Zealand Pharma

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Zealand Pharma is a Danish peptide-engineering house (HQ Copenhagen; founded 1998) that has spent 25 years turning its proprietary peptide-design platform into metabolic and GI drugs — and then monetizing them through Big-Pharma partners rather than carrying full commercial risk itself. CEO Adam Steensberg (M.D., CEO since Mar 2022) reframed it in Dec 2025 as "Metabolic Frontier 2030" — an ambition to be a leader in obesity/metabolic health with five product launches by 2030.

The business model is a platform-plus-partnership engine, three revenue layers:

1. Partnered late-stage obesity assets (the value driver). Two co-development deals carry the equity story:

• Petrelintide (lead, long-acting amylin analog) — partnered with Roche (Mar 2025): $1.65B upfront ($1.4B at close + $250M over two anniversaries), up to $5.3B total ($1.2B development + $2.4B sales milestones), 50/50 US + Europe profit/loss share, Roche takes ROW with tiered double-digit-to-high-teens royalties, Roche handles commercial manufacturing. Zealand also paid Roche $350M (offsettable) to co-own a fixed-dose petrelintide + enicepatide (CT-388, Roche's GLP-1/GIP) combo.
• Survodutide (glucagon/GLP-1 dual agonist) — licensed to Boehringer Ingelheim; Zealand is eligible for high-single-to-low-double-digit royalties on global sales plus up to €315M remaining milestones.

1. Wholly-owned pipeline — glepaglutide (GLP-2, short bowel syndrome; MAA filed EU Jun 2025, FDA NDA submitted, EASE-5 confirmatory ongoing), dapiglutide (GLP-1/GLP-2 dual, next-gen SBS + obesity), dasiglucagon for congenital hyperinsulinism (NDA resubmission H2'26), and earlier ZP9830 (inflammation), ZP6590/ZP6541 (GIP).
2. Legacy commercial/royalty trickle — Zegalogue (dasiglucagon) for severe hypoglycemia was out-licensed to Novo Nordisk (Sep 2022) for high-single-to-low-double-digit royalties; V-Go (insulin patch) is a small marketed product. These are immaterial to the thesis (FY2025 product/royalty revenue is a rounding error next to the DKK 9.2B Roche upfront).

The one-sentence version: Zealand is no longer "a biotech with a pipeline" — post-Roche it is a financed, de-risked optionality basket on the amylin + glucagon-dual obesity wave, where partners fund the Phase 3s and Zealand keeps ~50% US economics on the lead and royalties on the rest. Customers (in pharma terms) are the partners (Roche, Boehringer, Novo), not patients — Zealand sells discovery + early clinical de-risking, then rides someone else's commercial machine.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

For a clinical-stage peptide developer the "supply chain" is the drug-substance manufacturing + clinical-execution + commercialization stack, and the defining feature is that Zealand has off-loaded the two most capital-intensive links to its partners:

• Upstream — peptide API / drug substance. Peptide synthesis (solid-phase / recombinant) is the binding constraint for the entire GLP-1/amylin class industry-wide — Novo and Lilly have spent tens of billions on fill-finish and API capacity. Zealand's named differentiator is its in-house peptide-engineering platform (sequence design, half-life extension for once-weekly dosing), but it relies on CDMOs for GMP manufacture of clinical and commercial supply. Specific CDMO names are n/a — not disclosed in sourced material.
• Midstream — clinical execution. ZUPREME-1 ran across 32 sites in the US, Poland, and Romania (493 patients). Phase 3 execution for petrelintide is Roche-led — a critical chokepoint removed from Zealand's plate (Roche's global trial machine de-risks operational risk).
• Downstream — commercialization. This is the key structural fact: Roche is "responsible for commercial manufacturing and supply" of petrelintide, and Boehringer commercializes survodutide. Zealand's only direct commercial muscle is the US co-promote it may build for petrelintide under the 50/50 — otherwise it carries no field force, no commercial plant, no distribution.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) Roche is a near-single point of failure for the lead asset — Zealand's largest value driver is executed, manufactured, and (ex-US) sold by one partner; a Roche strategic pivot away from petrelintide would gut the thesis. (2) Class-wide peptide-API capacity — even partnered, commercial-scale amylin supply competes for the same constrained CDMO/fill-finish capacity as every other GLP-1. (3) Zealand is building its own capability deliberately — a Cambridge (UK) research hub + an AI-supercomputer partnership with the Danish Centre for AI Innovation — i.e. it is reinforcing the discovery link (its moat) while leaving manufacturing/commercial to partners. Names or it didn't happen: the chain is Zealand peptide-design platform → CDMO drug substance (unnamed) → Roche/Boehringer Phase-3 execution + manufacturing → Roche/Boehringer/Novo commercial → payers/patients.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Zealand's moat is narrow but real, and it sits in discovery — not in the lead molecule's profile.

