Spire Global

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

What it is. Spire Global designs, builds, owns and operates a constellation of multi-purpose nanosatellites (the "LEMUR" platform) that listen to Earth using radio-frequency (RF) sensing — GNSS radio occultation (weather), ADS-B (aviation), AIS (maritime), and RF geolocation (spoofing/jamming detection, signals intelligence). Spire explicitly positions itself in the "listening" (RF) satellite market — not "looking" (imagery) or "talking" (comms). It sells the data as subscriptions + analytics, plus a Space Services ("space-as-a-service") line where customers pay Spire to build/launch/operate their own constellation on Spire's platform.

Scale. As of 2025-12-31: 377 employees in 9 countries (372 full-time); >200 LEMUR satellites launched since inception, with >75 expected operating by end-2026; >30 ground stations globally. HQ Vienna, Virginia; founded August 2012; public since an August 2021 SPAC merger with NavSight Holdings (initially valued ~$1.6B ).

The four continuing solution lines (post-maritime):

1. Space Reconnaissance — RF intelligence / signals for defense & national security (the new growth vector; "RFGL" = RF geolocation).
2. Aviation — aircraft tracking, safety, route optimization (ADS-B).
3. Weather & Climate — GNSS-RO data + AI weather models (NOAA, EUMETSAT customers).
4. Space Services — build-and-operate constellations for third parties (lumpy, milestone-based, the source of most accounting trouble — see Lens 10). Plus R&D Services (funded development + IP licensing).

Revenue model & terms. 83% of revenue is subscription (recurring, ratable); 17% is non-subscription (project/milestone/historical-data). Space Services contracts are recognized percentage-of-completion (cost-to-cost) — judgement-heavy, and the root of restatements. Remaining performance obligations (backlog) = $184.8M at 2026-03-31, of which only 34% (~$62.3M) recognizes in the next 12 months.

Customers. Heavily government/defense-weighted — NOAA, EUMETSAT, Missile Defense Agency, NASA-adjacent, plus international met agencies. In Q1 2026 one US government agency was >10% of revenue. customers.csv is empty, so named-customer share beyond that disclosure is n/a — not in research layer.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: upstream inputs → Spire → end customer, named where the filings name them.

• Upstream / suppliers: Spire is vertically integrated — it manufactures its own LEMUR satellites end-to-end (Glasgow + other facilities) and builds its own software-defined-radio sensors (AIS/ADS-B/GNSS-RO receivers). This is a genuine differentiator vs. data resellers. Component/electronics suppliers are not individually named, but the 10-Q flags one vendor >10% of total purchases in Q1 2026 (equipment/components/services) — a concentration not present a year earlier.
• Launch (the critical chokepoint): Spire does not own launch — it is "dependent on third parties to launch its satellites," and a launch delay/failure directly hits revenue and SLA compliance. Historically a rideshare customer (SpaceX Transporter, Rocket Lab, etc.); specific 2026 providers not named in these two filings → ``.
• Ground segment: owned/operated network of >30 ground stations — internalized, a moat element (Lens 3).
• Downstream / end customers: government met agencies (NOAA, EUMETSAT), defense/intelligence (MDA, classified), aviation authorities, and Space Services counterparties who are simultaneously customers and quasi-partners (they buy a constellation). Named Space Services customers in the filings: Myriota (IoT — expanded for 16 more satellites), NorthStar Earth & Space (now an adversary — see Lens 10/13), the Canadian Space Agency (WildFireSat — terminated, see Lens 8), and Deloitte (on-orbit cyber/data).
• Single-source/chokepoint summary: launch availability and a single banking institution holding $65.1M of the $81.8M liquidity are the two named concentration risks; vertical integration removes most supplier dependency on the satellite/sensor side.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Where the moat is real:

• Vertical integration + cadence. Owning design→manufacture→launch-integration→ground→cloud-API lets Spire iterate sensors fast and stand up customer constellations cheaply ("Space Services"). 200+ satellites flown is real operational know-how, not a deck.
• Proprietary RF datasets with history. GNSS-RO weather data and global ADS-B/AIS feeds are time-series assets — depth and continuity compound; a new entrant can't retro-collect 10 years of occultation profiles. This is the closest thing to a data moat here.
• Government entrenchment / accreditation. Defense and met-agency procurement is slow, certified, and sticky once embedded (NOAA RO, EUMETSAT renewals, MDA SHIELD selection). Switching costs are bureaucratic as much as technical.

