eToro Group

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

eToro Group Ltd. is an Israeli-founded (HQ Bnei Brak), BVI-incorporated multi-asset retail trading and investing platform, listed on Nasdaq under ETOR since 14 May 2025. It serves ~3.81M Funded Accounts across 75 countries in 20 languages as of 31 Dec 2025. A "Funded Account" — KYC-complete, funded, with ≥1 trade and a positive balance — is the unit from which all Net Contribution is earned.

How it actually makes money (five Net Contribution components, FY25):

• Net trading income — equities, commodities, currencies (ECC): $399M. Bid/ask spreads on self-directed and copy trades, traded as underlying or as derivative, net of trading costs. eToro acts predominantly as principal — it is on the other side of, or hedges, user flow, so it carries inventory/market risk.
• Crypto net trading: ~$155M. This is the spread, the economically meaningful crypto number — not the $12.98B gross "Revenue from cryptoassets."
• Net interest income from users: $213M. Overnight margin financing fees + interest on segregated client cash net of interest paid to users. Total interest-earning assets $7.2B FY25 (vs $5.4B FY24). This is a rate-sensitive annuity.
• eToro Money: ~$84M — currency-conversion fees on non-USD deposits/withdrawals + withdrawal fees + IBAN/neobank monetization. FY25 "Currency conversion and other income" line was $96M.
• Subscriptions & other: ~$12M — nascent recurring revenue (launched 2025).

Products: self-directed trading across equities, ETFs, options, commodities, FX, and crypto (spot + derivatives); the differentiated CopyTrader (patented one-click replication of a "Pro Investor's" portfolio); Smart Portfolios (thematic baskets, incl. five core portfolios with BlackRock (2024) and six with Franklin Templeton (2025) ); eToro Money (multi-currency IBAN/card); eToro Club (tiered loyalty); demo accounts ($100k virtual); and the eToro Academy (6.6M views, 3,600+ pieces of educational content).

Customers: retail investors, median onboarding age "early thirties". Over half trade ≥2 asset classes; 53% of Funded Accounts hold >1 asset type. Counterparties (the supply side): banking partners hold/safeguard client cash — J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Coutts, Bank J. Safra Sarasin, Banque Pictet, UBP; trading counterparties are bulge-bracket — Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, UBS. Crypto held in segregated hot/cold omnibus wallets. customers.csv is empty — eToro has no revenue concentration in a single customer; its concentration is in asset class and retail-sentiment cyclicality, not a key account.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: upstream liquidity/data → eToro (principal broker) → retail end-user.

• Upstream — execution & liquidity: Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, UBS as trading counterparties for hedging principal positions and routing. Crypto liquidity from centralized exchanges/OTC desks (counterparties carried at fair value, $249M counterparty asset on B/S FY25 ).
• Upstream — market data & listings: licensing/collaborations with Nasdaq, London Stock Exchange, Deutsche Börse, ASX, Borsa Italiana, Euronext, Nasdaq Nordic, Dubai Financial Market for pricing and instrument breadth. Market-data cost rose ~$3M in FY25.
• Upstream — banking/custody: J.P. Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Coutts, Safra Sarasin, Pictet, UBP safeguard segregated client cash.
• The company: principal-model broker + IFRS-9 broker-trader; matches/hedges flow, earns spread + interest + FX + subscription.
• Downstream: ~3.81M Funded Accounts; distribution skewed to Europe + UK (core since founding) with growth pushes into APAC (Australia via 2024 Spaceship acquisition; Singapore MAS in-principle CMSL), Americas (US crypto restricted post-SEC — see Lens 10 — plus LatAm), and MENA (UAE since Nov 2023). Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) Banking partners — a small set of tier-1 banks gate the ability to safeguard client cash; losing one is operationally severe. (2) Liquidity counterparties — some designated G-SIBs; concentration is a counterparty-default risk eToro flags explicitly. (3) Regulatory licenses as supply inputs — FCA (UK), CySEC (Cyprus/EU, incl. MiCA permit Jan 2025), ASIC (Australia), FINRA/FinCEN/NYDFS (US). The "supply chain" of a broker is licenses + banking rails + liquidity, and eToro's is institutional-grade — a genuine asset versus unregulated crypto-native rivals.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

