Franco-Nevada

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Franco-Nevada is a gold-focused royalty and streaming company, headquartered at 199 Bay Street, Toronto, incorporated in Canada, NYSE+TSX listed under FNV. It does not operate mines. It buys two instruments:

• Royalties — a contractual right to a % of a mine's revenue or production (NSR / GSR), paid in cash, with no obligation to fund operating or capital costs.
• Streams — an upfront payment for the right to buy a fixed % of future metal at a deep-discount fixed price (e.g. ~20% of spot), the spread being the margin.

The economic engine: the cost base is essentially fixed while the top line floats with commodity prices and operator production. When gold rises, almost every incremental dollar drops to cash flow — there are no rising labour, diesel, or sustaining-capex bills to absorb it. FNV runs the whole ~US$1.8B-revenue portfolio with a tiny headcount (low-tens of employees) — the defining operating-leverage feature of the model.

• Customers / counterparties: the mine operators whose output FNV holds a claim on — First Quantum (Cobre Panamá stream), Lundin (Candelaria stream), Glencore (Antapaccay), BHP/Glencore/Teck (Antamina), IAMGOLD (Côté royalty), Discovery Silver (Porcupine), plus a deep tail of ~400+ assets across producing/advanced/exploration stages.
• Contract structure / key terms: mostly perpetual or full-mine-life NSR royalties (no take-or-pay obligation on FNV; pure optionality on operator success) plus fixed-price streams. FNV carries no debt and held ~$3.1B available capital at year-end 2025, i.e. a permanent acquisition war-chest.
• What it actually is: a diversified, levered, capex-free call option on the gold complex (plus a smaller energy/bulk-materials kicker), run as a disciplined capital-allocation shop.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

The "supply chain" for a royalty company is the chain of mines it sits atop, and the chokepoint is operator/jurisdiction concentration, not physical inputs. Named stakeholders along the chain:

• Upstream (the operators that mine the metal FNV is owed):
• First Quantum Minerals — operator of Cobre Panamá (gold-copper stream). The single most important — and most fragile — node.
• Lundin Mining — Candelaria copper-gold mine, Chile (one of FNV's largest precious-metal streams).
• Glencore — Antapaccay (Peru). Antamina (Peru, JV BHP/Glencore/Teck/Mitsubishi) — robust 2025 production drove the precious-metals GEO increase.
• IAMGOLD — Côté Gold (Ontario), royalty acquired Q2 2025.
• Discovery Silver — Porcupine Complex (Timmins), acquired from Newmont; FNV's financing package adds 85-95K GEOs/yr to the medium-term profile.
• Agnico Eagle / Newmont / Kirkland-lineage assets — Detour, Macassa-area and other Canadian royalties in the tail.
• AngloGold Ashanti — Arthur Project royalty (post-2025 acquisition).
• Midstream: FNV itself — pure financial intermediary; takes metal-in-kind (streams) or cash (royalties). No processing, no logistics, no inventory beyond in-transit stream metal.
• Downstream: physical metal sold into the spot bullion market (gold/silver/PGM) and the energy/iron-ore markets for the diversified sleeve.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies:

1. Cobre Panamá — a political single point of failure: one government decision (the 2023 shutdown) zeroed a stream that had been ~150-175K GEOs/yr of potential and forced a ~$1B impairment. The risk here is not geology; it's a sovereign.
2. Geographic clustering in the Americas — 87% of Q1 2026 revenue came from the Americas, heavily Latin-American (Panama, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Brazil) — resource-nationalism and tax-regime exposure travel with it.
3. Operator dependency — FNV is a price-taker on someone else's mine plan; it cannot fix a mismanaged or stranded asset, only diversify around it.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

This is a genuinely wide-moat business, and the moat is structural, not brand:

