Syrah Resources

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Syrah Resources is an ASX-listed (SYR.AX) natural-graphite miner and, uniquely among its peers, a vertically-integrated anode-material producer. Two assets define it:

1. Balama Graphite Operation (Cabo Delgado, northern Mozambique) — the mine. Syrah calls it "the largest high-quality graphite resource outside China," with >50-year mine life and 350,000 tpa installed capacity. It sells natural flake and fine graphite into industrial and battery markets, largely into China's spherical-graphite processors.
2. Vidalia Active Anode Material (AAM) Facility (Louisiana, USA) — the downstream plant. It takes Balama graphite and converts it into coated/purified active anode material, the finished battery input. This is the strategic prize: the only integrated mine-to-AAM chain outside China, and the entire reason the U.S. government is now trying to own a fifth of the company.

Business model in plain terms: dig graphite in Mozambique cheaply; ship it to Louisiana; turn it into the highest-value-added form (AAM) that Western battery makers can buy tariff-free and IRA-compliant. Today only leg one earns real revenue; leg two is pre-commercial.

Key customers / contract structure:

• Tesla — a four-year offtake for the majority of Vidalia AAM. In July 2025 Tesla issued a non-conformance/default notice; Syrah cured it and Tesla withdrew the termination notice on 1 June 2026, but retained the right to terminate if final qualification isn't met by January 2027. Tesla has an option to participate up to 25,000 t at Vidalia.
• Lucid Group (LCID) — a separate contract for ~7,000 t/yr of AAM on a floating-price mechanism, qualification window to 1 Jan 2027.
• Balama's natural-graphite output sells at spot-linked prices (Q1'26: US$630/t) into predominantly Chinese buyers.

Main suppliers: Balama is a low-cost mine, so Syrah is largely its own upstream. Vidalia's binding-input supply chain (binders, purification chemicals, furnaces) is the qualification-sensitive part.

Main competitors: on natural-graphite mining, China (75% of world natural graphite) plus Western juniors (Nouveau Monde, NextSource, Westwater). On AAM, the dangerous competitors are the synthetic-graphite anode makers (Novonix, and China's incumbents) — see Lens 3 and Lens 13.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map, with named stakeholders along the chain:

UPSTREAM (mine) MIDSTREAM (process) DOWNSTREAM (cell / OEM)
Balama pit, Cabo Delgado → [Option A, today] Chinese spherical-graphite
(Syrah, 350ktpa capacity) Chinese spherical-graphite processors → CATL/BYD-tier
 │ converters (bulk of sales) cell makers
 │ natural flake + fines
 │
 └──────────────────────────→ [Option B, the strategy] → Tesla (4-yr offtake, AAM)
 Vidalia AAM plant, Louisiana Lucid (7kt/yr, floating price)
 (Syrah Technologies LLC) + "other auto/battery OEMs"

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies:

• Chokepoint 1 — the mine is the only feedstock. Vidalia is designed around Balama graphite. A Balama halt (which happened — see Lens 5/8) starves both the cash engine and the Vidalia feed. Single-asset upstream risk.
• Chokepoint 2 — Mozambique country risk. Cabo Delgado is the same province that hosts the TotalEnergies LNG force-majeure zone; it carries insurgency risk and, as 2024–25 showed, election-driven civil-unrest risk. Balama is not insurgency-exposed the way LNG is, but the October 2024 election unrest shut it for eight months.
• Chokepoint 3 — qualification is a human chokepoint, not a physical one. Vidalia's output cannot be sold until Tesla/Lucid qualify it. Until then the plant is a cost centre. This is the binding constraint on the whole thesis.
• Chokepoint 4 — Chinese processing dominance. Even Syrah's natural graphite mostly flows through Chinese spherical-graphite converters. Syrah is trying to bypass that with Vidalia; until Vidalia scales, Syrah is still a feeder into the Chinese chain it claims to disrupt.

Names or it didn't happen: Balama (mine) → Chinese spherical converters / Vidalia (Syrah Technologies LLC) → Tesla, Lucid. Government stakeholders now in the chain: U.S. DFC, U.S. DOE, AustralianSuper.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is real but narrow, and it is largely policy-manufactured rather than intrinsic.

