Onto Innovation

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

Onto Innovation is a pure-play semiconductor process-control company — it designs, builds and supports the metrology and inspection tools that fabs and packaging houses use to measure and police what they are building, plus the analytical software that turns that measurement data into yield decisions. It does not make the wafers or the chips; it makes the instruments that tell chipmakers whether their multi-billion-dollar lines are producing good die.

Product families (all ):

• Atlas (and Atlas G6) — automated optical-critical-dimension (OCD) + thin-film + wafer-stress metrology for transistor/interconnect; the advanced-node workhorse (measures features to 5nm/3nm/2nm). Supported by AI Diffract, SpectraProbe and the AiGen X compute engine.
• Dragonfly (G3, and the new G5) / Firefly / NSX / F30 — 2D/3D macro-defect inspection for front-end fabs and back-end advanced packaging.
• JetStep X500 — advanced-packaging lithography stepper, including for large rectangular panels (up to 650×650mm).
• MetaPULSE / Echo — non-contact opaque-film metrology (metal interconnect, 3D-NAND hard-mask).
• NovusEdge / Element — edge/backside inspection and FTIR compositional analysis for EUV-grade wafers.
• FAaST / CnCV / MBIR — three lines added via the Semilab USA acquisition (Q4 2025) for in-line contamination monitoring, wide-bandgap (SiC/GaN) materials characterization and infrared OCD.
• Discover / process-control & yield-management software (APC/YMS) — the data layer.
• 4D Technology — interferometry for high-precision optics, aerospace and scientific markets (the non-semi sliver).

Revenue model: ~84% systems & software, ~8% parts, ~8% services in FY25. This is a capital-equipment cadence, not recurring SaaS: metrology sales are lumpy and front-loaded to each new node ramp; advanced-packaging inspection is more volume-driven (tied to assembly throughput, not node transitions). >190 customers across 25+ countries in 2025. Warranty 12–14 months; direct sales/service in US, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, Vietnam, Singapore, Europe.

End-markets: logic (incl. gate-all-around), memory (DRAM/HBM, 3D-NAND with 700+ layers), advanced packaging (CoWoSCoWoSTSMC’s method of packing a processor and its memory onto one carrier so they sit close together. Supply of it has been a hard limit on how many AI chips can be built., HBMHigh-bandwidth memoryMemory stacked in layers beside a processor so data reaches it faster. The usual bottleneck in AI chips. stacks, 2.5D/3D, panel), plus specialty (SiC/GaN power, CIS, MEMS, RF). The two structural growth vectors are advanced packaging for AI and advanced-node metrology (GAA + HBM).

Supply Chain

Upstream (inputs into Onto): precision optics and lasers are the critical, long-lead inputs — the 10-KForm 10-KA company’s audited annual report to the US regulator. The most complete thing it publishes. states lead times for qualifying a new supplier of lasers and certain optics can be ~1 year, other components ~9 months, and some component shipments have >6-month lead times. A significant number of components/subassemblies are sole- or single-sourced, and Onto does not hold long-term contracts with many suppliers — a genuine chokepoint on its own ramp. Onto outsources non-differentiating assemblies to contract manufacturers and keeps differentiating modules in-house. The filing does not name individual suppliers (the lens stays partly generic here because the disclosure is generic — a known gap; named optics/laser suppliers were not sourced this run → n/a).

Onto's own manufacturing: Milpitas CA, Tucson AZ, Wilmington MA (HQ), Bloomington MN, plus contract manufacturers worldwide. Substantially all long-lived assets are in the US.

Downstream (Onto → end customer): Onto sells directly to the chipmakers and packaging houses. The named end-buyers are inferable from geography and the customer concentration: leading-edge logic foundries (Taiwan), memory makers (Korea — DRAM/HBM), OSAT/advanced-packaging houses, and a rising US/China cohort. Top-3 customers = 49% of FY25 revenue (see Lens 1/Lens 4). Onto's integrated-metrology (IMPULSE) systems bolt onto other WFE vendors' process tools — so a slice of revenue depends on third-party equipment suppliers' sales and their goodwill (they could build competing IM; Nova is the named competitor there).

Chokepoint summary: the binding constraints are (1) inbound optics/lasers (single-source, year-long requalification) and (2) customer concentration on a handful of leading-edge fabs. Onto is itself a chokepoint supplier into the AI buildout — see Lens 3.

