Neurable

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Neurable is a Boston-based consumer-neurotechnology company (founded 2015 out of the University of Michigan Direct Brain Interface Lab) that builds AI software to read electrical brain signals (EEG) from sensors embedded in ordinary-looking head-worn hardware — initially its own headphones, now increasingly other companies' devices. The plain-terms pitch: a heart-rate monitor for your attention. Dry fabric EEG electrodes in the ear-cushions of a headphone capture brainwaves; Neurable's AI classifies them into focus states (low/medium/high) and surfaces them in a phone app.

Two business models, in sequence — and the pivot is the whole story:

1. Hardware product (2024→): The flagship is the MW75 Neuro, co-developed with premium audio house Master & Dynamic — ANC wireless headphones with a 12-channel EEG array in the earpads, launched Sept 2024 at $699. A lighter, cheaper MW75 Neuro LT at $499 followed. EU/UK pricing €729/£629. Critically, Neurable positions these as consumer neuro-wellness, not a medical device — a deliberate choice that keeps claim-language loose and avoids any FDA clearance burden.

2. Licensing platform (April 2026→): Neurable formally pivoted to a B2B "Intel Inside" licensing model — OEMs integrate "Neurable AI" into their headphones, hats, glasses, headbands and ship them with a "Powered by Neurable AI" badge, retaining control of design/UX/distribution. Stated goal: launch with 5 global OEMs between 2026 and 2028. CEO Ramses Alcaide's framing: "let's make this as ubiquitous as heart rate sensors on your wrist".

Key customers / partners (named): Master & Dynamic (hardware co-dev); HP Inc.'s HyperX (gaming-headset development partnership, unveiled CES 2026); iMotions (human-behaviour research platform — distributes Neurable hardware to labs); U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), 711th Human Performance Wing (cognitive-fitness research); MeSpace (named OEM partner). Validation institutions cited by the company: Mayo Clinic, US Air Force, US Army.

Suppliers: Master & Dynamic (headphone hardware/acoustics); generic EEG/silicon supply chain (no proprietary chip disclosed — the moat is software + the dry-electrode IP, see Lens 3). Competitors: the non-invasive consumer-EEG cluster — Muse/InteraXon (meditation/sleep headbands), Emotiv (research/EEG headsets), Kernel (Flow/Flux fNIRS helmets), OpenBCI (open hardware + Galea), Cognixion (BCI+AR), NeuroSky, and the most direct new threat NextSense (Alphabet-X spinout, EEG earbuds, launched Feb 2026). It does not meaningfully compete with the invasive-implant moonshots (Neuralink, Synchron, Precision, Paradromics) — different physics, different buyer, ~100× the capital.

Contract structure: Today, mostly direct-to-consumer hardware sales (one-time, ~$499–699) plus a nascent app layer (gamification, streaks, Spotify integration — freemium, subscription unconfirmed). The licensing pivot intends to shift the model to recurring per-unit royalties / licensing fees from OEMs — terms not disclosed. n/a — royalty rate not disclosed.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: upstream inputs → Neurable → end customer.

• Upstream silicon / sensors: Commodity EEG analog front-ends and microcontrollers. No proprietary ASIC disclosed — Neurable's differentiation is the dry conductive-fabric electrode housing (its own patented design, see Lens 3) layered on standard EEG acquisition. Specific chip supplier n/a — not disclosed.
• Hardware integrator / acoustics: Master & Dynamic (the MW75 chassis, ANC, acoustics) is the single most important named hardware partner for the product line. For the licensing model, the OEM is the integrator — Neurable supplies the sensor-design reference + AI, the partner supplies the device.
• The company itself: Neurable's value-add is software (signal processing + the "Neurable AI" focus classifier) and the dry-electrode IP. It is asset-light — it does not run fabs or large-scale device manufacturing.
• Distribution → end customer:
• Consumer: Master & Dynamic retail + Neurable.com DTC (focus/productivity/ADHD-curious buyers, premium price).
• Research: iMotions channels hardware to academic/neuromarketing labs.
• OEM (future): HyperX/HP, MeSpace and up-to-5 OEMs → their own retail channels, with Neurable embedded.
• Government: AFRL direct research engagement.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies:

