BHP Group

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

BHP is the world's largest diversified miner by market capitalisation (~US$195B ), incorporated in Victoria, Australia, HQ 171 Collins Street, Melbourne. It digs four things out of the ground and sells them to industrial buyers, overwhelmingly in Asia:

• Copper — concentrate and cathode. FY2025 revenue US$22.5B, Underlying EBITDA US$12,326M. Assets: Escondida (Chile, world's largest copper mine), Pampa Norte/Spence (Chile), Copper South Australia (Olympic Dam + ex-OZ Minerals Carrapateena/Prominent Hill), Antamina (Peru, equity-accounted), plus the new Vicuña JV (Argentina). FY2025 production 2,017kt — first time over 2Mt, +28% since FY2022.
• Iron Ore — the cash engine. FY2025 revenue US$22.9B, Underlying EBITDA US$14,396M. WAIO (Western Australia Iron Ore, Pilbara) produced a record 257Mt (290Mt 100% basis); world's lowest-cost major iron ore producer six years running. Plus Samarco (Brazil, 50% JV with Vale).
• Coal — steelmaking (BMA, Queensland) + energy coal (NSWEC). FY2025 revenue US$5.0B, EBITDA collapsed to US$573M from US$2,290M on price.
• Other — Western Australia Nickel (in temporary suspension since Dec 2024; potential divestment under review by Feb 2027) + Potash (Jansen, pre-production).

Contract structure: commodity sales, largely index-linked to benchmark prices (62% Fe CFR for iron ore, LME/COMEX for copper). No take-or-pay protection — BHP is a pure price-taker, so realised prices are the dominant swing factor. Customer concentration is geographic, not single-name: China is the gravitational centre of demand for iron ore and a large copper buyer. Workforce ~90,000. Credit: Moody's A1, Fitch A, both stable.

The strategic story in one line: BHP has spent five years reshaping from a fossil-and-iron miner into a copper-and-potash "future-facing commodities" house — exited petroleum (2022 Woodside merger), exited thermal-heavy coal (Blackwater/Daunia divested 2024), bought OZ Minerals (2023) and Filo Corp/Vicuña (2025) for copper, and is building the world's largest potash mine.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map, upstream → BHP → end customer, with named stakeholders:

Iron Ore chain (the cash spine):

• Upstream inputs: diesel, electricity (BHP-operated Pilbara grid moving to renewables), mining equipment (Caterpillar, Komatsu autonomous haul trucks), rail (BHP owns ~1,000km Pilbara rail + Port Hedland infrastructure — a genuine integrated logistics moat).
• BHP: mine (Mining Area C, South Flank — exceeded 80Mt nameplate in year one — Newman, Yandi/Jimblebar) → rail → Port Hedland ship loaders (Port Debottlenecking Project PDP1 unlocked record shipments ).
• End customer: Chinese steel mills (China Baowu, HBIS, Ansteel) + Developed/Developing Asia + European blast furnaces. Chokepoint: China. ~1Bt Chinese steel production is the demand floor for the whole seaborne iron ore trade.

Copper chain (the growth spine):

• Upstream: sulphuric acid (leaching), power (a two-week weather-related power outage at Copper SA cost 2% of FY25 volume — single-grid dependency ), water (desalination at Escondida — water is the binding constraint in the Atacama).
• BHP: concentrator/leach → concentrate.
• Downstream: smelters (BHP sells concentrate; smelting is largely Chinese — China controls ~50% of global smelting capacity, a structural chokepoint that compresses concentrate treatment charges and gives Chinese smelters bargaining power) → cathode → wire/cable → grid, EVs, data centres.

Jansen/Potash chain: building from scratch in Saskatchewan, Canada → first production gated on construction (the bottleneck — see Lens 11). End market: Indian/SE Asian/Brazilian agriculture.

