Garmin

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Garmin Ltd. (Swiss-domiciled, Schaffhausen; NYSE: GRMN since Dec 2021, prior Nasdaq from its 2000 IPO) designs, manufactures, and distributes GPS/GNSS-enabled hardware + attached subscription services across five reportable segments: fitness, outdoor, aviation, marine, auto OEM. It has shipped 300M+ lifetime products and 20.7M units in FY2025 alone.

How it actually makes money: ~95%+ hardware sale-through, sold via (a) a worldwide network of independent retailers/dealers/distributors, (b) OEM contracts (avionics, boats, autos), and (c) a growing direct channel (garmin.com webshop + retail stores + connected-service subscriptions) that exceeded 10% of net sales in 2025.

• FY2025 revenue $7,245.5M, +15% YoY (FY24 $6,296.9M; FY23 $5,228.3M).
• Net income $1,663.9M (+18%); diluted EPS $8.59 (FY24 $7.30).
• No long-term debt; ~$4.1B cash + marketable securities; ~$1.36B FCF.

Contract structure / payment terms. No take-or-pay, no firm OEM volume commitments — even the aircraft/boat/vehicle "life-cycle" arrangements generate sales order-by-order. Consumer orders are short-lead-time and management explicitly says backlog is immaterial. Recurring revenue (subscriptions: Connect+, Outdoor Maps+, Garmin Golf, inReach, aviation databases) is real but small — total deferred revenue only $127.9M at quarter-start, ~87% recognized within 3 years. Implication: this is a transactional hardware business, not a subscription annuity — every quarter is re-earned.

Subscription/services note for the seed: inReach satellite SOS (backed by Garmin Response, its own 24/7 emergency center) is the closest thing to a switching-cost annuity and the one genuinely "space-adjacent" line.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: upstream components → Garmin in-house manufacturing → indirect channel / OEM → end user.

• Upstream (named in filing): semiconductors, LCDs, memory chips, batteries, microprocessors — "certain key components obtained from single or limited sources." AMOLED display panels and memory are the implicit chokepoints (memory chips called out by name as a shortage risk).
• Manufacturing (the differentiator): vertically integrated, company-owned plants in Taiwan, U.S. (Olathe KS; Salem OR aviation), Netherlands, U.K., Poland (Wroclaw — auto OEM), and China. Principal owned facilities: ~2.24M sq ft Olathe + ~1.85M sq ft Taiwan. ~10,200 of ~23,000 employees are in manufacturing; ~6,500 in engineering.
• Single biggest chokepoint = Taiwan. Principal consumer-product manufacturing is in Taiwan (Xizhi HQ of Garmin Corporation, Taiwan-Dollar functional currency). The 10-K carries an explicit PRC-invasion risk factor — a Taiwan disruption hits the consumer segments hardest. This is the dominant supply-chain tail risk.
• Downstream: broad indirect channel (no >10% customer disclosed); customers.csv is empty and the filing names no single concentrated buyer — customer concentration is genuinely low, a structural strength.
• Inventory posture: $1.85B inventories at Q1 FY26 and $1,116.1M inventory purchase obligations ($862.5M due within 12 months) — Garmin is pre-buying/stockpiling to pull-forward ahead of tariffs.

Vertical integration is the supply-chain thesis: it lets Garmin redesign around component shortages and hold 59% gross margin, but it concentrates physical risk in Taiwan.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Garmin's moat is not one big durable wall — it is the compounding of many narrow ones across five fragmented verticals, plus a balance sheet no competitor can match.

1. Aviation = the real moat (75% gross margin). Garmin defined the integrated flight deck (IFD) category; its avionics carry FAA/EASA certification, multi-year design-in cycles, and retrofit dealer lock-in. Switching costs here are regulatory and capital-intensive — this is the closest thing to a wide moat in the portfolio. Competitors: Honeywell, Collins Aerospace (RTX), Thales, Garmin-vs-ForeFlight (Boeing/Jeppesen).
2. Brand + battery/ruggedness in outdoor/fitness. fēnix/Instinct/Forerunner command premium pricing vs Apple Watch on battery life, ruggedness, and serious-athlete depth (training load, recovery, multi-band GPS). Garmin Connect is a sticky data home (years of personal training history). But this is a perceived-value moat, not a structural one — Apple, Samsung, Google (Fitbit), Whoop, Oura, Coros, Suunto, Polar all attack it.
3. Vertical manufacturing → cost + speed. Sharing high-volume manufacturing resources across low-volume lines (avionics, marine) gives those niche products economies of scale rivals can't replicate.
4. Balance-sheet moat. Zero debt + $4.1B net cash + $1.36B annual FCF lets Garmin out-R&D ($1.13B/yr, 16% of sales) and out-last competitors through cycles, and self-fund the loss-making auto-OEM land-grab.