• Integration moat (genuine): Syrah is the only company that owns both a scaled non-China graphite mine and a U.S. AAM plant. Peers own one leg or the other. If Vidalia qualifies, Syrah can sell a fully ex-China, IRA/FEOC-compliant, tariff-immune anode — a product almost no one else can offer at scale.
• Cost moat (genuine at the mine): Balama's C1 cash cost is guided at US$430–480/t at ramped volumes. That is low; Balama is a legitimate tier-one deposit by grade and scale.
• Policy moat (large but contingent): the U.S. has stacked ~220% effective tariffs on Chinese natural-graphite AAM (10% IEEPA + 25% §301 + 25% §232 + 66.68% CVD + 93.5% AD). Syrah is literally a petitioner in the antidumping case (American Active Anode Material Producers coalition). This is a moat handed to it by Washington — but it evaporates if the trade case is unwound or if China's export-control détente (suspended controls to 27 Nov 2026) becomes permanent normalisation.
• Switching-cost moat (embryonic): anode qualification takes years per customer. Once Tesla/Lucid qualify Vidalia, they are sticky. But Syrah hasn't earned that stickiness yet — the Tesla dispute shows the switching cost cuts both ways during qualification.

Bargaining power: weak today. A pre-revenue plant negotiating with Tesla — where the dispute "might be more about pricing than quality" per ION Analytics — has almost no leverage. Balama, selling commodity flake into a Chinese-dominated market at $630/t, is a price-taker. Syrah's bargaining power is entirely prospective, contingent on Vidalia becoming the scarce Western AAM source under a tariff wall.

Verdict on moat: durable IF (a) Vidalia qualifies and scales, and (b) the tariff wall holds. Both are external, not intrinsic. This is a moat you rent from policy, not one you own outright.

Lens 4 · Segments

No segments.csv on the research shelf (research layer unavailable). Web-derived structure, all ``:

• By product: (1) Natural graphite (Balama) — the only revenue segment today. FY25 sales ~US$33.4M. (2) AAM (Vidalia) — pre-commercial, testing/qualification only; first commercial sales targeted 2H 2026. Zero segment revenue yet.
• By geography: production split Mozambique (mine) / USA (processing); sales are heavily China-weighted for natural graphite, pivoting toward U.S./OECD as AAM commercialises.

Trend & cause: revenue is decelerating-then-recovering around the operational disruptions, not compounding cleanly. FY25 revenue up ~5.9% YoY to $33.4M but off a Balama-disrupted base. The segment story that matters is binary: AAM goes from 0% to the majority of value if Vidalia qualifies. There is no smooth segment glide-path — it's a step function gated on qualification.

Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

Syrah reports half-yearly (Dec-31 FY) plus ASX quarterly activities reports. Latest hard data points, all ``:

FY2025 (year to 31 Dec 2025):

• Revenue US$33.38M, up ~5.9% YoY.
• Net loss US$100.66M, narrowed ~20% from FY24.
• Q4'25 total cash US$77M (US$18M unrestricted, US$59M restricted).

Q1 2026 quarterly activities report (29 Apr 2026):

• Balama produced 24,000 t natural graphite; 86% recovery, 95% grade — record technical metrics.
• Sold 20,000 t at avg US$630/t.
• Vidalia: testing only, accelerating customer qualification; first commercial AAM sales targeted 2H 2026.
• Pro-forma liquidity ~US$178M at 31 Mar 2026 after a US$72M equity raise (Mar 2026) + non-binding DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper proposals.

Guidance / outlook: medium-term Balama ramp to 200,000–240,000 tpa at C1 US$430–480/t; management targets first Vidalia commercial sales 2H'26. Tone: constructive on funding + tariff tailwind, but explicitly gated on qualification.

Balance-sheet flags (the core problem):

• Structurally loss-making — a ~US$100M net loss on ~US$33M revenue. This is a development-stage cash-burn profile, not an operating business yet.
• Restricted cash — most of the US$77M year-end cash was restricted; unrestricted was only ~US$18M. Liquidity headline flatters the truly available balance.
• DOE loan US$98M under two-year forbearance (effective 30 Jul 2025). Forbearance = the lender agreed not to enforce; it is a distress marker, not a clean facility.
• Convertible notes — Series 4/5/6 maturing 12 May 2028. Refinance/conversion overhang.