Single-source dependencies: Escondida is ~25%+ of copper EBITDA — one orebody, one water system, one Chilean tax/royalty regime. Antamina, Samarco and Vicuña are non-operated/JV — BHP takes the cash but not the control.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

BHP's moat is the orebody plus the cost position plus the balance sheet — the classic low-cost-producer-of-an-undifferentiated-commodity moat, which is real but cyclical.

• Cost-curve position (the durable one): WAIO is the world's lowest-cost major iron ore producer, six consecutive years. In a commodity, being bottom-quartile on cost is the moat — you survive every price trough that kills the marginal producer. The 20-F explicitly models a US$80-100/t iron ore "cost support" floor formed by ~180Mt of high-cost Australian junior/Indian/Chinese-domestic supply that exits below that level. BHP sits far below it.
• Integrated infrastructure: owned Pilbara rail + port. A new entrant cannot replicate this; it is why Simandou took a decade and a Chinese state consortium to build (Lens 13).
• Scale + cost of capital: A1/A credit rating → cheapest debt in the sector. Net debt target US$10-20B against US$26B Underlying EBITDA — it can fund counter-cyclically when rivals are forced sellers (it bought OZ Minerals and Vicuña while smaller players were capital-starved).
• Bargaining power: Strong over suppliers (it is a must-have customer for equipment makers). Weak over end customers in iron ore — China is a near-monopsony buyer and the seaborne majors are price-takers to the benchmark. Improving in copper — a tightening concentrate market shifts power toward miners, away from the (largely Chinese) smelters.

What is NOT a moat: brand (irrelevant for a commodity), switching costs (zero — iron ore is iron ore), network effects (none). The "future-facing commodities" framing is a demand-tailwind story, not a competitive moat — Rio, Vale, Glencore, Freeport are all chasing the same copper.

Lens 4 · Segments

FY2025 vs FY2024 vs FY2023, Underlying EBITDA by segment, all ``:

The single most important number in this dossier: copper's share of Group EBITDA went from ~24% (FY24) to 45% (FY25), and to 51% in H1 FY2026. By earnings, BHP is now a copper company with an iron-ore cash annuity attached — even though the market still quotes it on the iron ore cycle.

Geographic concentration: production is Australia (iron ore, coal, nickel), Chile/Peru/Argentina (copper), Canada (potash). Revenue is overwhelmingly Asia-destined. The FY25 revenue −8% was almost entirely iron-ore-and-coal price, partially offset by copper price + record copper volume — exactly the rotation the portfolio reshape was designed to produce.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

Two prints matter here: the FY2025 annual (the 20-F, the grounded base) and the H1 FY2026 (the latest tape).

FY2025 (year ended 30 June 2025) [all research-layer: filings/20-f-2025-q2.md]:

• Revenue US$51.3B, −8% YoY (lower realised iron ore + coal prices; WAN suspension; Blackwater/Daunia divestment; offset by record copper volume + price).
• Underlying EBITDA US$25,978M (−10%); Underlying EBITDA margin ~54% on a Group-production basis.
• Profit from operations US$19,464M (FY24 17,537 — note FY24 was depressed by US$6.1B exceptionals).
• Attributable profit to shareholders US$9,019M (FY24 7,897); Underlying attributable profit US$10,157M.
• Basic EPS 177.8c; Underlying basic EPS 200.2c (FY24 269.5c — the underlying drop reflects the iron-ore price reset).
• ROCE 20.6%, down 6.6pp — still a very high return on capital for a miner, but the deceleration is real and partly Vicuña-acquisition-driven (higher capital employed).
• Net operating cash flow US$18.7B.
• Exceptional loss US$1.1B after tax (US$0.9B Samarco + US$0.2B WAN suspension) — materially smaller than FY24's US$5.8B exceptional loss.
• Dividend: 110 US cents/share FY2025 (US$5.6B); final 60c paid 25 Sep 2025; 50% minimum payout policy.