• Social/copy-trading network effect (the real moat). CopyTrader is patented and creates a two-sided market: ~4,800 "Pro Investors" from 70+ countries earn a cut of Assets Under Copy for being copied; copiers get diversification and a reason to stay. 84% of copy relationships are cross-border — a structurally hard-to-replicate global social graph of investing behavior. 65% of Pro Investors have 5+ year tenure. This is the one feature incumbents (IBKR, Plus500) and crypto-natives (Coinbase) conspicuously lack.
• Multi-asset diversification as a financial moat. The five-component Net Contribution mix is a natural hedge: in Q4'24 crypto was 38% of NC (crypto rally); in Q2'25 equities were 54% of NC (tariff-driven equity activity). Q1'26 proved it live — crypto revenue fell ~38% YoY yet NC rose 19% on a 71% jump in capital-markets trading. Single-asset rivals (Coinbase = crypto-only; Plus500 = CFD-heavy) have no such ballast.
• Brand + organic acquisition. Globally recognized brand drives "a growing volume of organic user acquisition" — S&M is 24% of NC, high but not Robinhood-grade incineration, and >20% of new 2025 Funded Accounts were pre-2024 registrants converting (low-cost cohort).
• Switching costs (moderate). Public track records, social following, Assets Under Copy, eToro Club tenure, and tax-wrapped local products (UK ISA, France savings, Australia super) raise stickiness; 75% of Club members have >36-month tenure. Bargaining power: Over users — moderate (spreads are competitive but not the cheapest; the social layer lets it avoid pure price competition). Over suppliers — weak-to-moderate (depends on tier-1 banks and bulge-bracket liquidity it cannot easily replace). The moat is the social graph + diversification, not cost leadership.

Lens 4 · Segments

eToro reports one operating segment ("trading activity") under IFRS, so there is no audited segment-EBITDA breakout. The meaningful disaggregation is by revenue/income line and by Net Contribution component (segments.csv empty — all figures from the 20-F):

Geography: no quantified segment table, but qualitative distribution is Europe/UK-core, with APAC/Americas/MENA as growth. The single most important segment fact: the IFRS income statement's $13.8B "Total revenue" is dominated by a single gross-up line (crypto), so anyone using top-line revenue or revenue-multiples on this name is measuring the wrong thing. Decelerating headline NC growth (42% → 10%) is the honest concern — FY24 was juiced by the post-US-election crypto rally; FY25 normalized. Q1'26 re-accelerated to +19%.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

FY2025 (audited, the latest full-year print):

• Total revenue & income $13,838M (FY24 $12,641M, FY23 $3,886M) — gross, crypto-inflated; ignore for analysis.
• Net Contribution $868M, +10% YoY (FY24 $788M, +42%).
• Net income $215.7M (FY24 $192.4M, FY23 $15.3M) — +12% YoY.
• Adjusted EBITDA $317M (FY24 $304M, FY23 $117M), +4% YoY. Margin on NC ~36%.
• Diluted EPS $2.27 (FY24 $2.26, FY23 $0.18).
• Cash flow: operating cash flow $318M FY25 (FY24 $269M) — high quality, exceeds net income; capex trivial (~$5.5M PP&E + intangibles). This is an asset-light cash machine.
• Balance sheet (31 Dec 2025): cash $1,073M + short-term investments $203M; total assets $1,791M; total equity $1,395M; essentially no financial debt. IPO added ~$381M net + the company repurchased $62M of treasury shares in 2025. Net cash ~$1.27B against a ~$3.23B market cap — i.e. ~40% of the market cap is net cash.
• Drivers: ECC trading +21% on rising retail activity; crypto-derivatives swung from −$131M (FY24) to +$124M (FY25) as hedging normalized; interest income +8%.
• Unusual vs own history: Adjusted EBITDA grew only +4% while NC grew +10% — operating leverage reversed slightly as S&M (+17%) and R&D (+15%) outran NC; FY25 also absorbed ~$11M of one-time IPO/transaction costs. Tax rate fell (24% → 15%).