• Platform / process moat (the durable one). 25 years of peptide-engineering know-how — designing analogs with the half-life, receptor-selectivity and tolerability properties for once-weekly dosing. The proof of the platform is commercial validation by the most sophisticated buyers in the field: Roche paid $1.65B upfront and Boehringer built a global Phase 3 program on Zealand peptides. Big-Pharma willingness to pay is the moat's mark-to-market. This is a capability moat (can it keep generating partnerable assets?), not a product moat.
• IP estate. Composition-of-matter and formulation patents on petrelintide, glepaglutide, dapiglutide, dasiglucagon. Specific expiry/LOE dates n/a; for a Phase-2/3 asset the patent runway is long but the clinical risk dominates IP risk at this stage.
• The moat the bulls overclaim — "best-in-class tolerability." Petrelintide's pitch is amylin-class efficacy with placebo-like GI tolerability (~70% of patients had no GI adverse events; vomiting 3% vs 6.2% placebo; 98% escalated to maintenance dose). This is a genuine clinical edge — but it is NOT a durable moat, because (a) Lilly's eloralintide and Novo's cagrilintide showed similarly favorable tolerability (Cantor Fitzgerald: "limited differentiation… competing amylins demonstrated similarly favorable tolerability"), and (b) tolerability is a feature competitors can match, not a structural barrier.

Bargaining power. Weak-to-moderate and asymmetric. Pre-Roche, Zealand needed Roche more than Roche needed Zealand (it had one un-partnered late-stage obesity asset in a field where Roche could have bought alternatives — and indeed Roche also bought 89bio for $3.5B). The deal terms reflect that: Roche took control of manufacturing, ex-US economics, and Phase-3 execution. Post-deal, Zealand's leverage improved — $2.3B cash, a $200M buyback, and two validated partnered assets mean it no longer negotiates from weakness on the next asset. Over patients/payers Zealand has no direct pricing power — that lever sits entirely with Roche/Boehringer.

Lens 4 · Segments — Pipeline by value (+clinical swap)

Zealand has no product-revenue segmentation (FY2025 revenue is ~99% the one-off Roche upfront). The economically meaningful "segmentation" is the pipeline by value-bearing asset. Revenue is partnership/milestone/royalty-shaped, not product-shaped — so I break it by asset and economic claim rather than by reported segment. All ``; no segments.csv data exists.

