CareDx

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

CareDx sells transplant patients a way to know if their new organ is being rejected without a biopsy. That is the whole business in one sentence, and after a year of CEO reshaping it is finally close to being literally true — the lower-margin instrument/kit business is on its way out the door.

The model. CareDx is a Brisbane, California molecular-diagnostics company (Nasdaq: CDNA, incorporated Delaware, CIK 0001217234) ``. It reports three segments:

• Testing Services — its lab-developed tests (LDTs) run in CareDx's own CLIA labs. The flagship is AlloSure (donor-derived cell-free DNA, "dd-cfDNA") for kidney, heart and lung, plus AlloMap (a gene-expression heart-rejection test) and the bundled HeartCare. This is the engine: $275M of FY2025 revenue, +10% YoY, on ~200,000 tests (+14% volume) . The franchise (AlloSure Kidney/Heart/Lung + AlloMap Heart + AlloSure Heart) was **78% of total revenue in Q1 2026** (up from 73% a year earlier) — i.e. the company is more concentrated in its core, not less.
• Patient & Digital Solutions (PDS) — SaaS for transplant centers (patient surveillance, lab/ordering workflow). $57M FY2025, +31% YoY `` — the fastest-growing leg and a genuine moat widener (it embeds CareDx in center workflow).
• Product — IVD PCR/NGS kits for HLA typing sold to other labs. $48M FY2025, +19% YoY . **This segment is being sold** (see Lens 9) — divested to EuroBio Scientific for **$170M cash** .

Customers & payers. The "customer" is the transplant center / nephrologist / cardiologist who orders the test; the payer is the insurer. The defining fact of this business: Medicare = 46% of testing-services revenue in FY2025 (down from 50% and 53% in 2024/2023) . Medicare-covered patients are only ~25% of *tests* but ~46% of testing-services *dollars* because Medicare reimburses dd-cfDNA at a high fixed rate. No other payer is >10% of revenue . Average revenue per test ~$1,480 ``.

Suppliers. Key inputs are sequencing instruments/reagents from Illumina, cell-prep tubes from Becton Dickinson and Streck, lab equipment from Beckman Coulter, and reagents from Qiagen . Illumina is also a *commercialization partner* — CareDx holds worldwide rights to Illumina's NGS line for transplant diagnostics under a license-and-commercialization agreement .

Contract structure. Testing is largely fee-for-service per test (no take-or-pay; revenue recognized on accrual at expected collectible amount). PDS is recurring SaaS. So the revenue quality is mixed: SaaS is sticky, but the cash cow (testing) is exposed to per-test reimbursement decisions made by a government payer — the structural tension that runs through this entire dossier.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map the chain end to end, names attached:

Upstream inputs → CareDx:

• Sequencers, reagents, consumables: Illumina (NGS — the core platform), Qiagen, Beckman Coulter ``.
• Sample-collection hardware: Becton Dickinson, Streck (cell-preparation/blood tubes) ``.
• The biological input: a blood draw from the transplant recipient, taken at the transplant center / phlebotomy site, shipped to CareDx's CLIA labs.

CareDx (the conversion step): runs the assay (dd-cfDNA quantification or gene-expression) in its own labs, returns a rejection-risk result through its software to the ordering clinician.

Downstream → end customer → who pays:

• Ordering clinician at a transplant center (≈250+ US transplant programs are the addressable base).
• The economic end customer is the payer: Medicare (via MolDX/Palmetto → Noridian MAC) for 46% of testing dollars, commercial insurers for most of the rest ``.
• For the Product segment (being sold): distributors and other labs globally buy the HLA-typing kits.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies (the ones that matter):

1. Illumina is both a critical supplier and a partner — a genuine single-platform dependency on NGS chemistry. If Illumina pricing/allocation shifts, CareDx's COGS and product roadmap move with it.
2. The Noridian/MolDX reimbursement node is the real chokepoint — not a physical input but the single point that controls ~46% of segment revenue. This is the supply chain's true fragility: one administrative actor (a Medicare Administrative Contractor following a MolDX local coverage determination) can re-price nearly half the franchise overnight, as it did in 2023 (Lens 8/10).

