Mineral Resources

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

What it actually is: a three-legged industrial conglomerate, not a critical-materials pure-play. The "critical-materials" coverage bucket is misleading. Mineral Resources is a mining-services contractor that grew into a mine owner, and today it runs three distinct businesses under one balance sheet:

1. Mining Services — the original and structurally best business. MinRes provides contract crushing, processing, haulage, and infrastructure to third-party miners and to its own mines under long-term, volume-based (often take-or-pay-flavoured) contracts. It is a fee-for-tonnes annuity that earns regardless of whether the underlying commodity is iron ore or lithium, and regardless of who owns the ore. FY25 record production: 280 million wet metric tonnes (wmt) processed; FY26 guidance lifted to 320–330Mt. This leg is the reason the company survived the 2024 lithium crash.

2. Iron Ore — dominated by Onslow Iron (MinRes ~57% economic post-haul-road-sale; historically referenced as the flagship growth asset), a new ~35Mtpa hub in WA's Pilbara that reached nameplate in 2025. Plus the legacy, higher-cost Pilbara Hub (Utah Point). Onslow is a low-cost, long-life asset: FOB cost A$52/wmt in H1 FY26, targeting ~A$45/wmt at full capacity, which sits in the lower half of the global cost curve.

3. Lithium — 50% of Wodgina (JV with Albemarle) and Mt Marion (JV with Ganfeng), both hard-rock spodumene. MinRes is operator of both. This is the most volatile, most leveraged, and most capital-hungry leg — and the one the market trades the stock on.

Contract structure / key terms. Mining Services is the crown jewel because its economics are decoupled from commodity price — MinRes gets paid per tonne moved/crushed under multi-year contracts. Onslow additionally carries a life-of-mine tolling liability: after selling 49% of the haul road, MinRes pays the road trust a CPI-linked A$8.04/t (100% basis) toll, capped at 40Mtpa, resetting lower after 30 years. Lithium is sold as SC6 spodumene concentrate into offtake with the JV partners; POSCO will lift concentrate pro-rata once its 30% JV stake closes (below).

Key stakeholders. Customers: global steel mills (iron ore, via Platts 62% IODEX pricing, ~88% realisation at Onslow) and lithium converters/offtakers (Albemarle, Ganfeng, and soon POSCO). Founder/MD Chris Ellison owns 10.54%, the largest holder and the central governance fact of the whole company.

Supply Chain

Upstream inputs → MinRes → end customer, with names:

• Inputs to MinRes's mines: diesel/energy (a major cost line for a haulage-heavy model), mining consumables, and — critically — its own Mining Services division as an internal supplier (MinRes crushes and hauls its own ore, capturing the contractor margin in-house). Autonomous road trains on the Onslow haul road are the signature infrastructure bet.
• Iron ore chain: Ken's Bore mine → 150km private sealed Onslow haul road (49% owned by Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners via the Onslow Iron Road Trust; MinRes 51%) → Port of Ashburton (transshipment via barges to Capesize vessels offshore) → steel mills, primarily China. The haul road is the single most important physical chokepoint — a road outage caps the entire iron-ore business, which is exactly why MinRes prioritised sealing it (a wet-season washout episode constrained haulage before the Sept-2025 upgrade to "unconstrained" speeds).
• Lithium chain: Wodgina & Mt Marion ore → on-site concentrators (MinRes-operated) → SC6 spodumene → JV partners' converters (Albemarle, Ganfeng) and soon POSCO's downstream cathode/precursor plants in Korea → battery cells (CATL and the broader Chinese battery complex sit at the demand end).
• Mining Services customers (third-party): a roster of WA iron-ore and lithium juniors/mid-caps that outsource crushing and haulage to MinRes rather than build it themselves.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) the Onslow haul road (physical single point of failure for iron ore); (2) Port of Ashburton transshipment capacity; (3) China as the dominant end-market for both iron ore and lithium — a concentration risk that is macro, not company-specific; (4) JV-partner alignment in lithium — MinRes operates but does not solely control Wodgina/Mt Marion, so partner capital decisions (e.g. the A$490M Mt Marion expansion approved jointly with Ganfeng) require consensus.

