Draganfly

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Draganfly Inc. (Nasdaq/CSE/FSE: DPRO) is a Saskatoon, Saskatchewan–based designer and manufacturer of commercial and, increasingly, defense UAS (unmanned aerial systems). It bills itself as a ~25-year-old drone pioneer serving public safety, public health, agriculture, mining, industrial inspection, security, mapping/surveying — and now heavily, military/defense.

How it makes money. Two reported lines:

• Product sales — hardware drone systems (heavy-lift, FPV, fixed-wing, payloads). FY2025 product revenue $6,869,815 (+28.0% YoY), ~89% of total.
• Services — training, custom engineering, data/analytics, contract work. FY2025 services revenue $861,348 (−27.7% YoY), ~11% and shrinking.

Total FY2025 revenue $7,731,163 (+17.8% YoY vs $6.56M FY2024). This is a micro-cap, sub-$8M-revenue business — the entire company does less annual revenue than a single mid-size car dealership.

Product portfolio (current): Commander 3XL heavy-lift (with tether systems), the Flex FPV family (4"/7"/10" frame diameters, 550g–3kg payload, >149 km/h), the Outrider "Southern Border" surveillance drone, the newly-launched Blitz optical payload line, and — via the June 2026 Skip Dynamix asset acquisition (up to US$7.525M) — mass-producible long-range ISR / one-way fixed-wing systems.

Customers / contract structure. Historically fragmented commercial/government one-off orders; now pivoting to defense procurement. Named/disclosed 2025–26 wins: U.S. Army (Flex FPV, "initial order"), U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (Flex FPV + training, w/ Delmar Aerospace), a "Fortune 50 telecommunications company" (two heavy-lift orders for emergency response), DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory (counter-UAS development contract, w/ F4 Defense). Critical caveat: essentially none of these carry a disclosed dollar value — they are "landmark"/"initial" awards. Contract structure is therefore opaque; no take-or-pay, no disclosed recurring base, revenue concentration unknown-but-likely-high per-deal. customers.csv is empty.

Key payment terms. Balance sheet shows only $417,641 customer deposits and $165,237 + $44,512 deferred income at 2025-12-31 — i.e. negligible contracted/prepaid forward book relative to the $100M "2026 capacity" headline. That gap is the whole bear case in one number.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream inputs → Draganfly → end customer, named where sourceable:

• Upstream components. FPV/commercial drones depend on flight controllers, motors, ESCs, batteries, cameras/optics, and RF/datalink modules. The strategic driver of the entire "North American-made" pitch is the NDAA / DJI-ban tailwind — U.S. federal and defense buyers are barred from Chinese-made (DJI/Autel) drones and, increasingly, Chinese components, so a "NDAA-compliant, North-American-manufactured" supply chain is the selling proposition. Chokepoint: the non-China drone component ecosystem is thin — motors, flight controllers, and especially batteries are the squeeze. (Peer Unusual Machines is explicitly building non-China motors/batteries to fill exactly this gap.)
• Manufacturing. Draganfly announced (2025-08) expansion to "seven" facilities / a multi-site U.S. contract-manufacturing footprint, using AS9100- and ISO9001-certified contract manufacturers for resiliency/redundancy. So it is substantially an asset-light integrator/assembler leaning on contract manufacturers, not a vertically integrated OEM — capex-detail.csv is empty, consistent with an asset-light model.
• Named partners along the chain. Delmar Aerospace (USAF SOCOM delivery partner), F4 Defense International (counter-UAS co-development), Skip Dynamix (acquired fixed-wing IP/assets).
• Downstream. End customers = defense units (US Army/USAF/DEVCOM; also cited Canadian and Swedish army programs ), public-safety agencies, campus law enforcement (IACLEA program), and enterprise (the Fortune 50 telecom).

Chokepoint verdict: the moat-adjacent asset is NDAA-compliant sourcing + certifications, not proprietary silicon. That is replicable by any well-capitalized non-China integrator — and several peers are better-capitalized.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Honest read: the moat is thin and mostly regulatory/temporal, not structural.

