IperionX

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

IperionX is a pre-revenue critical-materials technology company trying to rebuild a domestic, recycled, low-cost titanium supply chain inside the United States — and, as a second pillar, a domestic source of titanium minerals + heavy rare earths. The thesis in one line: titanium is strategically vital and ~80–90% controlled by China/Russia/Kazakhstan via the 80-year-old, dirty, energy-hungry Kroll process; IperionX claims patented technology that makes titanium powder from 100% scrap, at 40–70% lower cost and >50% lower energy, on US soil.

Two pillars:

1. Titanium metals (Virginia "Titanium Manufacturing Campus," Halifax County, VA) — the operating core. Proprietary HAMR™ (Hydrogen Assisted Metallothermic Reduction → titanium powder) and HSPT™ (Hydrogen Sintering & Phase Transformation → near-net-shape parts with claimed wrought-equivalent properties). Transitioned to 24/7 continuous production in the March-2026 quarter; producing ~4.2 t of HAMR powder in March (~50 tpa annualized), targeting ~200 tpa run-rate by end-CY2026. A new GenX™ continuous-HAMR platform is slated for commercial-scale validation in 2026 to drive the next cost-down.
2. Titan Critical Minerals Project (Tennessee) — a heavy-mineral-sands deposit in the "Big Sandy Critical Minerals Province" prospective for titanium minerals (ilmenite/rutile), zircon, and heavy rare earths (dysprosium, terbium, yttrium). A DFS released June 2026 models a US$813M post-tax NPV / 39.4% IRR.

Customers (all early-stage, prototype/low-rate): US Army (ground-vehicle parts, fasteners), American Rheinmetall (US$0.3M prototype, 700 components), Ford (~US$11M over 45 months, not yet booked as revenue), Panerai (luxury watch cases), Carver Pump (US$100k Navy). Plus management's claim of "200+ NDA-backed opportunities" and "90+ active customer programs".

Suppliers/feedstock: titanium scrap (290 t transferred at no cost by the US Government; plus market-procured scrap) and, eventually, its own Titan-mined minerals.

Contract structure: the demand side is dominated by US Government cost-reimbursable funding ($47.1M IBAS + $12.7M DPA Title III + up to $99M SBIR Phase III IDIQ) — this is development funding, not recurring product revenue. Commercial offtake is still at the purchase-order/prototype stage. There is no take-or-pay backlog and no recurring revenue base yet.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map upstream → IperionX → end customer, named:

• Upstream feedstock: (a) titanium scrap — sourced from the open market + a US Government transfer of ~290 t at no cost; (b) future mined minerals from the Titan Project (TN) and the just-acquired Covia Camden silica-sand operation (US$3M, mineral rights + stockpiles + mining equipment + rail infrastructure, adjacent to Titan).
• Process chokepoint = IperionX itself. The entire value proposition is that it replaces the upstream chokepoints (Kroll sponge from China/Baoji, Russia/VSMPO, Kazakhstan/UKTMP; the melt/forge steps) with HAMR (powder) + HSPT (part). It is vertically integrating mineral → powder → near-net-shape component in one site.
• Midstream peers / alternative routes it bypasses: ingot/sponge producers Timet, ATI, Howmet, Perryman (US); VSMPO (RU); Baoji (CN); UKTMP (KZ); Toho & Osaka Titanium (JP, high-purity sponge). Powder atomizers (AP&C/GE, Tekna) sit in the legacy $150–250/kg spherical-powder lane IperionX is attacking.
• Equipment: commissioned a six-axis powder-metallurgy press (May 2026) to expand component manufacturing.
• Downstream end customers: US DoD/Army, American Rheinmetall, Ford, Panerai (Richemont), Carver Pump (Navy), plus stated aerospace/defense/space/shipbuilding/consumer-electronics/automotive/additive end markets.