This lens passes the "names or it didn't happen" test: Illumina, Qiagen, Beckman Coulter, BD, Streck, Palmetto/MolDX, Noridian — the chain is concrete, and its weakest link is regulatory, not industrial.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

What CareDx actually has:

1. Clinical-evidence + guideline lead. AlloSure/AlloMap have the longest real-world dataset and the most published validation in transplant dd-cfDNA. In diagnostics, the moat is evidence + payer coverage + guideline inclusion, and CareDx built that first. It is the category-defining brand in transplant surveillance ``.
2. Workflow lock-in via PDS. The SaaS layer (patient surveillance + lab ordering software) embeds CareDx inside transplant-center operations. Switching means re-tooling clinical workflow, not just swapping a test — a real switching cost, and the reason PDS grew +31% ``.
3. Scale in a niche. ~200,000 tests/yr `` gives a fixed-cost-absorption and data advantage a sub-scale entrant can't match quickly. The data flywheel (more results → better algorithms, e.g. AlloSure Plus / iBox) compounds the evidence lead.
4. Reimbursement as a moat (double-edged). Existing Medicare coverage under the MolDX LCD is itself a barrier — competitors must clear the same evidentiary bar. Natera did obtain a final Palmetto LCD for its kidney transplant test ``, so this moat is eroding, not absolute.

Bargaining power. Over suppliers: limited — Illumina/Qiagen are larger and CareDx is platform-dependent. Over customers (clinicians): moderate-to-strong, via evidence and embedded software. Over the payer: weak — Medicare sets the price, full stop. The single most important sentence about CareDx's moat is that it does not control the price of its best product.

Durability verdict: a real but narrow moat — evidence + workflow + scale in one disease area — sitting on a reimbursement foundation the company doesn't own. Wide enough to defend the #1 share position; not wide enough to make the Medicare risk go away.

Lens 4 · Segments

By product segment (FY2025, all ``):

By geography (FY2025 ``): US $359.9M (94.8%), Rest of World $19.9M (5.2%). Essentially a US business; the ex-US monitoring assets sit largely in the Product segment that is being sold — so post-divestiture CareDx becomes even more a pure-play US testing-services + SaaS company.

The trend that matters: testing services decelerated to +10% in FY2025 then re-accelerated to +48% in Q1 2026 ``. That swing is the whole bull case — it says the 2023 reimbursement wound has healed, volume is compounding, and pricing/mix (AlloSure Lung, iBox/AlloSure Plus, broader coverage) is now a tailwind rather than a headwind.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 2026)

The most recent print is Q1 2026 (reported 2026-04-28) and it is the inflection quarter.

• Revenue $117.7M, +39% YoY (vs $84.7M Q1 2025) ``.
• Testing services $91M, +48% ; PDS $16M .
• Income from operations turned positive: +$1.2M vs $(13.4)M a year ago — a $14.6M swing, +109% ``. This is the operating-leverage moment.
• GAAP net income $2.8M, EPS $0.05 (basic & diluted) vs $(10.4)M / $(0.19) ``. First clean GAAP-profitable Q1 in the company's history.
• Non-GAAP net income ~$18M, EPS $0.34; adjusted EBITDA ~$19M vs ~$5M ``. (The $0.34 some headlines quote is non-GAAP; GAAP is $0.05 — both true, label them.)
• Cost lines ``: cost of testing $17.1M (vs $15.1M), R&D $21.4M (+16%), S&M $30.4M (+32%), G&A $30.5M (+34%). Opex is rising, but revenue is rising faster — the definition of leverage finally appearing.
• Balance sheet: cash $77.9M + marketable securities $109.3M = ~$187M, net cash, no debt ``. AR $44.6M, inventory $26.4M — both well-behaved relative to a +39% revenue quarter.
• Cash flow from operations ~$4M in the quarter `` (positive, lighter than full-year run-rate on seasonality).

Guidance: management raised FY2026 to $447–465M revenue (+20% YoY at $456M midpoint) and adjusted EBITDA $43–57M (+58% at $50M midpoint) ``. Tone shifted decisively positive.

Market reaction / what was priced in: the print drove the stock toward the ~$26 area (mkt cap ~$1.35B by late June) . The reaction was constructive but not euphoric — the market is rewarding the profitability turn while still discounting the LCD overhang (analyst average PT ~$25.80–27.33, i.e. roughly *at* the price ).