• What passes as a moat today: (1) ~25-year brand/heritage in the drone space (genuine, if commercially under-monetized); (2) NDAA-compliant, North-American manufacturing at a moment when that is a hard procurement requirement; (3) an accumulating roster of named defense relationships that create reference credibility and (potentially) program lock-in; (4) — the real one right now — a ~$147M cash war chest that lets it out-spend/out-last commercial peers of its revenue size and buy IP (Skip Dynamix).
• What it is NOT: no evident scale advantage (revenue is a rounding error vs. the addressable defense budget and vs. peers), no switching-cost lock-in disclosed (no large installed recurring base), no network effect, no dominant proprietary IP cited as a barrier. Patents dir is empty.
• Bargaining power. Over customers: weak — it is a small vendor courting the U.S. defense apparatus and Fortune-50 buyers who hold the leverage; the absence of disclosed contract values is itself a tell of who sets terms. Over suppliers: weak-to-moderate — reliant on contract manufacturers and a scarce non-China component pool.

The durable question (Lens 12/13): in an NDAA-driven land grab, does heritage + cash beat Red Cat's Army SRR win, Unusual Machines' component vertical, and Ondas' scale? On current evidence, no.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is empty — the company does not report segment operating income; only a product-vs-services revenue split is public.

Geography is not cleanly broken out; commentary implies a U.S.-defense-led mix shift (management: military could be "up to 90% of total future revenue" ). The trend that matters: product up, services down, and gross margin deteriorating even as revenue grows — FY2025 gross margin 17.1% vs 21.3% FY2024, dragged by non-cash inventory write-downs; Q4 2025 gross margin collapsed to 4.5%; Q1 2026 gross margin 15.0% vs 20.0% Q1 2025. Growing the top line while margins fall is the opposite of operating leverage — an early warning that "record revenue" headlines are being bought with unprofitable/low-margin hardware.

Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 2026, reported 2026-05-11)

[all figures web: GlobeNewswire / StockTitan / GuruFocus, 2026-05]

• Revenue $2,312,353, +49.4% YoY ("record" Q1); product sales $2,232,132 (+44.8%).
• Gross profit $347,761 (+12.1%); gross margin 15.0% vs 20.0% Q1-2025 — margin fell again despite the revenue jump.
• Net loss $5,628,866 vs $3,424,825 Q1-2025 (loss ~64% wider); operating expenses $7,963,223 — i.e. opex is ~3.4× revenue.
• Balance sheet (2026-03-31): total assets $161,135,816 (up from $101.4M at YE2025); shareholders' equity $155,782,440; working capital $154,355,940; cash rose +$57,182,900 in the quarter (from the Feb-2026 ~$68M gross raise).
• FY2025 full-year (reported 2026-03): revenue $7.73M (+17.8%); gross margin 17.1%; net loss $22,981,079 (+65.6% YoY), inflated partly by warrant-derivative fair-value swings and higher office/travel/employee costs; cash $90.16M at YE2025 (from $6.3M at YE2024).

Read: revenue growth is real and accelerating off a tiny base, but every profitability line is going the wrong way, and the balance-sheet "strength" is entirely raised, not earned — the +$83.9M cash swing in 2025 and +$57.2M in Q1-2026 are financing inflows, not operating cash. Unusual vs. its own history: the Q4-2025 4.5% gross margin and the $23M annual loss are both worse than anything in its recent record — masked by the cash headline.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf; drawn from call summaries.

• Tone trajectory: progressively more defense-forward and more promotional. Q3-2025: management pivots the narrative to "military revenues up to 90% of future revenue," "seven new plants," Outrider border drone, large TAM language. Q1-2026: "record" framing, Drone Dominance "perfect score," "$100M capacity in 2026."
• What they keep saying: "NDAA-compliant," "North-American-made," "record," "defense/military demand surge," "well-capitalized." "Cash of ~$145M" is now the headline anchor of every corporate update.
• What they've de-emphasized: the legacy commercial/agriculture/public-health verticals that were the pre-2025 story; services revenue (now shrinking); and — conspicuously — hard contract dollar values and a firm backlog number.
• Sentiment flag: the shift from "diversified commercial drone company" to "defense pure-play in waiting" is a classic small-cap narrative migration toward whatever sector the market is paying up for. The Q3-2025 print "missed expectations" and the stock dipped on the release — the market is not fully taking the story at face value.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = U.S.-listed small/mid drone names (from the robotics beat + the obvious pure-plays).