• Scale + cost of capital (the primary moat). FNV is the largest royalty company by market cap (~US$26B). Scale lets it write the biggest cheques for the largest financings — which structurally excludes smaller rivals (Royal Gold, OR Royalties) from the marquee deals and lets FNV cherry-pick. In a business where the product is capital, the lowest-cost, largest-balance-sheet player wins the best assets.
• Asset-light margin structure. Adjusted EBITDA margin ~91% in FY2025 and Q1 2026 — vs. 25-35% for senior producers. The fixed cost base is the moat: it cannot be competed away by a rival willing to "work harder," because there's almost no work to do per dollar of revenue.
• Diversification as a moat. ~400+ assets means no single mine (ex-Cobre Panamá) can sink the company. The 2023 Panama shutdown — a worst-case, ~150-175K-GEO asset going to zero — was survivable precisely because of breadth. Rivals with 20-40 assets do not have this shock absorber.
• Perpetual optionality. Royalties typically run for the full mine life including expansions and exploration upside at no extra cost to FNV — i.e. free exposure to the operator's success. This is the "fund-once, ride-forever" property miners can't replicate.
• Bargaining power: strong over small/mid operators who need FNV's capital and have few alternatives at scale; weaker over majors (BHP, Glencore) who have many financing options — FNV needs their assets more than they need FNV. Net: high power on the buy-side of new deals, low power once a stream is signed (it cannot compel an operator to mine).

Where the moat is thinner than bulls claim: it is contestable on price. WPM, RGLD and well-capitalised newcomers bid against FNV; "royalty purchases imply project valuations meaningfully above current market pricing" — i.e. competition has bid acquisition economics up, compressing future returns on deployed capital. The moat protects the existing book; it does not guarantee the next dollar is invested well.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is empty, so all figures are **** from FNV's FY2025 release. FY2025 revenue by commodity (total GEOs basis, ~$1,808.6M of the $1,822.8M reported):

By Q4 2025, precious metals were 90% of revenue (71% gold, 17% silver, 2% PGM) — the mix is shifting back toward gold as Cobre Panamá (gold-copper) restarts and new gold royalties (Côté, Porcupine, Arthur) ramp.

Geography: ~87% Americas (Q1 2026), dominated by Latin America + Canada/US, with smaller Australia/Africa exposure.

Trend & cause: total GEOs +12% in 2025 (519,106 vs ~463K), accelerating on (a) the partial return of Cobre Panamá concentrate sales (+11,208 GEOs), (b) robust Antamina output, and (c) newly acquired royalties beginning to contribute. The diversified (energy/iron-ore) sleeve is a stable, low-growth annuity that dampens gold beta on the downside and is being deliberately out-grown by the precious-metals book.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

Latest print — Q1 2026 (reported 2026-05-12, the most recent quarter):

• Revenue $650.7M, +77% YoY — a quarterly record, driven by record gold & silver prices, higher GEOs, and newly acquired assets.
• Net income $468.6M.
• Adjusted EBITDA $591.9M, 91.0% margin.
• Operating cash flow $520.4M.
• Precious-metals assets $568.1M (87% of revenue); 87% from the Americas.
• Cobre Panamá inflection: Panama authorised processing of stockpiled ore → est. ~23,100 Au oz + ~265,000 Ag oz to FNV; stream deliveries to begin Q3 2026, bulk in 2027. Power plant restarted; Units 1 & 2 synced to the national grid; coal vessels received. The dead asset is starting to pay again — and none of it is in the 2026 guide.
• Governance: a new Board Chair was appointed at/around Q1 2026 (David Harquail, long-time chair and former CEO, stepping back).

Full-year 2025 (reported 2026-02):

• Revenue $1,822.8M (record), +64%.
• Net income $1,112.1M, $5.77/sh (record), +101%.
• Adjusted EBITDA $1,656.1M, $8.59/sh (record), +74% → ~91% margin.
• Adjusted net income $1,075.2M, $5.58/sh, +74%.
• Operating cash flow $1,493.7M (record), +80%.
• 519,106 GEOs sold, +12% (incl. 11,208 from Cobre Panamá); 469,819 net GEOs, +15%.
• Balance sheet: zero debt, ~$3.1B available capital.

Read-through: revenue +64% FY25 / +77% Q1'26 vastly outran the ~12% GEO-volume growth — i.e. the surge is overwhelmingly price (record gold/silver), with a volume kicker from Cobre concentrate + acquisitions. That is the model working exactly as designed (price flows straight through a fixed cost base) — and it is also the vulnerability: a meaningful share of "record earnings" is borrowed from a record gold tape, not durable volume.

