AMG Critical Materials

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

AMG Critical Materials is a Netherlands-domiciled, USD-reporting specialty-metals conglomerate built by Heinz Schimmelbusch out of the 2007 merger of Metallurg, ALD Vacuum Technologies and Sudamin (assembled inside the Safeguard International private-equity vehicle), IPO'd on Euronext Amsterdam in July 2006. It is not a pure-play anything — it is three structurally different businesses under one ticker, which is the single most important fact for valuing it:

• AMG Lithium — a backward-integrated hard-rock lithium chain: the Mibra mine in Minas Gerais, Brazil (originally a 1945 tantalum mine; tantalum tailings now feed a spodumene plant expanding 90→130 ktpa) shipping concentrate to the new Bitterfeld-Wolfen, Germany battery-grade lithium hydroxide refinery — Europe's first — designed as five 20kt modules toward 100kt by 2030. Also carries the Tantalum business unit.
• AMG Vanadium — the world's largest recycler of spent oil-refinery catalysts and the largest ferrovanadium producer in North America, converting >99% of vanadium-bearing refinery waste via the proprietary V-CYCLE pyrometallurgical process at Cambridge & Zanesville, Ohio. Spans vanadium, titanium and chrome.
• AMG Technologies — "advanced metallurgy": Engineering (vacuum furnaces / turbine-blade coating equipment to the aerospace-engine sector — a genuine global #1), plus Antimony, Graphite (being sold), Silicon (closed Dec-2025), and LIVA battery-storage systems.

Business model in plain terms: AMG sells into volatile commodity end-markets (lithium, vanadium, antimony, chrome) but with an unusual recycling/circular-economy and engineering overlay that gives it pockets of cost-curve advantage and book-to-bill visibility most miners lack. Customers are European cathode-active-material makers (lithium), steel mills and chemical producers (ferrovanadium/chrome), refiners who pay AMG to take their hazardous spent catalyst (a negative-cost feedstock — a real structural edge), flame-retardant/battery/defense buyers (antimony), and aerospace OEMs (Engineering). Suppliers: oil refiners (catalyst), its own captive Brazilian mine (lithium), and antimony concentrate sourcing. Contract structure is mostly spot-priced commodity (lithium concentrate priced CIF China; ferrovanadium; antimony) with the Engineering book providing order backlog ($370M at Dec-2025) and the Saudi V2O5 offtake providing a future take-or-pay-like exclusivity.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Three distinct chains; named stakeholders along each:

Lithium chain (vertically integrated — the moat): Upstream — AMG Brazil / Mibra mine (Minas Gerais) mines pegmatite ore → on-site spodumene concentrate plant (90→130 ktpa expansion) → ocean freight → Bitterfeld-Wolfen refinery (Germany) converts to battery-grade lithium hydroxide monohydrate → European cathode-active-material (CAM) manufacturers (named only as "all European CAM makers" received kg samples by end-2025; ton-scale qualification H1 2026). Chokepoint: the entire European downstream depends on one mine in Brazil (single-source feedstock) and one refinery ramp; a $50M Bitterfeld carbonate→hydroxide conversion plant (20% German federal grant) adds optionality. This is the rare mine-to-battery-chemical chain wholly inside one company — a genuine differentiator versus merchant converters.

Vanadium chain (circular / negative-feedstock — the cash engine): Upstream — US oil refiners (and globally) pay AMG to dispose of spent hydroprocessing catalyst and power-plant residues (hazardous waste) → V-CYCLE roast/melt at Cambridge & Zanesville, Ohio → ferrovanadium / V2O5 / chrome metal / titanium alloys → North American steel mills, chemical and alloy buyers. Chokepoint exposure (this hurt 2025): feedstock availability is tied to US refinery run-rates and shutdowns — refinery turnarounds in 2025 reduced spent-catalyst availability, directly compressing Vanadium EBITDA. New axis: Saudi Supercenter (Jubail/Jazan) — JV with Saudi Aramco + Shell + The United Company for Industry processing vanadium concentrate from the Jazan IGCC plant → 8M lbs V2O5/yr from H1 2028, AMG sole offtaker.

