Phase A — Understand the business
Lens 1 · Company Overview
Eutelsat Group is the world's first fully integrated GEO-LEO satellite operator, created by the September 2023 merger of France's Eutelsat Communications (a legacy geostationary operator founded 1977 as an intergovernmental org, privatised 2001) with Britain's OneWeb (a low-Earth-orbit broadband constellation that went through Chapter 11 in 2020 and was rescued by the UK government + Bharti). The combined entity operates ~35 GEO satellites plus a LEO constellation of 600+ satellites.
The business sells satellite capacity and connectivity across four operating verticals:
- Video — broadcasting capacity leased to TV channels/platforms (the legacy cash cow, structurally declining). ~46% of operating-vertical revenue in H1 25-26.
- Fixed Connectivity — broadband to enterprises, ISPs, telcos (increasingly LEO-delivered).
- Mobile Connectivity — in-flight connectivity (IFC) for airlines + maritime; the fastest-growing structural end-market.
- Government Services — sovereign/defence comms; the strategic core of the new thesis (Ukraine, French military, IRIS²).
Contract structure: a mix of multi-year capacity leases (Video — recurring but eroding) and newer connectivity service agreements (LEO — usage/seat-based, faster-growing). Backlog €3.4bn at 31 Dec 2025 vs €3.7bn a year earlier — ~2.7x trailing revenue, Connectivity now 59% of it. The declining backlog is itself a tell: the recurring Video annuity is running off faster than connectivity bookings replace it.
The real identity: this is not a clean growth story. It is a leveraged, ex-utility broadcast-capacity business in secular decline that has strapped on a capital-hungry, unprofitable LEO constellation and been re-cast — by geopolitics, not by its own P&L — as Europe's answer to Starlink. The equity now trades as a political/sovereign option rather than a cash-flow security (see Lens 8).
Lens 2 · Supply Chain
Map: manufacturers → Eutelsat (capacity owner/operator) → distributors/integrators → end users.
- Upstream — satellite manufacture:
- Airbus Defence and Space — prime contractor for OneWeb Gen2. Contracted Dec 2024 for 100 satellites, expanded Jan 2026 to 440 total new LEO satellites; first batches deliver from late 2026. Single-source chokepoint for the constellation refresh.
- OneWeb Satellites (the legacy Airbus–OneWeb JV in Florida) built the Gen1 fleet on a quasi-mass-production line — the original cost advantage of the OneWeb model.
- Thales Alenia Space — a partner on IRIS² and European GEO programs.
- Launch: historically Arianespace (Soyuz pre-Ukraine, then Ariane) and — awkwardly — SpaceX Falcon 9, which launched a tranche of OneWeb Gen1 after the Russian Soyuz route was severed in 2022. The company depends on its principal competitor for launch — a structural irony and a chokepoint.
- Ground segment: gateway/teleport network + user terminals. Terminal cost/availability has historically been a OneWeb bottleneck (enterprise/gov terminals are expensive vs Starlink's mass-produced consumer dish).
- Midstream — Eutelsat: owns/operates the orbital capacity.
- Downstream — distribution:
- Bharti Airtel (also the second-largest shareholder) — distribution into India/South Asia via a Hughes/Bharti JV.
- Telco/ISP partners, IFC integrators, and defence primes who package capacity for end customers.
- End customers: TV broadcasters (Video); airlines — 15 committed, 160+ private jets, Japan Airlines 40+ widebodies; maritime; governments — French military (10-yr deal up to €1bn), EU/Ukraine.
Chokepoints: (1) Airbus as single-source for Gen2 satellites; (2) launch dependence on SpaceX/Arianespace; (3) user-terminal cost/supply; (4) capital itself is the binding input — the constellation cannot be sustained without continuous fresh financing (Lens 5/11). Names present — this lens passes.
Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)
The honest verdict: the durable moat is regulatory/political, not economic.
- Orbital spectrum & landing rights — Eutelsat holds scarce, grandfathered GEO orbital slots and Ku/Ka spectrum priority, plus OneWeb's Ku-band LEO priority filings. Spectrum rights are a genuine regulatory moat — but a wasting one as the band fills with competitors.
- Sovereign / "non-American" status — the single most valuable asset post-2025. Eutelsat is the only at-scale, European-controlled, multi-orbit operator. For European governments who do not want to depend on Elon Musk's Starlink, there is no alternative. This is why the French state stepped in. It is a moat of availability, not of cost or technology.