Competitive Advantages (moats)

Onto sits in a structurally attractive corner of WFE: process control is an oligopoly, and Onto is the clear #2–3 in several sub-niches behind KLA.

• Named competitive map: thin-film & OCD metrology → KLA, Nova; advanced-packaging inspection → KLA, Camtek; advanced-packaging lithography → Ushio, Canon; panel inspection → GigaVis; process-control software → PDF Solutions; integrated metrology → Nova.
• Moat sources: (1) Switching costs — the 10-K explicitly cites "the high cost of switching equipment vendors in our markets" as a barrier that cuts both ways (hard to displace incumbents, hard for Onto to win share too). Once a tool is qualified into a customer's recipe at a given node, it stays. (2) Process IP / installed base — 423 granted/licensed patents + 312 pending (expiry 2026–2044) across metrology, defect classification, lithography, AI/ML. (3) Niche leadership in advanced-packaging inspection — Dragonfly is positioned as the cost-of-ownership winner for packaging-specific defects (wafer warp, rough surfaces, sub-200nm) vs front-end-adapted tools.
• Bargaining power: mixed. Against customers it is weak-ish — top-3 = 49%, leading-edge fabs are sophisticated, concentrated buyers. Against suppliers it is weak on optics/lasers (single-source). The moat is the qualification/switching lock-in, not pricing power over either side.
• Where the moat is thinner than bulls think: KLA is bigger, better-capitalized and competes in nearly every Onto niche; Nova is a direct, rising metrology threat; Camtek is a fierce advanced-packaging-inspection rival. Onto is a strong niche player, not a KLA-scale franchise.

Segments

Onto reports as ONE business segment — so there is no segment-level EBIT disclosure. It does disaggregate revenue by source and geography, and management narrates end-market splits on calls.

By source (FY25, FY24, FY23):

Systems & software was flat FY25 (−$2.6M) — the trough — as AI-packaging inspection units dipped and were offset by advanced-node metrology + Semilab SiC. Parts/services grew (installed-base monetization).

By geography (% of revenue):

China collapsed from 17% (FY23) → 7% (FY25) — directly attributed to US export controls. Asia is the majority of revenue and management expects that to persist.

End-market trends (management, calls): advanced nodes (GAA + HBM4 DRAM via Atlas G6) more than doubled to ~$308M in FY25; advanced-packaging base ~$500M (CoWoS, HBM inspection, OSAT, panel); GAA + Iris films ~$100M in FY24. For FY26 management guides advanced packaging +50%, advanced nodes ~+25%, power semis −10% (weak EVEnterprise valueWhat it would cost to buy the whole company: its market value plus its debt, minus the cash you would get with it. Often very different from market cap.).

Q1-2026 source mix: Systems&SW $247.2M (84.7%), Parts $26.6M (9.1%), Services $18.2M (6.2%) of $291.9M; Semilab contributed $24.0M.

---

Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 FY2026, quarter ended Mar 31 2026)

The headline GAAP print looks ugly and is widely misread; the underlying story is a trough-to-acceleration inflection.

GAAP, Q1'26 vs Q1'25:

• Revenue $291.9M vs $266.6M (+9.5% YoY); +9.4% QoQ vs the Jan-2026 quarter.
• Gross profit $146.4M; GM 50.1% vs 53.7% YoY — but the YoY drop is largely $6.1M of Semilab inventory step-up amortization (purchase-accounting, non-recurring) plus E&O write-downs; sequentially GM rose ~3.7pts off the ~46.4% Jan-2026 trough.
• Operating income $33.5M vs $63.1M — the swing is opex +41% YoY ($112.9M vs $80.1M), driven by amortization +$11.3M (Semilab intangibles, $19.7M vs $8.4M), G&A +$8.6M (Semilab integration + ERP), R&D +$7.1M.
• GAAP diluted EPS $0.67 vs $1.30 YoY.
• ⚠ Provenance conflict — surfaced, not resolved: the press/wires report Q1'26 EPS $1.42 as a beat vs $1.41 consensus. That $1.42 is the non-GAAP figure (adds back amortization, inventory step-up, restructuring, SBC); the filing's GAAP number is $0.67. Both are real; the gap ($0.75/sh) is almost entirely acquisition amortization. Do not conflate them.