Competitive Advantages (moats)

The real moat is Mining Services, and it is genuinely durable. MinRes's structural edge is being the lowest-friction, in-house contractor-plus-owner in WA hard-rock mining. The moats, ranked by durability:

• Process/scale moat (Mining Services) — strong. Decades of contract crushing (CSI) and processing (PMI) since the 2006 IPO give MinRes a fleet, workforce, and know-how that a junior miner cannot replicate cheaply. Switching costs are real: once MinRes builds and operates your crushing circuit under a long contract, ripping it out mid-life is disruptive and expensive. This is the annuity that lets the group survive commodity troughs. This is the part of the business a quality investor should actually pay up for.
• Cost-curve moat (Onslow Iron) — strong but commodity-exposed. A ~A$45/wmt FOB target puts Onslow in the lower half of the iron-ore cost curve, which converts to fat margins in upswings and survivability in downturns. But it's a relative-cost moat, not a price-setting one — MinRes is a price-taker on 62% Fe.
• Vertical-integration moat — moderate. By owning both the mines and the contractor, MinRes captures margin twice and controls its own ramp-up. Clever, but it also means the group carries both the operating leverage of a miner and the capital intensity of an infrastructure builder.
• Lithium — weak/absent moat. Wodgina and Mt Marion are good hard-rock resources, but MinRes has no pricing power in spodumene; it is a swing producer in a market set at the margin by Chinese lepidolite and African supply. The lithium leg is an option, not a moat.

Bargaining power: Over third-party Mining Services customers — meaningful (they need MinRes's fleet more than MinRes needs any single contract). Over iron-ore buyers — none (commodity). Over lithium JV partners — shared control, so limited. Over suppliers/lenders — improved sharply in 2026 as the balance sheet healed (see Lens 5), but MinRes spent 2024–25 as a taker of capital-market terms, not a setter.

Segments

No our figures on the shelf (web-only), so all figures are ``, primarily from MinRes's own FY25 release and FY26 quarterlies:

Group P&L (FY25, ``): Revenue A$4.5B (−15% y/y); Underlying EBITDA A$0.9B (−15%); Underlying net loss after tax −A$112M; Statutory net loss −A$896M (including A$632M post-tax non-cash impairments). Geography: revenue is overwhelmingly China-end-market for both commodities. The FY25 loss is the trough; H1 FY26 already swung back — Underlying EBITDA A$1.2B for H1 FY26 alone, i.e. the half-year already beat the entire prior full year, driven by Onslow volume and the lithium price snap-back.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result (latest print: Q3 FY26 quarterly, reported ~30 Apr 2026)

The most recent hard data point is the Q3 FY26 quarterly activity report (quarter to 31 Mar 2026), which was materially positive on every axis:

• Operations beat and guidance was raised, not held: Iron ore FY26 guidance lifted to 17.7–19.4M wmt; Mining Services to 320–330Mt (from 305–325Mt); lithium volumes lifted at both mines.
• Lithium price inflection: realised US$2,105/dmt SC6, +92% q/q — the single biggest swing factor in the print.
• Iron ore: Onslow produced 7.8Mt / shipped 7.2Mt (100% basis) in the quarter, running at nameplate; realised ~US$90/dmt earlier in the year (~88% of IODEX).
• Balance sheet — the headline: net debt cut to ~A$4.5B with liquidity up to A$1.8B, from ~A$4.9B. Management guided to near or below the 2x net-leverage target by June 2026.
• Debt refinancing (post-quarter): MinRes issued US$1.3B senior unsecured notes — US$650M @ 6.00% due 2032 and US$650M @ 6.25% due 2034 — to refinance higher-cost debt, repay the iron-ore prepayment facility, and redeem part of the 2028 notes. Estimated ~A$48M/yr interest saving, and nothing major due until 2032.
• Market reaction: shares jumped ~7% on the guidance upgrade. Over the full cycle the stock ran ~330% off its late-2024/early-2025 low near A$23 to ~A$65.

Unusual vs. own history: FY25 was a genuine near-death balance-sheet scare (net debt A$5.3B against A$0.9B EBITDA = ~5.9x trough leverage). The Q3 FY26 print is the confirmation that the de-lever thesis is working — driven by (a) Onslow finally at full rate and cash-generative since Nov-2024, (b) the lithium price recovery, and (c) A$1.2B+ of asset-sale proceeds (haul road + POSCO). This is a company that went from solvency question to operational execution story in ~18 months.