- GEO-LEO integration — Eutelsat markets itself as the only operator able to bundle GEO (high-throughput, fixed beams) with LEO (low-latency, global) in one service — relevant for IFC and government, where resilience/multi-path matters. Real but narrow.
- Switching costs — moderate in Video (multi-year leases, channel neighbourhoods) and government (integration, security accreditation); low in commodity broadband.
Bargaining power: weak on both sides. Upstream, Eutelsat needs Airbus and SpaceX more than they need it. Downstream, against Starlink's price/scale it has little pricing power in commodity connectivity — which is precisely why management explicitly says it does not compete with Starlink in consumer and retreats to government/enterprise/IFC niches. A moat you retreat into is a weak moat. Ground in: no commercial-layer files exist for space (all missing per Step 0), so this is web-derived.
Lens 4 · Segments
segments.csv is empty — all figures ``, from H1 FY25-26 (six months to Dec 2025) and Q3 FY25-26 (Jan–Mar 2026) disclosures. Eutelsat's fiscal year ends 30 June.
| Vertical | Latest disclosed revenue | YoY | Share | Trend & cause |
|---|
| Video | €266.5m (H1 25-26) | −12.3% | 46% | Structural decline + Russian-channel sanctions. Accelerating down. |
| Fixed Connectivity | €132m (H1 25-26) | +17.2% | — | LEO-driven; GEO fixed soft. Accelerating up. |
| Mobile Connectivity | €45m (Q3 25-26) | +27% | — | Aero/IFC ramp. Accelerating up. |
| Government Services | €52m (Q3 25-26) | +18.5% | — | Ukraine + LEO sovereign demand. Accelerating up. |
| LEO (cross-cut) | €110.5m (H1 25-26) | ~+60% | ~20% of group | OneWeb ramp; ~65% growth in Q3. |
The structural story in one line: Video (the cash) is melting at low-double-digits; the three connectivity verticals + LEO are compounding at 15–65% but off a small base and not yet profitable at the constellation level. Connectivity is now ~54% of operating-vertical revenue and LEO ~20% of group. The mix shift is favourable in direction but the absolute connectivity dollars are nowhere near large enough to fund the constellation they depend on — that is the entire problem (Lens 11).
Phase B — Measure performance
Lens 5 · Earnings Result
No quarterly P&L on the shelf. Latest hard markers, all ``:
FY 2024-25 (year to 30 Jun 2025):
- Revenue €1,244m, +2.5% reported / +1.6% like-for-like; four operating verticals €1,226m (+0.8% LFL).
- Adjusted EBITDA €676.2m, margin 54.2% (constant FX) — flat LFL.
- Net debt / Adjusted EBITDA 3.88x at 30 Jun 2025 (vs 3.79x a year earlier) — rising leverage, the proximate trigger for the recapitalisation.
- LEO revenue grew >80%, ~15% of group.
- Liquidity ~€1.07bn (cash + undrawn lines).
H1 FY25-26 (to 31 Dec 2025):
- Net debt €1,300.9m, down €1,325.7m vs Jun 2025 — almost entirely the €1,475.8m net capital-raise proceeds. This is the single most important number in the dossier: leverage fell from 3.88x toward ~1.9x because the state recapitalised it, not because the business de-levered organically.
- Weighted-average debt maturity 2.3 years (down from 3.0y) — a near-term refinancing wall.
Q3 FY25-26 (Jan–Mar 2026):
- Total Connectivity revenue €155.7m, +15.3%; LEO +65%.
- FY25-26 guidance confirmed: four verticals roughly flat vs FY24-25; LEO +50%; FY capex cut to ~€900m (from €1.0–1.1bn).
Margin/balance-sheet flags: 54% EBITDA margin is genuinely high (capacity businesses have low marginal cost) — but it is pre the LEO capex sinkhole. The gap between a 54% EBITDA margin and a business that cannot fund itself is the whole point: D&A + capex on the constellation consume the EBITDA. Discretionary free cash flow has been negative/marginal as capex runs ~€900m–€1.1bn against ~€676m EBITDA. Net income is not a clean positive figure (heavy D&A, impairments on legacy GEO) — n/a — not cleanly sourced for a single net-income line; do not fabricate one.
Market reaction: the equity has de-rated structurally despite "in-line" prints — the market is pricing the dilution and the funding gap, not the quarterly revenue (Lens 8).
Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)
No transcripts/ on the shelf — drawn from CEO commentary and results coverage ``.
- Tone shift, 2024 → 2026: from a defensive integration / debt-management posture under Eva Berneke (CEO through May 2025, who delivered the OneWeb merger) to a sovereign-mission / multi-orbit-pivot posture under Jean-François Fallacher (CEO from June 2025).
- What management now emphasises: "European sovereignty," "multi-orbit," IRIS², OneWeb Gen2 roadmap, government demand, capex discipline (the €900m cut, the 30% Gen2 capex reduction).
- What they stopped saying: any pretence of competing with Starlink in the consumer mass market. The framing is now explicitly niche/sovereign, which is candid but is also an admission that the broad-market LEO land-grab is lost to SpaceX/Amazon.
- Recurring phrase: "secure operational continuity" of the constellation — telling, because it signals the priority is survival/refresh, not expansion/share-gain.
Sentiment read: cautiously constructive on strategy, defensive on economics. Management is competent and honest about the constraints; the constraints are just severe.
Lens 7 · Comps
Peer table — Eutelsat vs key satellite operators. No space peers in the research index (Eutelsat is the first space name covered), so peers and multiples are pulled fresh ``. Multiples that cannot be cleanly sourced are marked n/a (per provenance discipline — no fabricated multiples).
| Company | Ticker | Mkt cap (approx) | EV/Sales | EV/EBIT | P/E | Div yield | 5-yr avg ROE | Note |
|---|
| Eutelsat | ETL.PA | ~€2.6bn (~$2.9bn) | ~3.1x | n/a — negative/near-zero EBIT | n/a — not cleanly positive | 0% (suspended) | Multi-orbit incumbent; state-controlled | |
| SES S.A. | SESG.PA | ~$4.2bn | ~0.9x (P/S ttm) | n/a | fwd P/E ~85x | reinstating | low-single-digit | GEO peer; bought Intelsat (2025) |
| Viasat | VSAT | ~$7.6bn | n/a | n/a | n/a | negative | US GEO+L-band, levered | |
| Iridium | IRDM | ~$5.5bn | ~6.7x (P/S) | n/a | ~50x normalized | ~2% | mid-teens+ | Profitable LEO niche (the bull-case template) |
| AST SpaceMobile | ASTS | ~$20–34bn | n/a — pre-revenue | n/a — negative | n/a — negative | negative | Direct-to-cell; pure option | |
| EchoStar | SATS | ~$30bn | n/a | n/a | n/a | negative | Spectrum + Hughes + Boost | |
Eutelsat EV (for its own line) ``: market cap ~€2.6bn + net debt €1.3bn (Dec 2025) ≈ EV ~€3.9bn; EV/EBITDA ~5.7x. On EV/EBITDA Eutelsat looks "cheap" vs SES's ~9.3x — but the EBITDA multiple flatters a business whose EBITDA is consumed by capex, so it is the wrong lens. The right lens is FCF/equity-value, on which the name screens expensive (FCF marginal, equity a residual claim behind €1.3bn net debt + a €4bn forward capex commitment).
Read: the comp set splits into (a) profitable niche legacy (Iridium — the template Eutelsat wishes it were), (b) levered GEO incumbents (SES, Viasat — Eutelsat's actual peer group), and (c) pre-revenue LEO options (ASTS — pure speculation). Eutelsat is (b) wearing a (c) costume.
Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (the 5-year tape)
This is the most important lens for understanding what moves the name — because it has become a political instrument, not a cash-flow security.
- Mar 2025 — the +387% week. Trump paused US military aid to Ukraine and floated cutting Ukraine's Starlink access. Eutelsat — the only European at-scale alternative — soared: +77% on 4 Mar, +120% on 5 Mar, +387% over the week; market cap went from <$1bn to briefly >$4bn on speculation it could replace Starlink in Ukraine. Pure geopolitical re-rating, not a fundamental event.
- May 2025 — CEO change. Berneke out, Fallacher (ex-Orange) in; shares +10% on the news, read as French-state/telco consolidation of control.
- Jun 2025 — French state recapitalisation announced (€1.35bn, state to ~30%), one day after the French military's 10-yr OneWeb deal (up to €1bn).