H1 FY2026 (half-year ended 31 Dec 2025, reported 17 Feb 2026) [all web: BHP HY26 release / Motley Fool AU / Investing.com, Feb 2026]:

• Revenue +11% to US$27.9B; attributable profit +28% to US$5.64B.
• Underlying EBITDA +25%, copper-driven.
• Copper 51% of Underlying EBITDA (copper prices +32% YoY; iron ore +4%).
• FY26 group copper guidance raised to 1.9-2.0Mt; Escondida record concentrator throughput.
• WAIO record first-half production + shipments.
• Interim dividend 73 US cents (US$3.7B, 60% payout) — up from 51c a year prior.

Balance-sheet flags: Net debt US$12.9B (up US$3.8B YoY), within the new US$10-20B target. Gearing 19.8% (FY24 15.7%). Gross debt US$24.5B, cash US$11.9B. The net-debt build is deliberate — funded Vicuña (US$2.1B), Samarco settlement (US$1.8B), and the dividend (US$8.3B paid). Watch: a single Jansen impairment (US$2.3B, H1 FY26 — Lens 11) and a soft iron-ore year could push gearing toward the top of the range.

Tone: management is leaning into the copper-growth narrative and away from the iron-ore-cycle story. The market reaction to HY26 was the EBITDA growth + raised copper guidance.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on disk; reconstructing from the FY25 20-F Chair/CEO reviews + H1 FY26 commentary.

• Recurring phrases (rising): "future-facing commodities," "copper," "Capital Allocation Framework / CAF discipline," "lowest-cost producer," "BHP Operating System," "balance sheet to work." Copper is now the lead, not iron ore.
• Phrases that disappeared: petroleum (gone since Woodside 2022), and the bullish Jansen schedule confidence — replaced by a notably contrite "This is disappointing" on Jansen Stage 1 cost in the FY25 CEO review, an unusual admission for a major-miner CEO.
• Sentiment shift: FY24 was defensive (Samarco + WAN impairments + the failed Anglo bid). FY25 → H1 FY26 is increasingly confident on copper, increasingly defensive on project delivery. The Chair (new — Ross McEwan) opens on "stability and resilience… 140 years," signalling a return-of-capital, steady-hand message to the retail base ("hundreds of thousands of retail shareholders who rely on BHP… for retirement" ).

Lens 7 · Comps

Major diversified miners + copper pure-play. Multiples ``, sourced; n/a where I cannot verify.

Read: BHP trades at the lowest EV/EBITDA of the diversified majors (~7.4x vs 8-10x) despite (a) the best cost position in iron ore, (b) the fastest-growing copper book, and (c) investment-grade-A balance sheet. The discount is the iron-ore-beta tax — the market prices the whole company off the iron ore cycle and the Samarco overhang, not off the copper mix shift. The bull case is literally a re-rating-to-copper-peers argument (a pure copper play like FCX historically commands a premium EV/EBITDA). The bear case is that the discount is earned because iron ore is ~45% of EBITDA and is rolling over (Lens 13).

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts

What has moved BHP >5% over recent years (mostly `` + research-layer context):

• Iron ore price prints / Chinese stimulus headlines — the dominant mover historically. BHP trades as a liquid China-property/steel proxy.
• The Anglo American bid saga (Apr-May 2024) — BHP made multiple proposals, all rejected; abandoned the bid 29 May 2024. BHP shares were pressured on deal-risk/dilution fear; relief on walk-away.
• Samarco provision revisions — each increase (the FY24 US$3.8B after-tax hit) is a discrete drawdown catalyst.
• Copper price + Escondida grade/throughput — increasingly a positive catalyst as copper's EBITDA share crosses 50%.
• Jansen cost revisions — the US$2.3B impairment (Feb 2026) is a negative catalyst and a credibility ding.
• Half-year/full-year results + dividend — the dividend is the retail anchor; a payout-ratio surprise moves the stock.