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on the shelf. From reported call coverage across FY25→FY26:

• FY25 results / early FY26 (mid-2025): tone was defensive and survival-framed — "positions for long-term success," value-preservation in lithium, cost-out, Bald Hill mothballed. Management was managing a balance-sheet crisis and a governance crisis simultaneously.
• H1 FY26 (Feb-2026): tone shifted to cautious optimism — record H1 EBITDA (A$1.2B), Onslow "progressing towards nameplate," deleveraging narrative front and centre.
• Q3 FY26 (Apr-2026): tone is now confident/offensive — guidance upgrades, "debt refinancing boost," "billion-dollar balance-sheet turnaround," reinvestment resuming (Mt Marion A$490M expansion approved).

The arc: survive → stabilise → reinvest, tracking exactly with the net-debt line. What they stopped saying: the crisis-era "orderly transition / succession" language — pointedly, because they scrapped the succession plan (Lens 9). What they keep saying: "2x leverage target," "Onslow nameplate / low-cost," "Mining Services record volumes." Sentiment is the most bullish it has been in two years — which is itself a mild contrarian caution flag (Lens 12).

Comps

MinRes is a genuine sum-of-parts oddity — no clean single peer. It's part diversified miner, part mining-services contractor, part lithium producer. Peers pulled from the research-layer _index.json (critical-materials topic) plus the obvious ASX names the index misses (PLS/Pilbara, IGO). Multiples are `` with date, or n/a. No multiple is fabricated.

Read: at ~10.4x LTM EV/EBITDA MinRes screens neither cheap nor dear on trailing numbers — but trailing EBITDA is depressed (trough year), so the multiple looks reasonable only because the "E" is small. On forward, normalised numbers (Onslow at full rate + a stabilised lithium price), bulls argue EV/EBITDA compresses to high-single-digits, which is the crux of the long case. Consensus 12-month price target ~A$68–69 (high A$87, low A$27) — i.e. the Street sees ~5% upside to the current A$65 with an enormous dispersion, which tells you the name is a lithium-price / execution call, not a value call.

Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~last 5 years — what the market actually reacts to)

The pattern is unusually legible for MinRes — the stock reacts to (1) the lithium spodumene price, (2) the net-debt line, and (3) Ellison-governance headlines, in roughly that order:

• 2022–early 2023: spodumene mania → MinRes ran hard as a lithium proxy despite iron ore/services being the bulk of cash flow. Market reacts to lithium price.
• 2024 (down ~48% on the year): twin collapse — spodumene crash and the Ellison governance scandal (AFR revelations of undeclared BVI payments, personal use of company resources) → shares fell to a ~A$23 low, MinRes became one of the most-shorted ASX names (31st by % of issued shares at Dec-2025). Market reacts to governance + debt fear + lithium.
• Late 2024–2025: Onslow first cash flow (Nov-2024), haul road sale to MSIP (A$1.3B), then the ~330% recovery as the solvency fear drained. Market reacts to deleveraging.
• 2026: guidance upgrades (+7% single-day), the US$1.3B notes deal ("burying the debt bear case"), POSCO lithium JV — all up catalysts. Then June-2026: shares "smashed" alongside PLS (−22%) and Liontown (−30%) as spodumene fell ~12% in the month on CATL's Jiangxi mine restart and rising Chinese supply. Market still reacts, violently, to the lithium price.

Conclusion: despite Mining Services being the steadiest earner and iron ore being the biggest, the market prices MinRes as a levered lithium option with an iron-ore ramp kicker and a governance discount. That mispricing of what the cash flow actually is is the single most interesting analytical fact about the name.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

Chris Ellison (Founder & Managing Director) — a genuine builder with a genuine governance problem. This is the defining lens for MinRes.