Where the moat is thin:

• Fragmented, "highly competitive" markets — Spire's own words. Named rivals: Aireon (aviation/space-based ADS-B — arguably better-positioned via Iridium hosting), PlanetiQ (a direct GNSS-RO weather competitor), HawkEye 360 (RF geolocation — well-funded private, the most dangerous in the new growth vertical), Muon Space (Space Services). None of these are weak.
• Bargaining power is poor. Spire is the price-taker: government customers can terminate for convenience (which just happened — WildFireSat) and represent revenue concentration; Space Services customers have proven litigious (NorthStar). Spire needs them more than they need Spire.
• Net: a modest data/integration moat in weather + a credible early position in commercial RF-intel, undercut by small scale, customer concentration, and no pricing power. Moat rating: narrow.

Lens 4 · Segments

Spire reports one operating segment (consolidated; CODM = CEO), so there is no GAAP segment P&L. Disaggregation available:

By revenue type (Q1 2026 vs Q1 2025):

The recurring base itself fell −32% YoY — this is not purely a divestiture optic; continuing-ops subscription revenue genuinely contracted.

By geography (Q1 2026): Americas 65% (US 55%, Canada 10%), EMEA 32% (UK 5%, Belgium 11%, Germany 10%), APAC 3%. US dependence is rising (55% vs 50% a year ago); UK collapsed (5% vs 14%) as maritime/exactEarth legacy rolled off.

Trend & cause: decelerating/declining on the reported line; the bull re-cut (management) is "core ex-maritime grew +13% YoY in Q1". Both are true — the divestiture mechanically drops the headline; the residual organic growth is low-double-digit if you accept management's adjusted base. The honest read: the business is small and roughly flat-to-modestly-growing organically, with a shrinking GAAP top line during the transition.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

Two prints matter: FY2025 (the 10-K) and Q1 2026 (the latest 10-Q).

FY2025 (year ended 2025-12-31):

• Revenue $71.6M, down 35% from $110.5M (2024) — driven by the maritime divestiture mid-year.
• Gross profit $29.2M; gross margin 41% (up from 36%).
• Loss from operations $(96.0)M — worse than $(69.3)M in 2024 (G&A ballooned +29% to $64.0M on restatement/legal/SEC-subpoena costs; loss on decommissioned satellites $9.1M).
• GAAP net income $51.3M — but entirely from the $154.3M gain on sale of maritime + a $10.6M FX gain, against a $12.0M loss on debt extinguishment and $7.4M interest. Non-GAAP net loss was $59.2M. EPS: basic $1.66 / diluted $1.49 — meaningless as a run-rate; it is a transaction artifact.
• Q4 2025 alone: revenue $15.8M (−27% YoY, +44% ex-maritime); Q4 net loss $(25.1)M; Q4 adjusted EBITDA $(9.7)M.

Q1 2026 (quarter ended 2026-03-31) — the cleaner read:

• Revenue $15.8M, down 34% YoY (vs $23.9M) — beat the top end of its own guidance but a Street "miss" on the headline.
• Gross profit $6.3M (40% margin, down from 36.5%; the print quotes "+5pts non-GAAP" framing).
• Loss from operations $(24.6)M (vs $(28.3)M).
• Net loss per share $(0.78) (vs $(0.88)); weighted shares 33.3M.
• Cash burn: used $26.2M in operating activities in the quarter → cash fell from $24.8M to $16.0M. (Note Q4-2025 op-cash-out was only $4.3M, so Q1 burn re-accelerated sharply — partly timing of restatement/legal payments.)