Bargaining power: Strong over suppliers (multi-segment purchasing scale, in-house redesign optionality). Weaker over consumers/retail in fitness/outdoor, where it competes on every product cycle against Apple's ecosystem gravity. In aviation/marine OEM, power is balanced-to-favorable (it's often the spec'd or only certified option).

Lens 4 · Segments

All figures (FY) and (Q1). $ in thousands in source; shown $M.

FY revenue by segment (and YoY):

The story in the mix:

• Fitness is the engine and the swing factor. It went from 26% of revenue (FY23) → 28% (FY24) → 33% (FY25), and its operating income compounded +108% (FY24) then +50% (FY25) to $725.9M — now Garmin's single largest profit pool. Driver: advanced-wearable demand + market-share gains. Fitness op margin nearly doubled (17% FY23 → 31% FY25) on volume leverage + favorable mix. This is the highest-beta, most-watched line.
• Outdoor is the cash cow decelerating. Highest segment op margin (34%) but growth slowed to +5% (FY25) from +16% (FY24), and Q1 FY26 outdoor revenue actually fell −5% lapping a strong prior-year adventure-watch launch. Watch this for the "post-pandemic normalization" tell.
• Aviation = quality compounder. +13% with 75% gross margin and 26% op margin; driven by OEM + aftermarket. Steady, high-moat, under-appreciated.
• Marine = mid-teens-margin cyclical, tariff-exposed (Q1 FY26 marine gross margin −200bps on higher tariff costs).
• Auto OEM = the deliberate loss leader. −$48.6M FY25 operating loss (a wider loss than FY24's −$38.8M despite +9% revenue). 17% gross margin. Management openly flags it has "negatively impacted consolidated operating income" and may require restructuring if contracts don't scale. Domain controllers + infotainment design-ins are a bet on future content-per-vehicle. This is the segment a bear shorts.

Geography (FY25 external net sales): Americas $3,453.9M (48%), EMEA $2,741.6M (38%), APAC $1,050.0M (14%). EMEA grew fastest (+18%), partly FX-aided (USD weakened ~13% vs EUR in FY25). US is the only single country >10% of sales.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 FY2026, qtr ended 2026-03-28)

All `` unless noted.

• Revenue $1,753.5M, +14.2% YoY (Q1 FY25 $1,535.1M) — a Q1 record. Units +9% to 4.765M (rev > units = positive mix).
• Operating income $431.7M, +29.7% YoY; operating margin 24.6% (+290bps); gross margin 59.4% (+180bps).
• Diluted EPS $2.09 (+21.5% vs $1.72); net income $405.1M (+21.7%). Pro-forma EPS $2.08 (+29%).
• vs consensus: a beat. Multiple outlets framed Q1 as "earnings beat with record revenue."
• Segment drivers: Fitness +42% to $546.8M (op income +103% to $157.6M, margin 20%→29%) on advanced-wearable share gains; Aviation +18%; Marine +11%; Auto OEM +1% (still a −$6.4M loss, narrowing); Outdoor −5% (tough adventure-watch comp).
• Margin moves & why: consolidated gross margin +180bps mostly FX-driven (favorable currency on sales), NOT pure pricing — a quality caveat. Fitness GM +470bps, Outdoor +210bps both FX-flattered; Marine GM −200bps on higher tariff costs.
• Guidance: Management reaffirmed (did not raise) FY2026 guidance of ~$7.9B revenue and $9.35 pro-forma EPS after the beat. Choosing not to raise after a 14% Q1 is a conservative/cautious tone tell — they're holding tariff/2H dry powder.
• Balance-sheet flags: $4.3B cash+investments, still zero debt. AR fell to $940.9M (seasonal collection of Q4 holiday sales — CFO $536.0M, +27%). Inventory built to $1,850.3M and inventory purchase obligations rose to $1,116.1M — the deliberate tariff pre-buy; watch for write-down risk if 2H demand softens.
• Tariff overhang (the new variable): On 2026-02-20 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled IEEPA tariffs were unauthorized; Garmin has not booked any refund/receivable for previously-paid IEEPA tariffs (potential upside optionality, unquantified). Management says tariff/component pressure could weigh on margins into 2027.
• Market reaction: stock trading ~$232–238 in mid-June 2026, near the upper half of a $186.67–$273.32 52-week range — the beat was met but not euphorically (consensus rating "Neutral").