Single-source dependency to mark: the demand and a large share of funding both currently route through the US Government — the chain's most important node is policy, not a private OEM. That is the chain's strength (national-security tailwind) and its concentration risk.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Claimed durable edges:

• Process IP / cost moat. HAMR + HSPT acquired/built (incl. the Nov-2024 Breakthrough Titanium Technologies acquisition) with foundational licenses tracing to ARPA-E / University of Utah work. Management targets ~$55/kg powder at first full utilization → ~$29/kg at 1,400 tpa, vs $150–250/kg for atomized Kroll-derived spherical powder. If real at scale, that is a structural cost advantage, not a marketing claim.
• Feedstock flexibility (100% scrap). Kroll cannot run on 100% scrap; HAMR can — a genuine differentiator and the ESG/closed-loop hook (>90% lower CO₂ per IperionX).
• Regulatory / "friend-shoring" moat. US-government validation (Air Force Research Lab, ARPA-E, R&D 100 Award, DPA Title III) plus a national-security mandate to de-risk titanium from China is a policy moat competitors can't easily replicate — the government is literally handing it scrap and milestone cash.

Bargaining power: today, weak — it needs customers to qualify its material (long aerospace/defense qualification cycles) more than they need it, and it needs government cash to fund the build. The bargaining power flips only if/when it is the lowest-cost qualified domestic source at volume.

Moat skeptic's note: "process IP" in metals is historically leaky and slow to defend; the binding constraint is qualification + yield at scale, not a patent. Until 1,400 tpa proves the cost curve, the moat is a claim with government endorsements, not a demonstrated one.

Lens 4 · Segments

No segments.csv data exists (`` empty) and the company is pre-revenue, so there is no revenue-by-segment to break out — n/a for any segment P&L. Structurally there are two reportable pillars:

Trend: metals is accelerating operationally (60× capacity vs pilot 12 months prior per management) but not yet financially. The minerals pillar is a separate, capital-intensive mining project years from cash flow.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Operating-battery note: IperionX has no revenue, no consensus EPS, and no GAAP earnings to beat or miss. I run Phase B as a pre-revenue ramp + cash-runway read, which is the honest analogue for "measure performance" on a development-stage name.

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print = March-2026 quarter)

• Cash: US$48.2M at 31-Mar-2026, plus US$42.1M remaining obligated-but-undrawn US Government funding.
• Cash trajectory / burn: down from US$79.2M at 30-Sep-2025 to US$48.2M at 31-Mar-2026 — i.e. ~US$31M consumed over two quarters (~US$15M/qtr gross, partly offset by reimbursements).
• FY2026 year-end cash guidance: US$36–40M — implying another ~$8–12M net outflow into June-2026 fiscal year-end and a financing need within ~12 months to fund the 1,400 tpa expansion.
• Revenue: ~$0 booked. Customer receipts at "early inflection point"; Ford (~$11M/45mo) and other POs not yet recognized.
• Cost flag (important): corporate/G&A jumped from ~US$3.3M to ~US$16.2M (~5×) — partly genuine scaling, partly the kind of overhead inflation a skeptic watches.
• Historical net loss: ~−US$21.8M in FY2024, losses growing with the build.
• Market reaction context: the stock is down ~45–55% from its Jan-2026 ATH of $60.11 (ADR) to the ~$28–34 area — the market has de-rated the name hard since the short report and amid dilution fear.

Read: this is a textbook pre-commercial ramp — cash going out, capacity going up, revenue still a rounding error, financing clock ticking. Nothing "beat/missed"; the only number that matters is runway-to-1,400 tpa vs the next raise.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls / Communications (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on disk; sentiment read from letters/quarterlies/releases:

• Consistent, escalating bullish operator tone across the 2026 Letter (Feb), Mar-2026 quarterly (Apr), six-axis-press release (May), and Titan DFS (Jun). Recurring phrases: "fully integrated American titanium supply chain," "lowest-cost," "largest scale," "national security," "24/7 continuous."
• New language in 2026: "GenX™" (next-gen continuous HAMR) and "credibility inflection" framing — management itself concedes 2026 is about proving the model, not revenue.
• What they stopped saying / pivoted: the 2023 "world's largest 100% recycled Ti powder facility by 2025" target has effectively slid — 200 tpa is now an end-2026 goal — a timeline-slippage tell a skeptic will hold them to.
• Defensive posture (Nov-2025): issued a formal "Response to Short Seller Report" leaning on government validation rather than a line-by-line rebuttal — confident in tone, but notably did not itemize Spruce Point's specific allegations.

Trend: tone is uniformly promotional-positive and has not softened despite the share-price collapse — which cuts both ways (conviction vs. promotion).