Market reaction / what's priced in: the stock trades ~A$0.12 (5 Jul 2026) versus A$0.145 in early March and dips under A$0.10 mid-year — i.e. the market is treating this as a distressed, dilution-heavy option, not pricing Vidalia success. Every capital raise has been met with sharp drops (the A$104M raise cratered the stock ~19% ).

Unusual vs. its own history: the eight-month Balama force-majeure shutdown (Dec 2024–Jul 2025) is the abnormality that broke FY25 and forced the 2026 rescue financing.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on the shelf. Web-derived call/commentary sentiment, ``:

• Through 2024: cautiously optimistic on Vidalia ramp and offtake pipeline.
• Late 2024 → mid 2025 (force majeure): defensive and preservation-mode — the narrative shifted entirely to regaining site access, preserving liquidity, and not breaching covenants. Management "stopped saying" anything about near-term profitability and started emphasising resilience and government support.
• Q1 2026 call (Apr 2026): the dominant phrases are "strategic funding," "liquidity runway," "customer qualification," and "policy support." The tone is a company that has pivoted from "battery-materials growth story" to "survive to the tariff-protected AAM inflection with government capital."

Tone shift over time: from growth (2023–24) → crisis management (late-24/mid-25) → government-backstopped survival with optionality (2026). The recurring new phrase is DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper; the phrase that disappeared is any near-term path to positive earnings.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = Western graphite / anode developers.

Read: On asset terms Syrah is the most advanced of the natural-graphite integrators — it alone has a producing mine + a built AAM plant. NMG carries a higher market cap on a less commercially-advanced (pre-production) footprint, which arguably makes Syrah look cheap on integrated-asset value — but that gap reflects Syrah's dilution/distress discount, not mispricing. Novonix is the synthetic-route threat, not a like-for-like comp. No credible EV/Sales or forward multiple is publicly clean for this group; anyone quoting one is guessing.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (moves >5%, last ~5 years)

Pattern of what actually moves SYR, all ``:

• Dec 2021: natural-graphite AAM prices peaked ~US$6.90/kg — the bull-cycle high context.
• Jul 2022: DOE closes US$102.1M Vidalia loan → positive.
• Dec 2024: force-majeure declared at Balama (election unrest) → sharp negative; eight-month shutdown begins.
• Apr–May 2025: site access restored, force majeure lifted (Jul 2025) → shares surged to ~A$0.415 on the restart.
• Jul 2025: Tesla issues default/non-conformance notice on Vidalia AAM → negative overhang; repeated deadline extensions through late-25/early-26.
• Mar 2026: A$104M equity raise at A$0.105 → stock fell ~19% (dilution).
• Mar 2026: DFC opens pathway to ~20% equity stake + DOE/AustralianSuper package → strategically bullish, but the stock fell even on government backing.
• 1 Jun 2026: Tesla withdraws termination notice → positive de-risking, though qualification still pending.

What the market actually reacts to: (1) Balama operational continuity (force-majeure on/off is the single biggest mover), (2) the Tesla/Vidalia qualification binary, (3) dilution events (every raise is sold), and (4) government-funding headlines (mixed — strategically bullish but dilutive). Notably the market rewards operational restart and punishes financing — a classic distressed-developer signature. Macro/graphite-price moves matter less than these company-specific binaries.

Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO — Shaun Verner (MD & CEO since Feb 2017; joined Oct 2016). ~9-year tenure. Track record: took Balama from development into production and built Vidalia from scratch — a genuine execution feat to have a Western AAM plant standing at all. But the shareholder record on his watch is poor: serial dilution, an ~US$100M annual loss, and a share price down enormously from its cycle highs. He has built assets and destroyed per-share value simultaneously — the classic development-stage-mining tension.
• CFO — Stephen Wells; COO — Julio Costa; GC — Andrew Komesaroff. Chairman Jim Askew (non-exec); board incl. Jose Caldeira. Avg board tenure ~6.8y, management ~7.8y — experienced, not fresh, which cuts both ways (deep context vs. ownership of the value-destruction).
• Skin in the game / ownership: the dominant fact is that AustralianSuper now holds ~49.6% and the DFC is pathway-ing to ~20%. Insider (management) ownership is immaterial next to that. This is no longer a founder-controlled company; it is effectively controlled by a super-fund with a government minority arriving — governance is now about those two blocs, not the executive team.
• Capital-allocation history: poor by returns, defensible by necessity. Repeated equity raises at ever-lower prices; heavy reliance on government (DOE) debt that has since gone to forbearance. ROE/ROIC deeply negative throughout. The one defensible allocation call is building Vidalia at all — it's what makes the company strategically relevant and fundable in 2026's policy environment.
• Red flags: (1) relentless dilution (18–27% share-count growth in a year ); (2) a lender in forbearance; (3) an anchor holder about to breach 50% (control without a premium bid); (4) a flagship offtake (Tesla) that spent a year in dispute.
• Archetype: professional-manager operator of a government-and-institution-backed strategic asset, not a founder-owner compounding for shareholders. Implication: decisions will increasingly serve strategic/sovereign objectives (U.S. supply-chain security, AustralianSuper's control position) that may not maximise minority-shareholder returns.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic lens. No filings on the research shelf (no CIK — Syrah files with the ASX, not SEC), so this is web + disclosure-derived; label all.

• Revenue recognition: low risk on the number itself (small, commodity sales). The forward risk is Vidalia AAM revenue recognition once qualification/first-sales occur — watch how "commercial sales" are booked vs. testing shipments.
• Cash vs. earnings divergence: the whole company is a cash-flow-negative development story. Operating cash burn + capex vastly exceed revenue; survival depends on financing cash, not operating cash. The restricted-vs-unrestricted cash split (only ~US$18M of US$77M unrestricted at Q4'25) is the key forensic tell — headline liquidity overstates spendable liquidity.
• Debt / going concern: the DOE US$98M loan is under two-year forbearance (30 Jul 2025) — a material distress marker. Convertible notes (Series 4/5/6) mature 12 May 2028. Auditors of serial-loss developers routinely attach material-uncertainty/going-concern language; I could not retrieve the exact FY25 audit opinion text `` — flag as an open item: confirm the going-concern paragraph in the FY25 annual report.
• Dilution / SBC: dilution is the headline (see Lens 9). Non-GAAP flattery is less relevant here because the losses are real cash, not accrual artefacts.
• Impairment risk: with graphite/AAM prices down (~1/3 from 2021 ) and Vidalia still pre-commercial, asset-impairment risk on the Vidalia carrying value is live if qualification slips.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC (EDGAR EFTS — LR + AAER): none possible — Syrah has no CIK; it is not an SEC registrant. No U.S. securities-enforcement search applies.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search "Syrah Resources" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR CFPB OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement): no material regulatory-enforcement action against Syrah surfaced in the Phase-A/C searches. The most litigation-adjacent item is the commercial Tesla default dispute (contractual, now cured/withdrawn — not a regulator action) and the Mozambican civil-unrest / farmer-resettlement grievances at Balama (resolved via agreement with farmers + government, Apr–May 2025) — a social-licence matter, not an enforcement penalty.
• Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) from a 10-K: n/a — no 10-K exists (ASX filer). Australian equivalent (annual-report contingencies note) not retrieved — open item.
• Conclusion: No material securities-regulatory or enforcement findings identified — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (no CIK → not applicable) and web search as of 2026-07-07. Principal governance/credit risks are the DOE forbearance, the convertible maturities, and the ~50% AustralianSuper control position — none of which are enforcement actions, but all of which a forensic analyst must price.

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

No forecast.ts create in the watchlist loop (per instructions). No EPS "consensus" is publicly clean for a distressed pre-Vidalia developer — quoting one would be fabrication. Projection is therefore scenario-framed, `` with arithmetic, EPS-agnostic (the number that matters is cash-runway-to-qualification and AAM revenue onset, not a smooth EPS line).