• Master & Dynamic concentration (today): essentially the entire shipping-product revenue line depends on one premium audio partner and one SKU family. Single-product, single-partner risk.
• The licensing model is unproven — zero shipping OEM products at scale yet. HyperX is a prototype/development partnership, not a launched product (no name, price, or date). So the "Intel Inside" supply chain is, as of mid-2026, aspirational.
• Neural-data / regulatory chokepoint (sector-wide): see Lens 10 — pending US neural-data privacy legislation could constrain the data layer that makes the AI improve.

This lens is honest about its limits: as a private asset-light licensor, Neurable's "supply chain" is thin and software-centric — the real dependency is partner adoption, not component sourcing.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The bull's moat claim — and how much of it is real:

• Form-factor / "invisible EEG" moat (genuine, narrow): Neurable's differentiator is putting research-grade-ish EEG into a device people already want to wear (premium headphones), using dry fabric electrodes that don't need gel and tolerate hair — its 12-channel, 500 Hz, 0–131 Hz bandwidth, true-DC-coupled array is the productised result. The insight (correct): people won't wear a clinical headband to work, but they'll wear headphones. NextSense is attacking the same insight from the earbud angle.
• IP estate (real, defensible-ish): Neurable claims 45+ patents and 9 published papers, anchored by its dry-electrode-for-EEG patent (US 10,987,015, issued Apr 2021). For a software-and-sensor company, a 45-patent estate around the hard part (clean signal from a dry, motion-prone, hair-obstructed scalp contact) is the most durable moat it has.
• Data flywheel (claimed, unproven): The pitch is that every "Powered by Neurable AI" unit feeds anonymised training data that sharpens the focus classifier, compounding accuracy. The AI was trained on EEG from 132 participants per the company white paper — a modest dataset, which is exactly why the licensing-scale flywheel matters. CEO is careful: "We are not collecting the data, just training on it willy-nilly" — privacy-positive framing, but it also caps the flywheel.
• Validation moat (marketing, soft): Mayo Clinic / US Air Force / US Army association lends credibility a Muse headband lacks. Soft but commercially useful for the OEM sales pitch.

Bargaining power (who needs whom more):

• Vs. consumers: weak. A $699 focus headphone is a discretionary novelty (Lens 13). Buyers have all the power.
• Vs. OEMs: this is the crux. In the licensing model, does HyperX need Neurable, or could a large OEM build its own EEG-in-headset stack? Neurable's bet is that its decade of dry-electrode + classifier IP is a faster/cheaper buy than building in-house. Plausible for mid-tier OEMs; risky against Apple/Samsung/Sony, who could in-house or acquire. Neurable needs the OEMs more than they need Neurable — until enough of them ship that "Powered by Neurable AI" becomes a recognised consumer mark.

Verdict on the moat: a real but narrow lead in productised dry-electrode EEG + a credible patent wall, wrapped around an as-yet-unproven data-flywheel and weak end-customer pricing power. It is the best-commercialised moat in BCI and simultaneously the shallowest relative to the implant players' surgical/regulatory moats.

Lens 4 · Segments

No segment financials exist — private, unaudited, segments.csv empty. Reconstructing the de facto segments qualitatively from disclosure:

Geography: US-centric (Boston HQ); product available US + EU/UK. No country-level revenue split disclosed — n/a — not disclosed.

The trend that matters: the centre of gravity is shifting from the hardware segment (own product) to the licensing segment (others' products). As of mid-2026 that shift is announced, not yet proven in revenue — the single most important fact in this dossier.

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Phase B — Measure performance

+private overlay applied. Lens 5 → Funding & valuation trajectory. Lens 7 → Cap table & secondary marks. Plus a Traction & unit-economics sub-section. No earnings prints exist.