Balance-sheet flags: clean — no debt, large cash/available capital, PwC unqualified opinion on ICFR, no error/restatement flags on the 40-F cover. The only recurring non-cash drag is depletion (~$230-260M/yr) — the accounting recognition of the portfolio being mined out, and the reason organic growth requires constant re-investment.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty); this is ****-derived from the FY2025 and Q1 2026 releases/coverage. The arc across the last four prints:

• Tone: confident and acquisitive, and increasingly so. Management frames 2024 + 2025 as "two of Franco-Nevada's best-ever years for capital deployment" and stresses deals that "add optionality and create real value… rather than simply adding scale" — a deliberate rebuttal to the "they overpay to chase growth" critique.
• The phrase that recurs: value over scale, optionality, discipline. They are signalling to the market that the post-Panama playbook is quality-acquisition, not desperation.
• What they stopped saying: the defensive, damage-control language of 2023-24 around Cobre Panamá has shifted to constructive restart language ("preservation & safe management," "stockpile processing authorised," "deliveries Q3 2026"). The narrative moved from loss to recovery optionality.
• Conservatism tell: 2026 guidance assumes $2,500/oz gold while spot traded multiples higher in early 2026 (gold hit ~$5,589 intraday Jan 2026) — management is sandbagging the price deck, which makes the guide easy to beat and the dividend easy to defend. Sentiment: bullish-but-disciplined, with credibility earned by 19 straight dividend increases.

Lens 7 · Comps

Royalty/streaming peers. Multiples are with date, or n/a — never fabricated. Index peers: royal-gold (RGLD), deterra-royalties (DRR.AX), emx-royalty (EMX); added obvious omissions WPM, OR.

Sector-level multiples (the honest, sourced read): royalty names trade EV/EBITDA ~15-25× and P/CF >20×, with FNV typically a 10-20% premium to RGLD; gold royalties trade 1.5-2.0× NAV vs. miners 0.7-0.9× NAV (BMO). The FNV ~37× P/E is an **** off FY2025 EPS and trailing — on a forward basis (Q1'26 alone annualises toward ~$7+ EPS at current prices) the multiple compresses materially, but the precise forward consensus EPS is n/a.

Conflict flagged: one search returned "FNV 2026 revenue outlook $1.2B" — this is inconsistent with $1,822.8M FY2025 actual and $650.7M in Q1 2026 alone (run-rate >$2.5B). Treated as stale/mis-scraped and excluded; do not rely on it.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts

The 5-year tape shows the market reacts to exactly three things — the gold price, single-asset political shocks, and acquisitions:

• Nov 2023 — Cobre Panamá shutdown. Panama's Supreme Court ruled the FQM mining contract unconstitutional after mass protests; the asset went dark; FNV took a ~$1B impairment and the stock derated hard. The defining negative catalyst — proof the market prices idiosyncratic political tail risk sharply for this name.
• 2024-2025 — gold's secular bull. Gold broke $3,000 (Mar 2026) and spiked to a record ~$5,589 intraday (Jan 28 2026); FNV rode it to an all-time-high close US$279.76 on Feb 26 2026.
• Feb-Jun 2026 — the divergence. From the Feb high, FNV fell to US$215 by late June ( -23%) even as gold stayed near records. This is the single most important tape fact in the dossier: the market is compressing FNV's premium, not re-rating it with gold — and WPM out-returned FNV (1-yr 69% vs 41%). The stock now reacts more to valuation and relative positioning than to the gold print.
• Recurring upside catalysts: record-quarter prints, dividend increases (19 straight), accretive royalty acquisitions, and — the live one — Cobre Panamá restart milestones (each authorisation step is a positive catalyst because it is pure, un-guided optionality).