• Track record — outstanding, quantified. Ellison built MinRes from a 2006 merger of three WA mining-services firms (PIHA, CSI, PMI), IPO'd at A$0.90, and grew it into a ~A$12.8B company with a world-class low-cost iron-ore asset (Onslow) that he willed into existence against sceptics. 36+ years in mining contracting. As an operator and asset-builder, he is elite — Onslow's ramp to nameplate inside a year of first shipment is a real feat.
• Tenure & skin in the game — very high. ~20 years at the helm; 10.54% ownership (largest shareholder) after trimming ~1.75M shares (A$122.4M) in May-2026 to seed a family office — his first sale since 2017. Alignment is real; the founder eats his own cooking.
• Capital-allocation history — mixed-to-good, with a near-miss. The Mining Services + Onslow build is value-creating and clever (capturing contractor margin in-house). But he over-levered into the 2024 downturn — net debt A$5.3B against A$0.9B EBITDA (~5.9x) — and only the haul-road and POSCO asset sales, plus the lithium price bailout, averted a genuinely dangerous outcome. Great builder, aggressive-to-reckless balance-sheet manager.
• Red flags — severe and unresolved. An external probe found Ellison ran the listed company as a "personal fiefdom" — using employees on his boat and properties, undeclared conflicts, keeping the board in the dark, and a tax-evasion scheme via BVI entities. He was fined A$8.8M by the company, forfeited incentives up to A$9.6M, and agreed to donate A$1M/yr for 5 years. ASIC has a formal investigation open into related-party transactions, the Kali Metals IPO, continuous disclosure, and directors' duties. Chair James McClements departed; Malcolm Bundey (no mining background) is now chair.
• The most important governance fact: the board originally announced Ellison would step down within 12–18 months (by mid-2026) — then scrapped the succession plan entirely at the AGM, with Bundey saying they "could not confidently deliver the intended outcomes of a smooth transition without creating unnecessary risk." Ellison stays indefinitely. Key-person risk and governance overhang are therefore structural, not transitional.
• Founder vs. professional manager: unambiguously a founder-operator — which explains both the asset-building brilliance and the "fiefdom" behaviour. For this stage (a de-levered, cash-generative mid-cap that needs institutional-grade governance to re-rate), the founder-control setup is a valuation cap, not a catalyst.

Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst; all figures `` (no filings on shelf to cross-tie):

• Earnings quality — the FY25 impairments. Statutory loss −A$896M vs underlying −A$112M, the gap being A$632M post-tax non-cash impairments. Impairments in a trough are defensible (writing down lithium assets at cyclical lows), but they signal that prior-cycle capital was deployed at values the company could not sustain — watch for reversal-vs-further-writedown as lithium recovers.
• Cash-flow vs. earnings divergence — the capital intensity. MinRes has run A$1.0–1.1B/yr capex (FY24 A$1,098M; FY26 guide A$1.1B, front-half weighted). For years, reported EBITDA did not convert to free cash flowFree cash flowCash left after paying to run and maintain the business. Unlike profit, it is hard to flatter with accounting choices. because Onslow was consuming it — the entire de-lever thesis rests on capexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. now falling and Onslow cash flow rising. This is the number to police every quarter.
• Balance-sheet engineering / off-balance-sheet-ish structures. The de-lever was achieved substantially via monetising future cash flows: (a) selling 49% of the haul road for A$1.3B while retaining a life-of-mine A$8.04/t toll obligation — i.e. MinRes converted an owned asset into a per-tonne cost annuity paid to MSIP; (b) an iron-ore prepayment facility (A$556M balance at Q1 FY26, being repaid with the new notes); (c) the Onslow carry loan (A$714M) financing partners' share. None are fraudulent, but they mean headline net debt understates the full economic claims on future Onslow tonnes — a careful analyst should treat the toll and prepayment as quasi-debt.
• Related-party risk — flagged by the regulator, not just the analyst. The Ellison-entity transactions and the Kali Metals IPO are under active ASIC investigation — this is a live, external forensic flag, not a hypothetical.
• SBC / non-GAAP flattering: MinRes's "Underlying" adjustments (excluding the A$632M impairment) materially change the optics from a ~A$900M statutory loss to a ~A$112M underlying loss. The adjustments are reasonable but, as always, the statutory number is the one that hit book equity.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (EDGAR LR/AAER): none possible — MinRes has no CIK and does not file with the SEC (confirmed in regulatory/regulatory-findings.md, total_sec_findings: 0). Not a clean bill of health, just the wrong jurisdiction.
• Non-SEC (the material findings): ASIC has an open formal investigation into MinRes/Ellison covering related-party transactions, the Kali Metals IPO, continuous disclosure, and directors' duties; the ATO pursued Ellison's BVI tax scheme; Ellison paid A$8.8M to the company and forfeited up to A$9.6M in incentives. This is the single largest non-price risk in the name.
• Company's own legal-proceedings disclosure (Item-3 equivalent): in the absence of a 10-KForm 10-KA company’s audited annual report to the US regulator. The most complete thing it publishes., the analogue is MinRes's ASX continuous-disclosure and annual-report contingencies — the Ellison matters and ASIC investigation are the disclosed material items.
• Verdict: Material regulatory/governance findings DO exist — an active ASIC investigation and a concluded ATO/company penalty against the sitting MD. Verified via regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (SEC: none, wrong jurisdiction) + web search across ASIC/ATO coverage as of 2026-07-06. This is not a "no findings" name.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection (FY26 → FY28)

No our model create (unattended --watchlist rule). EPS built bottom-up; all inputs labeled; outputs ``. MinRes has ~197M shares (Ellison's 20.83M = 10.54% ⇒ ~197.6M total).