Anything unusual vs its own history: yes — the FY2025 vs FY2024 annual comparison looks like a collapse (net income $52.5M → net loss $21.4M) but that is an accounting illusion (Lens 10): FY2024 carried a one-time $96.3M litigation-expense reversal. The Q1 2026 result is the clean, like-for-like signal, and it is unambiguously good.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research shelf (transcripts/ empty), so this is ``-grounded.

The tonal arc across the last several quarters is a clear fear → stabilization → confidence progression:

• 2023: management withdrew full-year guidance and announced layoffs amid the billing-article shock `` — maximum defensiveness.
• 2024–2025 (Hanna's first year): language pivoted from survival to a stated three-year framework — "$500M revenue and $100M adjusted EBITDA by 2027" ``. The recurring theme became operational efficiency, cost discipline, and portfolio focus.
• Q1 2026 call: explicitly framed as a pivot — "Growth, Naveris deal and pivot" ``. Management is now selling a story of (1) durable testing growth, (2) margin expansion, (3) capital-allocation aggression (buyback + tuck-in M&A), (4) diversification into oncology MRD.

Phrases now recurring: "precision medicine," "higher-growth, higher-margin," "simplify the operating model," "AEBITDA margin expansion." Phrases that disappeared: the guidance-withdrawal / reimbursement-crisis language of 2023. The thing to watch on the next call is whether they keep talking about the LCD pro-actively (good — managing it) or go quiet (a tell).

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = diagnostics names with overlapping franchises (transplant + MRD/molecular). Multiples are

Read: on EV/Sales, CareDx (~2.6x) trades at a discount to Veracyte (~4.5x) `` despite faster current top-line growth (CDNA +39% Q1 vs VCYT ~13-14% guided). The discount is the LCD risk premium the market attaches — the question the whole thesis turns on is whether that discount is too large (bull) or correctly sized for a binary policy event (bear). Natera and Guardant are larger and loss-making, so P/E comparison is meaningless; on a growth-adjusted EV/Sales basis CDNA is the cheapest profitable name in the cluster. I did not source live EV/Sales for NTRA/GH and will not fabricate them.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves CDNA >5%)

The five-year tape has one dominant lesson: CDNA trades on Medicare reimbursement headlines first, earnings second. ``

• March 2023 — the defining move: ~−30% in a single stretch on the MolDX/CMS billing article (effective 2023-03-31) that removed multimodality heart coverage and gutted surveillance reimbursement . Craig-Hallum cut its target from **$26 → $9** . Analysts estimated ≥$15M of HeartCare revenue going "to $0" . Testing revenue fell **20% in FY2023** ($263.7M → $209.7M) . This single regulatory event re-rated the entire equity.
• Subsequent LCD/coverage headlines repeatedly moved the stock and analyst targets (e.g. BTIG cut to $22 on reimbursement concerns) ``.
• 2024 litigation win (Natera patents invalidated → $96.3M reversal) was a large positive accounting/earnings event ``.
• Q1 2026 profitability turn + raised guidance + $100M buyback + M&A drove the move to ~$26 ``.

Pattern verdict: the market reacts to (1) Medicare coverage/LCD news (the big mover), (2) guidance changes, (3) capital-allocation/M&A. It does not react much to quarterly volume beats absent a reimbursement read-through. That is precisely why the pending new LCD is the single most important catalyst on the calendar — it is the variable with the largest historical price elasticity.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

CEO: John W. Hanna (President & CEO since 2024-04-15) ``.