Balance-sheet flags:

• FY-end liquidity $81.8M (cash $24.8M + marketable securities $57.0M); zero debt post-Kpler; stockholders' equity flipped from $(11.7)M deficit to +$112.9M.
• Going concern: previously disclosed substantial doubt (in the 2024 10-K/A) is now resolved — management asserts ≥12 months of runway. But with ~$26M/qtr burn and ~$82M cash entering 2026, that runway needed topping up — which is exactly why they raised again in April (Lens 11).

Guidance (FY2026): revenue $75–85M (midpoint $80M, ~12% above FY25; ex-maritime base implies "41–61% growth"); non-GAAP operating loss $(32.6)–(37.8)M; adjusted EBITDA $(20.7)–(26.0)M. ~76% of the guide is under contract. Translation: management is guiding to another full year of meaningful cash losses, not a path to breakeven.

Tone/market reaction: the stock rose ~3.4% after Q1 despite the headline decline — the market is now trading the forward (RF-intel + weather IDIQ pipeline + clean balance sheet), not the trailing tape.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty) → ``-sourced.

• Recurring management themes (Q3'25 → Q4'25 → Q1'26): (1) "debt-free, cash-strong, transformed company" post-Kpler; (2) RF intelligence as the growth engine — guiding RF geolocation capacity +15x over the next 12 months; (3) the NOAA/weather-data commercial wave — citing a NOAA 5-yr IDIQ with an $8B ceiling where Spire qualifies for 4 data types; (4) "core revenue ex-maritime growing double-digits."
• Tone shift: distinctly more upbeat / forward-leaning in Q4'25–Q1'26 vs the defensive, restatement-dominated 2024–early-2025 calls. The narrative pivoted from survival (restatement, going-concern, delisting risk) to growth (RF-intel TAM, IDIQ pipeline).
• What they've stopped saying: going-concern hedging; maritime; debt covenants. What they're now saying a lot: "RFGL," "microwave sounding," "commercial weather buy," "under contract."
• Caution: this is a management team that over-promised before (the SPAC-era $1.6B framing, the 2023–24 numbers that had to be restated). Treat the +15x and $8B-TAM language as aspiration, not bookings.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = small-cap commercial space-data / Earth-observation names (the index has no other tracked space peer with multiples on the shelf, so peers are pulled from the public market). Multiples are ``, TTM unless noted, and dispersed across data providers — treat as directional, not precise.

• Dividend yield: 0% (none of these pay). 5-yr avg ROE: n/a — not meaningful (all have been loss-making / inception-deficit; SPIR's equity was negative until 2025).
• Read: SPIR at ~9x EV/sales on a shrinking ~$72M revenue base is not cheap — it sits between Planet (cheaper, bigger, nearer breakeven) and BlackSky (pricier). On the EV/sales-to-growth axis it screens expensive, because the GAAP top line is declining; the multiple is being underwritten by the adjusted growth narrative and the debt-free balance sheet, not by trailing fundamentals. Several analyst targets ($15–16.50) sit below the ~$17.46 price.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves SPIR)

Pattern over the SPAC era — the tape reacts to financing/credibility events and government contracts far more than to organic results:

• Aug 2021: SPAC debut at ~$1.6B; all-time high ~$147.60 (Sept 2021). Pure SPAC euphoria.
• 2022–Mar 2023: collapse to sub-$1; NYSE delisting warning (Mar 2023). Liquidity/dilution fear.
• 2024: restatement disclosures → stock crashed ~50%; going-concern warning; late 10-Q filings; NYSE compliance scramble. Credibility, not revenue, drove the move.
• Nov 2024–Apr 2025: Kpler deal announced (Nov 13 2024) → closed (Apr 25 2025) = the re-rating catalyst (debt eliminated, going-concern cured). This is what un-broke the stock.
• 2025–26: defense/RF-intel + NOAA IDIQ news + debt-free balance sheet drive the recovery to ~$17; April 2026 the company raised at $14.00/share (above the 2025 raise at $8.00), confirming restored access to equity.
• What the market actually reacts to: (1) dilutive raises / debt / going-concern (down hard); (2) government contract wins & IDIQ qualifications (up); (3) restatement / SEC / filing-timeliness (down hard). Organic quarterly revenue is secondary. This is a sentiment/credibility stock, not a fundamentals stock — which cuts both ways.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Theresa Condor — appointed CEO effective Jan 1, 2025, also President since Mar 2025; previously COO and a long-tenured Spire operator. Founder Peter Platzer moved to Executive Chairman (was CEO Aug 2021–Dec 2024; ran Spire ~12 years, scaled $10M→$100M+ revenue and took it public). A planned founder-to-operator transition — but it lands squarely in the middle of the restatement/SEC mess.
• CFO: in flux (red flag). Leo Basola announced he will step down as CFO once the accounting-practices review completes; Thomas Krywe named interim while the search runs. CFO turnover during an active SEC investigation into accounting is a material governance negative — see Lens 10/13.
• Skin in the game / control: dual-class structure — Class B held by the Legacy Spire founders (Platzer, Condor, Joel Spark, Jeroen Cappaert) gives founder control disproportionate to economics; classified board, blank-check preferred, no stockholder special meetings — a founder-entrenched governance package. Precise insider-ownership % n/a — insider-transactions.csv empty; proxy not on shelf.
• Capital-allocation history — mixed-to-poor, improving: the SPAC-era constellation build + exactEarth/maritime acquisition led to a negative-equity, debt-laden, near-delisting company by 2023–24. The single best capital decision was the Kpler sale — monetizing maritime at ~$238.9M to erase debt and reset the balance sheet was genuinely value-accretive and arguably saved the company. But it also means they sold their most mature, profitable line (maritime threw off ~$5.3M pre-tax in 2025 stub, $17.1M in 2024) to survive — a shrink-to-strength move. ROE/ROIC trend: structurally negative; not yet a value-creation track record.
• Founder vs professional: transitioning from founder-led (Platzer) to operator-led (Condor). For a sub-scale company fighting for defense credibility and clean books, an operator-CFO-discipline phase is the right archetype — if they actually remediate. The jury is out.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

This is the lens that dominates the dossier. Spire has a documented accounting-integrity problem.

Internal controls — material weaknesses still open (2025-12-31): management concluded ICFR was NOT effective. Specific cited weaknesses: (i) insufficient segregation of duties in finance/accounting; (ii) inadequate risk-assessment process; (iii) inadequate journal-entry / account-reconciliation controls (same people create and review); (iv) ineffective controls over Space Services & R&D-Services revenue recognition (transaction-price allocation, embedded leases, uninstalled materials) — the one that caused the restatements; (v) ineffective controls over non-routine/complex transactions (warrants, earnout, business combinations, EPS two-class method). Several resulted in actual audit adjustments / restatements, including a material audit adjustment to Q2-2025 EPS.

Restatement history: prior financials for FY2023, FY2022, and Q1-2024 were restated (revenue/contract-liability errors on Space Services), and NavSight-era 2020 warrant accounting; the 2024 10-K was filed prematurely, without PwC's completed audit (the "going-concern paragraph" was initially omitted). The restatement reduced reported revenue by an estimated ~$10–15M/yr (~8–12%).

Cash-vs-earnings divergence: the $51.3M FY2025 net income is non-cash-flattered to the extreme — operating cash flow was negative $59.8M; the gap is the $154.3M gain (non-operating) plus $10.6M FX gain. Quality of earnings is effectively zero for FY2025 — every dollar of "profit" is the one-time disposal. Recurring economics: operating loss $(96.0)M, adjusted EBITDA deeply negative.