Q1 2026 (latest interim, web — not on shelf): Net Contribution $258M, +19% YoY; Adjusted EBITDA $109M, +35%; GAAP net income $82M, +37%; adjusted EPS $0.91 vs $0.67 consensus (+36% beat); Funded Accounts 4.02M (+12%); capital-markets net trading contribution +71% to a record $166M. Crucially, crypto revenue fell ~38% YoY to $2.15B — yet NC and EBITDA accelerated. Market reaction: stock dipped ~7% premarket despite the beat — the market punished the crypto-revenue optics rather than rewarding the diversification, which is precisely the mispricing this dossier flags.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty) — flagged for refresh. From web coverage of the Q1'26 call: management reiterated commitment to crypto despite falling activity, leaned into the multi-asset/capital-markets strength, and emphasized Funded-Account and AuA growth ($20.1B by May'26 ) over crypto volumes. The recurring strategic phrases are diversification, localization (ISA/super/savings), and "deepening" existing users. Tone shift inferred: from a 2024 crypto-tailwind narrative to a 2025–26 "we don't need crypto to grow" narrative — a deliberate de-emphasis of the volatile line. Cannot run a rigorous 3-call sentiment delta without the transcripts; MEDIUM confidence, label web-derived. Backfill the Q1'26 transcript next refresh.

Lens 7 · Comps

Multi-asset broker + crypto-exchange peer set. Multiples are with date; eToro's own ratios mix (the figures) and `` (the price).

Read: eToro trades at a crypto-broker's worst-case multiple (near Plus500, the no-growth CFD shop) while delivering Robinhood-like growth (NC +19%, EBITDA +35% in Q1'26) and IBKR-like balance-sheet quality (net cash, profitable, regulated). The gap between eToro ~10x fwd and HOOD ~41x / COIN ~70x is the entire bull thesis: the market applies the crypto discount to the gross-revenue optics and ignores that ~82% of net economics are non-crypto. If eToro re-rated even to Plus500's already-cheap forward multiple it would be roughly fairly valued today; any re-rate toward HOOD/IBKR is large upside. 5-year average ROE not sourced (only 3 years of public data exist; FY25 ROE ≈ 215.7/((1395+832)/2) ≈ 19% ) — n/a for the 5y figure, not fabricated.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts

eToro has <14 months of trading history, so a 5-year >5%-move map is impossible; the relevant catalogue:

• 14 May 2025 — IPO at $52, opened $69.69, closed ~$67 (+29%), ~$5.4B cap. Strong demand, "promising sign for IPO market."
• Post-IPO drift down — from ~$67 to a 52-week low of $24.74, now ~$40.64 (below the $52 IPO price). Lock-ups expired ~10 Nov 2025; supply overhang + crypto-cycle cooling pressured the stock.
• 12 May 2026 — Q1 beat, stock −7% premarket. The market reacts to crypto-revenue headlines and trading-volume optics, not to Net Contribution quality — the defining behavioral mispricing.
• Product/strategic updates (Apr–May 2026) — securities lending (UK/EU), US crypto staking, subscriptions, futures (EU) — "followed by positive price reactions". Pattern revealed: the tape trades eToro as a crypto-volume proxy (down on falling crypto trades even when earnings beat), while fundamentals are increasingly capital-markets/interest driven. The catalyst that closes the gap is sell-side reframing the name as a diversified broker — partially underway (Jefferies Buy) but resisted (Goldman Neutral $31).

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Yoni (Johnathan) Assia — Chairman & CEO, Co-Founder, age 45. Founded eToro 2007; has run it since inception (~19 years). Crypto-credible: co-wrote the Colored Coins whitepaper with Vitalik Buterin (2013), one of the earliest tokenized-asset concepts. Board member of Meitav Dash (top-tier Israeli asset manager, $40B AUM). Track record: built a profitable, $868M-Net-Contribution global platform from zero and took it public. Skin in the game: 9.86% of Class A, 27.73% of Class B, ~9.99% capped combined voting power. Founder-led, long-tenured — the archetype that fits a still-expanding platform.
• Ronen Assia — Co-Founder, Executive Director (part-time), age 49. Designed the original product; now Managing Partner at Team8 Fintech; 3.43% A / 9.62% B. Part-time status of a co-founder is a mild flag.
• Meron Shani — CFO since Nov 2022. Ex-The Stars Group (Finance Director), ex-888 Holdings (part of its 2005 IPO team), ex-PwC Israel. Genuine public-company-finance and IPO pedigree.
• Dr. Hedva Ber — Global COO & Deputy CEO since 2021. Former Supervisor of Banks at the Bank of Israel and ex-Chief Risk Officer of Bank Leumi — a heavyweight regulatory/risk hire, exactly right for a multi-jurisdiction regulated broker. Strong signal on governance seriousness.
• Board: Lead Independent Director Avner Stepak (Meitav Dash vice-chair — related to CEO's outside board seat, a cross-relationship to note); VCs Santo Politi (Spark Capital — also a 10.7% holder), Eddy Shalev; ex-SEC Commissioner Laura Unger (independent, strong regulatory credibility). Audit & risk committee staffed with independents.
• Capital allocation: profitable, asset-light, no dividend ("retain all future earnings for operation and expansion"); modest M&A (Spaceship 2024 ~$18M, Bullsheet 2022); $62M treasury buyback in 2025 — disciplined, not empire-building. ROE ~19%.
• Red flags: dual-class structure concentrates voting with pre-IPO insiders incl. the CEO (all officers/directors = 43.6% of votes / 35.2% combined ) — public holders have limited influence (Lens 13). A 9.99% voting cap and a sanctioned Sberbank-affiliated holder (SBT Venture Fund, voting/distribution-restricted) are unusual cap-table features. Heavy reliance on share options exercisable within 60 days in the ownership math (much of management's "ownership" is in-the-money options). FY23 SBC was $66M (now down to $16M FY25 — improving). Net: a credible, regulatorily-serious, founder-led team with real public-company finance depth. Governance is founder-favorable (dual class) — fine for a compounder, a discount factor for a passive minority.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on the IFRS statements:

• Gross-vs-net revenue presentation (the headline risk). Crypto is booked gross ($12.98B revenue / $12.93B cost) on a principal basis under IFRS-9/IFRS-15. This is disclosed and legitimate but massively inflates the top line and invites misclassification. It is not aggressive accounting — but it is the single most important thing to normalize. Always use Net Contribution.
• Fair-value / principal inventory risk. As IFRS-9 broker-trader, eToro marks crypto inventory ($62.6M FY25, down from $113.3M FY24) and counterparty positions ($249M) to fair value through P&L. "Cost of revenue from cryptoassets includes the net change in fair value of cryptoassets held" — so a sharp crypto drawdown hits the cost line and compresses crypto NC. The non-cash revaluation was a $29.6M cash-flow add-back in FY25; staking/blockchain rewards are recognized non-cash ($37.4M revenue / $25.4M cost add-backs) — watch this growing non-cash revenue component.
• Cash vs earnings: Favorable — operating cash flow $318M > net income $216M; the business converts. No receivables/inventory blow-out (it's a broker, not a goods company). Goodwill/intangibles tiny ($43M) and never impaired in 3 years.
• SBC flattering non-GAAP: Adjusted EBITDA adds back SBC ($16M), IPO/transaction costs ($11M), employee non-cash ($5M), "other" ($7M). The adjustments are modest relative to $317M EBITDA and shrinking — clean by fintech standards.
• Client-money commingling risk: "Payable to users" $108M and counterparty/omnibus balances sit on-balance-sheet; client funds are segregated per local rules. Standard for the model; the regulatory-capital and segregation regime is a live risk area (multiple jurisdictions, MiCA capital rules unsettled).

Regulatory findings (required sub-section).

• SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER): the pre-ingested regulatory/regulatory-findings.md reports zero LR and zero AAER naming "eToro Group" since 2021. However, that file MISSED a material action — because it was an administrative cease-and-desist order, not a Litigation Release: In September 2024 the SEC settled with eToro USA LLC for operating as an unregistered broker and clearing agency for crypto-asset securities; eToro paid a $1.5M penalty and agreed to cease trading nearly all crypto in the US, retaining only Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Ether. This permanently shrank the US crypto product and is disclosed in the 20-F's regulatory discussion. Materiality: moderate — US crypto was a small slice; the settlement actually de-risked US regulatory exposure ("a clear regulatory framework").
• Item 3 / Legal Proceedings (10-K-equivalent disclosure, from the 20-F): ASIC has commenced civil proceedings against eToro AUS Capital Ltd. alleging failure to adopt/implement/monitor a target-market determination for CFDs; ASIC seeks pecuniary penalties; ongoing, with risk of class action and copycat regulators. CySEC has made inquiries into eToro (Europe)'s CFD product-governance/appropriateness obligations. eToro has restricted CFDs in Spain and Belgium in response to local regulators. Italy's competition authority (AGCM) imposed a measure in July 2023. CySEC reached a €50k settlement in 2013 for early-operation organizational weaknesses (historical, remediated).
• Non-SEC web sweep (FTC/DOJ/CFPB/FCA): no material new enforcement beyond the above; CySEC granted eToro a MiCA permit Jan 2025 — a regulatory positive.
• Verdict: No accounting-fraud findings (no AAER; auditor Kost Forer Gabbay & Kasierer, EY Israel, since 2008 ). Real, conduct-side regulatory exposure clustered in CFDs (ASIC litigation is the live one) and the now-closed US crypto matter. The CFD/copy-trading suitability regime across UK/EU/Australia is the structural legal risk — material but not existential. Books appear clean; the risk is regulatory-conduct, not forensic-accounting.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Built bottom-up from FY25 actuals + Q1'26 run-rate (guidance.csv empty — eToro gives no formal EPS guidance; all outputs `` with arithmetic). Fiscal year = calendar year.