1. Track record. Two decades in molecular dx / life-science tools. Previously CEO of Apton Biosystems (high-throughput NGS platform for liquid biopsy), acquired by Pacific Biosciences in Aug 2023 `` — i.e. he has built and sold an NGS company, which is directly relevant to both the technology and the M&A/portfolio strategy he's now running.
2. Tenure & skin in the game. ~2 years in seat — still early. Insider ownership not sourced from the research layer (insider-transactions.csv absent); note a recent CEO sale of ~17K shares (June 2026) `` — small and likely routine/10b5-1 given the size, but worth flagging as a data point, not a thesis.
3. Capital-allocation history (his defining year). This is where Hanna has been aggressive and coherent: in a single stretch he (a) divested the low-margin Lab Products/Product segment to EuroBio for $170M cash , (b) **redeployed into Naveris** (viral-mediated cancer MRD) for **up to $260M ($160M upfront + $100M earnout)** , and (c) authorized a new $100M buyback (24mo) on top of the prior $50M = $150M total ``. That is textbook "sell what you don't want to own, buy growth, return the rest" — a real capital-allocator's playbook, executed while the core turned profitable.
4. Red flags. None severe surfaced. The 2025 Securities Class Action settlement predates/overlaps his arrival and relates to the 2023 reimbursement period. Selling Product *to a named competitor* (EuroBio appears in the 10-K competitor list) is mildly notable but commercially sensible. Watch comp/dilution: SBC ran **$34.9M in FY2025** on $379.8M revenue (~9% of sales) — high, typical for the sector, and the main thing keeping GAAP profit thin.
5. Archetype. Professional operator/turnaround-and-reshaper, not founder. For this stage (post-crisis stabilization → profitable growth + portfolio reshaping) that is the right archetype — and the $500M/$100M-EBITDA-by-2027 target is a clear, falsifiable yardstick to grade him against ``.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on the FY2025 10-K + Q1 2026 10-Q ``:

• The FY2024 "earnings" were inflated by a one-time item — the #1 thing a naive screen gets wrong. FY2024 net income of $52.5M included a $96.3M litigation-expense reversal (favorable outcome on patent-infringement claims Natera had filed against CareDx; District Court ruled the asserted patents invalid), partially offset by the 2025 Securities Class Action settlement . So **FY2024 income from operations was only $40.8M** and FY2025's swing to a **$(30.8)M operating loss / $(21.4)M net loss** is *not* a deterioration of the underlying business — it's the absence of a one-off benefit plus reinvestment. Anyone citing "net income collapsed 141%" is reading an artifact.
• Revenue recognition. Testing revenue is accrued at estimated collectible amounts (variable consideration) before cash is collected — inherent estimation risk in a fee-for-service lab model, but standard for the industry and not flagged as a control issue. AR actually fell to $42.6M (FY2025) from $64.6M (FY2024) and is $44.6M at Q1 2026 — collections improving, not stretching. Healthy sign.
• Cash vs. earnings. FY2025 operating cash flow was +$42.0M against a $(21.4)M net loss `` — the gap is mostly non-cash SBC ($34.9M) + D&A ($15.0M). Cash generation is better than GAAP earnings, the benign direction of divergence.
• SBC dilution flatters non-GAAP. The $0.34 non-GAAP vs $0.05 GAAP Q1 gap is largely SBC ``. Watch share count and the non-GAAP bridge — this is the one place to be skeptical of the "profitability" narrative.
• Inventory/goodwill. Inventory steady (~$26.7M FY2025) . FY2023 carried large impairments (the $(203)M operating loss year) ; the Naveris acquisition will add goodwill/intangibles to watch going forward, plus earnout-liability accounting on the $100M contingent consideration.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (generated 2026-06-23 from SEC EDGAR EFTS, LR + AAER, period 2021–2026) returned zero findings ``.
• Item 3 Legal Proceedings / Contingencies: the material items are the (favorably resolved) Natera patent litigation and the Securities Class Action settled in 2025 ``. Both relate to the 2021–2023 period.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search): no material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement action, consent decree, or penalty against CareDx surfaced. The recurring "regulatory" story is CMS/MolDX coverage policy — a reimbursement matter, not an enforcement/fraud matter.
• THE governing regulatory fact (not an enforcement finding, but the dominant risk): Medicare coverage runs through a MolDX/Palmetto LCD adopted by Noridian (the MAC), in place since Oct 2017 . A restrictive **Proposed LCD (DL40063/DL39787/DL40060, billing articles DA60146/DA60152)** with utilization limits and a bundled-payment concept was pending. **Crucial Q1 2026 update: the MACs decided NOT to finalize the proposed Aug-10-2023 LCD, but CMS stated the MACs intend to issue a NEW LCD "in the coming months"** . So the worst-case proposal is dead — but a replacement policy is explicitly coming, and its terms are unknown.

Forensic verdict: clean books, no enforcement history, conservative-trending working capital. The only "red flag" is interpretive (don't be fooled by the FY2024 one-off) and the only real risk is exogenous (the next LCD). This is an honest set of financials.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026–FY2028 EPS)

Built bottom-up from Q1 2026 actuals + company guidance. Important structural note: the Product segment ($48M FY2025) is being divested (~Q3 2026 close) and Naveris (~$34M 2025 revenue, 30–40% growth) is being acquired (~Q3 2026 close) ``. Net, these roughly offset on revenue in the near term but improve mix (sell low-margin kits, buy high-growth MRD). Company FY2026 guidance already reflects the expected timing.