Trend & cause. The direction of travel is decisive: in 18 months Zealand went from a single-late-stage-asset binary to two partnered Phase-3 obesity programs (petrelintide, survodutide) + a filed orphan drug (glepaglutide), funded by a balance sheet that swung from going-concern-watch to DKK 14.5B cash and a buyback. Revenue is lumpy by design — DKK 63M (FY2024) → DKK 9.2B (FY2025) on the Roche upfront, then back to DKK 34M (Q1'26) run-rate until the next milestone (DKK 4.5B / $700M recognized Q2'26 on Phase-3 progression). Do not model this as a P&L company — it's a catalyst-and-milestone cash machine attached to royalty optionality.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Pipeline by phase + latest print (+clinical swap)

The asset table above is the company. Here is the latest "earnings" read, which for Zealand means the cash position + the clinical prints, not revenue-vs-consensus:

FY2025 (reported 2026-02-19):

• Revenue DKK 9,215M (vs DKK 63M FY2024) — ~99% the Roche upfront.
• Operating result +DKK 6,959M (a one-off positive year driven by the upfront).
• Net operating expenses DKK 2,101M (excl. other operating income).
• Year-end cash DKK 15,109M (~$2.36B ).

Q1 2026 (reported 2026-05):

• Revenue DKK 34M (vs DKK 8M Q1'25) — milestone/collaboration trickle.
• Operating result −DKK 539M (vs −DKK 407M Q1'25) — the real burn is widening as programs scale.
• OpEx DKK 573M, of which R&D = DKK 469M (82%).
• Cash DKK 14.5B at 31-Mar-2026 (down from DKK 15.1B); expected year-end-2026 liquidity ~DKK 19B including ~$700M Roche milestones.
• $200M share buyback initiated — unusual for a clinical biopharma; management framed it as confidence in future cash flows.
• EPS −5.58 vs −8.94 forecast (a "beat" only in the sense of lower-than-feared loss; revenue "beat" of +53% is on a trivially small base).

The clinical print that actually matters — petrelintide ZUPREME-1 (Ph2, topline Mar 2026; full data ADA Jun 2026):

• −10.7% mean weight loss at 42 weeks (top dose) vs −1.7% placebo, 493 patients, 5 doses, all statistically significant from week 28.
• Tolerability the headline: ~70% no GI AEs; vomiting 3% vs 6.2% placebo; discontinuation at top dose matched placebo; 98% escalated to maintenance.
• Phase 3 endorsed (Apr 28-29, 2026), initiation H2 2026; ZUPREME-2 topline H2 2026.

Survodutide SYNCHRONIZE-1 (Ph3, Apr 2026): −16.6% weight loss at 76 weeks vs 3.2% placebo; predominantly fat-mass loss; 34% visceral / 63% liver-fat reduction with minimized lean-mass loss in a pre-specified analysis.

Balance-sheet flags: Healthy. No debt stress noted; cash covers multiple years of the current ~DKK 0.5B/quarter burn, before the milestone inflows. The risk is not solvency — it's whether the assets convert.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on disk — assessment is `` from earnings-call coverage (Investing.com/Seeking Alpha headlines, Q4'25 + Q1'26).

• Tone trajectory: rising confidence, increasingly commercial language. Through 2025 the narrative was "Roche deal transforms the balance sheet" (de-risking). By Q1 2026 management shifted to a strategy-leadership posture — "Metabolic Frontier 2030," five launches by 2030, a Cambridge research hub, an AI-supercomputer partnership, and a $200M buyback. A clinical biotech buying back stock is a loud tonal signal: we have more cash than near-term pipeline needs, and we think the stock is cheap.
• What they keep saying: "best-in-class tolerability," "foundational therapy," "amylin as the backbone," combinability with GLP-1/GIP. The recurring strategic frame is tolerability-led, combo-extensible — explicitly not "we'll out-lose Lilly."
• What's notably absent / softened: management does not lean on head-to-head efficacy vs CagriSema/tirzepatide (because it loses that comparison). The Q4'25→Q1'26 calls coincided with the stock dipping on the data even as revenue "beat" — i.e. the market is trading the clinical profile, not the milestone cash, and management's job on the calls became reframing 10.7% as sufficient + tolerability + combo upside rather than touting magnitude.

Lens 7 · Catalyst calendar + mechanism comps (+clinical swap)

Mechanism comps — by target, not by P/E (amylin/incretin obesity peers). Multiples are `` with date or n/a; pre-revenue obesity names trade on pipeline NPV, not earnings multiples, so EV/Sales and P/E are n/a for the pure-plays.