Lens 5 · Funding & valuation trajectory (overlay: replaces "Earnings Result")

Round history, seed → latest (all ``, unaudited):

Valuation: not disclosed at any round — n/a — private, not disclosed. No post-money figure has been published for the Dec-2025 round. The naming as a "Series A" in both 2018 and 2025 (a relabelled raise) suggests a long, capital-light slog — 10 years from founding to a $35M "Series A," which is itself a tell about how hard consumer BCI monetisation has been.

Burn signal: ~$65M raised over a decade with a single shipping product family implies disciplined-but-slow capital consumption; the Dec-2025 round is explicitly to "accelerate commercialization" of the licensing platform — i.e. the runway is for the pivot, and the pivot must work before the next raise.

Lens 6 · Founder/leadership signal trend (overlay: founder interviews, not earnings calls)

No earnings calls exist. Reading the trend in what management says publicly (2024→2026):

• 2024 (product launch): messaging is "world's first BCI consumer headphones," focus on the MW75 hardware as the hero.
• 2025 (Series A): messaging shifts to "Neurable AI" as the patented compact brain-signal-processing platform — the noun changes from a headphone to a platform.
• 2026 (licensing pivot + CES): full repositioning to "Open for Business… global OEM integration," the "Intel Inside" analogy, and privacy-forward language (CEO: brain data is "a little bit more intimate"; "not collecting… willy-nilly").

The tonal shift is deliberate and coherent: from hardware brag → platform → licensable infrastructure + responsible-data steward. The "stopped saying" tell: they have stopped leading with the headphone and now lead with the AI/badge. This is a founder repositioning the company for an infrastructure/IPO-grade narrative rather than a gadget. Read positively, it's strategic maturity; read skeptically (Lens 13), it's a pivot away from a product that didn't scale.

Lens 7 · Cap table & comparables (overlay: cap table + sector funding comps)

Syndicate quality (the IPO-proximity tell): Neurable's cap table is mid-tier, not blue-chip. Lead investors across rounds — Brian Shin, PJC, Loup Ventures (2016), then Ultratech/TRAC/Pace/Metaplanet (2024), then Spectrum Moonshot Fund (2025) — are niche/strategic neurotech and deep-tech funds, not the crossover names (Fidelity / T. Rowe / Coatue) that signal imminent IPO. There is no crossover-fund entry on record — by the SKILL's own heuristic, that is a not-yet-IPO-proximate signal. No secondary marks or mutual-fund markups are disclosed — n/a — not disclosed.

Sector funding comps (private consumer-EEG cluster; capital raised is the only comparable "multiple" available — valuations n/a, not disclosed):

For scale calibration vs. the invasive BCI frontier (different category, included only to size the gap): Neuralink ~$9B raised; Merge Labs ~$252M seed; Blackrock Neurotech ~$200M (Tether). Neurable raises in a decade roughly what an invasive moonshot raises in a seed round — the correct way to read this name is "consumer-electronics-margin software company," not "deep-tech capital-burn moonshot."

Read: Neurable is the capital-efficiency and commercialisation leader of the non-invasive consumer cluster, but its syndicate lacks the crossover-fund signature that would mark it IPO-imminent.

Lens 7b · Traction & unit economics (overlay add — Phase B)

All ``, unaudited:

• Revenue / units: not disclosed. No ARR, unit-sales, or run-rate figure has been published. n/a — private, not disclosed.
• Price points / implied unit economics: $699 (MW75 Neuro) / $499 (LT). Premium hardware gross margins on a co-branded device are likely thin-to-moderate (Master & Dynamic takes the acoustics value); the software/licensing layer is where any real margin lives — hence the pivot. Margin figures n/a — not disclosed.
• Product reception (proxy for traction): SoundGuys ~"niche product for now" at $699; brain-tracking "fascinating" and honestly useful, but mediocre sound (MDAQS 2.4/10), weak isolation, wired mode disables EEG, battery below the claimed 10h. Aggregated user rating cited ~4.5/5, "2 of 3 users report immediate focus boost" (company-sourced, Mayo-tested).
• Quantified efficacy (the strongest hard data point): in HyperX esports testing, the "Prime" neurofeedback feature improved reaction time by ~43ms and accuracy +0.53% in semi-pros; among collegiate/pro players accuracy +~3%, reaction time −38ms, +21 targets hit. These are small but real, vendor-run numbers — directionally supportive, not independently verified.