Antimony / Technologies chain (the swing factor): Antimony concentrate (globally sourced; primary supply ~50% China, plus Tajikistan/Russia/Myanmar/Bolivia) → AMG antimony-trioxide / specialty processing → flame-retardant, lead-acid battery, and defense buyers. Single most important chokepoint in the whole company right now: China's antimony export controls (licensing Aug-2024 → US ban Dec-2024 → broader halt 2025) created the windfall — AMG is a Western non-China antimony processor, so it is long the geopolitical fracture. Engineering chain is unrelated: AMG builds vacuum/coating furnaces for aerospace-engine OEMs globally.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Moats are segment-specific and uneven — this is not a single-moat company:

• Vanadium recycling = the strongest, most durable moat. V-CYCLE is a proprietary pyrometallurgical process (>99% conversion, no process wastewater, "industry's lowest emissions, gold-standard compliance") protected by a patent estate (USPTO filings on vanadium recovery from petroleum-combustion residues). The deeper moat is negative-cost feedstock + permitting: refiners pay AMG to take hazardous waste, and building a new hazardous-materials pyromet plant requires environmental permits that take years (the $325M Zanesville greenfield is itself the barrier to entry). Competitors (Metal & Catalyst Resources, Taiyo Koko, Aleon, LB Group, various Chinese recyclers) exist but none have AMG's North American scale + IP + permit position. Bargaining power: high over feedstock suppliers (they need disposal), moderate over steel-mill customers (FeV is a commodity).
• Lithium = a latency moat, not yet a profit moat. Backward integration (own mine → own European refinery → "Europe's first LiOH refinery") is a real structural advantage if European CAM localization (and any EU local-content / CRMA pull) materializes — but today it is loss-making (segment operating loss $(38.7)M in 2025). The moat is geographic/regulatory (a non-China, EU-domiciled qualified LiOH source) rather than cost.
• Engineering = a quiet, real moat. Global #1 in vacuum furnaces / turbine-blade coating for aerospace engines; high switching costs (qualified equipment, long sales cycles), evidenced by the $370M backlog. Bargaining power high — few alternatives.
• Antimony = NO durable moat — it is a price-taker riding a geopolitical spike. AMG's antimony profit in 2025–26 is a windfall from China's export ban, not a structural edge. When/if China normalizes (the Nov-2025 suspension of the ban runs to Nov-2026), the margin mean-reverts. Management itself flags it as transient (the explicit >$70M one-time low-cost inventory benefit). This is the analytical crux of the whole name — see Lens 5/12/13.

Lens 4 · Segments

FY2025 vs FY2024 (all ; the research-layer segments.csv is empty so none of this is ):

The trend that matters: the group's 40% EBITDA jump is almost entirely Technologies (+$96M of the +$67M group delta, i.e. Technologies more than carried the group while Lithium and Vanadium went backwards). Strip the antimony windfall and the one-time $70M inventory gain and the underlying franchise was down year-on-year. Geographic mix is Brazil (mine), Germany (lithium refinery + engineering), USA (vanadium), with antimony/engineering global — AMG does not break out clean geographic EBITDA publicly, so a geographic P&L split is n/a — not disclosed at segment-EBITDA granularity.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

FY2025 (reported 2026-03) — the print, fully sourced:

• Revenue $1,708.3M (+19%); Gross profit $308.2M (+35%), gross margin 18.1% (vs 15.8%); adj. gross margin 19.7%.
• Operating profit $99.5M (+125%); Adjusted EBITDA $235.1M (+40%) — third-highest in company history.
• Net loss $(18.6)M attributable to shareholders (improved from $(33.4)M); Adjusted net income $35.2M; Diluted EPS $(0.58); Adjusted diluted EPS $1.05.
• Operating cash flow $76.1M (+103%); capex $81.6M; cash $289.3M; total liquidity $484M.
• Senior secured net debt $145.3M; net debt incl. municipal bond $509.1M (the $307.2M Ohio tax-exempt bond is the swing item). Dividend €0.40/share.
• Quality-of-earnings flags (critical): (1) a >$70M temporary benefit from selling low-priced antimony inventory lifted Technologies — a genuine one-time gain management says it must "compensate for" in 2026; (2) a $41M non-cash charge from derecognising US + German NOL carryforwards drove a $57.6M FY tax expense (Q4 alone $43M) — management believes the NOLs remain recoverable; (3) 45X (IRA advanced-manufacturing) credit cash receipt deferred to 2026 due to the US government shutdown.

