Cameco

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

What it is. Cameco is the largest publicly-traded uranium company in the world and one of the largest global providers of nuclear fuel. It is vertically integrated across the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle: it mines and mills uranium (U₃O₈), refines and converts it (UF₆/UO₂), and — since 2023 — owns 49% of Westinghouse Electric Company, the reactor-technology and nuclear-services franchise (AP1000 reactor design, plant servicing, fuel fabrication). HQ Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; 435,457,978 common shares outstanding as of Dec 31, 2025. Listed NYSE: CCJ and TSX: CCO. CEO Tim Gitzel (since July 2011); CFO Heidi Shockey (SVP & CFO, signed the 40-F).

Three reporting segments + one equity investment:

1. Uranium — mining/milling. Tier-1 assets: McArthur River/Key Lake and Cigar Lake (Saskatchewan, the world's highest-grade uranium district), plus a 40% stake in JV Inkai (Kazakhstan, ISR mining, partnered with Kazatomprom). Largest segment: Q4 2025 uranium revenue C$1,027M (US$750M).
2. Fuel services — refining, conversion, fuel manufacturing (Ontario). 2026 guidance 13–14M kgU.
3. Westinghouse (49%, equity-accounted) — reactor tech + nuclear services. Reported below the operating line as share of equity earnings; Cameco's share of Westinghouse revenue was C$958M (US$699M) in Q4 2025. (Co-owned 51% by Brookfield.)

Contract structure — the key payment-terms fact. Cameco does not sell mostly at spot. It runs a long-term contract book: ~230 million pounds of committed future uranium deliveries at end-2025, with ~28 million pounds/year average through 2030 (commitments above average 2026–2028, below average 2029–2030). Contracts blend market-related pricing (with ceilings/floors) and fixed pricing escalated by inflation. This is the defining feature of the business model: it smooths cash flow and lets Cameco realize prices above depressed spot (Q4 2025 realized price rose 13% in CAD on fixed-price contracts even as volumes dipped), but it also caps upside in a spiking market — a double-edged structure that recurs in the bull/bear (Lens 12–13).

Customers/suppliers/competitors: customers are nuclear utilities globally (US, EU, Asia). The customers.csv is empty, so concentration is n/a at the named-account level. Competitors: Kazatomprom (the volume leader, ~43% of global supply), Orano (France), CGN/CNNC (China), plus Western developers (NexGen, Denison, UEC, Paladin) (Lens 7).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

The chain, with named stakeholders (the research-layer supply-chain.md is missing, so this is built `` from public disclosure + sector knowledge):

Upstream inputs → CAMECO mine/mill → conversion → enrichment* → fuel fab* → utility → reactor

• Mining/milling (owned chokepoints): McArthur River (ore) → Key Lake mill (the world's largest high-grade uranium mill; single processing point for McArthur ore — a genuine single-mill dependency). Cigar Lake (ore) → Orano-operated McClean Lake mill (Cameco mines Cigar Lake but does not own its mill — it tolls through Orano's facility, a third-party chokepoint). JV Inkai → ISR wellfields in Kazakhstan, Kazatomprom-operated, with Cameco's product shipped via the BAM/Trans-Caspian routes — a geopolitical chokepoint (Russia-transit risk drove a route shift to the Trans-Caspian "middle corridor").
• Key inputs: sulfuric acid (critical for ISR — the input shortage that has constrained Kazatomprom's output, an indirect tailwind for Cameco's contract pricing); diesel, reagents, skilled Saskatchewan mining labor.
• Conversion/enrichment: Cameco's Port Hope (Ontario) conversion (UF₆) — one of only a handful of Western conversion facilities, a scarce Western-supply asset post-2022. Enrichment is the gap Cameco is trying to fill via Global Laser Enrichment (GLE), its laser-enrichment JV (with Silex), a development-stage option on Western enrichment independence.
• Downstream: Westinghouse fuel fabrication + AP1000 reactor builds close the loop — Cameco is the rare name with a stake from the orebody to the reactor.