Read: Zealand and Viking sit at near-identical ~$3.3–3.6B caps — but Viking owns 100% of VK2735 while Zealand owns ~50% US of petrelintide. The M&A comps are the bull's anchor: Metsera fetched $10B and Roche paid $3.5B for 89bio — obesity assets command takeout premiums far above Zealand's current cap, if the asset is differentiated. The bear's anchor is the same table read differently: petrelintide's 10.7% sits below eloralintide (up to 20.1%), CagriSema (~20–23%), survodutide (16.6%), MariTide (16.2%) and aleniglipron (16.3%) — it is the lowest-efficacy late-stage obesity asset in its own comp set, carried by tolerability and combo optionality.

Catalyst calendar (what de-risks or kills, and when):

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves the tape)

Pattern over the last ~18 months:

• Mar 12, 2025 — Roche deal announced: sharp rally (balance-sheet transformation, validation).
• Mar 5, 2026 — petrelintide ZUPREME-1 topline: stock fell >33% (Roche −6%) — endpoint met but efficacy seen as "undifferentiated"; the single most important price event in the file. The market reacts to efficacy magnitude vs the class, not to whether the trial "worked."
• Apr 28–29, 2026 — survodutide SYNCHRONIZE-1 (16.6%) + petrelintide Phase-3 endorsement: supportive.
• Jun 5–7, 2026 — ADA full data (tolerability detail; survodutide fat-loss): "analyst optimism lifted stock ahead of ADA".
• 52-week range DKK 233.50 – 556.00; trading ~DKK 252–285 in Jun 2026 — i.e. near the lower third of its range, ~50% off the high, the post-data de-rating still largely intact.

What the tape tells you: this name trades on binary obesity-data magnitude vs the competitive set and on deal/partnership events — not on financials (the milestone cash barely moves it). The −33% drop on a successful trial is the defining tell: expectations were priced for best-in-class, and 10.7% wasn't it. That de-rating is the setup — the stock has already taken the "undifferentiated" hit; from here it re-rates on combo/ZUPREME-2 surprise or a takeout, and falls further only on a Phase-3 stumble.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO Adam Steensberg (M.D.; CEO since Mar 2022; prior EVP R&D / CMO at Zealand; 20+ yrs experience). Track record: he is the architect of the post-2022 transformation — landing the Roche ($5.3B) and Boehringer (survodutide royalty + €315M) deals and rebuilding the balance sheet from constrained to >$2B cash + buyback. That is a quantified, value-creating capital-markets track record, even if the clinical verdict on the lead asset is still open.
• Skin in the game: Steensberg directly owns ~0.088% of shares (~DKK 22M). Modest — typical for a professional-manager (non-founder) European biotech CEO, but not the founder-level alignment you'd want; he is incentivized more by comp/options than by a large equity stake.
• Key execs: Henriette Wennicke (CFO), David Kendall (CMO — a heavyweight metabolic-disease clinician, ex-Lilly/ADA, a credibility signal for the science). Management avg tenure ~3.3 yrs; board ~10.3 yrs.
• Capital-allocation history: the standout positive. Rather than dilute through a weak-leverage equity raise, Steensberg partnered the lead asset at a premium price, kept 50% US economics, and is now buying back stock — textbook value-accretive sequencing for a clinical biotech. The reinvestment (Cambridge hub, AI partnership) is into the moat (discovery), not empire-building. ROE/ROIC is meaningless for a pre-product company (FY2025's positive result is a one-off upfront).
• Red flags: none material sourced — no related-party dealings, no promotional retail-bait behavior, no strategy whiplash. The fair critique is archetype risk: a professional manager / dealmaker, not a founder-scientist — excellent at monetizing the platform, but the model's success now depends on partners' execution he doesn't control.
• Founder vs professional: professional manager. For this stage (de-risk-and-partner) that is arguably the right archetype — but it means the equity is a bet on Roche/Boehringer as much as on Zealand's own operators.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Read regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (Step-0): 0 SEC findings — Zealand has no CIK (deregistered 2022), so no EDGAR LR/AAER search is possible. Accounting review is therefore ``-only and IFRS-framed (Danish GAAP/IFRS, not US GAAP).