Q1 2026 (reported 2026-05-06) — better than expected:

• Revenue $446.1M (+15% YoY); Adjusted EBITDA $44M — up 2% sequentially vs Q4-25's $43M and beating guidance for a sequential decline, but −24% YoY (lapping the antimony spike). Net income $12M (vs $5M).
• Driver: AMG Vanadium, including consolidation of AURA from Jan-1-2026 ("ahead of expectations," contribution "single digits"); Bitterfeld contributed ~$21M Q1 revenue from not-yet-qualified battery-grade material; a $20–21M inventory write-up (lithium price improvement). Tantalum price peaked (€200) intra-quarter then moderated. Middle East conflict shifted ~12,000 tons of shipments Q1→Q2 (timing, not demand loss).
• FY2026 guidance reiterated: Adjusted EBITDA $210–240M; capex $70–90M; headcount ~3,200 (down from ~3,600 post Graphite-sale + Silicon-closure). Q1 framed as the trough; Q2 expected to approach Q2-25 levels on tantalum + lithium phasing. Management hinted toward the upper end ("you tend towards the upper number of that range").

Balance-sheet flags: the $307.2M / 5.0% / due-2049 Ohio municipal bond (funding the Zanesville greenfield) is the dominant leverage item and is project-financing-like — it inflates headline net debt ($509M) well above senior secured net debt ($145M). Inventory and the 45X receivable timing are the working-capital watch-items.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research layer (transcripts/ empty), so this is `` from the Q1 2026 call plus Q3/Q4-25 coverage:

• Speakers: CEO Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch, CFO Jackson Dunckel, Chief Corporate Development Officer Michael Connor.
• Tone trajectory: through 2024 the tone was defensive/survival (lithium bear market, "stronger than ever in the lithium bear market" framing); by late-2025 it shifted to vindicated/expansionary as antimony rescued the P&L; Q1 2026 is "confident yet cautiously balanced." The recurring new phrase is "significantly increased geopolitical headwinds and hence reduced visibility" — management leans on geopolitics both as the source of the antimony upside and as the reason for guidance conservatism. They are "ramping on plan" on Bitterfeld. They stopped talking up lithium pricing as a near-term driver and started emphasising the recycling/circularity + Saudi/molybdenum expansion narrative and supply-chain localisation (EU + US).
• Capital-allocation tone shifted hard toward growth over returns: the €127M April-2026 raise was earmarked for lithium/molybdenum/vanadium expansions ("low capital requirement, short implementation times"); no dividend emphasis on the Q1 call despite the €0.40 declared with FY results.

Lens 7 · Comps

AMG has no clean pure-play comp — it is a lithium-miner + a vanadium-recycler + an antimony processor + an aerospace-engineering OEM. So a single P/E line is misleading; the table below is honestly partial — most peer multiples are n/a rather than fabricated.

What the one sourced figure says: AMG trades at ~17x forward earnings on a market cap of €1.32B with +97.75% 1-year performance (52-wk €17.67–€43.50). That is not a distressed multiple — the market has already re-rated the name on the antimony recovery and the Bitterfeld/expansion optionality. Sell-side is bullish: consensus target ~€43.66 (≈+13%); Citi €52 Buy (raised from €45), Deutsche Bank upgraded to Buy, €42, and a "Strong Buy" cluster at ~€46. 5-year average ROE is n/a (AMG's ROE swings violently with the commodity cycle — FY2022 EPS $5.88 vs FY2024 loss — so a 5yr average would be more misleading than useful; flagged rather than fabricated).

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~5 years)

Pattern is unusually clean — AMG trades as a leveraged bet on three commodity prices, dominated serially by whichever is moving:

• 2021–H1 2022 — up sharply: lithium super-cycle; EPS peaked at $5.88 (FY2022).
• Mid-2023 → 2024 — down ~57% from mid-2023 highs: lithium price collapse; FY2024 swung to a $(1.03) loss/share, revenue −11% to $1.44B.
• Sep-2024 onward — the antimony re-rate: China's antimony export controls (licensing Aug-24 → US ban Dec-24) drove antimony from ~$12k/t to a $59,750/t ($27.10/lb) all-time high on 4-Jul-2025; AMG's Technologies EBITDA +142% FY25; the stock +97.75% over the trailing year into mid-2026.
• 2025–26 idiosyncratic movers: Q3-25 beat (+58% EBITDA), the €127M April-2026 equity raise at €34 (4x oversubscribed), and Bitterfeld ramp milestones. What the market actually reacts to: (1) antimony spot (the current swing factor), (2) lithium spot (the structural overhang), (3) vanadium/refinery-utilisation, and (4) Bitterfeld qualification news. Macro/geopolitics (China export policy) is now a first-order driver, not background.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Track record — long, scarred, credible. Dr. Heinz Schimmelbusch (b. 1944, Austrian; PhD Tübingen) ran Metallgesellschaft (one of Germany's largest industrial conglomerates, 250+ subsidiaries) as CEO 1989–1993 — a tenure that ended in the infamous ~$1.3B oil-derivatives hedging blow-up that nearly bankrupted MG. He then built Safeguard International Fund (1997, ~$305M), rolled up Metallurg/ALD/Sudamin into AMG, and IPO'd it on Euronext in 2006, serving as Chairman & CEO ever since (~20 years). So the operator is a founder-builder with a genuine industrial-metallurgy pedigree and a famous risk-management scar — relevant context, not disqualifying.
• Tenure & skin in the game: ~20 years as founder-Chairman-CEO — exceptional alignment by duration; precise current insider ownership % is n/a (no research-layer insider-transactions.csv; not cleanly disclosed in the sources read). The combined Chairman+CEO role is itself a governance flag (see Lens 10).
• Capital allocation: mixed and cycle-dependent. Pros: the recycling/circular-economy strategy is genuinely differentiated; the Saudi Supercenter is capital-light for AMG ($30M equity, non-recourse project finance); the 2025 portfolio pruning was disciplined (sold Graphite to Asbury Carbons, closed loss-making Silicon outright). Concerns: heavy simultaneous capex into Bitterfeld + Zanesville + Saudi + molybdenum during a commodity down-leg, funded partly by a dilutive 10% equity raise (April 2026) struck while the stock was elevated — defensible timing, but dilution nonetheless. ROE/ROIC trend is violently cyclical and currently depressed (GAAP loss).
• Red flags: (1) Chairman and CEO concentrated in one founder — weak board independence signal; (2) the Metallgesellschaft derivatives history is a permanent reminder this operator has taken franchise-threatening risk before; (3) related-party / promotional behaviour — none found in the sources read (n/a).
• Archetype: founder-operator (not professional caretaker) — implies conviction, long-horizon bets, and key-man risk concentrated in an 81-year-old CEO. Succession is an under-discussed risk.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic lens — every figure ; no numbers exist for this name.

• Quality of earnings — the dominant flag. FY2025 adjusted EBITDA ($235M) vs net loss $(18.6)M is a wide GAAP-to-adjusted gap. The bridge contains: a >$70M one-time low-cost antimony inventory liquidation (non-recurring, management-acknowledged), a $41M non-cash NOL-derecognition tax charge, and 45X credit timing slipping into 2026. Adjusted diluted EPS $1.05 vs GAAP $(0.58) — lean on the GAAP number and the recurring run-rate, not the adjusted headline.
• Revenue recognition / segment reporting: Engineering is percentage-of-completion-style equipment work (book-to-bill 0.95x in 2025 vs 1.27x in 2024 — backlog declined to $370M), where revenue timing is an estimate-heavy area worth watching. Antimony revenue is inventory-timing-sensitive (the $70M gain proves it).
• Balance sheet: net debt $509.1M including the $307.2M / 5.0% / 2049 municipal bond vs senior secured net debt $145.3M — the gap is the project-finance bond for Zanesville; not hidden, but headline-leverage optics depend heavily on how you treat it. Cash $289.3M; no near-term maturities (term loan Nov-2028, revolver extended to Aug-2028).
• Cash flow vs earnings: OCF $76.1M exceeded adjusted net income $35.2M in 2025 (healthy direction), but capex $81.6M ≈ OCF → FCF roughly breakeven/negative during the build-out; the multi-project capex wave + dividend is partly equity-funded (the April raise).
• SBC / goodwill: not flagged as material in sources read (n/a — not specifically sourced).

Regulatory findings (required sub-section). Per regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (generated 2026-06-21): AMG has no SEC CIK and no EDGAR filings — 0 SEC Litigation Releases, 0 AAERs (no EFTS search possible for a non-US filer). Non-SEC web search — "AMG Critical Materials" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR consent decree OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement — returned no material enforcement actions in the sources reviewed. There is no 10-K Item 3 to quote (AMG files a Dutch/Euronext annual report, not a 10-K); its legal-proceedings disclosure lives in the 2025 Annual Report (published 2026-03-16), which the sources read did not surface as containing material litigation. Net: no material regulatory or legal findings identified — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (returned N/A: non-filer) + web search as of 2026-06-21; the company's own Annual Report legal-proceedings section was not deep-read and is the one gap to close on a refresh.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Built bottom-up from the FY2026 guidance bridge; output `` with arithmetic. Fiscal years = calendar.