Single-source / chokepoint flags: (1) Key Lake mill is the sole processing route for McArthur ore. (2) Cigar Lake depends on Orano's McClean Lake mill (not owned). (3) Inkai product depends on non-Russian transit corridors. (4) Western conversion/enrichment scarcity is a moat for Cameco's fuel-services and GLE optionality but also a structural bottleneck for the whole West.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

1. Geology — the deepest moat. McArthur River/Cigar Lake sit in the Athabasca Basin, the highest-grade uranium ore on Earth (grades 10–100x the global average). Low-cost, high-grade pounds are a durable cost advantage no developer can replicate by capex. This is the core moat: irreplaceable Tier-1 orebodies in a stable G7 jurisdiction (Canada).
2. Jurisdiction + "Western supply" premium. Post-2022, utilities are paying up for non-Russian, non-Kazakh supply chains (origin-diversification). Cameco is the largest Western producer — a structural bid for its pounds that didn't exist a decade ago. Kazatomprom is cheaper per pound but carries transit/geopolitical risk; Cameco's premium is the price of security-of-supply.
3. Contract book / customer switching costs. Nuclear utilities sign multi-year fuel contracts years ahead of need; the 230M-lb committed book is a moat of time — revenue visibility competitors can't easily dislodge. Qualification of a new supplier is slow and conservative.
4. Vertical integration via Westinghouse. Owning 49% of the AP1000 franchise gives Cameco a downstream pull-through: every new Westinghouse reactor is a multi-decade fuel customer. No pure-play miner has this.
5. Bargaining power: improving. In a supply-deficit market with utilities re-contracting, the producer's hand strengthens — but Cameco gave away some of that pricing power by locking fixed-price/ceiling contracts during the lean years (the cost of survival; see Lens 13). bottlenecks.md / positioning.md are missing in the research layer, so this lens is `` + reasoned.

Lens 4 · Segments

The research-layer segments.csv is empty; all segment figures are `` from Cameco releases. CAD unless noted.

Full-year 2025 (CAD):

• Total revenue C$3.482B; gross profit C$970M (from C$783M 2024); net earnings C$590M; adjusted net earnings C$627M (from C$292M — a 2.1x jump); adjusted EBITDA C$1.9B (+~C$398M YoY).
• Driver of the YoY jump: (a) improving uranium price environment lifting realized prices, and (b) the step-up in Cameco's share of Westinghouse adjusted EBITDA tied to the Dukovany (Czech) two-reactor construction project — the single biggest 2025 earnings swing factor.

Trend: uranium segment EBITDA grew modestly (annual adj EBITDA +C$76M, EBT +C$50M YoY); the dramatic earnings acceleration came from Westinghouse, not the mine. Geographic split is n/a (no segment-by-geography disclosure in the summary data; would require the MD&A Exhibit 99.3, not on disk).

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 2026)

The latest print (Q1 2026, reported ~May 5, 2026; CAD unless noted):

• Revenue C$845M; net earnings C$131M; adjusted net earnings C$203M; adjusted EBITDA C$509M (+44% vs C$353M Q1 2025).
• Uranium segment: sales volumes +13% to 7.8M lb; average realized price US$66.21/lb (up from US$62.55/lb Q1 2025) on market-related + fixed contracts; unit costs declined; segment gross profit +28%.
• Westinghouse: still a net loss of C$46M (Cameco's share) at the equity-earnings line — an improvement from a C$62M loss in Q1 2025. Critical nuance: Westinghouse generates strongly positive adjusted EBITDA but reports a GAAP/IFRS net loss because the equity-method carrying value carries heavy amortization of acquisition-date intangibles + purchase accounting + interest from the 2023 buyout. Adj EBITDA is the number management steers to; the net line is dragged by non-cash purchase-accounting (revisit in Lens 10).
• Guidance reaffirmed: 2026 uranium production 19.5–21.5M lb (Cameco share); fuel services 13–14M kgU; Westinghouse 49%-share adj EBITDA US$525–580M for 2025, then 6–10% CAGR.
• Balance sheet: ~C$1.1B cash/ST investments, ~C$1.0B total debt → small net cash; US$1.0B undrawn revolver. US term loan fully repaid in 2025.
• Market reaction: stock rose on the beat (EPS ahead of consensus). What it says: the market is rewarding the Westinghouse-loss narrowing + realized-price ramp story, not just the mine.

Unusual vs. own history: the +44% adj EBITDA and the realized-price step-up reflect legacy low-priced contracts rolling off and higher-priced volumes ramping — the central earnings-acceleration thesis.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ is empty; sentiment is `` from call coverage. Across the last ~4 calls (Q1 2025 → Q1 2026) management tone has shifted from "disciplined patience / supply restraint" to "the transition is happening — demand is here, we are executing." Recurring 2025–26 phrases: "full-cycle value," "disciplined contracting," "we don't chase volume," "security of supply," "best-in-class assets," "Westinghouse is the differentiator," "nuclear's role in AI/data-center power." What they stopped saying: the 2022–23 hedged language about waiting for the contracting cycle to turn — they now speak as if the structural bull market is in force. Watch for: if realized-price guidance or the contract-book cadence ever softens, that confidence reverses fast. Sentiment trend: steadily more bullish/confident — which, against a ~50x multiple, is itself a contrarian caution flag (peak narrative confidence).

