Eve Holding

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Eve Holding is a development-stage aerospace company building an electric vertical take-off and landing (eVTOL) aircraft for urban air mobility, spun out of Embraer and taken public via the Zanite Acquisition Corp SPAC (blank-check incorporated Nov 19, 2020). It is Delaware-incorporated with operations in Melbourne, Florida and São José dos Campos / São Paulo, Brazil; HQ at 1400 General Aviation Drive, Melbourne FL; auditor KPMG LLP (Miami).

The company is pursuing three product lines, not one:

1. The eVTOL aircraft — a lift-plus-cruise design (eight rotors for vertical lift + a separate forward propulsion system and fixed wing for cruise). Target range ~100 km at entry-into-service, which Eve claims (via an MIT-collaborated analysis) addresses ~99% of intra-city UAM missions.
2. Service & Operations Solutions ("TechCare") — a full eVTOL maintenance / material / training / ground-handling support network, intended to serve both Eve's own fleet and third-party aircraft; commercialization targeted to begin 2026 (ahead of aircraft revenue).
3. Vector — an Urban Air Traffic Management (UATM) software platform.

Revenue to date: $0. Eve "has not generated any revenue" and expects to keep incurring losses until sustainable commercial operations begin. eVTOL deliveries are "not expected to begin until 2027 [now 2028 — see Lens 5] and may occur or not at all".

Contract structure / order book: an initial order pipeline of ~2,700 vehicles valued at ~$14 billion from 28 launch customers — explicitly non-binding letters of intent ("consistent with common aviation practices"), which Eve believes is the largest pipeline in UAM by vehicle count. Management is now trying to convert LOIs into firm orders by offering customers a place in the first 300 production slots. There is no take-or-pay, no recurring revenue, no cash backlog — the "$14B" is optionality, not a receivable.

The defining structural fact: Embraer owns ~72% of the common stock and performs the bulk of Eve's actual engineering under service agreements. Eve is a lean holding shell (198 direct employees) sitting on top of Embraer's aerospace machine.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: Embraer (design/engineering/certification muscle + capital) → Eve (program owner, IP, order book) → operators/lessors (end customers) → passengers, with a named tier-1 supplier bench feeding the airframe. Names or it didn't happen:

• Upstream — the parent as primary "supplier": Embraer (ERJ), via subsidiaries Embraer Aircraft Holdings (EAH) and Atech, performs Eve's R&D and SG&A work under the Master Service Agreements (MSA) + Shared Service Agreement (SSA) signed Dec 2021. Eve has first-priority access to up to 736 ERJ employees beyond its own 198. All of Eve's facilities sit on land owned or leased by ERJ. This is a single-source dependency on the parent for essentially the entire value-add.
• Named component/technology suppliers: BAE Systems, Thales Group, Nidec (electric propulsion / avionics / systems).
• Energy/charging partners: Acciona, EDP Group, Florida Power & Light.
• Vertiport / infrastructure partners: Heathrow Airport, London City Airport, Skyports, Jetex, Signature Aviation, Pentastar, Rio de Janeiro International, Universal Aviation.
• Financing suppliers (capital chain): BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank), Finep (Brazilian federal innovation funder), Bradesco BBI.
• Manufacturing node: production facility at Taubaté, São Paulo, Brazil, capacity up to 480 units/yr (initial run ~120/yr).

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies:

• The parent itself (Embraer) is the master chokepoint — it is simultaneously the controlling shareholder (~72%), the lead engineering contractor, the landlord, and the certification sponsor. Nearly two-thirds of Q1-2026 operating spend flowed back to Embraer ($42.4M of $66.3M opex). Any deterioration in Embraer's willingness/ability to fund and staff Eve is existential.
• Battery energy density is the industry-wide chokepoint (dictates the 100 km range and payload) — not disclosed as single-sourced but is the binding physical constraint on the product.
• Certification authorities (ANAC → FAA validation → EASA) are a regulatory chokepoint on any revenue at all.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Eve's moat is not a product-superiority moat — its aircraft has not flown a transition, let alone carried a passenger. The moat is institutional and financial:

1. The Embraer umbilical (the real moat). Eve is the only listed Western eVTOL pure-play inside a profitable, ~55-year-old certified-aircraft OEM. Embraer brings: (a) a proven type-certification track record with ANAC/FAA/EASA on fixed-wing and executive jets; (b) an on-tap engineering workforce (up to 736 people) at variable cost; (c) balance-sheet backing that let Eve raise capital while European peers went bankrupt. This is a scale + process + credibility moat competitors without a parent OEM (Joby, Archer, Vertical) must manufacture from scratch.
2. Certification-strategy moat. The lift-plus-cruise design deliberately reuses "existing fixed-wing and rotary aircraft certification criteria" to shorten the TC path — a bet that boring, provable engineering beats exotic vectored-thrust designs at the regulator.
3. Services + UATM as a second front. Eve is the only pure-play attacking third-party fleet services (TechCare) and air-traffic-management software (Vector) in parallel — potentially recurring, higher-margin, and earlier revenue than aircraft sales. Bargaining power here is weak-to-neutral (Airbus, Bell, Boeing all have service networks), but it diversifies the revenue-timing risk.
4. Order-pipeline signaling. The ~2,700-vehicle / ~$14B LOI book from 28 customers is the largest by count — real as demand signaling and slot-reservation leverage, near-worthless as contracted revenue (non-binding).

Bargaining power: LOW over customers (non-binding LOIs; customers can walk), LOW over the key supplier (that supplier is the 72% parent — Eve is a price-taker on the MSA). The moat is survivorship, not pricing.

Lens 4 · Segments

Per Note 19 (Segments), Eve reports a single operating structure but discloses R&D/asset build by three program lines. There is no revenue by segment (revenue = $0) — the only meaningful segmentation is where the spend goes and geography of operations.

• By program (development spend / capitalized effort, FY-cumulative disclosure basis): eVTOL aircraft is the overwhelming majority; Service & Operations Solutions and UATM are small. Interpretation: ~95%+ of the effort is the airframe; services and software are still nascent line items, not revenue engines yet.
• By geography: two operating hubs — Melbourne, FL (program, business development) and Brazil (São José dos Campos engineering + Taubaté manufacturing). Cost base is partly BRL-denominated (Embraer engineering, BNDES/Finep debt in reais), creating FX exposure — FY2025 booked a $4.6M foreign-currency loss.

Trend & cause: spend is accelerating — R&D rose from $105.6M (2023) → $129.8M (2024) → $194.7M (2025), up 50% YoY, driven directly by "the activities contemplated in the MSA agreements with Embraer" as flight testing ramped after the Dec-2025 debut flight. Q1-2026 R&D of $59.1M (+32% YoY) confirms the ramp continues.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, filed 2026-05-05)

This is a pre-revenue name, so the "print" is burn, cash, and milestones, not beats on the top line.

P&L (three months ended Mar 31, 2026):

• Revenue: $0 (in line — consensus revenue estimate $0).
• R&D: $59.1M (vs $44.7M prior-year Q1, +32%).
• SG&A: $7.2M (vs $7.9M, −8%).
• Operating loss: $(66.3)M (vs $(52.6)M, a 26% wider loss YoY).
• Reported EPS −$0.20, missing the −$0.17 consensus by $0.03.

Balance sheet / liquidity (as of Mar 31, 2026):

• Cash, equivalents & restricted cash: $129.4M
• Financial investments: $311.6M
• Available debt to draw: $127M (BNDES) + grant commitments ~$10M (Finep)
• Total liquidity ≈ $578M — higher than FY2025's $533M, because of Q1 financing.
• Management: liquidity "sufficient to fund our operating plan for at least the next twelve months" and, per the earnings call, through 2028.
• Note the press framing "record cash position of $441M" = cash + investments ($129.4M + $311.6M), i.e. the liquid pile before undrawn facilities.

Cash burn: operating cash used $160.4M in FY2025 (vs $136.0M FY2024), and 2026 burn is guided to $225–275M. Burn is rising, as expected into a certification ramp.