Segment EBITDA logic (AUD):

• Mining Services: ~320–330Mt at a stable per-tonne margin → the reliable ~A$500–700M EBITDA annuity floor.
• Iron Ore (Onslow at ~18Mt attributable + Pilbara Hub): at ~US$90/dmt realised and ~A$52→A$45/wmt FOB, Onslow throws off strong margins; the swing variable is the 62% Fe price, which consensus sees softening toward ~US$97/dmt into 2026.
• Lithium (50% of Wodgina + Mt Marion, ~250–300k dmt SC6 attributable): every US$500/t of realised SC6 is enormous operating leverage. Q3 FY26 was US$2,105/dmt; June-2026 the price wobbled −12%. This line alone determines whether FY27 EPS is A$3 or A$6.

Scenario EPS (``, AUD, illustrative given no consensus EPS on the shelf):

At A$65, the base case ⇒ ~19x FY27 / ~14x FY28 P/E — reasonable-to-full for a cyclical whose earnings quality is dominated by a commodity it can't price. The Street's ~A$68–69 target sits between base and bull and implies the lithium recovery holds. The honest read: the easy money (solvency-fear unwind) has been made; from here you are underwriting the spodumene price and Onslow execution. Consensus dispersion (A$27 low → A$87 high) confirms this is a wide-outcome name.

Brier forecast NOT logged (unattended breadth run).

Bull vs Bear

Bull case. The balance-sheet fire is out — net debt ~A$4.5B and falling toward <2x, nothing due until 2032, A$48M/yr less interest. Onslow is a long-life, lower-half-of-cost-curve iron-ore machine now at full 35Mtpa, generating real cash. Mining Services is a decoupled fee annuity growing to 320–330Mt that the market largely ignores. Lithium is a free option that just proved its torque (+92% realised SC6 in a quarter), with a tier-1 strategic partner (POSCO) validating the assets at ~A$3.9B for MinRes's 50% — well above where the market carries them. Re-investment has resumed (Mt Marion A$490M). If lithium normalises even at ~US$1,500–1,800/t, the SOTP (services multiple + iron-ore cash flow + lithium optionality + haul-road toll receivable) argues for a materially higher number than A$65.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment-grade risks). (1) Governance is unfixed and structural — Ellison stays indefinitely, ASIC is still investigating, and a founder who ran the company as a "fiefdom" caps the multiple institutions will pay forever, not just until a transition. (2) The de-lever was bought with future cash flow — the haul-road toll (A$8.04/t to MSIP), prepayments, and carry loans are quasi-debt that thins Onslow's true free cash flow; a second commodity downturn hits a company that has already spent its balance-sheet flexibility. (3) Lithium is a price-taker in a structurally oversupplied market — Chinese lepidolite/CATL supply (Jiangxi restart) and African spodumene can cap prices for years; the June-2026 −12% move is the reminder. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): spodumene rolled back under US$1,200 as Chinese supply returned, iron ore drifted to mid-US$80s, Onslow's real (post-toll, post-prepayment) cash conversion disappointed, ASIC escalated to enforcement/penalty, and a still-in-charge Ellison made another self-dealing headline — the stock round-trips toward the mid-A$30s.