Pattern read: historically BHP = iron ore + China sentiment. The market reaction function is shifting toward copper as the mix shifts, but slowly — the stock still sells off on iron ore weakness more than it rallies on copper strength. That lag is the re-rating opportunity (or the value trap).

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Mike Henry (since 1 Jan 2020). BHP insider since 2003, ELT since 2011; chemist by training, deep operational/commercial/marketing background. Track record: drove +28% copper production since FY22, six-year iron-ore cost leadership, the petroleum exit (Woodside) and the coal high-grading — a genuine, executed portfolio transformation. The blemish: project delivery. Jansen's serial cost blowouts happened on his watch and he owned it ("This is disappointing"). Capital-allocation record is mostly disciplined (CAF, 50% payout floor, walked away from Anglo when the price/structure didn't work) but the OZ Minerals (2023) and Filo/Vicuña (2025) deals were done at cycle-strong copper prices — the returns are unproven.
• CFO: Vandita Pant (since 2024) — long BHP tenure (ex-Chief Commercial Officer, treasurer); messaging is balance-sheet-strength/cash-flow-consistency.
• Chair: Ross McEwan (since 31 Mar 2025) — brand-new, and notably a career banker (ex-CEO of National Australia Bank and RBS), not a miner. Succeeded Ken MacKenzie (7-year tenure). Skill set is capital allocation + risk + regulatory/turnaround — a deliberate signal that the board's priority is financial discipline and stakeholder/political navigation over operational mining expertise (the board already has that).
• Board mining heavyweights: Senior Independent Director Gary Goldberg (ex-Newmont CEO), Don Lindsay (ex-Teck CEO) — serious mining capital-allocation pedigree. Plus tech/industrial directors (Dion Weisler ex-HP, on Intel/Thermo Fisher boards).
• Skin in the game: LTIP is 100% relative-TSR vs a Sector Group (67%) + World (33%) index; the FY2020 LTIP vested on 85th-percentile TSR (strong). No insider-transactions.csv on disk; insider ownership is modest in absolute terms (typical of a A$200B+ widely-held major) — professional managers, not founders.
• Capital allocation, the honest scorecard: dividends US$50B+ over five years; no buybacks in FY25 (chose growth + balance sheet); the CAF explicitly ranks: safety/maintenance → balance sheet → minimum 50% payout → growth/excess returns. This is a textbook disciplined framework. The risk is execution on the growth bucket (Jansen).
• Red flags: Samarco (an operational/governance catastrophe inherited from the pre-2020 era but still bleeding); Jansen overruns; deals at cycle highs. Nothing promotional or related-party.

Verdict on people: A-grade operators and capital-allocators, B-grade project-delivery, with a board now tilted to financial discipline. Trustworthy stewards; the question is whether they overpaid for copper growth.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic equity-analyst lens. Figures `` unless noted.

• Underlying vs statutory gap: BHP leans heavily on "Underlying EBITDA / Underlying attributable profit / Underlying EPS." FY25 Underlying attributable profit US$10,157M vs statutory attributable US$9,019M — a US$1.1B add-back (Samarco + WAN). This is legitimate and consistently applied (exceptional items are disclosed in Note 3), but the dividend payout ratio is calculated on the Underlying number, which structurally flatters cash returns vs statutory earnings. Watch the add-back creep.
• Cash vs earnings: Net operating cash flow US$18.7B vs attributable profit US$9.0B — cash exceeds accounting profit (heavy D&A on a capital-intensive miner), which is healthy, not a red flag. Net (decrease) in cash US$(629)M — the cash went to capex + Vicuña + Samarco + dividends, all visible.
• Impairments / goodwill: Recurring impairments are the pattern to watch — WAN (US$2.7B FY24), Jansen (US$2.3B H1 FY26 ). These signal a tendency to sanction/acquire at the top and write down in the trough. Not accounting fraud — capital-allocation discipline risk.
• Receivables/inventory vs revenue: net inventory movements added US$0.7B to FY25 costs — flagged by management, not hidden; normal for a price-taker building/drawing stockpiles.
• SBC: small relative to size (15.5M unvested equity awards, no exercise price ) — not a non-GAAP-flattering issue at BHP's scale.
• JV/equity-accounting opacity: Antamina, Samarco, Vicuña are equity-accounted — earnings flow in net, which reduces transparency into the underlying assets' margins and capital needs. The single biggest accounting-judgement item is the Samarco provision (below).