Milestone (the number that actually matters): first debut flight Dec 19, 2025; 59 successful flight tests / 2h 27m total flight time by Mar 31, 2026; hover & low-speed block completed; transition flights (the hard part) targeted for H2 2026.

Market reaction / what's priced: stock trades ~$3.40, market cap ~$1.2B — i.e. the market prices Eve as a funded but distant option, roughly 2× its liquid cash pile, with the rest as call-option value on 2028 certification.

Flag vs. its own history: the widening loss and the 2027→2028 cert slip are the two unfavorable deltas; the rising cash balance and clean audit are the two favorable ones. This is a company executing on plan but on a later plan than it sold at SPAC.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research shelf (transcripts/ empty), so this is ``.

Across the FY2025 → Q1-2026 calls, management's message has narrowed and hardened around three refrains:

1. "Fully funded / record cash position through 2028." The liquidity message is now the lead — a deliberate contrast to the sector's bankruptcies. Tone: defensive-confident.
2. "Flight-test progress" — 50, then 59 flights; hover-block complete; transition flights next. Tone: incrementally proud but carefully hedged.
3. "Embraer synergies of $100–150M over three years." Newly emphasized cost lever — signals management knows burn is the bear case and is pre-empting it.

What they stopped saying: the confident "2027 certification / 2027 entry into service" language of the SPAC era is gone — replaced by "2028" and "12 months of flight testing required". The quiet retirement of the 2027 date is the single most informative sentiment shift: the timeline is sliding, and management is managing expectations toward liquidity-and-progress rather than a hard delivery date.

Lens 7 · Comps

Every listed eVTOL pure-play has $0 revenue, so EV/Sales, EV/EBIT, P/E, dividend yield, and 5-yr ROE are all n/a / not meaningful (any such multiple would be a fabrication against a zero or negative denominator). The honest peer frame for pre-revenue eVTOL is market cap, liquidity, and market-cap-per-order-slot / cert timeline.

Read: Eve sits 4th of the four survivors by market cap but arguably 1st on bal-sheet quality relative to cap — it is the cheapest funded pure-play. Market-cap-per-LOI-slot: ~$1.2B / ~2,700 ≈ $0.44M/slot vs Joby ~$7.6B on a smaller order book — i.e. the market assigns Eve a large timeline/execution discount, not a demand discount. The peer table's real lesson is survivorship: two named competitors are already bankrupt, which is precisely the risk that makes Eve's Embraer backing valuable.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~last 2–3 yrs of listed life)

Eve is thinly analyzed pre-2024; catalysts are +:

• Aug 2025 — $230M equity raise at $4.85/share (47.4M shares): stock dropped ~24% intraday. The defining catalyst — the market reacted to dilution, not the cash. This tells you EVEX trades on share-count sensitivity: every capital raise is a de-rating event even though the cash extends runway.
• Jul 2024 — prototype roll-out and Dec 19, 2025 — first debut flight — milestone-driven pops; the tape rewards physical progress.
• 2026 — certification slip from 2027 → 2028 — a negative de-rating catalyst; timeline is the sensitivity.
• Flight-test cadence updates (50 → 59 flights) — modest positive catalysts.
• Sector contagion: Lilium/Volocopter bankruptcies (2024–25) — pressured the whole eVTOL complex, but differentiated Eve positively (funded vs. failed).

Pattern: the market reacts hardest to (1) dilution/capital raises (down), (2) certification-timeline changes (down on slips), and (3) hardware milestones (up). It does not react to order-book LOIs (correctly treating them as non-binding). The single most predictive variable for EVEX is share count × timeline — the two things a controlling parent and a slipping cert schedule directly govern.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

CEO — Johann Bordais (appointed Sept 1, 2023, replacing co-CEOs Gerard/"Jerry" DeMuro and André Stein).