• FY2026 (base): revenue $456M (company mid ); adj EBITDA **$50M** mid . GAAP EPS thin-positive, ~$0.20–0.35 . Non-GAAP EPS ~**$1.10–1.30** .
• FY2027 (base): management target ~$500M revenue, ~$100M adj EBITDA . If hit, that's ~+10% revenue but a **doubling of EBITDA** — i.e. the story is *margin*, not just growth. GAAP EPS ~**$0.55–0.85** . Non-GAAP EPS ~$1.50–1.80 ``.
• FY2028 (base): revenue ~$555M ; adj EBITDA ~**$120M** ; GAAP EPS ~$0.90–1.20 ``.

Scenario fan (FY2027 GAAP EPS):

• Bull ~$1.10+ ``: new LCD neutral-or-favorable, testing stays >20%, Naveris ramps, buyback shrinks share count.
• Base ~$0.55–0.85 ``: hits the $500M/$100M-EBITDA frame, LCD broadly neutral.
• Bear: GAAP loss again ``: a restrictive new LCD re-prices AlloSure (as in 2023) → testing decelerates to single digits, EBITDA target missed by half, equity re-rates toward the 2023 lows.

No forecast.ts create in this unattended watchlist run (per SKILL). If logged later, the scoreable base call would be: "CDNA FY2027 adjusted EBITDA ≥ $90M, p≈0.55, resolves 2028-02-28" — chosen because adj EBITDA (not GAAP EPS) is management's own yardstick and the cleanest measure of the leverage thesis, and 0.55 reflects a genuine-but-not-dominant probability given the LCD overhang.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. CareDx is the category-defining brand in a structurally growing niche (transplant dx ~$4.94B in 2024 → ~$9.21B by 2033, ~7.3% CAGR ), it just **turned GAAP-profitable while growing 39%** , and it is being run by a capital-allocator who is actively improving the business mix — selling $48M of low-margin kits for $170M cash, buying into the much larger oncology-MRD market via Naveris, and buying back $150M of stock. The worst-case 2023 LCD proposal is dead . The data flywheel (200k tests/yr → AlloSure Plus/iBox) widens the evidence moat, PDS deepens workflow lock-in, and at **~2.6x EV/Sales** the stock is the cheapest profitable name in its diagnostics cluster, trading roughly at the analyst average target with a clean balance sheet and optionality (oncology MRD) the market isn't paying for.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. The LCD fuse. ~46% of testing-services revenue is Medicare , governed by one MolDX/Noridian policy, and CMS has *confirmed a new LCD is coming* . A restrictive version (bundled payment, utilization caps) would do to 2026 what the March-2023 article did — a ~30% same-day re-rate and a 20% testing-revenue decline ``. This is the one risk that can permanently re-base the franchise's earning power.
2. Competitive share loss. Natera's Prospera is gaining share in select centers and now has its own final Palmetto kidney LCD ``, plus heart/lung expansion. Natera has vastly more scale and cash to fund a transplant land-grab.
3. Profitability is GAAP-thin and SBC-dependent. $0.05 GAAP vs $0.34 non-GAAP ; ~9%-of-sales SBC . The "profitable now" narrative is real but fragile to any revenue wobble.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the new LCD landed restrictive in late 2026 / 2027 — bundled surveillance payment + tighter utilization. Testing growth fell from +40% to single digits, the $100M-EBITDA-2027 target was abandoned, Naveris integration absorbed management bandwidth without offsetting the core decline, and CDNA round-tripped toward the low-teens. The tell we'd have wanted: the terms of the new LCD draft the moment it posts for comment.