Are multiples too high? On trough-normalised forward numbers, no — high-single-to-low-teens EV/EBITDA for a de-levering cyclical is defensible. On trailing and governance-adjusted terms, the stock is fully priced for the recovery it just had. Contrarian view the market is missing: the market keeps trading MinRes as a lithium stock (it cratered in June with PLS/Liontown), but its most valuable, most durable asset is the Mining Services annuity — a hidden industrials business inside a commodity wrapper. The re-rate that isn't priced would come from the market re-classifying MinRes as "contractor + low-cost iron ore with a lithium call option" rather than "levered lithium proxy." The blocker to that re-rate is, ironically, governance — which is why the Ellison overhang is the true swing factor, more than the spodumene price.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the money machine? MinRes doesn't set the price of anything it sells — iron ore (62% Fe) and spodumene are both price-taker commodities into a single dominant buyer (China). The only price-insulated leg is Mining Services, and even that is derivative of its customers' commodity fortunes — in a deep miners' downturn, third-party volumes and contract renewals soften too. The whole group is one China-demand + commodity-price bet wearing three hats.
• Revenue concentration: end-market concentration in China for both commodities; operational concentration on a single haul road (one washout/outage caps iron ore); and partner concentration (Albemarle/Ganfeng control lithium capital jointly).
• Weaker-than-bulls-think moat: the lithium assets have no moat — they're marginal-cost swing tonnes. Even the vaunted low-cost Onslow is a relative advantage that evaporates in absolute terms if 62% Fe breaks toward US$80.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: on lithium, Chinese domestic supply (lepidolite) + CATL's own upstream (Jiangxi) — they can flood the market on policy/permit timing, not economics, and did in June-2026. On iron ore, the majors (BHP/Rio/FMG) simply out-scale MinRes on cost.
• Worst capital-allocation / incentive red flags: the A$8.8M penalty against the sitting MD, the BVI tax scheme, the "personal fiefdom" finding, the scrapped succession plan, and the open ASIC investigation — this is a management-quality short case on its own, independent of commodities. A founder who bills the company for his boat is a governance discount you underwrite indefinitely.
• Assumptions that must hold for A$65: spodumene stays well above US$1,500; iron ore holds ~US$95; Onslow's post-toll, post-prepayment cash conversion is as good as the headline; ASIC does not escalate; and Ellison causes no further damage. Break any two and the thesis wobbles.
• What if growth disappoints 20–30%? A 25% haircut to normalised lithium+iron EBITDA, on a name carrying quasi-debt (toll + prepayments), compresses equity value hard given the operating and financial leverage stack — plausibly a 30–40% drawdown to the mid-A$40s/high-A$30s.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a multi-year spodumene glut (Chinese/African supply structurally caps prices) coincident with an iron-ore reset to mid-US$80s — MinRes, having already monetised its balance-sheet flexibility to survive 2024, would face the next downturn with fewer levers. Plausibility: moderate — not a base case, but far from tail given how young and supply-elastic the lithium market is.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Now that succession is scrapped, what specific, board-enforced controls prevent a recurrence of the related-party conduct that led to the A$8.8M penalty — and will you publish them?
2. What is the full economic claim on future Onslow tonnes once you stack the MSIP toll (A$8.04/t), the iron-ore prepayment, and partner carry loans — i.e. what is Onslow's true free cash flow per tonne after all of it?
3. Where does the current ASIC investigation stand, what is the realistic range of outcomes (enforcement, penalty, director bans), and what have you provisioned?
4. What normalised spodumene price underpins your capital plan (Mt Marion A$490M expansion), and at what price do you mothball again?
5. Disaggregate Mining Services margin per tonne — how much is genuinely decoupled from your customers' commodity exposure vs. cyclical with it?
6. At what iron-ore price does Onslow's cash margin turn uncomfortable, and what is the group cash breakeven across all three divisions?
7. Post-POSCO (30% of the lithium JV), what is MinRes's go-forward attributable share of Wodgina/Mt Marion output and cash flow, and does POSCO get board/capital veto rights?
8. What is the glide path and hard timeline to <2x net leverage, and what disqualifies further asset sales as the de-lever mechanism?
9. How much of the FY25 A$632M impairment could reverse at current lithium prices, and what would trigger a further write-down?
10. Why should institutional investors pay a market multiple for a company where the founder-MD has an indefinite, uncapped tenure and a documented governance record?
11. What is the customer/end-market concentration to China across iron ore and lithium, and what is the diversification plan (POSCO/Korea aside)?
12. What is the operational single-point-of-failure plan for the Onslow haul road (wet-season resilience, redundancy)?
13. What return hurdle do you apply to growth capex now that the balance sheet is repaired, and how does it compare to buying back stock at these levels?
14. How should we think about Ellison's May-2026 share sale (A$122.4M) and family-office setup — is further selling likely, and does it change alignment?
15. What is the five-year vision — do you remain a three-legged conglomerate, or does the logical endgame separate Mining Services (a re-ratable industrials annuity) from the commodity mines?

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