1. Track record: 20+ years at Embraer; built and led Embraer's Services & Support business from its 2016 founding. He is a services-and-support operator, not a moonshot founder — which fits Eve's second revenue leg (TechCare) and its certification-discipline strategy.
2. Tenure & skin in the game: ~3 years in seat. Personal insider ownership is not disclosed in the shelf (no insider-transactions.csv); the material alignment is institutional — Embraer owns ~72%, so management incentives are effectively parent-aligned, not classic founder-equity-aligned.
3. Capital-allocation history: the board/parent has raised capital opportunistically (2024 Embraer private placement 7.5M shares/$30M; Aug-2025 $230M raise; BNDES R$490M ($94.7M) and Finep grants) and cut a standalone tax structure when Embraer dropped below 80%. Allocation is disciplined-but-dilutive: they will fund the program by issuing shares when needed. No buybacks (appropriately — no free cash flow). ROE/ROIC are deeply negative (pre-revenue) and not a meaningful management-quality gauge here.
4. Red flags: the governance is thick with related parties — Embraer as controlling holder, engineering contractor, and landlord simultaneously (see Lens 10). The board is Embraer-stacked (Luis Carlos Affonso = ERJ SVP Engineering; Michael Amalfitano = CEO of Embraer's executive-jet arm). This is not fraud-shaped — it is minority-shareholder-risk-shaped: the parent controls both sides of every material transaction and the exit.
5. Archetype: professional manager inside a corporate-parent structure, not a charismatic founder. For a certification-stage aerospace program, this is arguably the right archetype — the risk is engineering discipline and capital, not vision — but it means the equity's fate is a parent's strategic decision, not a founder's crusade.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic lens. The accounting itself is clean and simple — a pre-revenue company with no revenue-recognition games to play (there is no revenue). The risks are structural, not manipulative:

• Revenue recognition: n/a — $0 revenue. No channel-stuffing / percentage-of-completion risk exists yet. (This becomes a future risk at first delivery, not today.)
• Related-party concentration (the #1 flag): ~64% of Q1-2026 opex ($42.4M of $66.3M) is paid to the controlling ~72% shareholder under MSA/SSA. The pricing of that intercompany work is set between affiliated parties — a minority holder cannot independently verify it is arm's-length. Not illegal; materially important.
• Cash flow vs. earnings: consistent and honest. FY2025 net loss $224.3M vs operating cash burn $160.4M — the gap is non-cash items (SBC, warrant/derivative marks, D&A), which is normal. No sign of earnings flattered above cash.
• Receivables/inventory outrunning revenue: n/a — negligible receivables, early-stage inventory (warehouse costs just beginning in Taubaté).
• SBC / non-GAAP flattering: Eve reports GAAP losses; there is no aggressive "adjusted-profit" narrative to strip. SBC is a real but disclosed R&D/SG&A component (Note 12).
• Derivative/warrant liabilities: public/private warrants marked to the traded warrant price — small P&L noise ($0.1M loss FY2025 on a $0.01 warrant move). Housekeeping, not a red flag.
• Debt: BNDES two lines totaling R$490M (~$94.7M) drawn from Sept 2023; interest expense rose to $10.1M FY2025. Modest, subsidized, BRL-denominated (FX-exposed) — not a solvency concern at current liquidity.
• Auditor / ICFR / going concern: KPMG issued a clean opinion; management concluded ICFR was effective as of Dec 31, 2025; NO material weakness; NO going-concern doubt. This is a genuine positive versus bankrupt peers.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases: none naming Eve Holding (EDGAR EFTS LR search, 2021-07-06 → 2026-07-06).
• SEC AAERs: none.
• Non-SEC enforcement (FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB): web search surfaced no material enforcement actions, consent decrees, or fines against Eve Holding.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): the company states it is "not currently a party to any such claims, lawsuits or proceedings" whose adverse outcome would be material.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-07-06.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Standard EPS projection is not meaningful for a pre-revenue eVTOL — the driver is not next year's earnings but runway vs. certification. So this lens is framed as (a) the loss/burn path, and (b) the runway-to-catalyst question that actually decides the equity. All outputs with arithmetic shown; inputs/``.

Burn & runway (the real model):

• 2026 burn guided $225–275M; call it ~$250M midpoint.
• Total liquidity at Q1-2026 ≈ $578M (incl. undrawn BNDES/Finep).
• Naive runway = $578M ÷ ~$250M/yr ≈ ~2.3 years → ~late 2028, consistent with management's "funded through 2028". This exactly coincides with the 2028 certification target — the runway barely reaches first delivery with no margin. That coincidence is the investment case and the risk in one line.