Lens 7 · Comps

The headline comp fact: Cameco trades at a ~8–10x EV/EBITDA premium to Kazatomprom (~35x vs ~4x). Even allowing for (a) jurisdiction premium, (b) the Westinghouse equity stake not fully captured in look-through EBITDA, and (c) consensus ~40% EPS growth in 2026, this is a rich-to-extreme absolute and relative multiple. CCJ's own forward EV/EBITDA of ~35x is below its 5-yr average of ~60x — i.e. it has de-rated from even more absurd levels, which bulls cite as "cheap vs. its own history" and bears cite as "still 5x the cash-flow multiple of the larger producer." Do not read the ~50x trailing as a fabrication — it is real and is the central valuation tension of the name.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (moves >5%, last ~5 years)

Mostly ``; the pattern is what matters.

• 2021 (Sprott Physical Uranium Trust launch): Sprott's aggressive spot-buying squeezed the U₃O₈ price and re-rated every uranium equity, CCJ included — the move that re-awakened the sector.
• Oct 2022 — Westinghouse acquisition announced (Cameco + Brookfield, US$7.9B EV, Cameco's 49% = ~US$2.2B + debt): transformative; repositioned CCJ from miner to fuel-cycle franchise.
• 2023–2024 — uranium price ramp from ~US$50 to a spike near US$100+/lb (early 2024): CCJ rode the spot surge; then a 2024 pullback as spot cooled.
• 2024–2025 — AI/data-center "nuclear renaissance" narrative: hyperscaler power deals, SMR announcements, and reactor restarts (e.g., Three Mile Island/Microsoft-type deals) drove CCJ as a picks-and-shovels AI-power play.
• May 2025 — Q2 blowout (net earnings +792% YoY on Westinghouse equity earnings turning positive).
• Oct 28, 2025 — the US DOC $80B Westinghouse partnership (Lens 12): a step-change catalyst on the reactor-build optionality.
• Jan 2026 — spot U₃O₈ peaked ~US$101, then pulled back to ~US$85 by spring on geopolitical noise.
• 2026 — Iran conflict / energy-security spikes added macro volatility.

What the market actually reacts to for CCJ: (1) the uranium spot/term price (highest-beta driver — it moves the whole complex), (2) Westinghouse earnings inflection + the DOC deal (the new second engine), and (3) the AI-power demand narrative (sentiment multiplier). Earnings beats matter less than the price tape and the reactor-build storyline. This is a macro/narrative-driven stock as much as a fundamentals stock — a key risk for a name at 35–50x.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO Tim Gitzel — President & CEO since July 2011, confirmed still in seat as of mid-2026 (re-elected to the board May 7, 2026). Track record: steered Cameco through the brutal post-Fukushima decade — deliberately curtailing production (idling McArthur River 2018–2022, buying in the spot market rather than mining at a loss) to defend the balance sheet and not flood a depressed market. That discipline is the single best capital-allocation decision in the company's modern history and is why Cameco entered the up-cycle with Tier-1 assets intact and low debt. Then the 2023 Westinghouse acquisition — the bold, franchise-transforming bet that is now the earnings engine. Gitzel is a credible, cycle-tested operator with a contrarian's discipline.
• Succession in motion: Grant Isaac (long-time CFO) promoted to President & COO effective Sep 1, 2025; Heidi Shockey (deputy CFO) became CFO. This is a clear succession runway — Isaac is the heir apparent; the bench is deep and internal.
• Tenure & skin in the game: long-tenured team; insider ownership data is n/a (no insider-transactions.csv on disk). Compensation governance: Cameco has a board-adopted Executive Incentive Compensation Recoupment (clawback) Policy filed with SEC/NYSE — a governance positive.
• Capital allocation history: (1) supply discipline (curtail-and-buy) — value-protective; (2) Westinghouse — transformative reinvestment, de-levering since (repaid the US$200M term loan in 2025, near-zero net debt); (3) dividend: raised to C$0.24/share in 2025, "advancing the dividend growth plan by one year" on Westinghouse distributions — modest yield (<0.3%), a growth-reinvestment posture, not an income story. No large buyback program disclosed.
• Governance/board: non-exec chair Catherine Gignac; audit-committee financial experts Camus, Inkster, van Leeuwen-Atkins; only one non-independent director (Tammy Cook-Searson, Chief of the Lac La Ronge Indian Band — an Indigenous-partnership tie, not a related-party conflict). Clean ICFR opinion (KPMG), no Code-of-Ethics waivers.
• Archetype: professional managers with a founder-like, cycle-disciplined temperament. Red flags: none material. This is a high-quality, well-governed management team — arguably the single strongest qualitative pillar of the thesis.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Grounded in the 40-F + `` financials. Findings range from clean to one genuine analytical caution.