Vs consensus: revenue $291.9M came in light vs ~$297.9M Street; non-GAAP EPS $1.42 beat ~$1.41. Initial after-hours reaction was −6.4% on the revenue miss + a Q2 outlook some read as soft, then the stock recovered to record highs after the Rigaku deal landed.

Guidance (the real news): Q2'26 revenue $320–330M (~+28% YoY) and a full-year framework of >$1.3B revenue, >30% annual growth, >30% operating margin by Q4. That is a dramatic step-up from FY25's +2%, and it reframes FY25 as the cyclical bottom.

Balance-sheet flags (Q1'26): operating cash flow fell to $26.3M vs $92.0M YoY on a −$41.6M working-capital swing — inventory $298M→$316M and receivables $269M→$307M both built while revenue was only modestly up (watch this; see Lens 10). Cash+securities $654.2M, still effectively debt-free (total liabilities $264M, all operating). Buybacks paused in Q1'26 ($99.9M left on the $200M auth) — consistent with conserving dry powder for Rigaku.

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the on-disk shelf (transcripts/ empty), so this lens is -grounded and lighter than ideal — flag: backfill FY25Q4 → FY26Q1 transcripts on next refresh.

Tone arc across the last ~4 calls:

• FY24 (mid-2024): euphoric — record specialty/AP quarter ($164M), $300M+ volume-purchase agreements for AI packaging + GAA, "AI packaging inflection."
• FY25 (through Q3'25): cautious-but-building — advanced nodes doubling, but AP inspection digesting; China headwind; restructuring/inventory write-downs depress reported margin.
• FY25Q4 / FY26Q1 (Feb–May 2026): decisively bullish on the setup — management put hard numbers on the reacceleration (>30% FY26 growth, >30% Q4 op-margin, AP +50%, advanced nodes +25%), specific design wins (Dragonfly G5 at a 2.5D-logic + an HBM customer; Atlas G6 at a 2nd GAA logic customer), and framed AI packaging as ~30%/yr for two years.
• Things they started saying: "panel-level packaging," "Dragonfly G5," "Rigaku/CD-SAXS X-ray collaboration." Things they stopped emphasizing: the China opportunity (export-controlled away).

Net: sentiment has shifted from "digesting a boom" to "next leg up," with management willing to commit to specific, falsifiable FY26 targets — which is itself a confidence tell (and a risk if they miss).

Comps

Peer set = the process-control / metrology oligopoly + adjacent WFE. Multiples are with date, or n/a. None are fabricated.

Derived ONTO multiples: shares 49.74M (10-QForm 10-QThe quarterly version of the annual report. Lighter, and not audited.); cash+sec $654.2M; EV ≈ $15.5B ($16.1B mktcap − $0.65B net cash); EV/Sales ≈ 15.0x on TTM ~$1.03B revenue, ≈11.9x on FY26 guide ≥$1.30B.

Read: Onto is not cheap on any lens. ~47x forward non-GAAP is roughly in line with Nova (~43–52x) and a touch above KLA (~38–41x EV/EBITDA), and richer than Camtek (~27x). The eye-popping 77–151x trailing GAAP P/E is an artifact of acquisition amortization depressing GAAP EPS — real, but not the number the market is paying on. The group as a whole is priced for the AI-WFE supercycle to keep compounding.

Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves ONTO >5%)

Mostly. The pattern over the last ~2 years:

• Advanced-packaging / AI-inspection data points are the single biggest mover — record specialty/AP quarters and AI-packaging VPA announcements (2024) drove the stock to highs.
• Guidance > the print. Q1'26 is the cleanest example: a revenue miss + soft-read Q2 → −6.4% after-hours, then a rip to record highs once the >30% FY26 framework + Rigaku deal were digested. The market trades the trajectory, not the trailing quarter.
• The Rigaku stake (Apr 20 2026) was a positive catalyst — record high.
• China export-control headlines are a recurring negative (China 17%→7% of revenue).
• Sector beta: as a small-cap WFE name, ONTO amplifies moves in the SOX / KLAC / ASML complex.

Implication: to underwrite ONTO you are underwriting (a) the AI-packaging + GAA capexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. cycle and (b) management hitting its own aggressive FY26 guide. Earnings reactions hinge on forward commentary and AP/advanced-node growth rates, not the GAAP EPS line.