What the table says: the whole cohort trades on story/TAM, not earnings — every name is loss-making and richly valued on sales. On a naive market-cap/revenue basis Draganfly (~24×) looks "cheapest," but that flatters it: (1) ~$147M of the $187M cap is cash, so the market assigns the operating business only ~$40M — i.e. the market barely believes the drone business yet; (2) DPRO's revenue is the smallest and its margins the worst; (3) peers have more disclosed traction (Red Cat's Army SRR program; Ondas' $96.6M revenue and raised $375M 2026 outlook; UMAC's Russell 2000 add + component vertical). Draganfly is the least-proven name in a speculative cohort — the low headline multiple is a discount for a reason, not a bargain.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~2y — the relevant window; DPRO's structure was reset by reverse splits)

52-week range $2.96–$14.40, now ~$5.14 (−64% from high). Pattern of movers:

• Reverse splits (structural): 1-for-25 effective 2024-09-05 (a Nasdaq-compliance manoeuvre) and a prior 5-for-1 in July 2021. These are the defining "moves" of the pre-2025 chart — a serial-dilution/consolidation cycle.
• Up-catalysts: defense contract announcements (US Army Flex FPV, USAF SOCOM, DEVCOM counter-UAS), Drone Dominance "perfect score," capital-raise closings, and sector-wide drone rallies (the RCAT/UMAC/ONDS "supercycle" narrative around the Pentagon's ~300,000-drone Drone Dominance program). DPRO is a high-beta co-mover with the drone basket.
• Down-catalysts: earnings prints (Q3-2025 "missed," stock dipped ~19% on one release citing wider losses ), and post-raise dilution digestion.

What the market actually reacts to: (1) the drone-defense theme (basket beta) and (2) contract headlines — far more than fundamentals. It sells off on the actual numbers. That is the signature of a narrative/momentum stock: catalysts are announcements, not cash flows.

Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Cameron Chell — CEO since Aug 2019; appointed Executive Chairman 2026-01-20 (replacing Scott Larson, who stays a director). Co-founder. Serial technology entrepreneur/venture-builder via Business Instincts Group; prior ventures include UrtheCast (satellite imagery, went public on TSXV, later distressed/sold), Slyce, Cold Bore Technologies, and involvement in the crypto/ICO wave (ICOx Innovations).
• Track record — genuinely mixed and promotional. Forbes/Globe and Mail document a dramatic arc: his first company FutureLink (~1998, an early "cloud" idea) ended with his departure, personal bankruptcy, addiction, and a period of homelessness before he rebuilt. He is a classic promoter-founder — skilled at narrative, capital formation, and riding hot themes (satellites → crypto → drones/defense). (Note: there are widely-circulated references to a late-1990s NASD/securities regulatory sanction tied to that era; I could not confirm the specific action via a primary source in this pass — flag as unverified, not asserted. It should be diligenced directly against FINRA BrokerCheck / SEC records before any position.)
• Skin in the game / insider ownership: not sourced this pass [insider-transactions.csv absent — research-layer]; CEO total comp ~C$790.87K (55% salary / 45% bonus+equity) — modest in absolute terms, appropriate for the company's size.
• Capital-allocation history: this is the crux and it is not encouraging — the demonstrated core competency is issuing equity: two reverse splits and 5+ dilutive rounds in 2025 (US$2.10 → $2.50 → $5.35 → $7.00) plus a ~$68M Feb-2026 raise, taking shares from ~29.3M (YE2025) to ~36.5M. Return on that capital has been deeply negative to date (cumulative losses; FY2025 −$23M). The bull spin: he raised a fortress balance sheet before the ramp, opportunistically, at rising prices, into strength — arguably shrewd market timing. Both readings are true; which dominates depends entirely on whether the defense revenue materializes.
• Board: Chell (Exec Chair/CEO), Scott Larson, Denis Silva, Kim Moody (Audit Chair, "financial expert"), Tim Dunnigan, Thomas B. Modly (former Acting U.S. Secretary of the Navy — a real defense-credibility signal). Military Board of Advisors added Victor Meyer and Keith Kimmel.
• Archetype: founder-promoter, not operator. At this stage that cuts both ways — great at funding and story, unproven at converting either into durable margin.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Grounded in the 40-F cover/obligations table + FY2025/Q1-2026 releases.