Other forensic items: (a) $4.5M note receivable (+$0.7M interest) from a Space Services customer (NorthStar) fully reserved, on non-accrual; "loss of entire principal reasonably possible" — a self-inflicted credit loss to a counterparty now suing them; (b) contingent earnout liability with the probability of hitting the target assessed at zero (expires Aug 2026) — i.e. the SPAC earnout is worthless, a tacit admission targets were missed; (c) no revenue hedging / no FX hedging — the $10.6M FX gain (and prior $(4.3)M loss) injects volatility into reported results; (d) heavy SBC ($18.7M FY2025) flattering non-GAAP.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER): `` — 0 Litigation Releases and 0 AAERs naming Spire Global in 2021-06-30 → 2026-06-30. No formal SEC enforcement action has been filed yet.
• BUT — active SEC investigation (subpoena): In July 2025 Spire received an SEC subpoena seeking records on the restatement, historical accounting policies, ICFR/disclosure-controls/material weaknesses, and the premature filing of the 2024 10-K. Spire is producing records and cooperating; outcome and timing unknown. This is the single largest overhang — it can mature into an AAER/enforcement/penalty.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) — material litigation: NorthStar Earth & Space arbitration (ICC): a Space Services customer initiated arbitration Sept 2024 (originally ~$15M), revised Feb 2025 to seek $45.9M, adding willful-misconduct and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims over a space-situational-awareness constellation contract; Spire denies all, counterclaims ~$5M, and separately sued to enforce a $5.1M promissory note. An evidentiary hearing was held January 2026; outcome pending. A $45.9M adverse award would be ~7% of market cap and material to a $16M-cash company. Prior stockholder litigation over the restatement was filed and dismissed.
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/FDA/etc.) web check: no material agency enforcement actions surfaced beyond the SEC matter and the commercial arbitration.
• Verdict for Lens 10: elevated forensic risk — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER → none), the company's own 10-K Item 3 (active SEC subpoena + NorthStar arbitration), Item 9A (open material weaknesses), and web search, all as of 2026-06-30. The absence of an AAER is timing, not exoneration — the investigation is open.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Spire has no GAAP earnings and guides to continued losses, so the meaningful projection is revenue → adjusted EBITDA → cash runway, not EPS. Building bottom-up from FY2025 actual ($71.6M) + management's FY2026 guide ($75–85M) + the backlog/IDIQ pipeline.

Inputs (every line labeled):

• FY2026 revenue: $75–85M guided, $80M midpoint; ~76% under contract; $184.8M RPO with $62.3M in the next 12 months. The $62.3M near-term RPO + non-RPO/cancellable + new bookings supports the guide but implies the back half must out-book the front.
• Growth drivers: RF-geoloc capacity +15x; NOAA/EUMETSAT weather renewals + a possible NOAA $8B-ceiling IDIQ allocation; MDA SHIELD IDIQ task orders.
• Cost: management-guided adjusted EBITDA $(20.7)–(26.0)M and non-GAAP operating loss $(32.6)–(37.8)M for FY2026 — losses narrowing vs FY2025 but still large.

Three-year revenue path (FY2026–FY2028), ``:

• Base: FY26 $80M (guide midpoint) → FY27 ~$96M (+20%, RF-intel + weather ramp) → FY28 ~$113M (+18%). Adjusted EBITDA crosses ~breakeven in late FY27/FY28 if opex discipline holds. ``
• Bull: FY26 $85M (top of guide) → FY27 ~$110M (+29%, IDIQ task orders land) → FY28 ~$140M (+27%); EBITDA-positive in FY27. ``
• Bear: FY26 $73M (low end, post-WildFireSat termination drag) → FY27 ~$78M (+7%, contracts slip, RF-intel TAM slower) → FY28 ~$84M (+8%); EBITDA stays negative; another dilutive raise required in 2027. ``

Runway (the number that actually matters): entering 2026 with ~$81.8M, burning ~$26M in Q1 alone, the April 2026 raise added ~$65.5M net at $14.00/share, so pro-forma liquidity ≈ $80–90M mid-2026. At a narrowing burn (guide implies ~$20–26M adj-EBITDA loss + capex ~$30M/yr), that funds roughly 12–18 months → another raise is likely in 2027 unless EBITDA inflects. The serial-dilution pattern (2025 raise $37.3M @ $8, 2026 raise $65.5M @ $14) is the base case to underwrite.