Unusual vs own history: the +42% fitness print is well above Garmin's historical mid-single/low-double-digit cadence — the central question of this whole dossier is its durability.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

Transcripts dir is empty (transcripts=0); sentiment is ``.

• Consistent management focus (Pemble): "active lifestyle / wellness" framing; fitness as the "strongest contributor to consolidated growth in 2026"; vertical integration as resilience. Q1 FY26 call hinted at new product categories, more connected (LTE/satellite) watches, and a "busy second half."
• Tone shift over the last several quarters: through FY2024 the cadence was repeated "raised full-year guidance" (Q2 and Q3 FY24 both raised). In Q1 FY2026 the tone turned more measured — record results but guidance reaffirmed not raised, with explicit tariff/2H caution. That is the meaningful sentiment delta: from "beat-and-raise" to "beat-and-hold."
• The "stopped saying": less of the pandemic-era supply-constraint language; new entrant: tariffs as the recurring margin caveat, and resilient consumer as a defensive talking point ("our customer base is probably a little more resilient than the average").

Lens 7 · Comps

Garmin + peers. Multiples are ``; "n/a" where I could not source a clean figure. Do not read unsourced cells as zero.

5-yr avg ROE column: Garmin FY25 ROE ~19.8%; multi-year ROE not separately sourced this pass — n/a for peers.

Read: Garmin is not expensive relative to its closest profile-peer Amer Sports (24.2x fwd P/E and 19.5x EV/EBITDA vs AS's 27.4x / 20.1x) and is cheaper than Apple — but those peers carry leverage and/or faster growth. On absolute terms a 24x forward P/E + 19.5x EV/EBITDA for a ~mid-single-to-low-double-digit grower with FX-flattered margins is a full price that already discounts the fitness re-rating continuing. The ~$4.1B net cash (≈9% of market cap) cushions EV-based multiples meaningfully.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves GRMN >5%)

Mostly + the 10-K's own 5-yr TSR table.

• 5-year total shareholder return (10-K stock-performance graph, $100 base 12/26/20): 2021 $113.95 → 2022 $80.56 (the ~30% drawdown) → 2023 $115.27 → 2024 $191.05 (the surge) → 2025 $190.56. Net: roughly tracked the S&P 500 ($196.16) over 5 years, but with far more amplitude.
• What the tape actually reacts to:

1. Earnings beats/misses & the guide — the dominant driver. The 2024 doubling was a string of beat-and-raise prints (fitness inflection); the 2022 swoon was consumer-demand/guidance softness + macro de-rating of consumer discretionary.
2. Fitness-segment momentum specifically — fitness is now 33% of revenue and the swing factor; the market re-rates GRMN on wearable-demand signals.
3. Idiosyncratic operational shocks — the July 2020 WastedLocker ransomware attack (Evil Corp, ~$10M demand) took Garmin Connect/flyGarmin down for days; a template for the kind of low-probability operational/cyber tail that can hit a connected-device + aviation-services company.
4. FX — with Taiwan-Dollar/Euro/Zloty functional-currency exposure and no hedging, currency swings move reported margins (a 10% adverse FX move ≈ $135M pre-tax hit per the 10-K sensitivity).
5. Tariffs (the new one) — the Feb-2026 SCOTUS IEEPA ruling + ongoing trade-policy noise is now a swing variable.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Clifton A. Pemble (President & CEO since Jan 2013, age 60). Garmin's ~6th employee — joined 1989 as a software engineer, rose through engineering → COO → CEO. Track record (quantified): under his tenure revenue went from ~$2.6B (2013) to $7.25B (FY25) and the company built the highest-margin fitness/wearable franchise from a standing start while staying debt-free. Deep-insider, product-culture operator — the archetype that has served Garmin's slow-compounding model well.
• Dr. Min H. Kao (Executive Chairman, age 77, co-founder). Still the anchoring shareholder — ~9.5%+ beneficial ownership (≈18.8M shares, ~$4.5B) via family/trust structures; among the largest individual stakes of any large-cap. The founders seeded the company with ~$4M and never took meaningful VC dilution — a structural alignment most peers lack.
• Skin in the game / culture: founder-Chairman + insider-engineer-CEO + Taiwan co-founder Gary Burrell legacy = unusually long-horizon, owner-operator mindset. Bench is deep-tenure (most NEOs 15–30+ yrs at Garmin; two co-COOs appointed July 2024 — Desbois & Trenkle — a succession-planning signal).
• Capital-allocation history (the heart of the case):
• Dividend: raised to $4.20/share for 2026 (+16.7% from $3.60 in 2025) — the latest of a long string of hikes; ~1.8% yield.
• Buybacks: historically modest — $181M repurchased FY25 under a $300M (2024) program; new $500M program (2026, through Dec 2028). Buybacks barely offset SBC + dilution rather than meaningfully shrinking the count (shares ~192.5M, roughly flat).
• M&A: disciplined, tuck-in only (FY25 acquisitions $175.7M net — added $156M goodwill; brands like JL Audio/Lumishore/MYLAPS over time). No transformational/value-destructive deals.
• The cash question: Garmin hoards ~$4.1B at a 3.3% yield rather than levering or returning it aggressively. Conservative to a fault — arguably the single biggest capital-allocation critique (return-of-capital could be far higher given zero debt and $1.36B FCF).
• Returns: FY25 ROE ~19.8%; ROIC on capital-employed-ex-cash ~36% — i.e. the operating business earns very high returns; the consolidated ROE is dragged down by the idle cash pile.
• Red flags: none material. No employment agreements with executives (Swiss-law severance limits — a minor recruiting risk the 10-K flags); no related-party concerns surfaced; no promotional behavior; comp incorporated-by-reference to the proxy (not in the 10-K). Founder-control + dual long-tenure-insider leadership is both the strength and the watch-item (entrenchment, conservatism).

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst. Bottom line: a clean book — among the lower-risk accounting profiles in the coverage universe. Specifics:

• Revenue recognition: straightforward point-in-time hardware sale-through; small ratable subscription deferral ($123.4M deferred revenue, ~87% recognized ≤3yrs). No channel-stuffing tell — backlog explicitly immaterial, and AR seasonally declined in Q1. No revenue-quality flag.
• Cash vs earnings: CFO $1,633.4M vs net income $1,663.9M (FY25) — ~0.98x conversion, healthy. FCF $1.36B. Earnings are cash-backed; no accruals divergence.
• Receivables/inventory vs revenue: AR +27% and inventory +20% in FY25 outran revenue (+15%) — the one yellow flag. Inventory build is a deliberate tariff pre-buy (inventory purchase obligations $1.12B), but it raises write-down risk if 2H FY26 consumer demand softens (the 10-K's own "excess inventory" risk factor). Track inventory-days next print.
• SBC: $166.0M FY25 = 2.3% of revenue / 10.0% of net income — modest; Garmin's "pro forma EPS" adjustment ($9.35 guide vs ~$8 GAAP-equiv) leans partly on excluding intangible amort & tax items, not heavy SBC add-backs. Watch the GAAP-to-pro-forma bridge but it is not an egregious non-GAAP flatterer.
• Goodwill/intangibles: $760.2M goodwill + $198.4M intangibles on a $11.0B balance sheet — small, no impairment history; tuck-in M&A only.
• Tax (the one genuine complexity): the Critical Audit Matter is uncertain tax positions / transfer pricing — Garmin runs a Switzerland↔U.S. IP-migration (started 2020) with advanced pricing agreements; FY23's negative tax rate (−7%) was a one-time deferred-tax benefit from that migration. Effective rate normalized to ~17% (FY25). OECD Pillar Two / Swiss-Schaffhausen ~15% statutory rate are in play. This is the area to watch for surprises, but it is disclosed, audited (E&Y, auditor since 1990, unqualified opinion + ICFR attestation), and not a manipulation flag.
• Leases/related parties/contingencies: immaterial operating leases ($242.6M); no related-party issues; contingencies deemed immaterial.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. Verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER) search period 2021-06-22 → 2026-06-22, 0 findings.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Garmin's own disclosure — "various legal claims... including patent infringement, product liability, customer claims"; management does not expect a material adverse effect; settled certain matters in FY25 with no individual/aggregate material impact. Quoted directly, ``. 10-Q Item 1 reaffirms no material change.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search): No FTC/DOJ/CFPB enforcement actions, consent decrees, or material fines found. Only civil patent litigation (e.g. UnaliWear fall-detection suit, Jan 2026; Suunto) — ordinary-course IP disputes, immaterial. Routine product recalls/service alerts (navigation units, quatix watch battery) exist but are standard consumer-electronics housekeeping, not enforcement.
• Verdict: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-22.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026 → FY2028)