• Revenue quality/recognition: small absolute base ($7.7M FY25) makes any single deal or timing choice swing the quarter; watch product-revenue "records" against falling gross margin — margin at 4.5% in Q4-2025 and 15–17% for the year suggests either aggressive pricing to win reference deals or genuinely low-value hardware. Deferred income is tiny ($209K), so revenue is booked largely on delivery, not spread — limits smoothing but also means no forward-contracted cushion.
• Inventory: non-cash inventory write-downs cut FY2025 gross profit — a flag that hardware is being built/held ahead of orders that may not land, or that product is aging. Inventory-vs-revenue trend worth monitoring directly in the 10-Q/financials (not on shelf).
• Cash flow vs. earnings: operating cash burn is real; the enormous reported cash growth is financing, not operations — do not read the $147M as business health. Warrant-derivative fair-value changes distort net loss (a non-cash, mark-to-market swing on the many warrants issued) — a recurring noise item that will keep making GAAP losses lumpy.
• Stock-based comp / dilution: the dominant shareholder risk. Share count +~24% YE2025→mid-2026 from raises, on top of two historical reverse splits — structural, ongoing dilution is the base rate here.
• Goodwill/intangibles: the Skip Dynamix asset deal (up to $7.525M) will add intangibles — watch for future impairment given DPRO's history.
• Auditor / controls: auditor DMCL LLP (PCAOB ID 1173); audit fees $250K (FY25). Management asserts ICFR effective, but as an Emerging Growth Company DPRO is exempt from SOX 404(b) auditor attestation — i.e. no independent audit of internal controls. Reasonable given size, but a control-assurance gap to note. IFRS/CAD reporting adds a translation layer for USD comparability.
• Going concern (historical): prior filings carried explicit going-concern material-uncertainty language dependent on raising capital. The 2025–26 raises have, for now, removed the near-term going-concern risk — the $147M cash pile is the one unambiguous positive and buys multiple years of runway at the current burn. This is the single biggest change vs. the company's own history.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section).

• SEC Litigation Releases: none — "No LR found for this company in the search period".
• SEC AAERs: none — "No AAER found".
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): no material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement action against Draganfly Inc. surfaced in this pass. Company-level: clean. Person-level: the Chell 1990s regulatory question (Lens 9) is unresolved and should be diligenced against FINRA BrokerCheck/SEC directly — not a company enforcement matter, but material to management assessment.
• Item 3 Legal Proceedings (10-K/40-F): the 40-F on the shelf is the cover/certifications shell; the substantive legal-proceedings disclosure lives in the incorporated-by-reference AIF (Exhibit 99.1) and financial statements (Exhibit 99.2), which are not ingested. Historical Globe and Mail coverage references FutureLink-era litigation involving Chell, but no material current Draganfly litigation surfaced this pass.
• Net: No material company-level regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and the 40-F as of 2026-07-01. Caveat: Item 3 not read from primary (in unfetched exhibits), and a person-level founder history flag remains open.

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

No forecast.ts create in watchlist mode (per skill). Bottom-up from the latest actuals; all outputs with arithmetic; every input labeled.

Anchors: FY2025 revenue $7.73M; Q1-2026 $2.31M (+49% YoY); opex ~$8M/qtr → ~$32M annualized; gross margin ~15% and falling; cash ~$147M; company target "$100M capacity in 2026" and sell-side "~138% FY2026 revenue growth".