Lens 7 · Comps

• End-market sizing: global titanium powder market ~US$1.2B (2022) → ~$1.66B (2025), growing ~12.5% CAGR to 2030; aerospace/defense ~44–50% of demand. IperionX cites a $4.3B titanium-fastener market as a beachhead.
• The honest comp statement: IperionX trades like an option on a cost-curve + a government mandate, valued on a 2029–2030 EBITDA-multiple basis by its own analysts (one note lifts the 2029 EV/EBITDA from 7× to 8×), not on any current multiple. Bears say that is exactly the problem.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~2–4 yrs as a Nasdaq/ASX name)

• 2024–2025 melt-up → Jan-2026 ATH US$60.11 (ADR): driven by serial US-Government funding awards, 24/7-production milestone, first furnace runs, customer POs, and the broad "critical minerals reshoring" trade.
• 12-Nov-2025: Spruce Point short report → sharp sell-off. Triggered a Levi & Korsinsky securities investigation and recurring ~14% down-days. This is the single biggest negative catalyst on the tape.
• Government-funding headlines repeatedly move it up (e.g. $25M Sep-2025, final $4.6M + 290 t scrap Jan-2026).
• Jun-2026: Titan DFS ($813M NPV) + Covia Camden acquisition — incremental positive catalysts.

Pattern: the market reacts hardest to (1) US-Government funding/validation (up) and (2) credibility/short attacks + dilution fears (down). It is not an earnings-reaction stock (no earnings) — it is a policy-and-credibility stock. That makes it unusually headline-driven and high-beta.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO / co-founder: Anastasios "Taso" Arima (MD & CEO since Mar-2021; ~5 yr tenure). Greek-born, UWA-educated (Commerce + Engineering). Founded Piedmont Lithium (Nasdaq: PLL) and secured its early funding/Nasdaq listing.
• Skin in the game: Arima owns ~2.5%; director Todd Hannigan ~7.9%; institutions ~43% (BNY Asset Mgmt ~17% largest, FMR/Fidelity ~8.1%). Decent institutional sponsorship for a microcap; founder stake is modest, not controlling.
• Comp: ~US$2.0M/yr, 76% bonus/equity-weighted — incentive-heavy.
• Capital-allocation history: the defining trait is serial equity issuance — shares 69M (FY21) → 135M → 168M → 218M (FY24) ordinary, +215% in three years, plus a ~A$70M (US$46M) placement. Pattern = fund an ambitious build chiefly via dilution + government grants. Bolt-on M&A (Breakthrough Titanium Tech 2024; Covia Camden US$3M 2026) has been small and strategic.
• Archetype: a founder-promoter in the critical-minerals mold — visionary, government-relations-savvy, narrative-strong, dilution-comfortable. This archetype is fit for the early capital-raising stage but is exactly the profile short-sellers target (see Lens 13).
• Red flags (alleged, ): Spruce Point alleged undisclosed Arima-controlled entities (PowerChem Inc., PowerChem Land LLC, GX Technologies LLC) tied to a separate graphene-oxide promotion, and overlap with Piedmont Lithium, which itself faced short-seller promotion allegations. Unproven, but a governance question that belongs on the record.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Accounting-risk surface (pre-revenue dev-stage):

• Revenue recognition: minimal — but watch how the Ford ~$11M/45mo and government-reimbursable amounts get recognized once they start; cost-reimbursable government accounting can flatter optics if presented as "funding" near revenue.
• Cash flow vs. earnings: the meaningful divergence Spruce Point flagged is on operating cash flows / "financial reporting issues that appear to affect operating cash flows" — the specific item to verify in the 20-F (not on disk).
• Inventory: Spruce Point noted no inventory on the balance sheet and no inventory purchases through 30-Sep despite production claims — a flag to reconcile against the 24/7-production narrative.
• Capitalized vs. expensed build, G&A: the ~5× G&A jump ($3.3M→$16.2M) and Spruce Point's claimed discrepancies in employee count, capex accounts, and Titan acreage (1,486 claimed vs ~1,349 in county records) are the forensic items.
• Stock-based comp: comp is 76% equity/bonus-weighted — SBC dilution is a real, recurring line.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER): no Litigation Releases and no AAERs naming IperionX in the search window (2021-06-30→2026-06-30).
• Non-SEC enforcement (FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB): no material agency enforcement actions surfaced in web search.
• Securities litigation: Levi & Korsinsky announced a shareholder investigation / putative class action (Nov-2025) following the Spruce Point report and price drop. This is plaintiff-bar activity in the wake of a short report — common, early-stage, not an SEC action — but it is a live legal overhang.
• Item 3 Legal Proceedings: the most recent annual report (20-F) is not on disk (`` unavailable) — cannot quote it directly; flag for the next refresh once filings are ingested.
• Net: No SEC/regulatory enforcement found via EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER) + web as of 2026-06-30, but a short-report-driven securities investigation is open and several financial-reporting discrepancies are alleged (unproven).