- Nov–Dec 2025 — the dilution. €1.5bn capital raise completed: reserved tranches (~€828m, 21 Nov) + ~€670m rights issue (Dec). Share count 475m → 1,178m. 2.48x dilution.
- Dec 2025 — SoftBank selloff. Shares −7% on a report SoftBank was cutting its OneWeb-legacy stake.
- Feb 2026 — debt refi + state-backed satellite financing. €1.5bn senior bonds (2031/2033) to redeem 2027/2029 notes; €975m French-export-credit-backed financing for the 340 Airbus satellites.
Pattern: the stock reacts to geopolitics (Ukraine/Starlink/sovereignty) and capital-structure events (raises, refis, state backstops) — almost never to operational beats/misses. Q3 25-26 was "in line" and barely moved. Anyone owning this equity is making a bet on European political will and the French state's continued backstop, not on satellite unit economics. That is the single sharpest finding in this dossier.
Phase C — Judge people & books
Lens 9 · Management
- CEO — Jean-François Fallacher (since Jun 2025). 30+ yrs European telecom; ex-CEO Orange France/Spain/Poland/Romania; ran nationwide fibre/5G rollouts and large public-private integrations. Track record: a telco operator/integrator, not a satellite or capital-markets specialist — fitting for a business that is now effectively a state-aligned infrastructure utility. Skin in the game: professional manager, not a founder; insider ownership negligible (
insider-transactions.csv not present — `` only). The signal is that the French state, via APE, is the real principal, not the CEO.
- Predecessor — Eva Berneke (2022–May 2025) delivered the OneWeb merger, then was replaced as the state took control — a de facto governance reset.
- Capital-allocation history: poor on a returns basis. The OneWeb merger doubled the company into an unprofitable, capital-hungry constellation; leverage rose to 3.88x; the dividend was suspended; equity holders were diluted 2.5x to survive. ROE/ROIC have been low-to-negative through the build. This is value-preservation under state sponsorship, not value creation.
- Red flags (governance): heavy related-party density — Bharti Airtel is both ~18% shareholder AND the India distribution partner; the French state is controlling shareholder AND a major customer (military) AND the regulator's sponsor. These are not fraud flags but they mean minority equity holders' interests are subordinate to French/European industrial-policy objectives. A minority shareholder should assume decisions will be made for European sovereignty first, share price second.
- Archetype: state-backed national champion run by a professional telco operator. Implication: low bankruptcy risk (the state will not let it fail), low upside torque (the state will dilute/restructure rather than let equity holders capture a windfall).
Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags
financials.csv is empty; assessment is `` + structural reasoning.
- Cash flow vs earnings: the central forensic feature is the chronic gap between Adjusted EBITDA (~€676m, 54% margin) and free cash flow (marginal/negative) — capex ~€900m–€1.1bn swamps EBITDA. "Adjusted EBITDA" is the metric management leads with precisely because the GAAP picture (post-D&A, post-capex, post-impairment) is far weaker. Trust FCF and net debt, not Adjusted EBITDA, on this name.
- Goodwill/intangibles: the OneWeb merger and legacy GEO fleet carry large intangible/goodwill balances exposed to impairment if LEO economics disappoint — a watch item (impairments have featured in prior years).
- Net debt definition & maturity wall: weighted-avg maturity just 2.3 years — the company is in continuous refinancing mode; the Feb-2026 bond deal addressed 2027/2029 notes but the structure remains short-dated.
- Off-balance-sheet / commitments: €4bn+ of forward capex commitments (OneWeb Gen2 €2–2.2bn + IRIS² €2bn) only partly financed — the real "liability" is contractual capex, not just reported debt.
- Dilution as a recurring instrument: 2.5x share issuance in one year. Future equity holders should price further dilution risk as the base case if the funding gap widens.
Regulatory findings (required sub-section):
- SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): none possible — Eutelsat has no CIK and does not file with the SEC.
- Non-SEC enforcement (web search
"Eutelsat" (FTC OR DOJ OR EU OR sanctions OR consent decree OR fine OR penalty)): No material fines or consent decrees surfaced. The one regulatory-adjacent item is EU/international sanctions on Russian broadcasters, which forced Eutelsat to drop Russian channels — this is Eutelsat complying with sanctions (a revenue headwind in Video, −12.3% partly attributed to it ), not an enforcement action against Eutelsat.
- Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): n/a — no 10-K on the shelf (foreign filer). French URD (Document d'Enregistrement Universel) would hold the equivalent; not ingested.