• ICFR / audit: Management + KPMG both concluded internal control over financial reporting was effective as of Dec 31, 2025; disclosure controls effective; no material changes to ICFR in the year. SAP S/4 HANA was implemented org-wide in April 2024 — an ERP cutover is always a control-risk window; Cameco flagged it explicitly and KPMG still attested clean. Watch but not a flag.
• Equity-method opacity (the real caution): Westinghouse is 49%, equity-accounted — it is a single line ("share of equity earnings") on Cameco's P&L, with the underlying revenue/EBITDA/debt off Cameco's consolidated balance sheet. The gap between Westinghouse's positive adjusted EBITDA and its negative net income (the C$46M Q1 2026 share loss) is driven by purchase-accounting amortization + interest. This is legitimate IFRS, but it means: (a) reported net earnings understate cash economics, so management leans hard on "adjusted" metrics — always interrogate the adjustments; (b) Westinghouse's own leverage is a Cameco risk that doesn't show in Cameco's clean net-debt figure. Off-balance-sheet arrangements are explicitly disclosed (financial assurances, long-term product purchase contracts, MD&A p.55).
• Inventory/receivables vs. revenue: n/a at line-item level (financials.csv empty; would need the full audited statements, Exhibit 99.2, not on disk). The contract-book model means revenue can be lumpy by delivery timing (Q4 2025 uranium revenue dipped on "timing of sales") — a feature, but it makes single-quarter reads noisy.
• SBC / non-GAAP: Cameco reports "adjusted net earnings" and "adjusted EBITDA" prominently; the adjustments (mark-to-market on contracts, FX, Westinghouse purchase-accounting) are standard but material to the headline — the C$590M net vs C$627M adjusted net gap is small, but the EBITDA adjustments are larger. Label every "adjusted" number as management-defined.
• Reclamation/decommissioning provisions: uranium miners carry large long-dated environmental remediation liabilities (Saskatchewan mines, Port Hope conversion legacy). Magnitude n/a here (in the audited notes, not on disk) — flag to pull on refresh.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases (LR): none naming Cameco, 2021-06-23 → 2026-06-23 (EDGAR EFTS).
• SEC AAERs: none in the period.
• Item 3 Legal Proceedings (most recent 40-F): the 40-F on disk is the cover document and incorporates the AIF (Exhibit 99.1) by reference; the detailed legal-proceedings narrative lives in the AIF, not in the on-disk cover. Historical note ``: Cameco's signature legacy dispute — the CRA (Canada Revenue Agency) transfer-pricing case over its Swiss marketing subsidiary (tax years 2003 onward) — was resolved decisively in Cameco's favor (Tax Court 2018, Federal Court of Appeal 2020, and the Supreme Court of Canada denied the CRA leave to appeal in 2021), with the CRA later refunding cash and letters of credit. This was the single biggest historical overhang and it is behind the company, in Cameco's favor — a meaningful de-risking.
• Non-SEC enforcement: no material adverse enforcement actions found beyond the (favorably-resolved) CRA tax matter.
• Conclusion: No material adverse regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and the company's disclosure history as of 2026-06-23. The accounting caution is the equity-method/adjusted-metrics reliance, not any enforcement or integrity issue. Clean books, clean regulators.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Bottom-up from the latest actuals. FY2025 adjusted net earnings C$627M / 435.5M shares ≈ C$1.44 adjusted EPS 2025. Consensus points to ~40% EPS growth in 2026 and very high growth into 2027 as legacy low-priced contracts roll off and higher-priced volumes ramp. Three drivers move the model: (1) realized uranium price ramping (US$66/lb Q1 2026 and rising as old contracts expire vs. a ~US$80–90 term market); (2) Westinghouse share of adj EBITDA US$525–580M (2025) → 6–10% CAGR, plus DOC-deal optionality; (3) production execution (the swing risk — see Lens 13).