Illustrative loss path (GAAP net loss, $M):

EPS is a fabrication risk here — with share count governed by discretionary raises and revenue at $0, any specific EPS number would be false precision. n/a as a hard figure; loss-per-share ≈ current run-rate −$0.20/qtr × 4 ≈ −$0.80 FY-run-rate on ~348M shares, pre any new raise.

Brier forecast (logged conceptually, not committed in --watchlist): the scoreable binary that matters is "Eve completes first eVTOL transition flight by 2026-12-31" — management targets H2-2026; base rate for eVTOL schedule adherence is poor (see peers). Suggested p ≈ 0.45. Per --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create run in this loop — flagged for Connor to log if he takes a view.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Eve is the funded survivor of a mass-extinction event. Lilium and Volocopter — two of the most-hyped names — are bankrupt; Vertical is a $220M micro-cap fighting its balance sheet; even Joby and Archer face dilution pressure. Eve alone has (a) a clean-audit, no-going-concern balance sheet with ~$578M liquidity funding it through the 2028 cert target; (b) a controlling parent (Embraer, ~72%) that is a real, profitable, 55-year certified-aircraft OEM supplying engineering, certification expertise, and capital; (c) a certification-friendly lift-plus-cruise design deliberately built to reuse existing fixed-wing/rotary criteria; (d) the largest LOI book in UAM (~2,700 / ~$14B) now being converted to production slots; and (e) an early second revenue leg (TechCare services + Vector UATM) that could generate cash before aircraft sales. At ~$1.2B — roughly 2× liquid cash — you are paying a modest premium over the cash for a call option on Embraer successfully certifying an air taxi. The pre-mortem's opposite: if transition flights land in 2026 and ANAC cert holds for 2028, this re-rates violently toward Archer/Joby multiples.

Bear case (things that permanently impair, not just dent).

1. The timeline is the whole thesis, and it is already slipping. 2027 → 2028 happened in one year; eVTOL cert routinely slips again. Each slip pushes first revenue past the runway and forces another dilutive raise — and EVEX has shown it drops ~24% on a raise. A 2028 that becomes 2029/2030 is a cash-death-by-a-thousand-raises scenario even with Embraer.
2. Minority-shareholder capture. Embraer controls both sides of every material transaction (MSA pricing, land leases) and the exit. A ~72% parent can take Eve private at a low point or dilute minorities on unfavorable terms — the public equity's upside is capped by the parent's discretion. You do not control your own destiny as an EVEX holder.
3. Unit economics of UAM are unproven at any price. Even certified, air-taxi economics (vertiport availability, battery cycle life, pilot cost, ticket price that fills seats) may not close. The $14B LOI book is non-binding; if certified-aircraft economics disappoint, LOIs evaporate.

Are multiples too high? There is no earnings multiple. On price-to-liquidity (~2×) Eve is the least stretched pure-play — the risk isn't an expensive multiple, it's that the denominator (a working, certified, economically viable aircraft) may never exist, and the parent may not let minority holders capture the upside if it does.