Pattern: for FNV the market reacts to gold + sovereign-risk events + the valuation premium. Earnings beats matter less than they "should," because the model is so legible that prints are largely pre-figured by the gold tape — the surprises come from politics (Panama) and from multiple compression.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO — Paul Brink. With FNV since the 2007 IPO, ran business development before becoming President & CEO; the deal-making DNA of the firm. Track record: architected the acquisition engine that rebuilt the portfolio post-Panama — >$1.3B deployed in 2024, a record 2024+2025 of capital deployment (Côté, Discovery Silver/Porcupine financing, Arthur/AngloGold, Western Limb) explicitly framed as optionality over scale. He is a capital-allocator archetype, which is exactly the right CEO profile for a royalty company (the job is allocation).
• Chair transition. David Harquail — founding figure, former CEO, long-time Chair — stepped back from the Chair around Q1 2026 to a new Chair. The 40-F (filed Mar 2026) still lists Harquail as Chair and Tom Albanese as lead independent director; the handover is a watch-item for continuity but is an orderly, long-telegraphed succession, not a shock.
• Board / governance quality: majority-independent board; Audit & Risk Committee = Hugo Dryland, Catharine Farrow, chair Jennifer Maki (designated audit-committee financial expert). PwC auditor, unqualified ICFR opinion. Follows TSX home-country governance for certain NYSE carve-outs (private-placement / equity-comp approval thresholds) — standard for an MJDS filer, mildly less shareholder-protective than US-domestic NYSE rules but disclosed.
• Capital allocation: the crown jewel — zero debt, ~$3.1B dry powder, 19 consecutive dividend increases (latest +16% to $0.44/q). ROE/ROIC inflected sharply higher in 2025 on the gold tape (FY25 net income +101%), though absolute 5-yr ROE figures are n/a here.
• Red flags: none material on governance. The fair critique (not a flag) is the structural one — to grow they must keep buying royalties, and competition has bid acquisition economics up, so allocation discipline is the whole ballgame. Founder vs professional: Brink is a long-tenured insider-operator (IPO-era), Harquail the founder-figure — culturally founder-led, which suits the patient, fund-once-ride-forever model.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on a royalty company (the risk surface differs from an operator):

• Revenue recognition: simple and clean — cash royalties recognised as received/accrued, stream metal at sale. Low manipulation surface; little percentage-of-completion or channel-stuffing risk. No flag.
• Impairments / carrying value: the live area. Cobre Panamá's ~$1B impairment (2023) was taken; the question is whether any write-back on restart, or further write-downs on other stranded/delayed assets, is handled conservatively. Depletion ~$230-260M/yr is a real, recurring non-cash charge that understates the cash economics (cash flow >> GAAP earnings) — note: here the divergence flatters cash, the opposite of the usual SBC-flattered-non-GAAP red flag. Watch that adjusted EBITDA (which adds depletion back) is not used to over-distribute against a depleting asset base.
• Cash flow vs earnings: OCF $1,493.7M vs net income $1,112.1M FY25 — OCF > NI, the healthy direction (depletion is the bridge), no earnings-quality concern.
• Receivables / inventory: minimal — a royalty co holds little inventory beyond in-transit stream metal; not a flag.
• SBC / non-GAAP: adjusted figures strip transaction costs, impairments, FX — standard; the adj-EBITDA margin (~91%) is credible given the model. No evidence of aggressive add-backs.
• Related parties: none disclosed as material on the 40-F cover.
• Off-balance-sheet: the 40-F explicitly states "does not have any off-balance sheet arrangements".
• PFIC risk (US holders): FNV relies on the active-commodities-business exception and states (more-likely-than-not) it was not a PFIC for 2025 and does not expect to be — but flags genuine uncertainty given limited authority on the exception. A real, if low-probability, US-investor-specific tax tail.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. Verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER) since 2021-06-30. total_sec_findings: 0.
• Item 3 Legal Proceedings (10-K equivalent): FNV files a 40-F, not a 10-K; the equivalent disclosure lives in the AIF "Risk Factors" + financial-statement notes (not ingested). The 40-F cover flags two live legal/tax matters directly: (1) the Cobre Panamá arbitration and (2) ongoing/future CRA audits.
• CRA (Canada Revenue Agency) tax dispute — RESOLVED favourably (2025-09-11): settlement on 2013-2019 reassessments of the foreign earnings of Franco-Nevada Barbados and Franco-Nevada Mexico — no Canadian tax payable on those foreign earnings for 2013-2019; transfer-pricing penalties reversed; interest reduced; cost mark-up adjusted to 30% but offset by non-capital losses → ~C$1.4M taxable income, ~zero cash tax. The principles are expected (not legally binding) to apply post-2019. This removes a multi-year overhang — though the 40-F (filed Mar 2026) still lists CRA audit risk because the settlement only binds through 2019.
• Cobre Panamá arbitration: FNV's ICSID-style claim against Panama over the shuttered stream is set for hearing in October 2026; FQM has a separate ~$20B damages claim. This is litigation-as-call-option, not an enforcement action against FNV.
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/etc.): web search surfaced no material enforcement action against FNV. Net: no material adverse regulatory or accounting findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and the 40-F's own disclosures as of 2026-06-30. The CRA matter resolved in FNV's favour.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Bottom-up off FY2025 actuals + 2026 guidance. Output; inputs labeled. No forecast.ts create in watchlist mode.