Anchor: FY25 Net Contribution $868M; net income $216M; diluted EPS $2.27. Q1'26 annualizes to NC ~$1,032M, NI ~$328M — but Q1 is seasonally strong (tariff-driven equity activity), so straight-lining overstates. Diluted shares ~95M, creeping to ~98–100M on option dilution.

Base-case read: ~$2.90 FY26 EPS on a $40.6 stock ≈ ~14x P/E trailing-into-2026, ~11x on FY27 base — cheap for a low-double-digit-NC-grower with net cash. The model's central estimate ($2.90 FY26) implies the ~10x forward multiple the web reports is roughly right and the discount is the opportunity. Per --watchlist rules, NO forecast.ts create logged in the loop. If promoted to a thesis, the scoreable base call would be: ETOR FY26 non-GAAP EPS >= $2.90, p≈0.55, resolves 2027-03-31.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. eToro is a misclassified compounder. (1) The diversification is structurally real and just proved itself — Q1'26 NC +19% and EBITDA +35% while crypto revenue fell 38%; the five-component model means no single asset class can sink it. (2) The social/copy-trading moat is unique and global (84% cross-border copying ) — neither incumbents nor crypto-natives have it. (3) European retail-investing TAM is early — Oliver Wyman projects EU brokerage accounts compounding ~11.3% 2023–28 and penetration rising 6.8%→11.7%; eToro is EU/UK-core. (4) Pristine balance sheet — ~$1.27B net cash (~40% of market cap), asset-light, $318M operating cash flow, buying back stock. (5) Optionality — securities lending, US staking, subscriptions, EU futures, savings/super localization, MiCA-licensed EU crypto. (6) Valuation — ~10x forward vs HOOD 41x / COIN 70x / IBKR 37x; even a re-rate to cheap-Plus500 leaves it fairly valued, anything above is upside.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) Crypto-cycle dependence is larger than the 18% NC share suggests — crypto drives engagement, acquisition, and the marginal trade; a multi-year crypto winter could cascade into Funded-Account growth, trading frequency, and the interest book (lower balances). (2) Regulatory conduct risk on CFDs/copy-trading — ASIC litigation, CySEC inquiries, EU appropriateness/suitability rules could force product restrictions in core markets (already happening in Spain/Belgium) and CFDs are a high-margin slice. (3) Spread compression — spot-crypto ETPs and zero-commission competition (Robinhood, Trading 212, Revolut, neobanks) compress the bid/ask economics eToro lives on; the 20-F explicitly flags ETP-driven crypto-spread compression.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It's late 2027. Crypto has been flat-to-down for six quarters, killing the marginal-trade and acquisition engine; rate cuts have halved net interest income; ASIC won its CFD case and the UK/EU followed, forcing eToro to restrict or re-price CFDs and copy-trading across its core European book; NC growth went negative; the dual-class board resisted a buyout. The stock that was "cheap at 10x" turned out to be 14x a shrinking earnings base — a value trap, because the multiple was low for a reason the bulls dismissed (crypto-and-CFD-cyclicality dressed as diversification).