Contrarian view (what the market is refusing to see): the crowd trades all eVTOL names as one basket and has beaten Eve down with the bankrupt ones. But Eve is structurally the least likely to go bankrupt and the most likely to be de-listed via a parent take-private — a completely different risk than Lilium's. The market is mispricing the type of risk: Eve doesn't have solvency risk, it has agency/timeline risk. That's a better risk to own if (and only if) you trust Embraer's discipline and can stomach a possible low-ball buyout.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the money machine? There is no money machine — there is a $250M/yr cash furnace with a delivery date that keeps receding. The short thesis writes itself: serially dilutive, controlled by a parent that can squeeze minorities, selling a product that has never carried a passenger, into an application (urban air taxis) whose unit economics are unproven and whose two loudest evangelists just went bankrupt.
• Where is "revenue" concentrated? In non-binding LOIs (~2,700 vehicles, 28 customers). Zero is contracted. If cert slips again, launch customers (United, lessors Azorra/Falko) walk at no cost. The "$14B backlog" is a marketing number.
• Why is the moat weaker than bulls think? The moat is Embraer — and Embraer is a double-edged moat: the same control that funds Eve lets Embraer set intercompany prices and time an exit against minorities. Bulls count the 72% as safety; a short counts it as the reason the minority equity is a residual claim on a parent's whim.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Joby — better-funded ($7.6B cap, Toyota/Delta), further along FAA (stage 4 of 5), Dubai launch commitments. If Joby certifies first and defines the category, Eve's "largest LOI book" advantage compresses fast. Also Chinese eVTOL (EHang) with home-government backing on a faster domestic cert path.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance moves: the web of related-party dependence (engineering, land, and control all sit with the 72% holder) and a dilution reflex ($230M at $4.85, −24% day) that trains the market to sell every raise.
• What must hold for today's ~$1.2B? (1) Transition flights succeed in 2026; (2) ANAC cert lands ~2028 with FAA/EASA validation; (3) no more than ~1 additional major dilutive raise before revenue; (4) LOIs convert to firm orders at economics that work; (5) Embraer keeps funding and treats minorities fairly on the exit. That is five sequential low-base-rate events.
• Valuation if growth disappoints 20–30%: there is no growth to disappoint — the analog is timeline slips 20–30% (2028 → 2029.5), which would force ≥1 extra raise, likely re-rating the equity toward its cash floor ($400–500M liquid), i.e. materially below $1.2B.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: Embraer decides UAM isn't worth the capital, stops incremental funding, and takes Eve private at a distressed price — or simply lets it wither. Plausibility: moderate — Embraer has kept funding so far, but it is a rational corporate parent, not a true believer, and it holds all the cards.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Certification honesty: With cert already slipped 2027→2028, what is the specific set of flight-test and conforming-prototype gates between today and ANAC type certification, and what is the realistic probability each is on schedule?
2. The runway-vs-cert coincidence: Your ~$578M liquidity funds you to ~2028 — exactly when cert is due. How many additional capital raises do you model to reach first revenue, and at what assumed dilution?
3. Minority protection: Embraer owns ~72%, prices your MSA work, and owns your facilities. What independent, arm's-length governance protects minority shareholders on intercompany pricing — and on a potential take-private?
4. Transition-flight risk: Transition (vertical→horizontal) is where eVTOL programs stall. What is your confidence and contingency if 2026 transition flights reveal aerodynamic or control-law problems?
5. LOI → firm orders: Of the ~2,700 LOIs, how many have converted to binding orders with deposits, and what conversion do you actually underwrite?
6. Unit economics: At entry into service, what per-seat cost and utilization must an operator achieve for your eVTOL to be profitable for them — and does that price fill seats?
7. Embraer commitment: What is Embraer's stated maximum incremental capital commitment to Eve, and under what conditions would the parent stop funding?
8. TechCare / Vector revenue: You target services commercialization in 2026 — what concrete, contracted 2026–27 services/UATM revenue is realistic, and how much does it offset burn?
9. BRL/FX exposure: With engineering and BNDES/Finep debt in reais, how do you hedge the FX and interest-rate risk on a multi-year, real-denominated cost base?
10. Manufacturing ramp: Taubaté is speced to ~480 units/yr but you plan to start ~120. What are the gating constraints (supply chain, battery, workforce) to reach even the initial rate?
11. Battery supply & energy density: What is your battery source, cycle-life assumption, and the range/payload sensitivity if energy density underperforms?
12. Competitive timing: If Joby or a Chinese OEM certifies 12–18 months before you, how does that change your LOI book and pricing power?
13. Capital-allocation discipline: Given the −24% reaction to the last raise, how will you structure future financing to avoid training the market to sell every capital event?
14. Second-source dependency: What is your contingency if Embraer's engineering workforce is diverted to its core aircraft programs when Eve's certification campaign peaks in 2027?
15. Definition of success: What does a good outcome for a minority EVEX shareholder look like over 3–5 years, distinct from a good outcome for Embraer?

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