Base inputs (all ``): Balama ~24kt/qtr → ~200–240ktpa medium-term target; C1 US$430–480/t; natural graphite realised ~US$630/t; Vidalia first commercial AAM sales targeted 2H'26; pro-forma liquidity ~US$178M (Mar'26).

• Bear path (qualification slips / tariff wall softens): Vidalia stays pre-commercial into 2027; Tesla exercises its retained termination right after Jan-2027; another dilutive raise at sub-A$0.10; DOE forbearance expires unresolved. Balama alone (~US$130–150M revenue at full ramp × ~$630/t on ~210kt ) cannot cover corporate + Vidalia carrying costs → continued net losses, further dilution, equity impaired toward option-value. Probability: material.
• Base path (Vidalia qualifies late-26/H1-27, tariff wall holds): first meaningful AAM revenue in 2027; Balama ramps toward 200kt+; corporate losses narrow but profitability remains 2028+. Company survives on the DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper package (financial close 2H'26). Equity re-rates modestly off distressed levels. This is the "survive-to-the-inflection" case management is underwriting.
• Bull path (Vidalia scales to 45ktpa under 220% tariff protection, multiple OEMs qualify): Vidalia AAM at Western pricing (natural AAM ~US$4.60/kg in 2025, i.e. ~US$4,600/t ) on 45,000 t ≈ ~US$207M AAM revenue — an order of magnitude above today's total revenue, at far higher margin, in a tariff-protected market. This is the call option. Requires qualification + scale + policy durability + the funding to build out.