Are multiples too high? No — they are too low on the base case and about right on the bear case. The asymmetry favors the long.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The market is still trading eToro as a crypto-volume proxy (−7% on a Q1'26 beat because crypto revenue fell) and pricing the $13.8B gross-revenue optics. It refuses to see that eToro is now primarily a European multi-asset broker + interest-rate annuity with a crypto call option attached — and is pricing the call option's volatility as if it were the whole business.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull:

• What structurally breaks the model? eToro is a principal-model spread broker — it makes money on bid/ask and on financing user leverage. Two secular forces compress both: (a) zero-commission / tight-spread competition (Robinhood, Trading 212, Revolut, neobanks expanding into investing) and (b) spot-crypto ETPs that let users get crypto exposure in a regular brokerage account, compressing the crypto spreads that do matter (the 18% NC slice has outsized engagement value). The company names this risk itself.
• Where is revenue concentrated, and what shifts it? Concentrated in retail trading activity (cyclical sentiment) and net interest income (25% of NC, directly geared to rates and user balances). A simultaneous crypto winter + rate-cut cycle hits both engines at once — the "diversification hedge" is weaker than advertised because crypto-cyclicality and rate-cyclicality can correlate (risk-off does both).
• Why might the moat be weaker than bulls think? CopyTrader is patented but copy/social investing is being copied — and copy-trading is precisely the product drawing regulatory suitability scrutiny (CySEC, ASIC). The moat feature is also the legal-risk feature.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Revolut — a far larger European neobank user base now pushing trading/crypto, with a banking license, that can bundle investing into a daily-use app and out-acquire eToro in its core EU/UK market. Also Robinhood internationally (now in the UK/EU).
• Worst capital-allocation / governance moves: the dual-class structure (insiders 43.6% of votes) means minorities can be steamrolled in a take-private or related-party decision; the 9.99% voting cap and a sanctioned Sberbank-linked holder are messy; co-founder Ronen is part-time; management "ownership" is heavily unexercised options.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: that NC keeps compounding low-double-digits through a crypto downcycle, that rates don't collapse interest income, and that CFD/copy-trading regulation doesn't gut a core product.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: at bear EPS ~$2.10 and a derating to ~9x, the stock is ~$19 — roughly the 52-week low, ~50% downside.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: coordinated EU/UK/Australia restriction of leveraged CFDs + copy-trading on suitability grounds, removing the high-margin leveraged-trading and the differentiating social product simultaneously. Plausibility: moderate — ASIC is already litigating; ESMA/FCA have a long history of CFD crackdowns. This, not crypto, is the real tail risk.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Crypto is ~18% of Net Contribution but a far larger share of engagement and new-account acquisition — what is your measured crypto-attributable Funded-Account acquisition and trading-frequency uplift, and what happens to ECC/interest NC in a 24-month crypto winter?
2. What is the realistic downside to net interest income (25% of NC) under a 200bp rate-cut path, given your $7.2B interest-earning asset base and the rate paid to users?
3. On the ASIC CFD proceeding — what is the range of pecuniary-penalty and product-restriction outcomes, and what % of Net Contribution is leveraged-CFD-derived across UK/EU/Australia that is at regulatory risk?
4. Spot-crypto ETPs are explicitly flagged as compressing your crypto spreads — how much spread compression have you already absorbed, and what is the floor on crypto Net Trading Contribution per trade?
5. Adjusted EBITDA grew only +4% in FY25 vs NC +10% — when does operating leverage return, and what is the steady-state EBITDA-margin-on-NC target?
6. What is your customer acquisition cost and payback by region, and how does the >20%-of-new-accounts-from-prior-registrants cohort change blended CAC?
7. How do you defend the copy-trading moat against Revolut/Robinhood replicating social features, and against regulators reclassifying copy-trading as portfolio management requiring suitability?
8. Capital allocation: with ~$1.27B net cash and no dividend, what is the buyback vs M&A vs special-dividend framework, and at what valuation do buybacks accelerate?
9. What is the US strategy post-SEC settlement now that crypto is restricted to BTC/BCH/ETH — is the US an equities-led growth market or structurally capped?
10. Subscriptions, securities lending, US staking, EU futures — what is each worth to FY28 Net Contribution, and which is the largest?
11. The dual-class structure — is there a sunset, and how do you weigh minority-shareholder alignment against founder control?
12. Take-or-pay / counterparty concentration — how exposed are you to your top liquidity counterparties (the G-SIBs), and what is the contingency if one withdraws?
13. MiCA capital rules for crypto are unsettled — what is the plausible incremental regulatory-capital requirement, and does it constrain buybacks?
14. Funded-Account net growth was only ~0.3M in 2025 (vs 0.4M in 2024) — is organic top-of-funnel decelerating, and how much of growth now depends on acquisitions like Spaceship?
15. What KPI, if it broke, would tell you the diversification thesis has failed — and where is it today?

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