---

Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

• CEO Michael Plisinski — CEO of Rudolph Technologies since Nov 2015, carried through into Onto; ~25 years semicap experience. He architected the 2019 Nanometrics + Rudolph "merger of equals" that created Onto — the defining capital-allocation act of his tenure, and by the numbers a success: Onto compounded from ~$816M (FY23) to >$1B (FY25) revenue and the stock has been a multi-bagger. Founder-style operator-dealmaker archetype (builds via M&A), though not a founder-owner by equity.
• Skin in the game: insider ownership only ~0.86% of shares; institutions 96% (BlackRock, Vanguard, JPM). CEO directly owns 168,505 shares ($54M at $324) — meaningful in absolute dollars, small as a % of a $14B+ company. Professional-manager incentive profile.
• Capital-allocation history: historically disciplined and conservative — net cash, modest buybacks ($75M FY25, paused Q1'26), the value-creating 2019 merger, bolt-on Semilab USA ($436M, Q4 2025). ROE solid (FY25 net income $136.8M on $2.1B equity ≈ 6.5% on an equity base bloated by cash + goodwill; on a cash-adjusted base it is far higher). The $710M Rigaku stake funded by a $500M bridge loan is the first real break from that conservative pattern — see Lenses 12/13.
• Comp alignment: PSUs are benchmarked to relative TSR vs the Philadelphia Semiconductor (SOX) index. Prior tranches vested at the 200% max (2-yr TSR 146%, 3-yr 121%, 90th+ percentile); the 2024 tranche just settled at only 77% of target (Mar 2026) — recent relative underperformance vs the SOX, an honest signal the comp plan is actually working as a meter.
• Red flags: none material on governance. Standard Delaware anti-takeover provisions disclosed as a risk. No related-party issues surfaced. Insider ownership is low but that is typical for a merged-entity professional-management semicap.

Forensic Red Flags

Forensic lens. Every figure labeled. Onto's accounting reads clean; the watch-items are working capital and acquisition optics.

• Income statement — non-GAAP vs GAAP gap is the #1 thing to watch. Q1'26 GAAP EPS $0.67 vs non-GAAP $1.42 — a ~2.1x gap, almost entirely acquisition amortization ($19.7M/qtr) + Semilab inventory step-up ($6.1M) + restructuring ($5.2M). This is legitimate purchase accounting, not aggressive add-backs, but it inflates the "beat" optics and will keep GAAP EPS depressed through the amortization schedule. SBC is modest and honest — $27.6M FY25 (~2.7% of revenue), $7.0M Q1'26.
• Balance sheet — the real yellow flag is inventory + receivables. Inventory $287M (FY24) → $298M (FY25) → $316M (Q1'26) and A/R $269M → $307M while revenue was roughly flat-to-modestly-up. The provision for inventory valuation was $26.5M in FY25 (up from $19.2M FY24) — Onto is actively writing down excess/obsolete inventory tied to exiting older product lines (incl. some lithography). Inventory building ahead of the guided FY26 ramp is defensible (long-lead optics/lasers), but it must convert to the promised revenue — if the >30% guide slips, more write-downs follow. Q1'26 operating cash flow $26.3M vs net income $33.8M (OCF < NI on the −$41.6M WC swing) — watch the cash-conversion gap on the next print.
• Goodwill/intangibles: goodwill $330M → $644M and intangibles $127M → $298M post-Semilab. ~$972M of the $2.4B asset base is now goodwill+intangibles — impairment risk if Semilab/Rigaku underdeliver. No impairment taken to date.
• Cash flow vs earnings: FY25 OCF $328.3M comfortably exceeded net income $136.8M (non-cash amortization/SBC/inventory provisions) — healthy at the annual level. The divergence is only at the noisy quarterly WC level.
• Tax: effective rate 16% FY25 (up from 9%) as the OBBBA trimmed the FDII benefit; Q1'26 11.3%. Pillar Two / global-minimum-tax monitored but US safe-harbor likely protective. No tax aggression flags.
• Controls: disclosure controls deemed effective as of Jan 3 2026; Semilab excluded from the ICFR assessment (closed Q4'25, standard SEC carve-out). Fiscal-year change to a Dec-31 calendar basis effective Q1'26 — cosmetic, but creates period-comparability noise.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. Verified via EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER) search 2021-06-30 → 2026-06-30, 0 findings.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): ordinary-course only; the 10-Q Note states management's opinion that current disputes would not have a material adverse effect. No material litigation disclosed.
• Non-SEC enforcement (FTC/DOJ/FDA/export): no enforcement actions surfaced. The material regulatory exposure is US export controls on China-bound semiconductor technology — not an enforcement action against Onto, but a structural revenue headwind it already absorbed (China 17%→7%). The Rigaku deal carries HSR/foreign regulatory-approval conditions.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-30.