Unit-economics takeaway: the consumer hardware is a funnel/credibility play with weak standalone economics; the investable economics are entirely future licensing royalties that do not yet exist at scale.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO & co-founder — Dr. Ramses Alcaide. PhD in Electrical Engineering + Neuroscience from the University of Michigan; thesis on novel BCIs and EEG biomarkers for cognitive function in children with cerebral palsy. Track record: built Neurable from a 2015 university lab project to the first shipping consumer BCI headphone (2024) and a CES-2026-award gaming partnership — a genuine "got a real product to market in the hardest category" credential. Founder archetype: technical scientist-founder, decade-long tenure, deep domain credibility. For a frontier-tech company this is the right archetype; the risk is the classic scientist-founder gap on commercial scaling (which the licensing pivot + a strategic-partnerships co-founder are meant to cover).
• Co-founder & COO — Adam Molnar. U-Michigan (Environmental Studies); Forbes 30 Under 30 (Consumer Technology); runs commercialization/partnerships/policy. The HyperX/HP, iMotions, AFRL relationships are his lane — relevant given the company is now a partnerships business.
• Tenure & skin in the game: both co-founders since 2015 — ~11 years, very high alignment; as an early-stage private, founder ownership is presumably substantial though exact insider %/cap table n/a — not disclosed.
• Capital-allocation history: disciplined — ~$65M over a decade with a shipping product and a patent estate (45+) is capital-efficient by deep-tech standards. The judgment call to stay consumer-wellness and avoid the FDA path preserved optionality and cash; the 2026 pivot to licensing is a sensible asset-light allocation of the new $35M. No value-destructive M&A or buybacks (N/A at this stage).
• Red flags (management): none material on the record — no related-party deals, comp disclosures, or promotional-fraud signals surfaced. The mild concern is narrative-versus-shipping: a decade in, the headline is still "world's first" + a prototype gaming headset and an announced licensing model. Execution-to-scale is unproven, not mismanaged.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

No audited financials exist (private, no SEC filings) — a forensic income-statement/balance-sheet/cash-flow teardown is not possible; there is nothing to tie out. This is itself the headline forensic caveat: all financial claims are company-sourced and unaudited. The relevant risk surface for a private consumer-neurotech company is claims integrity + neural-data governance, addressed below.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): No CIK — Neurable is private and not required to file. No EDGAR enforcement is possible..
• Non-SEC enforcement (FTC / DOJ / FDA / CFPB) — web search: No enforcement action, consent decree, settlement, fine, or lawsuit against Neurable was found. However, the sector-wide regulatory overhang is real and rising: in 2025–2026 Senators Cantwell/Schumer/Markey called on the FTC to use its Section 5 authority to investigate whether neurotech firms engage in unfair/deceptive practices around neural data; the proposed "MIND Act" would direct study of national neural-data standards; Colorado/California have extended privacy law to neural data. Neurable is named in coverage of companies collecting consumer brain data, though not singled out for wrongdoing; the CEO states the company built on state privacy law and originally required per-data-point opt-in. This is a future-compliance and claims-substantiation risk, not a current finding.
• FDA: Neurable deliberately markets as wellness, not a medical device, so it sits outside FDA jurisdiction as long as it makes no medical/diagnostic claims. The forensic risk: the SoundGuys review notes the tech "can allegedly detect patterns associated with neurological conditions like ADHD or Alzheimer's," and Neurable markets an "ADHD" product page — claim-creep toward medical territory is the single most plausible trigger for an FTC/FDA action. Worth watching.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): N/A — no 10-K exists (private).
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER → 0, no CIK), web search (no enforcement), and the absence of any 10-K, as of 2026-06-29. Unaudited per public sources. The live risks are prospective: neural-data privacy legislation and wellness-vs-medical claim discipline.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · IPO-readiness & path-to-tradeable (overlay: replaces "Forward Projection")

No private-watch.json entry exists for Neurable — so this is built /, and I am not writing back to a ledger entry that doesn't exist (flag: a privates.ts entry should be created for Neurable so future refreshes are ledger-warm).