Accounting-risk read (clinical-stage, partnership-revenue):

• Revenue recognition is the one real watch-item. FY2025's DKK 9.2B is collaboration revenue (the Roche upfront), and Q2'26 recognizes another DKK 4.5B / $700M on "Phase-3 progression." Under IFRS 15, when and how much of a multi-element collaboration upfront/milestone is recognized vs deferred is a judgment call — the timing of milestone recognition can flatter a given period. This isn't fraud-flavored; it's the standard partnership-accounting risk (lumpy, judgment-heavy, hard to compare period-to-period). Watch the split between revenue recognized and cash deferred on the balance sheet.
• Cash vs earnings divergence: favorable, not a flag — earnings are lumpy (one-off upfront) but cash is real (DKK 14.5B verifiable, milestone inflows contractual). The opposite of the usual "earnings outrun cash" red flag.
• SBC dilution: real but not disclosed in sourced material (share-count detail n/a); for a biotech of this size, monitor option grants against the buyback (a buyback that merely offsets SBC is cosmetic — verify net share count when FY data lands).
• No receivables/inventory red flags — no product revenue to inflate.
• Going-concern: not at risk (multi-year runway).

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC LR/AAER: None — no CIK; not an SEC registrant since the 2022 ADS delisting/deregistration.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search "Zealand Pharma" (FDA OR DOJ OR FTC OR EMA OR consent decree OR settlement OR fine OR penalty)): no material enforcement actions, consent decrees, fines, or penalties surfaced. Interactions with FDA/EMA are ordinary-course regulatory submissions (glepaglutide MAA/NDA, dasiglucagon NDA), not enforcement.
• Item 3 / Legal Proceedings: no 10-K on disk (foreign filer, deregistered); Danish annual-report legal-proceedings disclosure not in sourced material — n/a. No material litigation surfaced via web.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR/AAER, returned zero — no CIK) and web search as of 2026-06-30. The absence of US-registrant disclosure is itself a (minor) transparency reduction vs US-listed peers — a diligence limitation, not a red flag.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · rNPV + runway-to-catalyst (+clinical swap)

For a pre-product company the question is not "what's FY28 EPS" — it's "does cash reach the next value-inflection, and what is the lead asset's risk-adjusted value?" No forecast.ts forecast is logged in this unattended --watchlist run (per skill rules — only log when genuinely committing a base case).

Runway-to-catalyst — comfortably clears. Cash DKK 14.5B (Q1'26) + ~$700M (DKK 4.5B) 2026 Roche milestones → ~DKK 19B expected year-end-2026 liquidity. Against a burn of ~DKK 0.5–0.6B/quarter scaling toward the FY2026 OpEx guide of DKK 2.72–3.3B, that is a 5+ year runway before milestones — and the runway extends with each Phase-3/sales milestone. Cash reaches every near-term catalyst (ZUPREME-2, Phase-3 starts, glepaglutide approvals) with room to spare. Runway is not the risk.

rNPV sketch of the lead (petrelintide, Zealand's ~50% US + ROW royalty share) — illustrative, every input ``, not a precise model (no consensus rNPV sourced):