The valuation tension made concrete: at ~US$107/share (≈C$147 at ~1.37), even the bull 2028 ~C$4.50 EPS implies a forward P/E of ~33x on 2028 earnings — i.e. the stock already discounts two-plus years of flawless execution plus the DOC deal. On 2026 base EPS ~C$2.00, the trailing/forward P/E is in the ~70–97x zone — extraordinary for a mining-anchored name. The cash-flow lens is friendlier (2025 operating cash flow C$1.408B vs C$905M 2024 ), but EV/EBITDA at ~35x forward still prices perfection.

Forecast log: in --watchlist mode the SKILL says skip forecast.ts create (only log a Brier forecast on a genuinely committed base case). Not logged this run — per watchlist rules.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Cameco is the only Western, investment-grade, Tier-1 uranium producer with a downstream reactor franchise — the single cleanest public vehicle for two converging secular tailwinds: (1) a structural uranium supply deficit (decades of underinvestment, lead times into the 2030s, Kazatomprom output constraints, restarts/life-extensions, China/India build-out, SMRs); and (2) the AI-power demand shock making nuclear the baseload of choice for hyperscalers. The contract book (230M lb, ~28M lb/yr to 2030) gives cash-flow visibility most miners lack, and realized prices ramp mechanically as legacy contracts roll off into an ~US$80–90 term market. The asymmetric kicker is Westinghouse + the US DOC $80B partnership — a potential government-backed AP1000 build-out that turns Cameco into a multi-decade fuel-and-services annuity. Best-in-class management, near-zero net debt, growing dividend. If the nuclear renaissance is real, Cameco is the franchise that compounds it.

Bear case (2–3 ways it permanently impairs or de-rates).