Because the company is deeply loss-making with tiny gross profit, EPS is negative across all scenarios for the projection horizon (FY2026–FY2028); the real question is revenue trajectory and cash runway, not EPS. I frame it as revenue paths + burn:

• Bear (base-rate case): FY2026 revenue ~$12–14M. Defense POs stay small/undisclosed; gross margin stuck ~15%. Net loss ~$18–22M. Cash still ample (>$100M) — no existential risk, but the story de-rates as the $100M capacity claim visibly misses. EPS ~−$0.50 to −$0.60.
• Base: FY2026 revenue $18M (+130%), driven by defense mix ramping toward management's "up to 90%." Gross margin improves toward ~20% as volume/mix helps. Net loss narrows modestly to ~$15–18M on higher opex for the ramp. EPS ~−$0.45.
• Bull: FY2026 revenue ~$30–40M. Margin toward mid-20s%. Still loss-making but the "path to scale" narrative is validated and the stock re-rates on revenue, not cash. EPS ~−$0.30 to −$0.40.

The number that decides it all: does a single disclosed, multi-million-dollar firm defense purchase order land and convert to shipped revenue? Everything above bear depends on it. The $100M-capacity headline is ~13× current revenue — treat it as aspiration, not forecast, until backing orders appear (deferred income is $0.2M today ).

Base-case forecast I'd log if attended (not logged in watchlist): "DPRO FY2026 revenue ≥ $18M, p≈0.40" and "DPRO FY2026 revenue ≥ $50M, p≈0.10."

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. A ~25-year drone brand, finally in the right place at the right time: the NDAA/DJI-ban wall plus the Pentagon's Drone Dominance program (≈300,000 attack drones by 2027) create a multi-year, non-China, U.S.-made procurement supercycle — and DPRO is NDAA-compliant, multi-site, and already winning named Army/USAF/DEVCOM selections. Uniquely in the micro-cap cohort it holds a ~$147M net-cash fortress (net cash ≈ 79% of market cap), so it can fund the ramp, buy IP (Skip Dynamix), and out-last commercial peers without further dilution for years — the going-concern risk that defined its past is gone. A single large disclosed PO would re-rate a stock the market currently values at only $40M ex-cash. Board now carries real defense weight (ex-Acting SecNav Modly). If even the base case ($18M FY26) prints with improving margin, today's ~$5 looks cheap vs. peers on P/S.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. The business never earns its cash — DPRO's demonstrated core skill is raising money, not making it. Margins are falling as revenue grows (4.5% GM in Q4-2025); opex is 3.4× revenue. If defense POs stay small and undisclosed, the $147M slowly funds losses and the equity is a melting-ice-cube dressed as a fortress.
2. Out-competed in the land grab — Red Cat won the Army SRR program; Ondas is 12× the revenue with a $4.4B cap and a real software leg; Unusual Machines owns the non-China component vertical. DPRO is the least-proven, smallest-revenue, worst-margin name — heritage + cash may simply lose to better-positioned, better-capitalized rivals.
3. Serial dilution + promoter risk — two reverse splits and relentless issuance are the base rate; a promoter-CEO with a checkered history (and an unresolved regulatory question) running a narrative that migrated satellites→crypto→drones is exactly the profile that separates retail from its money when the theme cools.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): FY2026 revenue came in $12–14M, not the implied $18M+; the "landmark" contracts turned out to be small/one-off with no follow-on; gross margin never cleared 20%; the drone-basket euphoria faded and DPRO fell back toward its ex-cash value ($1/sh territory net of the pile), while continued raises to fund the ramp diluted holders further. The $100M-capacity headline is remembered as the top signal.