• Obesity market >$150–180B by ~2030. A tolerability-led, non-best-in-class amylin might realistically capture a low-single-digit % share → peak branded sales for petrelintide on the order of $3–6B.
• Zealand's claim ≈ ~50% of US profit + double-digit-to-high-teens royalty on ROW. Crudely, Zealand's economic share of peak ≈ ~$0.8–1.5B/yr at peak.
• Apply Phase-3 probability-of-success ~50–60% (Phase-2 met, partner-backed, but efficacy-differentiation risk) and a biotech discount rate (~10–12%) over a ~2030+ launch → a lead-asset rNPV in the very rough ~$2–4B range, i.e. the current ~$3.3B market cap is roughly priced for petrelintide alone succeeding — with survodutide royalties, glepaglutide, the combo, and the platform as un-priced (or lightly-priced) optionality. That is the crux of the value case: you're paying ~fair value for the lead and getting the rest cheap — but only if petrelintide's Phase 3 clears.
• Brier forecast (illustrative, not logged): "Petrelintide Phase 3 (chronic weight management) meets primary endpoint, readout 2027+" — p ≈ 0.62.

Analyst anchor for triangulation: consensus Buy (9 buy / 7 hold / 1 sell of ~14), avg target ~DKK 457 (range DKK 300–745; Jefferies DKK505 buy, Deutsche Bank DKK300 hold) vs ~DKK 252–285 spot → ~35% USD / ~60% DKK implied upside. The Street is net-constructive but split — exactly what you'd expect for a de-risked balance sheet wrapped around a contested lead asset.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Zealand is a financed call option on the second-largest drug market of the decade, bought at roughly the value of its lead asset alone. Three legs: (1) De-risked balance sheet — $2.3B cash, buyback, partners funding the Phase 3s; this is no longer a dilution-and-pray biotech. (2) Two partnered Phase-3 obesity assets (petrelintide + survodutide) plus a filed orphan drug (glepaglutide) and a combo call option (petrelintide + enicepatide) — multiple shots, not one binary. (3) Tolerability as a real-world wedge: in a market where ~half of GLP-1 patients quit within a year over GI side-effects, a drug with placebo-like tolerability and double-digit loss could win a durable maintenance/foundational niche — and amylin is the consensus "next backbone." The contrarian view the market refuses to see: efficacy magnitude is over-weighted by a market anchored on tirzepatide; adherence-adjusted real-world weight loss may favor a tolerable drug, and obesity is plausibly a multi-winner market (Metsera's $10B takeout says scarcity value for amylin assets is high). Upside is re-rating on ZUPREME-2/combo data or a takeout toward the DKK 450–500 analyst zone.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) "Undifferentiated" is structural, not a headline. Petrelintide's 10.7% is the lowest late-stage efficacy in its comp set; if Phase 3 confirms ~10–12% while Lilly's eloralintide (up to 20%) and Novo's amycretin (22%) and CagriSema (~23%) launch, petrelintide becomes a 3rd/4th-choice amylin that struggles for formulary share regardless of tolerability — and Zealand only owns ~50% of US of that. (2) Single-partner dependence: Roche controls execution, manufacturing and ROW commercialization of the lead; Roche has its own obesity pipeline (CT-388/89bio) and could deprioritize petrelintide — Zealand can't control its own destiny on its biggest asset. (3) Expectations baked into the price: even after the −33% drop, ~$3.3B substantially capitalizes petrelintide success — a Phase-3 efficacy or tolerability disappointment re-rates it toward the orphan/survodutide-royalty floor (well below current). Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): ZUPREME-2 or an early Phase-3 look shows ~10% with tolerability no longer differentiated vs launched competitors; Roche quietly shifts emphasis to its in-house combo; the amylin "scarcity premium" deflates as multiple amylins read out — and Zealand de-rates to a $1.5–2B royalty-stub-plus-cash valuation. Are multiples too high? Not on cash, but the implied lead-asset value leaves little margin for Phase-3 disappointment.