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC: "No LR found" and "No AAER found" for BHP Group across 2021-06-23 → 2026-06-23. Clean on SEC enforcement.
• 10-K/20-F Item equivalent — Legal Proceedings (the Samarco dam failure):. The Nov 2015 Fundão tailings dam collapse (Samarco, BHP Brasil's 50/50 JV with Vale) remains BHP's defining liability. A Settlement Agreement terminated the major Brazilian public claims — the R$20B Public Civil claim and R$155B Federal Public Prosecutors' claim and 14 linked enforcement proceedings. But it did NOT resolve: (i) the UK group action (the large English-court class action, est. ~£36B claimed, Pogust Goodhead-led ); (ii) the Australian class action; (iii) a Netherlands group claim; (iv) criminal charges against the companies and individuals; (v) various private CPAs (Tanfloc water-treatment, Indigenous-community ASE payments). The 20-F explicitly warns outcomes "may be materially higher or lower than amounts reflected in BHP Brasil's provision". FY25 Samarco exceptional charge US$0.9B after tax; US$1.8B settlement obligation paid in cash in FY25. This is a real, open-ended, multi-jurisdiction tail liability — the single largest forensic/legal risk on the sheet.
• Non-SEC enforcement web check ("BHP Group" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR CFPB OR consent decree OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement): no material new non-Samarco regulatory enforcement surfaced. The Samarco UK/Brazil/Australia litigation is the material legal exposure.

Bottom line: books are clean on fraud/accounting-manipulation (auditor EY, A1/A credit, no SEC actions). The risks are (1) the Underlying-vs-statutory framing driving the dividend, (2) serial top-of-cycle impairments, and (3) the un-provisioned tail of Samarco litigation outside the settlement.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Building from FY2025 actuals + H1 FY2026 run-rate + guidance into Underlying EPS for FY2026-FY2028. All outputs `` with arithmetic shown; inputs labeled.

Anchors: FY25 Underlying basic EPS 200.2c. FY24 269.5c. H1 FY26 attributable profit +28% YoY → implies a strong FY26 recovery. FY26 consensus EPS ~US$2.66 (US$2.66/sh) per Simply Wall St, up from ~US$2.35. Copper now 51% of EBITDA and copper +32% YoY; iron ore softening toward ~US$95/t 2026 avg, heading to ~US$89/t by 2027.

Base-case arithmetic (illustrative): FY26 ≈ consensus US$2.66. FY27 base: hold copper EBITDA roughly flat-to-up (price softer, volume flat) at ~US$13B, iron ore EBITDA down ~10% to ~US$13B on US$90/t, coal ~flat low, Other still negative-to-breakeven → Group Underlying EBITDA ~US$26-27B, less higher D&A/finance on the growth capex, flat-ish share count → **Underlying EPS ~US$2.70 **. The whole projection is a tug-of-war between a falling iron ore price and a rising copper contribution — and copper volume growth doesn't really arrive until 2028+ (Vicuña 2030), so 2026-27 EPS is gated on price, not BHP's control.

Brier forecast (NOT logged — --watchlist rule says skip forecast.ts create in the loop; flag for Connor): the scoreable base call would be "BHP FY2027 Underlying EPS ≥ US$2.50, p≈0.60."

