" is fake. Operating loss −¥601M; the +¥153M net is non-operating. Management guides ¥75M for FY27 — de minimis and still non-operating. There is no operating turnaround; there's a smaller loss + accounting/non-op noise.
• Revenue is going the wrong way. −12% in FY26, ceiling ~¥4.4B after 20+ years. The TAM/CAGR slides are for the market, not for Cyberdyne's share — which is shrinking, not compounding.
• Most dangerous competitors bulls underestimate: Wandercraft (well-funded, self-balancing personal exoskeleton "Eve," $75M Series D) and the Chinese low-cost entrants — if exoskeletons commoditize toward personal/home use at lower price points, HAL's premium clinic model and reimbursement dependence are stranded.
• Worst capital-allocation moves: LeyLine GmbH (loan-recovery risk + ¥252M doubtful accounts + fire-sale); ¥10B into third-party VC while the core loses money; chronic negative ROIC.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's ~¥309–340 price: that the asset value is both real and eventually monetized, or that the Physical-AI pivot creates a new growth leg. Neither is in evidence.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: revenue to ¥2.7–3.1B, operating loss re-widens toward −¥1B, cash burn resumes, and the only support is the (un-monetizable) book — likely a drift back toward the ¥147–200 lows.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs it: slow death by sub-scale — revenue never breaks ¥5B, the founder consumes the cash on R&D + VC + overseas pushes, the book erodes 5–8%/yr, and the structure prevents any rescue. Most plausible of all the scenarios, which is exactly why the short-seller's verdict is "expensive on cash-flow, value-trap on assets."

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. With ¥9B in cash, ~81% equity ratio, and no dividend, what is the explicit capital-return policy — and why deploy ¥10B into the Pegasus VC fund instead of returning capital or proving HAL's unit economics?
2. FY26 net profit was non-operating; the operating line lost ¥601M. What is the concrete path and timeline to sustained operating breakeven, and what revenue level does it require?
3. Revenue fell 12% in FY26 and has stalled near ¥4B for years. Stripping out LeyLine, what is the organic growth rate of the medical HAL franchise, and what is the realistic ceiling?
4. Given the dual-class structure gives you ~85% of votes, what governance commitments protect minority holders from value being trapped or misallocated indefinitely?
5. Segment economics: what are the standalone revenue, gross margin, and operating margin of (a) Medical HAL, (b) non-medical/lumbar, (c) cleaning/transport robots — and which, if any, makes money?
6. The PERKESO 65-unit deal — is this a repeatable B2G template, and how many such national-payer deployments are in the pipeline and at what revenue/unit?
7. Why did the LeyLine GmbH overseas venture fail, what did it cost in total, and what has changed in how you govern foreign subsidiaries and intercompany loans?
8. Reimbursement is the gating variable. Which new reimbursement codes/geographies (US Medicare, Germany, others) are realistically winnable in 3 years, and what's the revenue sensitivity?
9. Capex was just ¥13M in FY26 for a robotics company. Are you under-investing the product to flatter cash flow, and what is normalized R&D/capex to stay ahead of Wandercraft/Chinese entrants?
10. What is the home/personal-use strategy vs. clinic-bound HAL, given rivals are winning FDA personal-use clearances?
11. How does the "Physical AI / HCPS / Society 5.0" platform vision translate into a P&L line within 3–5 years, concretely?
12. What is the installed base and lease-renewal/churn rate of HAL units globally, and the recurring vs. one-time revenue mix?
13. On the ¥292M analyst consensus vs. your ¥75M FY27 guide — what are they modeling that you are not?
14. What is the succession plan for the company and the Class B votes if/when the founder steps back — does control pass to the foundations indefinitely?
15. Under what circumstances, if any, would you sell the company or merge it to put the IP at greater scale?

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