Built bottom-up off FY25 actuals + the company guide + consensus. Output ``; inputs labeled. No forecast.ts create per --watchlist rules — base case noted below for a later human-gated log.

FY2026 (base = company guidance, sanity-checked vs consensus):

• Revenue ~$7.9B (+9%) vs my bottom-up: fitness +20%, outdoor flat-to-down, aviation +10%, marine +8%, auto +5% → ~$7.85–7.95B. Aligns.
• Pro-forma EPS $9.35 (company) / $9.57 (Street consensus). GAAP EPS ~$9.0–9.1.
• Base FY26 EPS call: ~$9.40 pro-forma.

FY2027 (the durability test):

FY2028: base ~+6% revenue → pro-forma EPS ~$11.2–11.6, assuming auto-OEM reaches breakeven (the swing). All highly sensitive to the fitness trajectory.

Brier-forecast candidate (for a later /thesis-gated log, NOT created here): "GRMN FY26 pro-forma EPS ≥ $9.35, p≈0.78, resolves 2027-02" — high probability given Q1 run-rate + reaffirmed guide.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. A debt-free, founder-aligned compounder with a 59%-gross-margin model, $4.1B net cash, 36% operating ROIC, and a fitness/wearable franchise that just demonstrated genuine share gains (+42% Q1 fitness, op margin 20%→29%). Five diversified end-markets smooth the cycle; aviation (75% GM) is a quietly-widening regulated moat; auto OEM is a self-funded option on content-per-vehicle that, if it turns breakeven, adds ~$50M+ to op income for free. Optionality: connected (LTE/satellite) watches, Connect+ subscription attach, and an unbooked IEEPA tariff-refund. Capital returns rising (dividend +17%, new $500M buyback). At 19.5x EV/EBITDA with ~9% of cap in cash, you're paying a fair-but-not-crazy price for durable quality.

Bear case (2–3 things that permanently impair or de-rate).

1. Fitness is a post-pandemic echo, not a step-change. The +33% FY25 / +42% Q1 prints lap easy comps and were FX-flattered; if wearable demand normalizes to mid-single-digit and Apple/Samsung/Google compress Garmin's premium, the single largest profit pool decelerates hard and the 24x multiple compresses. Outdoor's Q1 −5% is the canary.
2. Margins are borrowing from FX and pre-tariff inventory. ~180bps of Q1 gross-margin gain was currency, not pricing power; tariffs are explicitly deferred into 2027; a $1.85B inventory pile risks write-downs if 2H softens. Normalize FX + add tariffs and FY27 margins could give back 100–200bps.
3. Capital-allocation conservatism caps the re-rating. Hoarding $4.1B at 3.3% drags ROE to ~20% when the operating business earns ~36%; management won't lever or return capital aggressively, so the stock stays a "compounder, not a re-rater."

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It's late 2027. Fitness growth fell to +3% as the wearable cycle rolled over and Apple's health push bit; FX flipped to a headwind; tariffs hit margins ~150bps; a soft Q3 holiday left excess inventory and a guide cut. GRMN de-rated from 24x to ~17x and sits at ~$185. Most plausible single failure mode: fitness normalization + margin give-back hitting simultaneously, exactly when the multiple priced perpetuation.