Anchors: FY2025 adj EPS $5.58, net income $5.77/sh. 2026 guide: 510-570K GEOs (~90% PM), excludes Cobre Panamá, assumes $2,500/oz gold (vs. spot multiples higher). ~192.8M shares out. The single biggest swing is realised gold price, not volume.

Base call (for the record, not logged): FY2026 adj EPS ≈ $7.25, predicated on elevated-but-off-peak gold and mid-guide volume with Cobre as un-modelled upside. The honest caveat: this is dominated by an un-forecastable gold price — the EPS band is really a gold-price band, and forward consensus EPS is n/a.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. FNV is the highest-quality way to own gold: a ~91%-margin, zero-debt, capex-free, ~400-asset portfolio that converts a record gold tape almost entirely into cash, run by a disciplined capital allocator with ~$3.1B of dry powder and 19 straight dividend hikes. Three growth levers stack: (1) gold price (pure flow-through), (2) organic ramp of newly acquired royalties (Côté, Porcupine 85-95K GEOs, Arthur), and (3) Cobre Panamá restart — entirely free in the guide, a 150-175K-GEO asset returning from zero with deliveries starting Q3 2026 and arbitration upside (a hearing in Oct 2026 that could yield a settlement and a producing stream). The CRA overhang just cleared favourably. You are paid to wait while a written-off asset un-writes itself.

Bear case (permanent-impairment-grade risks):

1. The premium is the position, and it's already compressing. FNV trades ~1.5-2.0× NAV / ~15-25× EBITDA, and the stock fell ~23% from its Feb-2026 high while gold stayed near records, under-performing WPM (1-yr 41% vs 69%). If the market keeps re-rating royalties down toward miners, multiple compression overwhelms EPS growth — you can be right on gold and still lose.
2. Earnings are borrowed from the gold spike. +64% FY25 / +77% Q1'26 revenue on ~12% volume = it's price. A gold mean-reversion to $2,800-3,200 takes the "record-everything" narrative with it, and the bear-case EPS path declines.
3. The depletion treadmill. ~$230-260M/yr of the portfolio is mined out annually; growth requires continuously buying new royalties into a market where competition has bid acquisition economics above market pricing — i.e. returns on the next deployed dollar are structurally falling.

Pre-mortem (it's Dec 2027, the thesis broke): gold rolled over from the 2026 spike; the Feb-2026 premium fully unwound to ~miner-like NAV multiples; Cobre Panamá's restart slipped again on Panamanian politics (arbitration without a deal); and the "record" 2025-26 prints became the comp everything is measured down from. FNV is fine operationally but the stock de-rated 30-40% because you paid a peak multiple on peak gold earnings.