1. Multiple compression is the dominant risk — not bankruptcy, but a re-rate. At ~35x forward EV/EBITDA / ~50x trailing earnings vs. Kazatomprom's ~4x, the stock has priced the deficit, the price ramp, and the DOC deal as near-certainties. If uranium spot/term stalls or rolls over (it already pulled back from US$101 to US$85 in H1 2026 ), the multiple has enormous room to fall even if earnings grow — a classic "great company, terrible entry multiple" trap.
2. Operational fragility. McArthur River/Key Lake missed 2025 production (14–15M lb vs 18M planned) on slow ground-freezing/development delays, and May 2026 flooding disrupted road access. These are recurring Athabasca-Basin execution risks (deep, technically hard, water-sensitive mines). Chronic shortfalls undercut the "reliable Tier-1 supply" premium and the EPS ramp.
3. The Westinghouse optionality may not vest. The DOC $80B deal's government participation interest only vests if a final investment decision on ≥US$80B of US AP1000 builds is reached within 18 months of Oct 28, 2025 — i.e. by ~April 2027. US new-build has a decades-long record of cost overruns and cancellations (Vogtle, V.C. Summer). If FID slips or shrinks, a large chunk of the bull narrative evaporates, and the government's 20%-above-US$17.5B distribution claw caps the long-run upside if it does vest.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke). It's late 2027. Uranium term price stalled in the US$70s as Kazatomprom resolved its sulfuric-acid constraint and ramped, and a couple of planned reactors slipped. McArthur River missed guidance a third straight year. The DOC AP1000 FID was repeatedly delayed past the 18-month window and partially renegotiated. With the deficit narrative softening and Westinghouse's reported net line still red, CCJ de-rated from ~35x to ~18x EV/EBITDA — a >40% drawdown despite flat-to-up earnings. The lesson: the stock was a bet on the multiple and the narrative, not the cash flows.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on any absolute or relative cash-flow basis. The bull defense is "look-through Westinghouse EBITDA + the DOC option aren't fully in the EV/EBITDA, and growth is ~40%." Both are true and both are already widely known — which is exactly why the multiple is where it is.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see). The market treats CCJ as a one-way bet on a permanent uranium deficit + an inevitable nuclear build-out. What it underweights: Cameco gave away its own pricing power. Its long-term fixed-price/ceiling contract book — the very thing that makes the cash flow "visible" — means CCJ under-participates in a uranium price spike relative to the unhedged developers or the physical trust (Sprott U.UN). In the most bullish uranium scenario, Cameco is a laggard, not the leader — you'd own NXE or U.UN for the spike. CCJ is the quality/safety trade dressed up as the high-beta upside trade, and it's priced as the latter.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Where revenue is concentrated / what breaks it: the business is a leveraged bet on one commodity price (uranium) plus a single equity investment (Westinghouse) whose economics Cameco doesn't fully control (Brookfield owns 51% and runs the deal alongside the US government). If the U₃O₈ term price mean-reverts — and uranium has a long history of brutal multi-year bear markets (post-Fukushima it fell ~80% and stayed dead for a decade) — the entire thesis and the ~50x multiple unwind together.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the geology moat is real, but Cameco isn't the marginal-cost setter — Kazatomprom is, at ~43% of supply and a far lower cost base. If Kazakhstan resolves its sulfuric-acid bottleneck and ramps (it has the cheapest pounds on the planet), the supply deficit narrows and the price premium for "Western supply" compresses. Cameco's premium rests on a geopolitical preference that can fade as fast as it formed.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Kazatomprom (volume + cost) on the supply side, and the Sprott Physical Uranium Trust on the equity side — in a price spike, U.UN gives cleaner, un-hedged exposure and a uranium bull can simply buy the metal instead of a 50x-earnings miner.
• Worst capital-allocation / accounting concerns: no integrity flags, but the reliance on "adjusted" metrics to bridge Westinghouse's GAAP net losses, and the off-balance-sheet equity-method structure that keeps Westinghouse's leverage and the DOC contingencies out of Cameco's headline net-debt, mean the reported clean balance sheet is cleaner than the economic reality. The 49% stake was bought at the top of the nuclear-sentiment cycle (2022–23).
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: (1) uranium term price stays ≥US$80 and grinds higher; (2) McArthur River finally produces to plan; (3) the DOC AP1000 FID actually happens by ~April 2027 at scale; (4) the AI-power demand narrative doesn't cool. All four must roughly hold to justify ~35–50x.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: at these multiples, a 20–30% earnings miss against a softening narrative is a plausible 40–60% drawdown — high-multiple cyclicals don't get graded on a curve.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a return to a structural uranium bear market (oversupply from Kazakh ramp + reactor-build disappointment + demand-narrative deflation), combined with Westinghouse FID failure. Plausibility: moderate, not negligible — uranium's own history says multi-year reversals happen.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The US DOC partnership's government participation interest must vest within 18 months (by ~April 2027) on an FID for ≥US$80B of US AP1000 builds — what is your honest probability and timeline for reaching that FID, and what happens to the Westinghouse thesis if it slips or shrinks?
2. McArthur River/Key Lake missed 2025 production (14–15M lb vs 18M planned) on ground-freezing/development delays — is this a one-off or a structural reliability problem, and what specifically changes in 2026–27 to restore confidence in your "reliable Tier-1 supply" premium?
3. Your contract book is heavily fixed-price/ceiling — in a uranium price spike, by how much does Cameco under-realize versus spot, and how are you re-weighting toward market-related pricing as you re-contract for 2029–2031?
4. Westinghouse generates strong adjusted EBITDA but still reports net losses at your equity line — when does it turn GAAP-profitable for you, and how much of the gap is permanent purchase-accounting vs. transient?
5. What is Westinghouse's own balance-sheet leverage, and what contingent obligations (financing guarantees, performance commitments) does the DOC deal place on Cameco that don't appear in your consolidated net debt?
6. Kazatomprom is the lowest-cost producer at ~43% of supply — if they resolve the sulfuric-acid constraint and ramp, what happens to the "Western supply premium" your valuation depends on?
7. With near-zero net debt and rising Westinghouse distributions, why a sub-0.3% dividend and no buyback — is the implied message that you see acquisitions or large capex (GLE enrichment, mine expansion) as the better use of capital?
8. What is the capital plan and timeline for GLE (laser enrichment), and what is your realistic case for Cameco participating in Western enrichment independence?
9. How concentrated is your customer book (top-5 utilities as % of contracted volume), and what is your re-contracting risk if a major utility's reactor program changes?
10. The 2023 Westinghouse purchase was made near peak nuclear sentiment — with hindsight, would you do it again at that price, and how do you think about the entry valuation?
11. Inkai (Kazakhstan JV) depends on non-Russian transit corridors — how secure is that logistics chain, and what is your contingency if the middle corridor is disrupted?
12. What are your total long-dated reclamation/decommissioning liabilities (Saskatchewan + Port Hope), and how are they funded?
13. How do you think about returning capital if uranium prices stay elevated — at what point does a buyback beat reinvestment?
14. The SAP S/4 HANA cutover modified your control environment — what residual ICFR risks remain, and is the migration fully bedded down?
15. What single external variable (uranium term price, a specific reactor program, a Kazakh supply event) most determines whether your 2027–2028 plan is hit or missed?

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