Metaplanet

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Metaplanet is Japan's first publicly listed Bitcoin Treasury Company — a corporate vehicle that raises capital through equity, equity-linked warrants, zero-coupon bonds and (newly) perpetual preferred shares, and deploys essentially all of it into Bitcoin held on the balance sheet. The stated single KPI is "Bitcoin per share"; CEO Simon Gerovich: "Every capital decision we make gets measured against that".

Origin / what it used to be. The entity was Red Planet Japan, a money-losing budget-hotel operator (part of a Bangkok-based Asian value-hotel chain Gerovich co-founded) that COVID pushed to the brink of bankruptcy. In April 2024 Gerovich — an ex-Goldman Sachs Tokyo equity-derivatives trader who'd encountered Michael Saylor's thesis — sold off the hotel assets (keeping one Tokyo property, now "The Bitcoin Hotel"), rebranded to Metaplanet, and wrote Bitcoin into the Articles of Incorporation as a core business. The "Bitcoin Standard" adoption date is 8 April 2024.

Two reported segments, one that matters:

1. Bitcoin Treasury / Bitcoin income generation — ~95% of total income. This is (a) accumulating BTC and (b) an options desk that writes cash-secured puts on Bitcoin to harvest premium (see Lens 4).
2. Hotel — a single Tokyo property being rebuilt as a Bitcoin-themed hotel; immaterial to the financials.

Customers / suppliers / competitors. There is essentially no "customer" in the operating sense — the product is the equity itself as a BTC access wrapper, and the "customers" are Japanese retail investors buying 3350.T inside tax-advantaged NISA accounts (Lens 3). Counterparties: EVO Fund (the warrant allottee / financing counterparty — see Lens 9/13), crypto exchanges/custodians for BTC purchase and ~95% cold storage under Japan's FSA/JVCEA regime, and options-desk counterparties for the put-writing. Competitors: Strategy/MicroStrategy (MSTR), Twenty One Capital, other DATs, and spot Bitcoin itself / BTC ETFs — the most dangerous competitor (Lens 13).

Contract structure / key terms. No take-or-pay or recurring revenue. The economic "contracts" that matter are the financing instruments: moving-strike warrants to EVO (floating daily strike, floor originally ¥298, board-revisable down to ¥187), zero-coupon unsecured bonds, a $100M BTC-collateralized loan, and the new MARS (Class A senior preferred) + MERCURY (Class B perpetual preferred, 4.9% dividend, convertible) stack.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain (the capital supply chain — names or it didn't happen)

For a treasury company the "supply chain" is the chain of capital that converts investor yen into balance-sheet BTC. Mapped end-to-end with named stakeholders:

Capital sources (upstream) →

• Japanese retail investors (the demand base — ~87% of the share register ) buy 3350.T, much of it inside NISA tax-free accounts.
• EVO Fund — Cayman-based fund and the sole allottee of the moving-strike warrants (the serial ATM-equivalent financing engine; 20th–27th+ series). The single most important named counterparty in the structure.
• MARS / MERCURY preferred holders — institutional buyers of the new perpetual-preferred tranches (e.g. 23.61M MERCURY shares at ¥900 = ¥21.25B / ~$150M).
• Zero-coupon bondholders — e.g. a $50M zero-interest bond issue, and a $100M BTC-collateralized loan lender.

The conversion node (Metaplanet itself) →

• Treasury function buys BTC; the options desk (led by Director of Bitcoin Strategy Dylan Leclair) writes cash-secured puts to lower net acquisition cost.

Custody / settlement (downstream) →

• Licensed Japanese exchanges + custodians under FSA / JVCEA rules (~95% cold storage, client-asset segregation).

Chokepoints & single-source dependencies (the fragile links):

• EVO Fund warrant exercises are THE chokepoint. When the share price falls toward the warrant floor, EVO stops exercising and the financing engine stalls — exactly what happened Oct–Nov 2025 (20th–22nd series suspended). The entire accumulation pace is hostage to one counterparty's willingness to exercise into a falling stock.
• The mNAV premium is the other chokepoint — see Lens 3. Below 1.0x the whole conveyor becomes value-destructive.
• Bitcoin price is the exogenous input the company cannot control and is ~100% exposed to.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (the moat is regulatory arbitrage, and it is leaky)

Metaplanet has no operating moat — it owns no technology, no network, no switching costs. Its only durable edge is a Japan-specific regulatory/tax arbitrage that makes its equity a better BTC wrapper for Japanese retail than spot BTC:

1. The NISA tax wrapper. Direct crypto gains in Japan are taxed as miscellaneous income at up to 55%; listed-equity gains inside the New NISA are tax-free. So a Japanese retail investor who wants Bitcoin exposure is structurally incentivized to buy 3350.T (a stock) rather than spot BTC. This is the demand engine — over 60,000 NISA users form "the backbone," and the stock has ranked among Japan's top weekly NISA purchases.
2. No Japanese spot Bitcoin ETF. With no domestic ETF, Metaplanet was for a period the only liquid, tax-advantaged listed BTC proxy in Japan — a scarcity premium (the stock once traded at 5–8x NAV, implying BTC at $500k+).
3. Disclosure-based (not permission-based) financing. Japan's regime lets Metaplanet fire off serial warrant issuances and short-tenor bonds without shareholder pre-approval, giving it MSTR-like fundraising velocity; the US Investment Company Act would risk reclassifying such a vehicle.
4. Retail concentration / reflexive base — ~87% retail register, shareholder count +1,075% since Dec 2023; a sticky, narrative-driven holder base that supported the premium.

Why the moat is leaky (and is leaking now):

• The premium depends entirely on the tax differential and ETF absence persisting. Japan is actively debating a flat 20% crypto tax and broader crypto reform; if that passes, the NISA arbitrage collapses and the premium compresses.
• A future Japanese spot BTC ETF would offer cheaper, cleaner exposure and gut the scarcity premium.
• Bargaining power is essentially nil — the company is a price-taker on BTC, a price-taker on its own financing (EVO sets the pace), and its "customers" can substitute spot BTC or ETFs the moment the arbitrage narrows.

The honest read: this is not a moat that compounds — it is a policy window that is closing, and the market has already started pricing the closure (mNAV from 8x → <1x).

Lens 4 · Segments (revenue concentration in a single options strategy)

No segments.csv data exists (research layer empty) — all ``.

What the segment actually is. The "revenue" is overwhelmingly option premium from writing cash-secured puts on Bitcoin: Metaplanet sells puts, collects upfront premium, and — because it wants more BTC anyway — is happy to be assigned coins at the strike if BTC falls. Either it keeps the premium (BTC stays above strike) or it buys BTC at a price it already liked.

Trend & the catch. Premium income is accelerating in nominal terms (Q1 FY2026 was the strongest quarter ever) and management guides FY2026 to ¥16B net sales / ¥11.4B operating profit. But this is procyclical, short-vol income: it is positively correlated with the very BTC drawdowns that destroy the balance sheet. In a sharp BTC decline the desk gets assigned coins (using up cash) right as the mark-to-market loss craters equity — the premium income is real but it is dwarfed by the BTC P&L (Q1 FY2026: ¥2.27B operating profit vs. ¥114.5B net loss, see Lens 5). The segment is a rounding error against the coin position; it lowers net cost-of-BTC at the margin but does not change the thesis.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (Q1 FY2026 — the print that tells the whole story)

Latest reported quarter: Q1 FY2026 (ended 31 March 2026), reported 13 May 2026. All ``:

The story in one line: the operating business looked spectacular (+283% op income, 73.6% margin) while the company lost $725M because Bitcoin fell and JGAAP marks BTC to market through the P&L (Lens 10). This is the defining feature of the name — the income statement is a Bitcoin price chart wearing a corporate costume.

• vs consensus: no clean sell-side consensus exists for this name (web-only); management reaffirmed FY2026 guidance of ¥16B sales / ¥11.4B operating profit — so the operating beat was "in line / ahead" against its own guide, the net loss was a BTC-price artifact.
• Balance-sheet flags: the company keeps raising equity to buy BTC even as the stock trades below NAV (¥52B raised in Q1) — the single most important red flag (issuing below NAV is dilutive to BTC/share). It also carries a $100M BTC-collateralized loan — so the "100% debt-free" framing management uses for the warrant program is not the whole capital structure.
• Market reaction / what's priced: the stock is down ~85% from its June-2025 peak (¥1,930 → ~¥200–224 by June 2026, 52-wk low ¥220). The market has not just de-rated the premium — it has flipped to a discount (mNAV 0.63x basic). What's priced in: that the financing flywheel is broken and dilution will continue.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls / Management Communication (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on disk; Metaplanet communicates heavily via X (Gerovich, @Metaplanet_JP), monthly disclosures, and quarterly slides rather than US-style earnings calls. Tone trend over the last ~4 reporting points ``:

• Mid-2025 (premium era): triumphant, expansionist — "Asia's largest-ever equity raise," "100x market cap since the Bitcoin Standard," "568% BTC Yield in 2025," 555 Million Plan unveiled (210k BTC by 2027).
• Oct–Nov 2025 (the break): defensive — suspended warrant exercises (20th–22nd series), pivoted messaging to "we're protecting shareholders," unveiled perpetual preferred (MARS/MERCURY) as a non-dilutive alternative. The vocabulary shifted from "issue at a premium" to "avoid dilution."
• Early–mid 2026 (discount era): the tell is the new refrain — "when mNAV is below 1.0, share buybacks improve BTC Yield". Management is now openly discussing buying back stock rather than issuing it — a complete inversion of the 2024–25 playbook, and an implicit admission that the premium engine is dead for now.

Recurring phrases: "Bitcoin per share," "BTC Yield," "the 1% club / 210,000 BTC," "non-dilutive." What they stopped saying: "issue equity at a premium," "Asia's MicroStrategy" boasts. The arc is textbook: euphoria → suspension → "buybacks now make sense." That last phrase is management telling you the stock is below NAV.

Lens 7 · Comps (DAT peer table — multiples web-sourced or n/a)

The relevant comp set is other Bitcoin treasury companies (DATs), not operating companies. Traditional EV/Sales, EV/EBIT, P/E are meaningless here (earnings are BTC marks) — the governing multiple is mNAV (market value of equity+debt ÷ value of BTC held). Dividend yield n/a (none pay common dividends). 5-yr ROE n/a (no comparable history).

Read: the entire DAT cohort has de-rated through NAV in 2026. When the leader (MSTR) trades at 0.70x, the playbook — issue premium equity, buy more BTC, repeat — stops working for everyone, and the smaller names (Metaplanet) trade at deeper discounts because their financing structures (EVO warrants) are flimsier and their premium was more extreme (8x → 0.63x is a ~92% multiple compression). EV/Sales etc.: n/a — not the governing metric; not sourced.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what actually moves 3350.T >5%)

The pattern over the company's short BTC-era life (Apr 2024–Jun 2026) is unusually legible ``:

• + Bitcoin purchase announcements (each ~weekly buy) — historically pumped the stock during the premium era (reflexive: more BTC → narrative → higher premium → cheaper equity → more BTC).
• + Eric Trump joins advisory board (21 Mar 2025) → +17% in a day. Pure narrative/political-optionality catalyst.
• + MSCI index decision (Jan 2026) → stock rallied to a 3-month NAV high.
• + Capital-raise / 555 Million Plan unveils (Jun 2025 ¥770.9B/$5.4B) — initially bullish narrative.
• − The October 2025 cascade: the $19B market-wide crypto liquidation on 10 Oct 2025 (triggered by Trump China-tariff escalation) crushed BTC and DATs; Metaplanet fell ~70% from June highs, mNAV hit 0.99, Bloomberg headlined "Metaplanet's enterprise value sinks below Bitcoin holdings — DAT trade unravels".
• − Sustained mNAV compression / dilution through 2026 — the slow bleed to ¥200.

What the pattern reveals: 3350.T does not trade on fundamentals — it trades on (1) Bitcoin's price, (2) the direction of the mNAV premium (re-rating up or down), and (3) narrative catalysts (Trump, index inclusion, "largest-ever raise"). It is a high-beta, reflexive proxy: in a BTC bull with an expanding premium it goes up multiples; in a BTC bear with a collapsing premium it goes down ~85%. The market reacts to premium direction more than to any operating number.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

Simon Gerovich (Representative Director, President & CEO).

• Track record: Harvard (AB Applied Mathematics) → Goldman Sachs Tokyo equity-derivatives trader → co-founded Sparx Ventures (HK, 2011) → co-founder/Chairman of Red Planet Hotels (the predecessor). The signature achievement is the Metaplanet pivot itself: ~100x market-cap increase from the Apr-2024 Bitcoin Standard to the 2025 peak, and a 568% BTC Yield in 2025. That is a genuinely extraordinary capital-markets execution — during the premium window. The flip side: he also presided over the ~85% drawdown from peak and the hotel business's near-bankruptcy that forced the pivot.
• The derivatives-trader fit: the whole strategy (moving-strike warrants, monetizing the stock's own volatility, an options-writing desk) is exactly what an ex-GS equity-vol trader would build. This is a volatility-arbitrage operator, not an industrialist.
• Skin in the game / insider ownership: not cleanly disclosed in web sources — n/a, not sourced (no insider-transactions.csv).
• Capital-allocation history: aggressive, reflexive, single-asset. He correctly issued equity at a premium in 2024–25 (accretive), and — critically — suspended the dilutive warrant program in Oct 2025 and pivoted to non-dilutive perpetual preferreds (MARS/MERCURY) and now buyback talk when mNAV went below 1. That responsiveness is a point in his favor; a worse operator would have kept diluting below NAV. But the company did keep raising equity (¥52B in Q1 FY2026) below NAV, so the discipline is imperfect.
• Founder vs professional: founder-operator / promoter archetype — charismatic, X-native, narrative-driven (the Saylor template). Implication: high conviction and fast capital-markets reflexes, but also promotional risk and a structure built around his read of volatility.