Contrarian view (what the market is refusing to see): the Cobre Panamá optionality is being valued near zero (excluded from guidance, written down to ~$1B impairment) right as the operational restart is visibly underway (power plant on, grid-synced, stockpile processing authorised, deliveries Q3'26). The market is treating a recovering asset as a dead one. If the Oct-2026 arbitration nudges a settlement, FNV gets a large GEO stream back and a cash/award — none of it in numbers today.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the model: FNV doesn't control a single mine. Its cash flows are someone else's mine plan in someone else's jurisdiction — and the worst case isn't geology, it's a sovereign (Panama 2023 proved one government decision can zero a flagship asset overnight and force a $1B write-down). 87% Americas / heavy Latam concentration means resource-nationalism is a portfolio-level, not asset-level, risk.
• Where revenue is concentrated / what if it shifts: the top streams (Cobre Panamá, Candelaria, Antamina, Antapaccay) are Latin-American copper-gold operations run by others; a tax grab in Peru/Chile/Mexico, an operator strike, or another Panama re-runs the 2023 movie.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the moat protects the existing book, not the next acquisition. Competition (WPM, RGLD, capital-flush newcomers) has bid royalty prices to "valuations meaningfully above current market pricing." A capital-allocation business whose acquisition returns are compressing is, at the margin, growth-on-worse-terms.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underrate: Wheaton Precious Metals — bigger silver torque, and it has simply out-returned FNV (1-yr 69% vs 41%) — the relative trade is already going the wrong way for FNV holders.
• Worst capital-allocation risk: overpaying for scale. Management protests too much that deals are "optionality not scale" — a tell that the Street worries they overpay. Each large royalty bought at a peak-gold valuation is a bet that gold stays high.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: (1) gold stays elevated; (2) the royalty premium does not compress to miner multiples (it's already started to); (3) Cobre Panamá actually restarts; (4) acquisitions stay accretive. Break any two and the ~37× trailing P/E is indefensible.
• If growth disappoints 20-30%: on a name priced at 1.5-2.0× NAV, a volume and gold-price disappointment compounds — EPS down + multiple down is a 30-40% drawdown (the pre-mortem), and the Feb→Jun 2026 -23% shows the market will do it even with gold high.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a second sovereign shock (another Panama, or a punitive Latam royalty/windfall tax regime) on top of a gold rollover — structurally re-rates the entire royalty model's "safe-haven premium" away. Plausibility: low-to-moderate, but 2023 proved it's non-zero.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. With acquisition multiples now "meaningfully above market pricing," what minimum after-tax IRR / NAV-accretion hurdle must a new royalty clear — and have you walked away from large deals in 2025-26 because they failed it?
2. The stock fell ~23% from its Feb-2026 high while gold stayed near records and WPM out-returned you. What is your read on the premium compression, and at what valuation would you buy back stock instead of acquiring royalties?
3. On Cobre Panamá: what milestones (beyond stockpile processing) must clear for a full restart, what's the realistic GEO ramp 2026→2028, and how does the Oct-2026 arbitration change the calculus?
4. You guide $2,500/oz gold while spot is multiples higher. What gold-price assumption actually governs your acquisition underwriting — and how do you avoid buying peak assets at peak prices?
5. What share of FY2026-28 GEO growth is contractually locked (ramping assets you already own) vs. dependent on future acquisitions you haven't made yet?
6. The CRA settlement binds only through 2019. What is your residual exposure on post-2019 offshore-stream taxation, and could a global minimum tax change the Barbados structure's economics?
7. With 87% of revenue in the Americas / heavy Latam, what is your concrete plan to diversify sovereign risk — and would you accept lower returns for jurisdictional safety?
8. How do you think about return of capital at this cash-flow level — is the 19-year dividend-growth streak a constraint that could ever push you to over-distribute against a depleting asset base?
9. Depletion runs ~$230-260M/yr. At what acquisition pace does the portfolio merely tread water, and are you confident the deal pipeline supports growth above that for the next five years?
10. The diversified (energy + iron-ore) sleeve is ~10-14% of revenue. Is that a core hold, a runoff annuity, or a source of capital to redeploy into precious metals?
11. With a new Board Chair and the founder (Harquail) stepping back, what changes — if anything — in risk appetite, deal style, or capital-allocation philosophy?
12. What is your hurdle for streams vs. royalties today, given streams carry counterparty-delivery and metal-price-floor risks that pure royalties don't?
13. Which single asset in the portfolio worries you most operationally or politically over the next 24 months, and what's the mitigation?
14. How are you positioning for a gold mean-reversion scenario — what does the business look like at $3,000 gold, and is the cost base genuinely as fixed on the way down as on the way up?
15. What is the succession depth below Paul Brink on the business-development bench — the deal-sourcing skill is the franchise; how is it institutionalised beyond a few key people?

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