Anchor: FY2026 management guidance Adjusted EBITDA $210–240M, capex $70–90M, with Q1 the trough and a tilt to the upper end.

• FY2026 (base): Adj. EBITDA ~$230M. Below FY2025's $235M because the $70M antimony inventory gain does not repeat, partly offset by AURA + Vanadium recovery + Bitterfeld first qualified volumes. Adjusted diluted EPS ~$0.95–1.15. GAAP EPS likely still thin/near-breakeven given depreciation from the capex wave.
• FY2027 (base): Adj. EBITDA ~$270–300M. The swing is entirely Bitterfeld qualification + antimony's glide path.
• FY2028 (base): Adj. EBITDA ~$320–360M. Bull path materially higher if lithium prices recover into a tightening 2027–28 market and Bitterfeld hits 40–60kt; bear path flat-to-down if antimony fully mean-reverts and lithium stays depressed.

Base / Bull / Bear (FY2027 adj. EBITDA, the pivotal year): Bear ~$210M (antimony normalises hard, lithium flat, Vanadium soft) / Base ~$285M / Bull ~$360M (lithium recovery + Bitterfeld ramp + antimony sticky-high). Every input is a labeled estimate; no number here is research-layer-sourced.

Forecast log: per --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create in this loop (breadth mode logs forecasts only on genuine conviction commitment, which is a human-gated /thesis step). The scoreable base call to log later: "AMG.AS FY2026 adjusted EBITDA ≥ $225M, p≈0.62, resolves 2027-03-31."

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. AMG is three call options the market under-models as one cyclical: (1) Bitterfeld — Europe's first qualified battery-grade LiOH source, fully backward-integrated to a captive Brazilian mine, ramping toward 100kt by 2030 into a structurally China-dependent EU battery supply chain that needs a local qualified converter (CRMA tailwind); today loss-making, so it is free optionality in the price. (2) Vanadium recycling — a genuinely moated, negative-feedstock, permit-protected franchise about to double with the $325M Zanesville greenfield and add an exclusive 8M-lb V2O5 Saudi offtake from 2028, plus a molybdenum leg by 2029. (3) Engineering — a quiet global-#1 aerospace-furnace business throwing off real cash and backlog. Layer on antimony staying elevated (China's ban only suspended to Nov-2026; US defense mobilisation ~$400M underpins Western demand) and the earnings base is higher-for-longer. Sell-side agrees (Citi €52, DB upgrade).

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) Antimony mean-reversion is not "if" but "when" — the 2025–26 earnings were rescued by a one-off geopolitical spike and a literal $70M one-time inventory gain; normalise antimony and a large slice of EBITDA evaporates, exposing a Lithium segment still losing ~$39M/yr and a Vanadium base that went backwards in 2025. (2) Lithium structural overhang — if lithium oversupply persists into 2027, Bitterfeld ramps into weak pricing and the "Europe's first refinery" trophy is a cash sink, not a profit centre; the segment's $632/dmt price vs $488 cost leaves thin cushion. (3) Leverage + simultaneous capex + key-man — $509M net debt, a multi-project build (Bitterfeld + Zanesville + Saudi + moly) during a down-cycle, funded partly by dilution, run by an 81-year-old founder-Chairman-CEO with thin succession visibility and a Metallgesellschaft-sized historical risk scar.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It is late-2027. China fully lifted antimony controls in Nov-2026; antimony halved; Technologies EBITDA round-tripped. Lithium never recovered, Bitterfeld is running at <30% utilisation burning cash, and a refinery-shutdown wave kept Vanadium feedstock tight. Net debt crept up as the capex wave completed into soft prices; the stock gave back most of the 2025 antimony re-rate. What killed it: the market paid a structural multiple for a cyclical print.