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

There is no current EPS and no reliable consensus EPS (pre-revenue, loss-making), so a three-year EPS ladder would be fabrication — I state the inputs and give a revenue-ramp + cash-need projection instead, every line labeled.

Operating ramp (titanium metals), management targets: ~50 tpa (now) → 200 tpa (end-CY2026) → 1,400 tpa (mid-2027) → 10,000+ tpa (2030).

Illustrative revenue at 1,400 tpa: at a blended realized price in management's $180–400/kg finished-component range, 1,400 t = 1.4M kg →

• Low: 1.4M kg × $180/kg = ~$252M revenue
• High: 1.4M kg × $400/kg = ~$560M revenue

Cost curve: ~$55/kg → ~$29/kg powder at 1,400 tpa; powder ≠ finished part, so gross margin depends on the HSPT part conversion.

Cash / financing: $48.2M cash (Mar-26) + $42.1M undrawn gov't funding; FY26 year-end guide $36–40M; a sizeable equity raise (one source flags a potential ~$50M raise / ~20% dilution at depressed prices) is likely needed within ~12 months to fund the 1,400 tpa expansion.

Titan minerals pillar: NPV US$813M post-tax, IRR 39.4%, capex US$381.3M, first production ~Sep-2028 — a separate multi-hundred-million capex program, i.e. more financing, not less.

Base call: revenue stays immaterial through FY2026; FY2027 is the first year with a chance at >US$50M revenue, contingent on the 1,400 tpa ramp and customer qualification; the equity count keeps rising. (No forecast.ts create per --watchlist rules.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. The US must re-shore titanium — it is on every critical-minerals list, ~80–90% non-US controlled, and irreplaceable in aerospace/defense/space/shipbuilding. IperionX is the best-funded, best-validated domestic challenger with technology the Air Force/ARPA-E/DPA have repeatedly backed with cash and feedstock, a credible 40–70% cost advantage, and the only 100%-scrap route. If the 1,400 tpa expansion (mid-2027) hits the cost curve and even a few of the 90+ customer programs (Ford, Rheinmetall, defense fasteners — a $4.3B beachhead) convert to volume, the company re-rates from "option" to "earnings," and the Titan minerals project ($813M NPV) is a second leg. Government scaffolding de-risks the build that kills most microcaps. Bull price targets cluster A$9.25 (Bell Potter, ASX ords) and US$40–71 (ADR, median ~US$53).

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. It never out-executes the cost curve at scale. Pilot economics ≠ 1,400 tpa economics; titanium qualification cycles are years; yield/throughput at continuous scale is unproven. If $29/kg slips to $80/kg, the moat evaporates and so does the NPV.
2. Dilution compounds the equity to death. +215% shares in 3 yrs and more raises coming for both the VA expansion and the $381M Titan capex — at a depressed price, existing holders are ground down even if the business "works."
3. The credibility/governance overhang is real. A live Spruce Point short thesis (70–95% downside scenarios), a securities investigation, alleged undisclosed related entities, and Piedmont-Lithium déjà vu mean the market will demand proof, not promises — capping the multiple.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the 1,400 tpa expansion slipped to 2028, realized powder prices came in well below the $180–400/kg part-pricing dream, a dilutive raise hit at a low price, a second short report (Spruce Point hinted at one) landed on the cash-flow/inventory discrepancies, and the stock is a sub-$15 ADR with the Titan project mothballed for lack of capex.