Dividend projection: at 50% minimum payout on ~US$2.65-2.70 Underlying EPS, the floor dividend is ~US$1.33-1.35/sh; recent payouts have run 60% (US$1.83 FY26 trajectory) → ~3.5-4.5% yield at ~US$93. The yield is the downside cushion in the bear case.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. BHP is a copper company the market still prices as an iron-ore proxy. Copper is 51% of EBITDA and rising; the copper market is heading into a multi-year structural deficit (no new large mines, South American grade decline, AI-datacentre + electrification + EV demand — UBS sees US$14k/t, a ~407kt 2026 deficit ). BHP owns the world's best copper asset (Escondida), is growing organic copper +28% already delivered, and has bought into one of the ten largest undeveloped copper districts on earth (Vicuña/Filo del Sol). It funds this from an A1/A balance sheet and the world's lowest-cost iron ore annuity, while paying a 50%+ dividend. If it re-rates from 7.4x to peer ~9-10x EV/EBITDA, that's ~30-35% upside on the multiple alone, before copper-price upside. Potash (Jansen) is a 2027+ optional fifth leg into food security.

Bear case (2-3 things that permanently impair or de-rate):

1. Iron ore structurally rolls over. It's ~45% of EBITDA and Simandou (60Mtpa of new low-cost Guinean supply, ramping now ) lands into a market where Chinese steel has plateaued at ~1Bt and pig-iron is set to decline as scrap rises. Iron ore is already sub-US$100, heading to ~US$89 by 2027. BHP's cost position means it survives — but its earnings and the dividend compress, and the value-trap discount persists or widens.
2. Copper-growth capital was deployed at the top. OZ Minerals + Vicuña + Filo were bought at cycle-strong copper prices; if copper mean-reverts to US$9k (Goldman's US$10-11k base is already below the bull case ), the returns on US$ billions of acquisition + Vicuña's escalating capex (US$400M→US$800M in 2026, production not until 2030 ) look poor for years.
3. Project-delivery credibility is broken. Jansen Stage 1 +47% over budget, Stage 2 +42% and delayed ~2 years to FY2031, a US$2.3B impairment. If BHP can't build a potash mine on budget, the market will discount every future growth dollar — which is exactly the capital the bull case depends on.

Pre-mortem (it's late 2027, the thesis broke): Iron ore broke to US$80 as Simandou ramped faster than expected and Chinese property stayed dead; copper also softened on a global-growth scare; the Jansen impairment was followed by a second one; the Samarco UK action produced an adverse English-court liability ruling; gearing pushed past US$20B and the board cut the dividend below the 50% floor's recent 60% level. BHP de-rated further below peers as "the iron-ore-and-litigation miner."

Are the multiples too high? No — 7.4x EV/EBITDA is the cheapest of the majors. The risk isn't over-valuation; it's that the cheapness is deserved (iron-ore beta + Samarco) and the re-rate never comes.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The market is still trading BHP as a China-iron-ore proxy when the earnings engine has already crossed 50% copper. The mix-shift is happening faster than the multiple is adjusting. The non-consensus call: BHP re-rates not because copper goes to US$14k, but because the market is forced to recategorise it as a copper major after 2-3 more quarters of copper-led results — a classification re-rate, not a commodity-price re-rate.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Skeptical short-seller dismantling the bull.