- Net: No material regulatory or legal enforcement findings against the company — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (no CIK, zero findings per the regulatory file) and web search as of 2026-06-30. The salient regulatory exposure is sovereign/political: as a French national champion its fortunes are tied to EU industrial policy and export-credit/state-aid rules.
Phase D — Project & stress-test
Lens 11 · Forward Projection
Eutelsat's fiscal year ends 30 June; projection covers FY2026, FY2027, FY2028. EPS is the wrong primary metric here (net income is not cleanly positive and dilution is the dominant variable) — so I anchor on revenue, Adjusted EBITDA, capex, and the funding gap, and give an indicative EPS only with heavy caveats. All with arithmetic; inputs.
Base case
- Revenue: FY26 ~€1.24bn (verticals flat, LEO +50% per guidance ) → FY27 ~€1.30bn → FY28 ~€1.38bn.
- Adjusted EBITDA: ~€670–700m/yr, margin drifting toward ~50% as mix shifts to lower-margin connectivity.
- Capex: ~€900m (FY26 guided ) → ~€800m–€1.0bn (FY27–28, Gen2 build).
- FCF: negative-to-breakeven through FY28 — the constellation refresh consumes EBITDA.
- EPS: ~breakeven to marginally positive on ~1.18bn shares;
n/a — not reliably sourced as a point estimate, and not meaningful given dilution risk. Do not fabricate an EPS line.
Bull case: LEO compounds 50%+ for 3 years, government/IFC bookings accelerate, IRIS² and export-credit financing close the funding gap without further equity dilution, leverage holds ~2x, and a strategic/sovereign premium re-rates the equity. Revenue ~€1.5bn FY28, EBITDA margin holds ~52%, FCF turns positive FY28.
Bear case: Video declines accelerate (−15%+), Starlink/Amazon price-compress connectivity, the €4bn capex bill forces another equity raise (further dilution), leverage re-rises, and the state restructures over minority holders. Revenue stalls ~€1.2bn, FCF stays negative, equity de-rates toward distressed-asset value.
The decisive question is not EPS — it is the funding gap. Committed forward capex €4bn+ vs ~€676m annual EBITDA and €1.3bn net debt + ~€1.07bn liquidity + €975m export-credit facility. The base case requires near-flawless execution on financing (export credit + IRIS² EU money) to avoid a fourth capital event. That is the call.
(Forecast tracker: forecast.ts create is skipped per --watchlist rules — breadth mode logs no Brier forecast. Were one logged, the scoreable claim would be a binary: "Eutelsat completes OneWeb Gen2 funding through FY2028 without a further equity raise," p≈0.40.)
Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear
Bull case. Eutelsat is the only investable, at-scale, European-sovereign multi-orbit operator in a world that has decided — post-Ukraine — that depending on Elon Musk's Starlink is a strategic vulnerability. It has the orbital spectrum, a 600+ LEO constellation already in service, a GEO cash base, a 10-year French military anchor (up to €1bn), a seat in IRIS² (Europe's €10.6bn sovereign constellation), and a French state that has demonstrated it will write the cheque. LEO revenue is compounding 50–65%. If Europe's defence/sovereignty capex super-cycle is real, Eutelsat is its listed pure-play, with the state de-risking the downside. The EV/EBITDA (~5.7x) is a fraction of growth-LEO peers.
Bear case (the three permanent-impairment risks).
- The funding gap is structural, not bridgeable on current cash flow. €4bn+ committed capex against ~€676m EBITDA and negative FCF means the equity is a perpetual call on dilution. The 2.5x dilution of 2025 is the template, not the exception.
- The product is competitively cornered. Management has conceded the consumer mass market to Starlink and is retreating to government/enterprise niches — exactly where Amazon Leo ($10bn committed, enterprise beta Apr 2026 ) and Starlink's gov tier also compete. The niche is not defensible enough to earn a return on €4bn of capex.
- Minority equity is structurally subordinated. With the French state at ~30% and controlling, decisions will be made for European industrial policy — equity holders are residual claimants behind the state's strategic agenda and €1.3bn of net debt.
Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): Video declined faster than modelled, LEO connectivity ARPU compressed under Amazon/Starlink, the export-credit financing came with strings or fell short, and Eutelsat launched another rights issue in 2027 — diluting holders again — while the share price ground toward €1.50. The "sovereignty premium" proved to be a one-time 2025 spike, not a durable re-rating.