Are multiples too high? On earnings, infinitely (no earnings). On revenue, ~24× headline / ~5× ex-cash — the ex-cash multiple is not crazy if the ramp is real, but the market is right to price only ~$40M of operating value into it today given the evidence. The cash is the floor; the business is the call option.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): both sides. Bulls refuse to see that falling margins on rising revenue is disqualifying for a "scaling defense manufacturer" and that un-priced contracts are marketing. Bears refuse to see that the balance sheet genuinely de-risked the equity to a hard cash floor — this is not the going-concern zombie it was in 2023; it can afford to be patient. The stock is a binary on defense conversion, wrapped in a cash floor — mispriced only at the extremes.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• Where revenue is concentrated / what breaks it: a handful of undisclosed government/defense deals. If even one or two "initial orders" don't convert to follow-on production, the growth story stalls — and we'd never see it coming because management doesn't disclose contract values or backlog. The absence of a hard backlog number against a "$100M 2026 capacity" claim is the single most damning fact.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: "NDAA-compliant North-American manufacturing" is a procurement checkbox, not a moat — it's replicable by any funded integrator, and the better-funded ones (UMAC on components, RCAT on the SRR win, ONDS on scale/software) are already ahead. DPRO's IP barrier is unquantified (empty patents dir).
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Ondas — $96.6M revenue, $4.4B cap, raised 2026 outlook to $375M, and moving into military software via the Omnisys deal. It can crush DPRO on scale, credibility, and R&D spend. Also Red Cat, which already holds the flagship Army program DPRO is merely adjacent to.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance flags: serial dilution (5+ raises in 2025 + $68M in Feb-2026), two reverse splits, a promoter-CEO whose career includes bankruptcy, homelessness, an ICO-era chapter, and an unresolved late-1990s securities-regulatory question — plus EGC exemption from SOX 404(b) auditor attestation. Related-party/insider-ownership detail not disclosed on shelf.
• What must hold for today's price (~$5, ~$187M cap): that ~$40M of ex-cash value is conservative — i.e. the market is underpricing a real defense ramp. That requires converting narrative to disclosed, sizeable, recurring POs and fixing the margin structure. Neither is evidenced yet.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: FY2026 lands ~$12–14M, the P/S de-rates hard, and — critically — the stock has a gravity well at its ex-cash value. If sentiment breaks, ~$147M cash / ~37M shares ≈ ~$4/sh of pure cash is the theoretical floor, but a market that stops believing the business assigns negative operating value and the equity can trade toward/through cash while dilution continues. Downside to the $2–3 area (the 52-wk low was $2.96) is very live.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: defense procurement standardizes on 2–3 winners (Red Cat / Anduril-class primes / Ondas) and DPRO is left as a sub-scale also-ran burning its cash pile on losses and dilutive M&A — heritage brand, no franchise. Plausibility: moderate-to-high given how far behind on revenue it is.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What is your total firm defense/government backlog in dollars as of today, and how much is funded/obligated vs. a ceiling/IDIQ? (The one number that would most change the view.)
2. For the U.S. Army Flex FPV, USAF SOCOM, and DEVCOM counter-UAS awards — what is the disclosed or expected dollar value and delivery schedule of each, and why have values not been disclosed?
3. Bridge the $100M "2026 capacity" to actual expected 2026 revenue — what specific POs underpin it, and what's the realistic base case?
4. Gross margin fell to 4.5% in Q4-2025 and ~15% in Q1-2026 — what is the structural margin of the defense product mix at volume, and when do you cross 25%+?
5. What were the inventory write-downs in 2025, what caused them, and how much finished/WIP inventory sits against un-contracted orders?
6. What is your quarterly operating cash burn trajectory, and at the current burn how many years does the ~$147M fund without another raise?
7. Commit to a dilution posture: given the fortress balance sheet, will you refrain from further equity issuance absent a transformational, accretive use — and for how long?
8. How do you win against Red Cat (Army SRR), Ondas (scale + software), and Unusual Machines (non-China components) — what do you have that they can't replicate?
9. What share of the "up to 90% military" future revenue is recurring/production vs. one-off development/prototype work?
10. What is current insider ownership, and have executives been net buyers or sellers through the 2025–26 raises?
11. On the Skip Dynamix acquisition — what revenue/IP does the up-to-$7.525M buy, what are the earn-out triggers, and what's the integration/impairment risk?
12. What is your non-China component supply security (motors, batteries, flight controllers) — single-source exposures and mitigation?
13. What is the status of any Nasdaq listing conditions post-reverse-splits, and your plan to avoid another compliance/consolidation cycle?
14. Cameron — given your prior ventures and any historical regulatory matters, how should investors weigh governance and disclosure discipline at Draganfly?
15. When do you expect positive gross-margin dollars to cover opex (path to operating breakeven), and what revenue level does that require?