The forecast that actually matters (logged narratively, not via forecast.ts): Does cash runway (~US$178M pro-forma, Mar'26) reach first commercial Vidalia AAM sales and the DFC financial close (2H'26) without another deeply dilutive raise? That binary — not an EPS point estimate — is the scoreable call. Lean: liquidity is adequate to reach the 2H'26 milestones but NOT to fund full Vidalia scale-out without the DFC/DOE package closing — so the package closing is the true survival gate.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Syrah owns the single most strategically valuable non-China graphite position in the West: a producing tier-one mine plus a built U.S. AAM plant, arriving exactly as Washington erects a ~220% tariff wall against Chinese anode material and the U.S. government itself moves to take ~20% equity via the DFC. If Vidalia qualifies (Tesla already withdrew its termination), Syrah becomes the default IRA/FEOC-compliant AAM supplier to Western OEMs with almost no competition at scale — a step-change from ~US$33M commodity revenue to potentially US$200M+ high-margin AAM revenue. The moat is scale + integration + a policy shield; the growth lever is qualification-then-multiplication across OEMs; the capital-allocation story is now government-backstopped, which de-risks funding. The contrarian read: the market is pricing this as a dying dilutive junior at ~A$0.12 while the U.S. and Australia's largest super-fund are both buying control — that divergence between the tape and the strategic buyers is the mispricing.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks). (1) Qualification failure / commercial obsolescence — if Vidalia never clears final qualification at scale, or if synthetic graphite (Novonix/Panasonic route) wins the fast-charge anode war, the entire downstream thesis is impaired and Vidalia becomes a stranded, impaired asset. (2) Dilution to oblivion — the equity has been diluted 18–27% in a year, raises are sold hard, and AustralianSuper at ~49.6% + DFC arriving means minority holders can be structurally diluted/controlled without a takeover premium; the company may survive while the share is impaired. (3) Mozambique country risk — a second Balama shutdown (election cycle, insurgency spillover in Cabo Delgado) starves both cash and Vidalia feed simultaneously. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): Vidalia missed final Tesla qualification in early 2027, Tesla walked, a Balama disruption forced another raise at ~A$0.06, the DFC package stalled in FIRB/shareholder approval, and the DOE forbearance lapsed into enforcement — the equity is a stub even though the assets still exist. Multiples too high? Meaningless on earnings (loss-making); on strategic-asset value the equity is arguably cheap, but "cheap and permanently diluting" is a value trap. What the market refuses to see: that two sophisticated strategic buyers (U.S. government, AustralianSuper) are accumulating control precisely because the asset is more valuable than the distressed equity implies.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Skeptical short dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the model: the product may be the wrong product. The bull thesis rests on natural-graphite AAM; the battery industry's fast-charge and durability edge increasingly favours synthetic graphite (Novonix is qualifying synthetic AAM with Panasonic). If cell makers standardise on synthetic for premium cells, Vidalia's natural AAM competes only on cost/policy, not performance — a much weaker position.
• Revenue concentration: ~all real revenue is one mine (Balama) selling one commodity, largely into China — the very customer base the U.S. strategy is trying to bypass. And the downstream is concentrated in two customers (Tesla, Lucid), one of which just spent a year threatening to walk and whose dispute "might be about pricing" — i.e. Tesla may be using qualification as commercial leverage to reprice a fixed-price contract that is now above market (AAM fell ~1/3 to US$4.60/kg by 2025). If so, even "qualification" yields worse economics than the bull model assumes.
• Weakest moat link: the moat is policy, and policy reverses. China suspended its graphite export controls to the U.S. through 27 Nov 2026; a broader U.S.–China détente or a change in administration trade posture could gut the 220% tariff shield that is doing all the moat work.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Novonix (synthetic AAM, U.S.-domiciled, Panasonic-qualifying) — same policy tailwind, arguably better product fit, without Mozambique country risk.
• Worst capital-allocation / incentive flags: DOE loan in forbearance; serial dilution; an anchor holder (AustralianSuper ~49.6%) whose interests (control, long-horizon strategic exposure) may diverge from minority-return maximisation; a government stake (DFC ~20%) that optimises for U.S. supply-chain security, not share price.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: Balama runs uninterrupted; Vidalia qualifies at Tesla and scales; the DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper package closes in 2H'26; the tariff wall persists; no further dilution below current levels. Break any one and the thesis wobbles.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: for a company with no earnings, "growth disappointing" = qualification slipping a year → another raise → equity down another leg. The downside isn't a multiple de-rate, it's dilution and impairment.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: Vidalia fails final qualification AND synthetic wins the anode standard — Vidalia is impaired, Syrah reverts to a sub-scale, China-dependent, loss-making natural-graphite miner. Plausibility: moderate and rising if the qualification clock (Jan 2027) is missed.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What are the specific, quantified remaining requirements for final Tesla qualification of Vidalia AAM, and what is your honest probability of clearing them before the January 2027 deadline?
2. Is the Tesla dispute fundamentally about technical conformance or about repricing a fixed-price contract that is now above the ~US$4.60/kg market — and if the latter, what price do the economics actually work at?
3. What is the exact cash runway on unrestricted cash to (a) first commercial Vidalia sales and (b) full Vidalia scale-out — and at what point do you need the DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper package to have closed to avoid another raise?
4. What are the precise conditions and timeline for the DFC/DOE/AustralianSuper package financial close, and what is the fallback if FIRB or shareholder approval fails?
5. Given AustralianSuper is heading toward or past 50%, how are minority shareholders protected, and is a full control transaction (with a premium) on the table?
6. Does the FY25 audit opinion carry a going-concern / material-uncertainty paragraph, and what specifically resolves it?
7. What happens to the DOE US$98M loan when the two-year forbearance expires (2027) — repay, convert, or restructure?
8. On the natural-vs-synthetic anode question: what is your evidence that natural-graphite AAM wins (or holds) share against synthetic for the cells your customers are building?
9. What is your realistic C1 cost and realised price at 200–240ktpa Balama, and what natural-graphite price do you need for Balama to be cash-flow-positive standalone?
10. How exposed is Balama to a repeat of the 2024–25 disruption (Cabo Delgado security, election cycles), and what have you changed operationally to de-risk it?
11. Beyond Tesla and Lucid, which additional OEMs/cell-makers are in active qualification for Vidalia AAM, and what volume could convert by 2027?
12. What is the capex and timeline to take Vidalia from current capacity to the contemplated 45ktpa, and how is it funded?
13. How dependent are Balama's current sales on Chinese spherical-graphite processors, and how does that reconcile with the "ex-China supply chain" positioning?
14. What is your impairment sensitivity on the Vidalia carrying value to (a) a 6-month qualification slip and (b) a 20% AAM price decline?
15. If the U.S.–China graphite tariff/export-control détente becomes permanent (post-Nov 2026), how much of the Vidalia value proposition survives on economics alone?