Multiple assessment: 24x forward P/E / 19.5x EV/EBITDA is full — it discounts the good case. Downside protection is the net cash and the dividend, not the multiple.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The Street rates it "Neutral" and frames it as a slowing consumer-gadget maker. The non-obvious truth is that aviation + marine + the inReach/Response satellite-safety annuity are a higher-quality, lower-beta ~30% of the business than the market credits — and the "boring" $4.1B balance sheet is a call option on a downturn (M&A / buyback firepower when peers are stressed). The mispricing isn't "is it cheap" (it isn't), it's "the quality/durability of the non-fitness core is underweighted in the bear narrative."

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the money machine: the wearable franchise is discretionary, replacement-cycle hardware with no contractual lock-in — every quarter re-earned, backlog immaterial. A consumer slowdown or an Apple/Google health-ecosystem leap could deflate the 33%-of-revenue, fastest-growing, highest-incremental-margin segment overnight. There is no subscription annuity to cushion it.
• Concentration risk: not customer concentration (low) but segment + geographic-manufacturing concentration — fitness is the profit swing factor, and consumer manufacturing is concentrated in Taiwan (explicit PRC-invasion risk). One geopolitical event hits the crown jewels.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: in fitness/outdoor the moat is brand + battery + Connect data — all attackable, and Apple has infinitely deeper pockets and ecosystem gravity. The genuinely wide moat (aviation) is only ~14% of revenue.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underrate: Apple (ecosystem + health/medical push) in fitness; and in the long run Google/Fitbit + a maturing Whoop/Oura wellness category that could commoditize "advanced wearable" features Garmin charges a premium for.
• Worst capital-allocation move: not a value-destructive deal — it's the opposite: a $4.1B idle-cash anchor depressing ROE, plus an auto-OEM segment that has lost money for years ($48.6M FY25 loss, widening) with management still funding it. A skeptic calls auto OEM a sunk-cost trap.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price (~$232, 24x fwd): fitness stays double-digit-ish, margins hold ~25%+, FX doesn't reverse hard, tariffs stay manageable. If FY27 revenue growth disappoints by 20–30% (i.e. ~+3–5% becomes ~0–2%), EPS stalls near ~$9.5–9.8, the multiple compresses to high-teens, and the stock is a ~$170–185 stock — ~20–25% downside.
• Single permanent-impairment scenario: a Taiwan Strait disruption halting consumer-product manufacturing — low probability, severe, and un-hedged. Plausibility: low but non-zero and rising.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Fitness grew +42% in Q1 on "market-share gains" — what share are you taking, from whom, and what is the durable underlying unit-growth rate once pandemic/launch comps and FX normalize?
2. You reaffirmed rather than raised FY26 guidance after a 14% Q1 — what specifically in 2H makes you cautious (tariffs, demand, comps), and what would have made you raise?
3. Quantify the tariff impact deferred into 2027 — magnitude, which segments, and how much the unbooked IEEPA refund could offset.
4. ~$4.1B net cash earning 3.3% drags ROE to ~20% vs ~36% operating ROIC — why not lever modestly or return capital far more aggressively? What's the cash actually reserved for?
5. Auto OEM has lost money for years and the FY25 loss widened. What is the explicit path and timeline to breakeven, and at what point do you restructure or exit?
6. How much of recent gross-margin expansion is FX vs structural pricing power — and what's the margin bridge if currency reverses?
7. Apple/Google/Samsung keep adding health features — where is Garmin's premium genuinely defensible in 3 years, and where will you cede ground?
8. Inventory is at $1.85B with $1.12B purchase obligations — how confident are you in 2H sell-through, and what's the write-down exposure if demand softens?
9. What is the subscription/services revenue run-rate and attach trajectory (Connect+, inReach, aviation databases) — can services become a margin-stabilizing annuity?
10. Taiwan concentration in consumer manufacturing — what is the realistic geographic-diversification plan, and what would a Taiwan disruption do to FY revenue?
11. The Switzerland↔U.S. IP migration and transfer-pricing CAM — where does the effective tax rate settle through 2028 under Pillar Two, and what's the surprise risk?
12. Two co-COOs appointed in 2024 — what is the succession plan for Pemble, and how do you preserve the engineering-owner culture?
13. R&D is $1.13B (16% of sales) — which segment is getting the incremental dollar, and what's the expected return / next category?
14. Marine and outdoor are the most cyclical — how do you defend those margins through a consumer downturn?
15. Capital-allocation priority ranking for the next 3 years: organic R&D vs dividend vs buyback vs M&A — and what would make you do a larger, non-tuck-in acquisition?

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