Multiples too high? No — ~2.6x EV/Sales `` on a +20%-guided, EBITDA-positive, net-cash name is not demanding. The multiple is low precisely because of risk #1. You're not paying for optimism; you're being paid (a discount) to underwrite policy risk.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market is still trading CDNA as "the 2023 reimbursement victim" and pricing a permanent LCD overhang — but the worst proposal already died, the business re-accelerated to +39%, and management has de-risked the model (more US testing/SaaS, less commodity kit, fresh cash, oncology optionality). If the new LCD lands merely neutral, the risk discount collapses and a ~2.6x name re-rates toward its 4–5x peer — that's the asymmetric, non-consensus payoff.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the model: a single government payer controls ~46% of the cash-cow segment . That's not a normal customer-concentration risk you can diversify away by selling harder — it's an administrative-pricing risk, and the administrator has *announced it's rewriting the rule* . The bull's "worst case already died" is naïve: CMS explicitly said a new LCD is coming, and "new" is not "favorable."
• Where revenue is concentrated & what shifts it: AlloSure/AlloMap = 78% of revenue ; ~46% of that exposed to Medicare. One unfavorable bundling decision and the model's best economics evaporate — *exactly* the 2023 playbook, which took testing revenue −20% .
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the moat is reimbursement + evidence, and Natera now has its own final kidney LCD and is taking share ``. The "category-definer" is being out-scaled by a far larger, better-capitalized rival that can cross-subsidize a transplant push from its $2.6B+ revenue base.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Natera. Bigger, faster-growing overall, with a credentialed competing product (Prospera) and now matching reimbursement status. CareDx's lead is being commoditized.
• Worst capital-allocation read: buying Naveris pushes CareDx out of its circle of competence (transplant) into oncology MRD — a brutally competitive field with Natera/Guardant/Veracyte already entrenched — funded with $160M cash + a $100M earnout, right as it should be defending the core. Is this diversification, or di-worse-ification dressed as a "pivot"? The simultaneous $150M buyback at ~$26 also competes for the same cash.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: (1) the new LCD is neutral-or-better; (2) testing growth stays double-digit; (3) Naveris integrates and ramps; (4) SBC-heavy non-GAAP profit converts to durable GAAP profit. Break any one and the discount widens.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: a restrictive LCD doing −20% to testing (≈ −$55M to a ~$280M segment) drops the company back to operating losses, kills the $100M-EBITDA target, and re-rates a "show-me" name toward 1.5x sales — well below today.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a bundled-payment surveillance LCD that structurally caps reimbursable dd-cfDNA frequency per patient. Plausibility: moderate — it's literally the concept CMS floated in the (withdrawn) proposal ``, and bundling is the direction MolDX has signaled.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What are the specific terms you expect in the new MolDX/Noridian LCD, when does it post for comment, and what is your reimbursed-frequency exposure under a bundled-surveillance-payment scenario? (The single highest-value question — it gates ~46% of testing revenue.)
2. How much of FY2026 guidance assumes a neutral LCD, and what's the revenue/EBITDA bridge if the new LCD restricts surveillance frequency like the 2023 proposal?
3. Quantify AlloSure vs Natera Prospera share by organ (kidney/heart/lung) over the last 8 quarters — are you gaining or defending, and at what price?
4. Now that Natera has its own final kidney LCD, what is the durable basis of your reimbursement/evidence moat?
5. Walk through the Naveris thesis: peak-sales, integration cost, the $100M earnout triggers, and why oncology MRD beats redeploying that capital into the transplant core.
6. Post-divestiture of Product, what is the steady-state gross-margin and adjusted-EBITDA-margin profile of the remaining testing + PDS business?
7. Bridge GAAP to non-GAAP: what is the path for SBC as a % of revenue, and when does GAAP net income become durably positive (not one-quarter)?
8. What is the realistic ceiling on US transplant test volume, and what % of eligible surveillance is already penetrated — where is the growth runway after that?
9. PDS grew 31% — what is its net revenue retention, churn, and gross margin, and can it become a double-digit % of revenue?
10. Capital allocation priorities for the EuroBio $170M: buyback vs further M&A vs balance sheet — and your hurdle rate on deals?
11. ARPT rose ~26% YoY in Q1 — how much is durable price/mix (Lung, iBox/AlloSure Plus) vs one-time reimbursement catch-up?
12. What is your contingency if Illumina materially changes NGS pricing or allocation given your platform dependence?
13. International is ~5% of revenue and shrinking post-divestiture — is ex-US a strategy or are you now a US-only company by choice?
14. What would have to be true for you to miss the $500M / $100M-adj-EBITDA 2027 target — your own bear case?
15. What is insider ownership today, and how is management comp tied to the 2027 targets vs. share price?

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