Are multiples too high? ~17x forward earnings is not cheap for a commodity conglomerate at what may be a near-peak antimony contribution. The bull retort: forward EPS understates the 2027–28 Bitterfeld/Saudi/moly step-up that isn't in numbers yet. Both can be true — which is exactly why this is a WATCH, not a chase.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The consensus frames AMG as a lithium/antimony commodity play. The durable, under-priced asset is actually the vanadium-recycling + Saudi/molybdenum circular-economy franchise — negative-cost feedstock, permit-moated, doubling capacity, with a sovereign-backed offtake. If you strip the commodity noise, that is the part worth owning, and it is buried inside a conglomerate the market values on antimony headlines.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Skeptical short dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the model: the cash engine (Vanadium) depends on US refinery utilisation for negative-cost feedstock — a wave of refinery rationalisation/closures (already a 2025 drag) starves the plants; meanwhile the profit in 2025–26 is antimony, which is pure geopolitical rent with a known expiry (China ban suspended to Nov-2026). You are short a melting ice cube of antimony EBITDA against two structurally-challenged commodity legs.
• Revenue concentration: dangerously concentrated in antimony pricing for current profitability and in one Brazilian mine + one German refinery for the entire lithium thesis. A single operational failure at Mibra (already saw equipment failure + poor ore in 2025) or a Bitterfeld qualification slip guts the growth story.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: Bitterfeld's "first-mover EU LiOH" edge evaporates if Chinese converters or other EU projects qualify, or if EU CAM demand under-delivers; it's a moat only while it's the only qualified Western option and lithium economics work — neither is guaranteed.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: for vanadium, Chinese recyclers (LB Group, Henan Rongjia, Sichuan) scaling under domestic mandates; for lithium, the entire low-cost Chinese converter complex that makes Bitterfeld's cost position uncompetitive ex-policy support.
• Worst capital-allocation/governance: raising dilutive equity at a cyclical-high stock to fund a capex wave into a commodity down-leg; Chairman=CEO founder concentration at 81 with no clear successor; the Metallgesellschaft derivatives near-death is the historical tell that this management can take franchise-level risk.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: antimony stays well above pre-2024 norms; Bitterfeld qualifies and ramps on schedule; Vanadium feedstock normalises; lithium at least stops falling. If 2027 growth disappoints 20–30%, ~17x forward de-rates toward low-teens/high-single-digits on a lower EPS base → a plausible 30–45% drawdown from current levels.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a prolonged lithium glut (2026–2028) turning Bitterfeld into a structural cash sink simultaneously with full antimony normalisation — the company funds an uneconomic European refinery out of a shrinking earnings base while levered, and the equity re-rates to deep-cyclical-trough multiples. Plausibility: moderate — not a base case, but not tail-risk either.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of FY2026 EBITDA guidance, how much assumes antimony above pre-2024 norms — and what is the run-rate group EBITDA if antimony fully normalises to ~$12–15k/t?
2. What is the precise Bitterfeld ramp schedule — qualified tonnes by quarter through 2027 — and the segment EBITDA-breakeven utilisation?
3. At today's lithium price (~$630/dmt concentrate), is Bitterfeld NPV-positive, and at what lithium price does it turn structurally cash-generative?
4. What is the all-in cost curve position of the Mibra→Bitterfeld chain versus Chinese merchant LiOH converters, excluding any grant/policy support?
5. How dependent is Vanadium feedstock on US refinery run-rates, and what is the sensitivity of Vanadium EBITDA to a further 10% drop in spent-catalyst availability?
6. What are the Saudi Supercenter economics for AMG specifically — expected EBITDA contribution and IRR on the $30M equity, and the gating risks to H2-2028 commissioning?
7. Succession: what is the board's concrete CEO-succession plan, and the timeline to separate the Chairman and CEO roles?
8. Why fund the capex wave with dilutive equity at this point in the stock's cycle rather than the project-finance / non-recourse structure used for Saudi?
9. What is the realistic recoverability and timing of the $41M derecognised NOLs and the deferred 45X cash credit?
10. What is the path and timeline for the molybdenum business to first revenue/EBITDA, and what offtake or partner commitments underpin the 2029 target?
11. Engineering book-to-bill fell to 0.95x in 2025 — is that cyclical or a share-loss signal, and what is the 2026 order pipeline?
12. How much of group capex over 2026–2028 is committed/non-deferrable versus optional if commodity prices stay weak?
13. What covenants attach to the $307.2M municipal bond and the term loan, and how much EBITDA cushion exists in a downside case?
14. What is the capital-return policy through the build-out — is the €0.40 dividend secure if FY2026 lands at the low end of guidance?
15. Which single end-market (EU battery localisation, defense antimony demand, refinery vanadium, aerospace engineering) does management view as the most durable five-year earnings anchor, and why?

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