Key execs: CFO Yoshi Ikurumi; COO Yoshimi Abe; Dylan Leclair (Director of Bitcoin Strategy — runs the options/BTC engine, well-known BTC analyst); CPO Kevin Mendoza. Several execs are ex-Goldman/Morgan Stanley.

Advisory board: Eric Trump (joined 21 Mar 2025). Read this honestly: it is a narrative/political-optionality signal, not operating substance — a flag for promotional characterization, useful for US-investor reach and BTC-policy optionality, but not a governance positive.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst. No filings on disk (`` throughout); the accounting regime itself is the headline risk.

• JGAAP fair-value-through-P&L on BTC (the dominant item). Under ASBJ PITF No. 38, crypto with an active market is marked to market at period-end with the change running through profit and loss. Consequence: earnings ARE the Bitcoin price. Q1 FY2026 booked a −¥116.4B unrealized BTC loss; an earlier period took a ¥104.6B / $680M markdown. This is not fraud — it is mechanical — but it means net income is uninformative about the business and hugely volatile. Watch for any attempt to reframe losses as "non-operating" to distract (they already characterize markdowns as "non-cash, non-operating") — true, but the markdown is the company's core risk.
• Deferred tax liability on unrealized gains (phantom tax). Because Japanese corporate tax uses period-end fair value, unrealized BTC gains create a deferred tax liability (e.g. ~¥4.489B against a prior unrealized gain). In an up-market this is a real cash claim on paper gains the company hasn't realized; a forensic flag on the quality of reported equity.
• Dilution / share-count explosion (the biggest governance red flag). Shares outstanding reached 1,279,913,624 (basic) by a 2026 month-end, up from a tiny pre-pivot base (~tens of millions). The EVO moving-strike warrant series (20th–27th+; 27th = 1M rights × 100 = up to 100M shares; 23rd/24th = up to 210M shares) plus the 555M-share plan mean the diluted base balloons toward ~759M+ on the plan alone. Issuing into a falling stock below NAV destroys BTC/share — the cardinal sin of the model.
• BTC/share vs headline BTC growth divergence. Total BTC keeps rising (40,177) while BTC-per-share growth decelerated hard (2025 quarterly BTC Yield: 95.6% → 129.4% → 33.0% → 11.9%). The per-share engine was already sputtering before the discount — exactly what dilution-at-compressing-premium produces. Watch this metric, not the headline coin count.
• Counterparty concentration on EVO Fund — the financing depends on one Cayman fund's warrant exercises; opacity around that relationship is a structural red flag (Lens 13).
• Options-desk tail risk — writing puts on Bitcoin is short-volatility; a gap-down forces assignment (cash out the door) at the worst time. Premium income flatters operating profit but embeds a fat left tail.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section).

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (fetched 2026-06-30) → 0 findings; Metaplanet has no CIK and does not file with the SEC, so no EDGAR enforcement search is possible. ``
• Non-SEC web search ("Metaplanet" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR CFPB OR "consent decree" OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement): no material enforcement actions, fines, or consent decrees surfaced as of 2026-06-30 ``. The company operates under Japan's FSA/JVCEA crypto regime; no JFSA enforcement against Metaplanet was found.
• Company's own legal-proceedings disclosure (10-K Item 3 equivalent): n/a — no SEC 10-K exists; no material litigation surfaced in Japanese-disclosure web coverage.
• Net: No material regulatory or legal enforcement findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER → 0, no CIK) and web search as of 2026-06-30. The real regulatory risk is forward-looking policy (Japanese crypto-tax reform gutting the NISA arbitrage), not any existing action.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (this is an mNAV + BTC model, not an EPS model)

For a treasury company, "EPS" is a Bitcoin-price derivative and not the right object to forecast — a base/bull/bear EPS would be a thinly disguised BTC price forecast (forbidden). The honest forward framework is mNAV × BTC-value-per-share, with the two questions that actually decide the stock: (1) where does the mNAV multiple settle? and (2) does BTC/share grow or shrink from here? All `` with inputs labeled; no forecast.ts EPS line is logged (per --watchlist rules and because an EPS forecast here would be fabricated precision).