Forecast tracker: per --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create logged (breadth mode; not a committed base case). If promoted to a thesis, the scoreable forecast would be "SPIR FY2026 revenue ≥ $78M (within guide), p≈0.70" and "SPIR raises external capital again before FY2027-end, p≈0.65".

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Spire is a de-risked, re-based asset: debt-free, $80M+ liquidity, going-concern cured, and now a focused RF/space-data pure-play aimed at two large secular government wallets — commercial weather data (NOAA explicitly shifting to commercial buys, $8B-ceiling IDIQ) and commercial RF intelligence (defense/intel only beginning to outsource RF collection; HawkEye/Spire early movers). The data + vertical integration + 200-satellite operating history is a genuine asset base that would cost >$200M to replicate. ~76% of 2026 revenue is contracted, backlog is $184.8M, and losses are narrowing. If RF-geoloc scales anywhere near "15x" and one large IDIQ allocation lands, a $72M-revenue company re-rates fast off a small base. The Kpler sale proves management can surface value. At ~$17 the market is paying ~9x sales for that optionality with a clean balance sheet underneath.

Bear case. Strip the narrative and you have a sub-scale ($72M, shrinking GAAP revenue) company that loses ~$96M at the operating line, burns ~$26M/quarter, and survives by serially diluting shareholders — while operating under a live SEC subpoena into its accounting and with material weaknesses still unremediated. It just sold its only mature, profitable business (maritime) to stay alive, and the government customers it's betting on can terminate for convenience at will — which they just did (WildFireSat, up to CAD $71.8M, gone overnight). A Space Services customer is suing for $45.9M alleging fraud. Competition (Aireon, PlanetiQ, HawkEye 360) is real and better-funded in exactly the verticals Spire calls its future. Three risks that could permanently impair: (1) SEC enforcement / AAER → penalties, re-restatement, lost government trust, debarment risk; (2) chronic cash burn forces dilution at depressed prices in a 2023-style risk-off, re-breaking the stock; (3) RF-intel TAM disappoints and weather IDIQs go to better-positioned rivals, leaving Spire a flat ~$80M data shop worth 2–3x sales, not 9x.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke). It's late 2027. The SEC investigation produced a settlement with a penalty and a fresh control-remediation order; the NorthStar arbitration went partly against Spire; RF-geoloc "15x" turned into "3x" amid procurement delays; a soft tape forced a third dilutive raise below $10; revenue is ~$80M and adjusted EBITDA is still negative. The stock is back near its 2024 lows. The tell we'd have ignored: the gap between the adjusted growth story on the calls and the GAAP shrinking-revenue, widening-burn reality on the filings.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on trailing fundamentals — ~9x EV/sales on declining GAAP revenue with no earnings and an SEC overhang is a momentum/optionality multiple, not a value one. It's only justified if you fully underwrite the forward narrative.