• The "copper company" story is half a story. ~45% of FY25 EBITDA is still iron ore, and that's the half that's structurally declining. You're being sold the growing 51% and asked to ignore that the other 49% faces Simandou + Chinese steel decline. Revenue concentration: China. If Chinese steel demand finally cracks below the 1Bt plateau (real-estate is still a sinkhole and pig-iron is set to fall ), the iron-ore annuity that funds everything compresses fast.
• The moat is just being low-cost in a price-taking commodity. It protects survival, not margin. In a down-cycle, "lowest cost" means you lose less money than Fortescue — it does not mean you make money.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: the Simandou consortium (Rio Tinto + China Baowu + Winning/Chinalco + Guinea). 60Mtpa of new, high-grade, low-cost iron ore deliberately built by China to reduce dependence on the Australian majors. This is a geopolitically-motivated attack on BHP's single most profitable franchise, and it is shipping now.
• Capital allocation: the worst moves are recent. Billions into copper M&A and Vicuña at cycle-strong prices; Jansen — a greenfield megaproject — is +47%/+42% over budget with a US$2.3B writedown and a 2-year delay. Bulls call BHP disciplined; the evidence of the last three years is overpaying for growth and over-running on builds.
• Samarco is an un-quantifiable tail. Eleven years on, the UK group action (~£36B claimed ), Australian and Dutch class actions, and criminal charges are unresolved, and BHP's own 20-F admits the liability could be "materially higher" than provisioned. You are short a company with an open-ended, multi-billion, multi-jurisdiction legal liability that resists estimation.
• What must hold for US$93? Iron ore not breaking below ~US$85, copper holding US$10k+, no fresh Jansen blowout, no adverse Samarco ruling, China steel staying flat. If growth disappoints 20-30% (iron ore to US$80 + copper to US$9k), Underlying EPS falls toward ~US$2.0 and at a 14x P/E that's ~US$28/sh ADR-equivalent on earnings — the multiple, not just earnings, would compress.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a sustained iron-ore price collapse (Simandou + Chinese steel decline) that turns the cash annuity into a low-return business before copper volume growth (2028+/Vicuña 2030) arrives to replace it — a multi-year earnings air-pocket during which the dividend is cut and the stock de-rates as a structurally-challenged iron miner. Plausibility: medium. Iron ore is rolling over; the open question is speed.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. At what realised iron-ore price does the dividend payout drop to the 50% floor, and below what price would the board breach it? (The single most price-sensitive question for the equity.)
2. Given Simandou is now shipping and Chinese pig-iron is set to decline, what is your base-case iron-ore price deck for FY27-30, and what WAIO volume/cost path does it imply?
3. On Jansen: what specifically changed in your project-controls process after the Stage 1/Stage 2 blowouts, and why should the market trust the Vicuña and copper-growth capex budgets given that track record?
4. What after-tax IRR did you underwrite on OZ Minerals and Filo/Vicuña, at what copper price, and how do those returns look at US$9-10k copper today?
5. What is the realistic remaining cash and contingent exposure on Samarco — UK group action, Australian/Dutch class actions, criminal proceedings — beyond the booked provision, and what's the range?
6. Vicuña doesn't produce until ~2030 and capex is escalating (US$400M→US$800M in 2026). What's the total capital commitment to first production, and the funding path within the US$10-20B net-debt range?
7. Copper is 51% of EBITDA. Do you intend to manage and report BHP as a copper-led company, and would you ever demerge or spin the iron-ore or coal assets to crystallise the copper re-rate?
8. Escondida is your single most important asset — what is the grade-decline and water-supply trajectory over the next decade, and the capex to hold volume?
9. What is your counter-cyclical M&A appetite if a copper asset (or Anglo, again) comes available in a downturn, and what would you NOT do after the Anglo experience?
10. On capital returns: with no buybacks in FY25, under what conditions do buybacks return vs. funding growth?
11. What is the decarbonisation capex required to hold the "lowest-cost" iron-ore position as the Pilbara grid electrifies, and is that in the cost guidance?
12. WAN (nickel) is suspended pending a Feb 2027 review. What's the decision tree — restart, divest, or close — and the impairment/cash implication of each?
13. How exposed is the copper concentrate book to Chinese smelting capacity and treatment-charge compression, and does downstream integration make sense?
14. What is your exposure to resource nationalism / tax change in Chile (mining royalty), Peru, and Argentina (Vicuña), and how is it modelled in project returns?
15. Coal EBITDA fell ~75% in FY25. What is the strategic future of BMA steelmaking coal — harvest, grow, or exit — and on what horizon?

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