---

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection (FY2026 / FY2027 / FY2028)

Built bottom-up from the latest actuals + management's own framework. Onto reports non-GAAP EPS as the Street number; I model non-GAAP and footnote the GAAP gap. No our model logged — --watchlist mode (skip per skill).

Anchors: FY25 revenue $1,005.3M; mgmt FY26 guide >$1.3B, >30% growth, >30% op-margin exiting Q4; Q2'26 guide $320–330M (~+28%); Street FY26 non-GAAP EPS ~$6.72–7.16; ~49.7M diluted shares, minimal dilutionDilutionIssuing new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the same company.; net cash (pre-Rigaku).

Arithmetic (base): FY26 rev $1.32B × ~28% op-margin ≈ $370M op-income; + ~$15M net interest (lower post-Semilab/Rigaku cash); − 14% tax; ÷ 49.8M sh ≈ **$6.8–6.9 non-GAAP EPS**. GAAP EPS runs **$1.50–2.00/sh lower** on the ~$80M/yr acquisition-amortization drag (growing with Rigaku) — i.e. GAAP FY26 ~$5.0–5.4.

Brier forecast (not logged this run; candidate for a refresh): ONTO FY2026 non-GAAP EPS ≥ $6.50, p ≈ 0.70, resolves 2026-12-31.

Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Onto is a picks-and-shovels chokepoint on the two highest-conviction semis vectors — AI advanced packaging (HBM, CoWoS, 2.5D logic; mgmt guides +50% FY26) and advanced-node metrology (GAA + HBM4 DRAM via Atlas G6; +25% FY26). FY25 was a cyclical trough (+2%); FY26 is a guided >30% reacceleration to >$1.3B with >30% exit op-margins — operating leverage on a largely fixed cost base. The moat is qualification/switching lock-in in an oligopoly where the only bigger player (KLA) can't be everywhere. Net-cash balance sheet, disciplined operator with a proven M&A record, ~$100M buyback dry powder, and Dragonfly G5 / Atlas G6 design wins de-risking the growth. Process control's content per wafer rises every node — a secular tailwind independent of unit volumes. If the guide lands, the stock is ~47x→ mid-30s forward as EPS catches up.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) Customer + end-market concentration — top-3 = 49%, and the growth is levered to a handful of leading-edge AI-packaging and GAA programs; a single HBM/CoWoS push-out or a customer's in-sourcing of inspection guts the FY26 guide. (2) It's a #2/#3, not the franchise — KLA, Nova and Camtek are all well-capitalized and gunning for the same niches; share is contestable and pricing power is limited (the 10-K admits switching costs cut against Onto winning new sockets too). (3) The Rigaku pivot — $710M, 27%, non-controlling, funded by a $500M bridge loan, on a company that has been debt-free for a decade. A minority stake you can't consolidate, at ~$710M for 27% of a Japanese X-ray firm, is a strategic option, not an operating asset — and it converts the pristine balance sheet into net debt for an unproven payoff. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): AI-packaging orders proved pull-forward, FY26 came in ~+12% not +30%, GM never reclaimed 52% as inventory written down again, the Rigaku bridge had to be termed out into real debt with no visible synergy, and a 47x multiple compressed to ~25x → the stock halves even though the business is "fine." Are multiples too high? Yes on any historical lens (10-yr median P/E ~30 vs ~47x fwd / 77–151x trailing GAAP). The price already embeds the guide working. There is little margin of safety if FY26 merely meets rather than beats. Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the bull crowd treats the >30% FY26 guide and AP +50% as near-certain and the Rigaku deal as obviously smart; the under-appreciated risk is that the same guide that is the bull case is also the bear trigger — management has staked credibility on specific numbers in a notoriously lumpy capex business, and the Rigaku debt removes the balance-sheet shock-absorber right as the cycle bet is placed.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Where revenue is concentrated, and the kill-shot: ~49% in three customers, geographically Taiwan+Korea (60%), end-market increasingly AI-packaging + GAA. The whole FY26 thesis rides on a few leading-edge programs (a 2.5D-logic customer, an HBM customer, two GAA logic customers). One HBM4/CoWoS digestion air-pocket — exactly the kind that hit AP-inspection in FY25 — and the +50% AP guide and the >30% total guide both break. WFE is the lumpy industry; Onto just guided as if it isn't.
• The moat is thinner than the multiple implies: the 10-K itself says switching costs make it hard for Onto to take sockets from incumbents. Against KLA (bigger, every niche), Nova (direct metrology, also re-rating, Q1 record), and Camtek (AP inspection), Onto is the contender, not the king. A 47x forward multiple is a franchise multiple on a #2/#3 franchise.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Nova. It is the direct OCD/integrated-metrology rival, just printed record Q1 revenue ($235M), and trades at a similar/again-stretched multiple — meaning the metrology growth Onto is counting on is being contested dollar-for-dollar by a focused, well-run rival.
• Worst capital-allocation move = the one they just made. $710M for 27% of Rigaku, non-controlling, fair-value, not consolidated, with a $500M Goldman bridge — this is a decade-conservative management taking on its first real leverage for a minority option whose synergy ("joint IP," CD-SAXS go-to-market) is years out and unquantified. If the bridge gets termed into permanent debt with no payoff, it is value destruction layered onto a cyclical bet.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: FY26 ≥ +30% and margins reclaim ~30% exit and the multiple holds near 45x. Strip any one and the math breaks.
• What if growth disappoints 20–30%? FY26 at ~+10% (not +30%) → non-GAAP EPS ~$5.4 not ~$6.9; on a de-rated ~28x that's ~$150 vs $324 today — >50% downside in a disappointment.
• Single permanently-impairing scenario: a structural shift in advanced-packaging inspection toward an in-house or KLA-standardized solution at the top two AI customers — plausibility moderate-low but it is the tail that matters because of concentration.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The FY26 framework implies a sharp H2 ramp to clear >$1.3B and a >30% Q4 op-margin — what specific customer POs or volume-purchase agreements underpin that back-half, and what's already booked vs expected?
2. Walk through the Rigaku rationale in hard numbers: what is the expected return on the $710M, when does it turn accretive beyond the Dec-31-2026 claim, and will the $500M Goldman bridge be repaid from cash or termed into permanent debt?
3. Advanced packaging is guided +50% — how much of that is HBM vs 2.5D logic vs panel, and how concentrated is it in your top one or two customers?
4. Inventory has climbed to $316M and you took $26.5M of write-downs in FY25 — how much of current inventory is committed against booked FY26 orders, and what's the write-down risk if the ramp slips a quarter?
5. Where are you actually winning new sockets from KLA, Nova and Camtek versus defending installed base — and what is the win/loss trend at the leading edge?
6. What is the realistic path back to ~53% gross margin, and how much is just the Semilab step-up rolling off vs structural mix/efficiency?
7. China is down to 7% of revenue under export controls — what is the floor, and is any of the FY26 growth China-exposed (i.e. at risk from tighter rules)?
8. Dragonfly G5 and Atlas G6 design wins — how many distinct customers, and how durable is the qualification (multi-node lock-in vs one-node)?
9. Integrated metrology (IMPULSE) rides on third-party WFE platforms where Nova competes — how do you protect that, and what % of revenue is exposed to a partner building competing IM?
10. With buybacks paused for Rigaku, what is the capital-allocation priority stack for the next 24 months — debt paydown, buyback, more M&A?
11. How dependent is the ramp on single-source optics/laser suppliers with ~1-year requalification lead times, and where are the binding supply constraints for FY26?
12. The 2024 PSU tranche settled at 77% of target on relative TSR — how is the board thinking about the comp plan given the recent SOX-relative underperformance?
13. What does the panel-level packaging (JetStep X500) opportunity look like in revenue terms, and when does it move the needle?
14. The fiscal-year change to Dec-31 creates comparability noise — can you bridge the stub/transition cleanly for modeling?
15. What single assumption in your FY26 guide are you least certain of, and what would make you revise it down?

---