Anchors (all ``, as of late June 2026):

• BTC held: 40,177
• BTC price: ~$58,500 (30 Jun 2026), down from ~$107k a year prior
• BTC value of holdings: ~$2.35B
• Avg cost basis: ~$89.3k–97.6k → position is ~35% underwater (−$1.24B unrealized)
• Market cap: ~$1.58B; mNAV ≈ 0.63x basic / 0.75–0.84x EV
• Shares: ~1.28B basic, diluting toward ~759M+ incremental on the 555M plan

Scenario frame (12–18 months):

• Bear (premium stays broken / BTC flat-to-down): mNAV holds 0.6–0.8x; continued issuance below NAV erodes BTC/share; stock tracks BTC down with extra dilution drag. Equity is a levered-short-the-premium loss. ``
• Base (BTC stabilizes, management executes buybacks): with mNAV <1.0x, buying back stock is accretive to BTC/share — the inverted-but-rational playbook management is now signaling. If BTC stabilizes near ~$60k and Metaplanet shifts from issuance to buybacks/preferred-only funding, the discount could narrow back toward 1.0x, which is the bull mechanism in a discount regime (re-rating from 0.63x → 1.0x is ~+60% even with flat BTC). ``
• Bull (BTC bull resumes + premium re-rates): BTC rallies AND the scarcity/NISA narrative reasserts (no JP ETF yet, tax reform stalls) → mNAV re-expands above 1.0x → financing flywheel restarts → reflexive multiple-bagger, as in 2024–25. This is the fat right tail the bulls own. ``

The single scoreable forward proposition (not logged as EPS, stated as the falsifiable line): Within 12 months, either (a) mNAV re-crosses 1.0x (flywheel restored, bullish) or (b) it stays <1.0x and the share count keeps climbing (flywheel dead, bearish). That binary — not an EPS number — is what to track. (No forecast.ts create run — an EPS forecast would be unsourced fabrication for this name; the trackable claim is the mNAV-crossing binary, to be logged via /thesis if promoted.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Metaplanet is the only tax-advantaged, listed Bitcoin proxy in Japan at a moment when direct crypto is taxed at up to 55% and there is no domestic spot ETF — a genuine, if temporary, structural demand magnet with a fanatical ~87% retail base. Management is an elite capital-markets operator (ex-GS vol trader + Dylan Leclair) who built a 568% BTC Yield in 2025 and has shown the discipline to stop diluting and pivot to non-dilutive perpetual preferreds and buybacks when the premium broke. With the stock at a discount to NAV, buybacks are accretive to BTC/share, and a re-rating from 0.63x back to 1.0x is ~+60% before any BTC move. If Bitcoin resumes its bull market, the reflexive flywheel restarts and the stock is a multi-bagger again. The options desk throws off real, growing cash (¥2.5B/quarter) that lowers net cost-of-BTC. Contrarian view the market is missing: at sub-NAV, this has quietly become a cheap leveraged BTC call with an embedded buyback put — the opposite of the 2025 bubble.