IPO-readiness read: EARLY. Not tradeable on a near horizon.

• Stage: a $35M "Series A" in Dec 2025, ten years after founding = roughly a mid/growth-stage but capital-light company. The relabelled-"Series A" suggests prior rounds were small; this is not a late-stage, pre-IPO balance sheet.
• Readiness blockers (what must happen before an S-1 is conceivable):

1. The licensing model must produce real, recurring revenue — ≥2–3 OEMs shipping "Powered by Neurable AI" products at volume (today: zero shipping, one prototype).
2. A disclosable revenue run-rate / ARR — none exists publicly; IPO-grade scale for a hardware-adjacent licensor is plausibly $50–150M revenue, which Neurable is multiple rounds away from.
3. A crossover-fund round (Fidelity/T. Rowe/Coatue) — absent today; its appearance would be the real IPO-proximity tell.

• Estimated window: No credible IPO inside 3 years on current trajectory; a trade sale to a large consumer-electronics or audio OEM (Sony, Bose, Samsung, HP, Apple) is the more probable exit than an IPO, and arguably the intended end-state of the "Intel Inside" pivot — make the tech indispensable to a strategic, then get acquired.

No Brier forecast logged — --watchlist/unattended mode skips forecast.ts create, and there is no binary EPS/readout to score for a private with undisclosed financials. (If promoted, the right forecast to log is a binary: "≥2 third-party OEMs ship a 'Powered by Neurable AI' consumer product by YE2027, p≈0.4.")

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Neurable is the only BCI company with a product ordinary people actually buy today — it solved the form-factor problem (invisible dry-electrode EEG inside premium headphones) that every clinical-headband rival fails on. With $65M raised and a fresh $35M, it is pivoting from a single $699 SKU to an "Intel Inside" licensing platform with a 45+-patent moat, validated by Mayo/USAF, and an early flagship partner in HP's HyperX whose esports data shows measurable performance gains. If even 3–5 of the world's headwear OEMs embed "Powered by Neurable AI" by 2027–28, Neurable becomes the default attention/cognitive-state layer for consumer wearables — a high-margin, recurring royalty business riding the secular wearables + mental-health-tracking wave (a consumer-neurotech TAM projected to roughly double toward $55B within a decade ). The exit is a strategic acquisition by a Sony/Bose/Samsung/Apple that needs the sensing IP. Capital-efficient, real IP, first-mover, asset-light upside.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. The product may be a solution in search of a problem. $699 (now $499) for focus tracking is a discretionary novelty; "niche product for now" is the independent verdict. If consumers don't sustain the behaviour (focus-tracking has high churn risk), the funnel that feeds the licensing pitch never materialises.
2. The licensing model is unproven and the buyers can in-house it. Zero OEM products ship at scale today; HyperX is a prototype. Worse, the attractive OEMs (Apple/Samsung/Sony) have the in-house silicon, ML, and acquisition budgets to build or buy EEG-in-headset themselves — leaving Neurable to license only to mid-tier players who can't move volume. The "Intel Inside" analogy assumes Neurable's IP is non-replicable; a 45-patent estate around dry electrodes is a speed bump, not Intel's fab moat.
3. Neural-data regulation could throttle the data flywheel and the claims. The FTC/MIND-Act scrutiny and ADHD/Alzheimer's claim-creep are a live risk to both the training-data engine and the marketing message.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke). It's late 2027. The licensing pipeline stalled at one prototype — HyperX shipped a limited SKU but no major OEM signed at volume; the big players quietly built their own. MW75 sales plateaued as the focus-tracking novelty wore off and churn climbed. A larger audio brand launched a cheaper "good-enough" EEG earbud (NextSense-style), commoditising the category. An FTC inquiry into neural-data claims forced Neurable to soften its marketing and pause data collection, blunting the AI. The $35M funded a pivot that didn't convert, and the next round comes at a flat/down valuation or not at all — pushing Neurable toward an acqui-hire rather than the platform exit.