Multiples too high? On any current metric, infinitely (no E). On a 2029–2030 basis, the price already bakes in successful execution — so the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside at ~$0.9B until 1,400 tpa and real revenue de-risk it.

Contrarian view (what the market may be missing): the government-funding + scrap-transfer arrangement is a more durable competitive moat than the market credits — Washington has chosen IperionX as a national-security instrument, which lowers financing cost and raises the strategic-acquisition floor (an ATI/Howmet/defense-prime could buy it). The short report may have over-discounted a name the US government is structurally motivated to see succeed.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case — anchored on the actual Spruce Point thesis:

• The market is oversupplied, not undersupplied. Spruce Point claims the titanium powder market is "already oversupplied with 3.5× more capacity than shipments" — so why will a new high-cost entrant displace the 80-year-entrenched Kroll chain with locked aerospace LTAs (ATI–Airbus/Boeing)? Qualification inertia favors incumbents.
• Revenue is vapor. A Ford contract "estimated ~$11M starting 2025" with no revenue booked, no inventory on the balance sheet, and no inventory purchases through Sep-30. The "90+ customer programs / 200+ NDAs" are unverifiable funnel, not orders.
• Management is the red flag. Heavy overlap with Piedmont Lithium (itself short-seller-targeted as a "promotion"), plus alleged undisclosed Arima-controlled entities (PowerChem, GX Technologies) running a similar "exciting-industrial-tech" playbook. Pattern-matching to promotion.
• Reporting discrepancies. Claimed mismatches in Titan acreage (1,486 vs ~1,349), G&A, employee count, capex accounts, and "issues that appear to affect operating cash flows". An empty office with piled-up packages and a stale annual report on display is the kind of color that fuels a second report (which Spruce Point hinted at).
• Concentration & assumptions for today's price: the valuation needs (a) the cost curve to hold at scale, (b) qualification to convert, (c) financing at non-destructive prices, and (d) the Titan capex to clear — all four must break right. A 20–30% growth disappointment, or one bad raise, takes a large chunk off a name with no earnings to cushion it.
• Downside: Spruce Point's 70–95% scenarios.

Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not another startup — it's incumbent inertia + cheap foreign sponge. If titanium prices stay soft and Kroll capacity is underutilized, the economic case for paying up for domestic powder weakens to a pure national-security subsidy play.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. At 1,400 tpa, what is your audited, fully-loaded cash cost per kg of (a) HAMR powder and (b) a representative HSPT finished part — and what is the bridge from today's cost to that number?
2. Of the "90+ customer programs," how many have firm, dollar-denominated purchase orders with delivery schedules, and what total booked revenue do they represent in the next 8 quarters?
3. What is your funding plan to cash-flow breakeven — how many more equity raises, at what cumulative dilution, across the VA expansion and the $381M Titan capex?
4. Spruce Point alleged discrepancies in operating cash flow, inventory, employee count, capex accounts, and Titan acreage — please reconcile each, line by line.
5. Please disclose CEO Arima's involvement in PowerChem Inc., PowerChem Land LLC, and GX Technologies LLC, and any related-party relationship to IperionX.
6. What realized price per kg are you actually achieving today on shipped product, versus the $180–400/kg market-pricing range you cite?
7. What are the specific qualification milestones and dates for Ford, American Rheinmetall, and your lead defense fastener programs to move from prototype to rate production?
8. Is the US redomicile to Delaware / conversion to domestic-filer (10-K) status actually planned, and on what timeline — and what triggers it?
9. What is the yield and throughput of the continuous HAMR (GenX™) line at commercial scale, and how does it change the cost curve vs. batch HAMR?
10. How much of the $99M SBIR ceiling and remaining $42.1M obligated funding do you realistically expect to draw, and against what milestones?
11. What happens to the Titan Project schedule and the $381M capex if you cannot secure project financing / a strategic partner by 2027?
12. What is your answer to the "oversupplied powder market" thesis — what share of the $4.3B fastener / aerospace markets can you actually win, and from whom?
13. How do you think about strategic M&A interest from ATI / Howmet / a defense prime, and at what stage would you entertain it?
14. What are your patent-protection and trade-secret defenses for HAMR/HSPT, and which claims would survive a determined incumbent design-around?
15. What is the single assumption that, if wrong, most impairs the equity — and how are you hedging it?

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