Bear case. The only engine — the mNAV premium — has gone into reverse, and history says premium compression overshoots (8x → 0.63x). Below 1.0x the entire model is value-destructive: every share issued shrinks BTC/share, and the company kept issuing (¥52B in Q1). The coins are ~35% underwater; the income statement is a Bitcoin chart (−$725M Q1); the financing depends on one opaque Cayman counterparty (EVO) whose warrant exercises already froze once. The moat is a closing policy window — a Japanese 20% flat crypto tax or a spot BTC ETF would erase the whole reason to pay a premium. Sector-wide, the bellwether MSTR is also below NAV (0.70x) and Jim Chanos called the entire DAT model "silly" — when the leader's playbook breaks, the followers break worse. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): BTC chopped sideways near $50–60k, Japan passed crypto-tax reform, a domestic BTC ETF launched, the premium never recovered, dilution continued, and 3350.T became a permanently-discounted, ever-diluting closed-end fund trading at 0.5–0.7x NAV — a value trap. Multiples too high? No — they've inverted to a discount; the risk is not over-valuation but a permanent discount + dilution spiral.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the money-machine: the model only creates value when mNAV > 1.0x. It is <1.0x. Therefore the core value-creation mechanism is currently switched off, and the company's reflexive response (keep buying BTC via issuance) actively destroys per-share value below NAV. The bull case requires a re-rating you cannot underwrite — it depends on Bitcoin's price and retail sentiment, neither of which management controls.
• Revenue concentration: ~95% of income is one options strategy (writing BTC puts) that is short-volatility and procyclical — it pays best right up until a crash, then forces coin assignment (cash out) at the worst moment. Concentrate-and-correlate risk: the income source and the balance-sheet risk are the same exposure (Bitcoin vol), pointing the same direction in a crisis.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the entire premium is a tax/ETF arbitrage with a legislative expiry date. Japan is debating a flat 20% crypto tax; a domestic spot BTC ETF is plausible. Either kills the reason to pay >1.0x. A "moat" that a single Diet vote can delete is not a moat.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: spot Bitcoin and BTC ETFs. They deliver the same exposure at 1.0x with no dilution, no counterparty, no key-man, no warrant overhang. The moment Japanese retail can hold BTC tax-efficiently directly, Metaplanet's premium has no reason to exist.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance flags: issuing equity below NAV (Q1 FY2026); dependence on a single Cayman fund (EVO) via moving-strike warrants (a structure widely associated with "death-spiral" financing — floating strike revisable down to ¥187); a promotional Eric-Trump advisory seat; and a "100% debt-free" narrative that omits the $100M BTC-collateralized loan.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: that the discount narrows (not widens), that management stops diluting and executes buybacks, that BTC doesn't break lower (avg cost ~$90k+ vs spot ~$58.5k), and that Japan leaves the tax arbitrage intact. That's four bets, each independent.
• If growth (BTC/share) disappoints by 20–30%: the stock is already pricing failure (0.63x basic); a further leg of dilution at a discount could push it toward 0.5x NAV — a closed-end-fund-style permanent discount. Downside from here is "permanently-discounted diluting fund."
• The single scenario that permanently impairs the business: Japan equalizes crypto taxation (or launches a spot BTC ETF) while BTC is in a bear market. Plausibility: moderate and rising — crypto-tax reform is on Japan's policy agenda. That one event removes the demand engine and the premium simultaneously, leaving a sub-NAV, over-diluted vehicle.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Below 1.0x mNAV, what is your hard, pre-committed rule — will you cease all common-equity issuance and pivot fully to buybacks until the premium is restored, and at what mNAV threshold exactly?
2. What is the maximum dilution (shares + warrant + preferred conversion) you will accept, and what BTC-per-share floor will you defend?
3. Walk through the EVO Fund relationship: ownership, economics, who controls warrant-exercise timing, and your concentration risk if EVO stops exercising (as in Oct 2025).
4. The "100% debt-free" framing excludes the $100M BTC-collateralized loan and the preferred dividends — what is the full fixed-claim stack senior to common, and what BTC price triggers a margin call on that loan?
5. If Japan equalizes crypto taxation at ~20% or approves a domestic spot BTC ETF, what specifically is your reason for shareholders to keep paying a premium — and what's the contingency?
6. Your options desk writes cash-secured puts — quantify the assignment/cash-drain scenario in a 30%+ overnight BTC gap-down. How much cash could be called away at the worst moment?
7. BTC Yield decelerated every quarter in 2025 (95.6% → 11.9%). What is a realistic per-share BTC-growth rate for 2026–27, and how does it survive a discount regime?
8. The 555 Million / 210,000-BTC plan was set when mNAV was >1.0x. Is it still operative below NAV, and would you slow accumulation to protect BTC/share?
9. Average cost basis is ~$90k+ against ~$58.5k spot — at what point, if ever, would you realize losses or pause buying, and how do you think about averaging down vs. preserving optionality?
10. What governance and independent-director oversight exists over a strategy this concentrated and this dependent on the CEO's volatility read?
11. How do you intend to narrow the discount beyond buybacks — index inclusion, dual-listing/ADR, dividend, partial monetization?
12. What is the MARS/MERCURY preferred total capacity, dividend burden, and conversion overhang, and how do you avoid those becoming the next dilution source?
13. What insider ownership do you and the team hold, and have you bought in the open market during the drawdown?
14. What is the role and value of the Eric Trump advisory seat beyond marketing?
15. In your own pre-mortem, what is the most likely way this thesis is permanently impaired, and what early-warning metric would tell you first?

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