Are multiples too high? On EV/EBITDA, no (it's optically cheap). On equity value vs free cash flow and dilution risk, yes — the equity is priced as an option, and options can expire worthless.
Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market still half-prices the March-2025 fantasy that Eutelsat could "be Europe's Starlink." It can't — it's a niche sovereign carrier with a melting legacy book and a capex bill it can't self-fund. But the market also under-appreciates the flip side: the French state will not let it fail. So the real trade is not the equity (leveraged, dilutive) but the credit / state-backstopped instruments — the sovereign put is the asset, and it sits in the bonds, not the shares.
Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)
Dismantling the bull case:
- Revenue concentration & quality: 46% of revenue is structurally declining Video; the "growth" is ~20% LEO that doesn't cover its own capex. The backlog is shrinking (€3.7bn → €3.4bn) — the recurring annuity is running off faster than new bookings replace it.
- The moat is rented, not owned. Eutelsat depends on Airbus (sole-source satellites) and SpaceX (launch — its own competitor). It has no cost advantage vs Starlink's vertically integrated launch+manufacture. The only true moat — "European-controlled" — is a regulatory designation, not an economic one, and could be matched by any state-backed European new-entrant.
- Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not Starlink (priced in) but Amazon Leo — $10bn committed, 1 Gbps enterprise beta (Apr 2026 ) — coming straight for Eutelsat's enterprise/gov niche with Amazon's balance sheet and AWS distribution. And SES-Intelsat (post-2025 merger) as the consolidated European GEO peer.
- Worst capital allocation: doubling into OneWeb (an asset that had already been through Chapter 11), then diluting equity 2.5x to fund it. Related-party density (Bharti = shareholder + distributor; state = shareholder + customer + sponsor) means capital decisions aren't made for minority holders.
- Assumptions that must hold for today's price: (1) no further equity raise; (2) LEO 50%+ growth sustained; (3) export-credit/IRIS² financing closes the €4bn gap; (4) the sovereignty premium persists. If any one fails, the equity re-rates down.
- −20–30% growth scenario: if LEO growth halves and Video accelerates down, FCF stays negative indefinitely → a 2027 rights issue → another
30–50% dilution → equity toward distressed-asset value (€1.0–1.5/share ).
- Single permanent-impairment scenario, plausibility: a fourth capital event on worse terms (dilutive convertible or state-led restructuring) that wipes out most of the current equity value while the state/creditors are protected. Plausibility: moderate-to-high given the funding math — this is the base bear case, not a tail.
Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)
- What is the fully-financed funding plan for the €4bn+ OneWeb Gen2 + IRIS² capex through 2031, and what specifically prevents another equity raise? (The whole thesis turns on this.)
- At what LEO revenue scale does the constellation generate positive free cash flow, and in which fiscal year do you model group FCF turning sustainably positive?
- Given you've conceded the consumer mass market to Starlink, what is the defensible long-run market share and ARPU in your government/enterprise/IFC niches once Amazon Leo is at scale?
- How should minority equity holders think about the alignment of the French state (controlling shareholder + customer + policy sponsor) with their interests when the two conflict?
- What is the expected dilution path under your base/bear cases — should equity holders price further issuance as a base case?
- With weighted-average debt maturity at ~2.3 years, what is the refinancing roadmap, and at what cost of debt?
- What is the realistic incremental margin of connectivity/LEO revenue vs the legacy 54% Video EBITDA margin — i.e. where does group margin settle?
- How much of the €3.4bn backlog is Video (running off) vs Connectivity (growing), and what is the net new-bookings trajectory?
- What are the terminal-cost economics for OneWeb user terminals vs Starlink, and how does that gate enterprise/gov adoption?
- What is the return on invested capital you target on OneWeb Gen2, and how does it compare to the legacy GEO book?
- How exposed is the IRIS² timeline (service early-2030s) to EU budget/political risk, and what is your contingency if it slips?
- What is the strategic logic for remaining a standalone public equity rather than being taken fully private/sovereign by the French state?
- What is the impairment risk on OneWeb goodwill/intangibles and the legacy GEO fleet under your bear scenario?
- How do you assess launch dependence on SpaceX, and what is the path to non-competitor launch capacity (Ariane / others)?
- What single metric should investors watch each quarter to know whether the LEO economics are working (not just LEO revenue growth)?