Contrarian view (what the market is refusing to see). Bulls are treating the Kpler-funded balance-sheet reset as the end of the risk chapter; it may be the beginning of the disclosure chapter — the SEC subpoena specifically targets the premature 2024 10-K filing, a process/governance failure that often precedes, not follows, enforcement. The market is also quietly conceding the growth story by funding the company at $14 via private placement rather than the open ATM (which is frozen — the S-3 lapsed due to the late 10-Qs ). A company that can't use its own shelf is not as financing-flexible as "debt-free" implies.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Where revenue is concentrated: government / single-agency >10% + a lumpy Space Services line. If a budget cycle slips or one agency deprioritizes, or another contract is terminated for convenience (precedent: WildFireSat), revenue gaps instantly. There is no diversified commercial base cushioning this.
• The moat is weaker than bulls think: Spire's own 10-K calls its markets "fragmented and highly competitive" and names credible rivals in every vertical. The weather-data "moat" faces PlanetiQ; RF-geoloc faces HawkEye 360 (better-funded); aviation faces Aireon. Spire is not the category leader in any of its growth verticals.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: HawkEye 360 in RF geolocation — the exact vertical Spire is staking its re-rating on — is private, well-capitalized, and defense-native.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance moves: a restatement of multiple years, a prematurely filed 2024 10-K without a completed audit, CFO departing during an SEC probe, a fully-reserved note to a customer now suing for fraud, and a dual-class founder-control structure that limits accountability. This is a textbook "management/controls" short.
• Assumptions required for today's price (~$17, ~9x sales): that the SEC closes benignly; that RF-geoloc actually scales ~15x; that a large weather IDIQ allocation lands; that burn narrows to breakeven by ~FY27 without a value-destroying raise. All four must roughly hold.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: FY27 revenue ~$78–80M instead of ~$96M; EBITDA stays negative; runway forces another raise; at a peer-sane ~3–4x sales the stock is $6–9, i.e. 40–60% downside from $17.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: an SEC enforcement action / AAER combined with a forced dilutive raise into weakness — the 2023–24 playbook, which already took the stock to sub-$1 nominal. Plausibility: moderate — the investigation is real and open; the burn is real.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The SEC subpoena (July 2025) covers the restatement and the premature 2024 10-K filing. Where does the investigation stand, what is the realistic range of outcomes, and have you reserved for any penalty?
2. You guided FY2026 to a negative adjusted EBITDA of $(20.7)–(26.0)M with ~$26M of Q1 operating burn. Walk us precisely to the quarter you expect adjusted-EBITDA breakeven and the cumulative cash required to get there.
3. After the April 2026 raise, what is pro-forma liquidity, and will you need to raise again before end-2027 at the current burn? Under what conditions?
4. Your S-3/ATM is frozen (lapsed registration from late 10-Q filings). When will timely filing be fully restored, and what financing flexibility do you have until then?
5. When will all material weaknesses be remediated, and what specifically has changed in segregation-of-duties and Space Services revenue-recognition controls?
6. The CFO is departing amid the accounting review. What is the permanent-CFO timeline, the mandate, and how do you reassure investors about finance-org stability mid-investigation?
7. The NorthStar $45.9M arbitration alleges fraud and willful misconduct. What is your assessed range of loss, and what does the January 2026 hearing imply about timing?
8. The Canadian Space Agency terminated WildFireSat for convenience. How much FY2026 revenue/RPO did that remove, what's the settlement claim, and what does it say about Space Services contract durability?
9. "RF-geolocation capacity +15x in 12 months" — translate that into contracted bookings and revenue, not capacity. What's actually under contract today vs. pipeline?
10. On the NOAA commercial-weather IDIQ ($8B ceiling, 4 data types) — what is your realistic share, the task-order timing, and the competitive set (PlanetiQ et al.)?
11. You sold maritime — your most mature, profitable line. What is the long-term gross-margin and operating-margin model for the remaining mix at scale?
12. Subscription revenue (83% of total) declined ~32% YoY in Q1. Net revenue retention, churn, and the path back to growth on the recurring base specifically?
13. Capex was ~$8M in Q1 and ~$33M in FY2025. What's the steady-state satellite-replenishment capex, and how does accelerated solar-cycle decommissioning affect it?
14. The dual-class founder-control structure and classified board — is there any sunset, and how should public shareholders think about governance accountability given the control overhang?
15. What is the single metric you want investors to judge this management team on over the next 8 quarters, and what target are you committing to on it?

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