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case. What structurally breaks the model: Zealand makes money by selling de-risked peptides to Big Pharma and clipping royalties/profit-shares — that only works if the assets are wanted. The lead asset is already flagged "undifferentiated" by the sell-side on its pivotal-supporting data, which means the core value-creation loop (partner pays premium → asset wins share → royalties compound) may be broken at the "wins share" step for petrelintide. Revenue concentration: the equity is ~80% one molecule (petrelintide) controlled by one partner (Roche) that has a competing in-house asset — the single most dangerous concentration in the file. If Roche reallocates, there is no Plan B of equal size. The most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Eli Lilly. Not Novo — Lilly, whose eloralintide is a selective amylin (same mechanism as petrelintide) that already showed up to 20.1% — i.e. Lilly can offer petrelintide's mechanism with double the efficacy, plus retatrutide/orforglipron breadth and unmatched manufacturing. That collapses petrelintide's "tolerable amylin" white space. Worst capital-allocation critique: paying Roche $350M for the combo and running a buyback while the lead's differentiation is unproven could read as deploying cash to defend a contested thesis rather than waiting for ZUPREME-2 — though the counter is that the cash is genuinely surplus. What must hold for today's price: petrelintide Phase 3 clears at ≥ current efficacy and the amylin scarcity premium survives multiple competitor readouts and Roche stays committed. If growth/efficacy disappoints 20–30% (Phase-3 ~8% instead of ~11%, or tolerability advantage erodes): the lead-asset rNPV roughly halves and the stock re-rates toward cash + survodutide-royalty + orphan = a ~$1.5–2B floor — meaningful downside from ~$3.3B. Single scenario that permanently impairs: a Phase-3 efficacy or tolerability miss on petrelintide concurrent with a strong Lilly/Novo amylin launch — plausibility moderate, not remote, and it's the scenario the price is least protected against.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. At what petrelintide Phase-3 weight-loss threshold do you and Roche consider the program competitively viable — and what is the go/no-go bar on ZUPREME-2 before Phase 3 starts?
2. Given Roche's in-house CT-388/89bio obesity assets, what contractual protections prevent Roche from deprioritizing petrelintide, and how do you read Roche's commitment today?
3. Is the strategic bet that petrelintide wins as a monotherapy, or only as the amylin backbone of the enicepatide combo? What combo efficacy would you need to be competitive with CagriSema/tirzepatide?
4. Lilly's eloralintide (selective amylin) showed up to ~20% weight loss. What is petrelintide's defensible white space if a higher-efficacy amylin with comparable tolerability reaches market first?
5. How much of the FY2025 DKK 9.2B and the Q2'26 DKK 4.5B is recognized vs deferred, and what is the revenue-recognition schedule for remaining Roche milestones?
6. Why a $200M buyback now, ahead of ZUPREME-2 and Phase-3 capital needs, rather than preserving optionality or funding wholly-owned assets?
7. What is the realistic peak-sales and launch-timing assumption for glepaglutide in SBS (EU and US), and what own-commercial infrastructure will you build for it?
8. On survodutide, what milestone/royalty cash should we model across SYNCHRONIZE-2, the CV outcomes trial, and MASH, and what is your visibility into Boehringer's launch plans?
9. What real-world adherence/persistence data would validate the "tolerability beats magnitude" thesis, and are you running studies designed to generate it?
10. How do you think about partnering vs retaining the next wholly-owned obesity asset, given the platform now has two validated Big-Pharma relationships?
11. What is the net share-count trajectory (SBC grants vs buyback), and how should we think about dilution over the Phase-3 period?
12. What are the petrelintide manufacturing/supply assumptions (CDMO, scale-up, COGS) under Roche, and where are the capacity bottlenecks?
13. What is the IP/LOE runway on petrelintide and glepaglutide, and how exposed are you to amylin-class composition challenges?
14. What is the dasiglucagon (CHI) NDA-resubmission risk after the prior cycle, and what's the expected approval timing?
15. Where does the Cambridge hub + AI-supercomputer investment show up in pipeline output — what's the 3-year target for new INDs from the platform?

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