Are multiples too high? n/a — no public valuation to assess. The relevant discipline: don't underwrite the licensing royalty stream as if it exists — it doesn't yet.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see). Both the BCI-hype crowd and the BCI-skeptics mis-file Neurable. The hype crowd lumps it with Neuralink and over-rates it (it's not implants); the skeptics dismiss all consumer EEG as toys and under-rate it (it ships, has real IP, and is the obvious sensing-IP acquisition for any audio/wearables giant that decides cognitive-state is the next biometric after heart rate and SpO2). The non-consensus take: Neurable's value is as an acquisition target for the consumer-electronics majors, not as a standalone platform IPO — and that makes the $65M-in-a-decade capital efficiency a feature, because it keeps the eventual purchase price digestible.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case as a skeptical short-seller:

• What structurally breaks the model? Neurable monetises a behaviour (consumers wanting quantified focus) that may not be durable or large. Focus-tracking is gimmick-adjacent; the independent review calls it niche and recommends waiting for cheaper options — i.e. the value prop doesn't justify the price for normal buyers. No disclosed revenue, ARR, or unit numbers in any source — for a company that's shipped since 2024, the silence on sales is itself a bearish tell.
• Revenue concentration: today it is effectively one product, one hardware partner (Master & Dynamic), one SKU family. If M&D deprioritises the line or the licensing pivot stalls, there is no diversified base underneath.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the hard part Neurable solved (dry-electrode signal quality) is engineering, not physics — well-funded incumbents can replicate or license around 45 patents. The "data flywheel" is throttled by the CEO's own (commendable) privacy stance and a tiny 132-participant training base. The validation logos (Mayo/USAF) are research engagements, not revenue or endorsements.
• Most dangerous underestimated competitor: the OEM customers themselves (Apple/Samsung/Sony) and NextSense (Alphabet-X DNA, earbud form factor, $35M, launched Feb 2026). The "Intel Inside" strategy hands your roadmap to partners who can become competitors.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance concerns: none egregious — but ten years and ~$65M for a still-pre-scale licensing pivot is a long road, and the twice-used "Series A" label hints at a hard fundraising path and possibly unfavourable terms not disclosed.
• What must hold for the (implicit) valuation? That ≥3–5 OEMs ship at volume by 2027–28 and the majors choose to license rather than in-house and neural-data regulation stays permissive. Three independent must-holds = fragile.
• If licensing growth disappoints 20–30% (i.e., 1 OEM instead of 3–5): the platform thesis collapses to "a niche headphone company with a patent portfolio," and the realistic outcome is a modest acqui-hire, impairing growth-equity expectations.
• Single permanent-impairment scenario (most plausible): a major OEM (Apple/Sony) ships its own EEG-in-headset/earbud, commoditising the sensing layer before Neurable signs enough licensees — plausibility: moderate-and-rising given the wearables biometrics arms race. That would strand Neurable as a sub-scale licensor.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What was MW75 Neuro (incl. LT) unit volume and revenue in 2025, and what is the 2026 run-rate? (The undisclosed number that most changes the view.)
2. How many OEM licensing agreements are signed (not in talks), and how many will ship products at volume in 2026 and 2027?
3. What are the actual licensing economics — per-unit royalty, minimums, exclusivity — and what gross margin does the licensing segment carry vs. the hardware?
4. What stops Apple, Samsung, or Sony from building or acquiring this in-house — concretely, which patents are blocking, and have any majors approached you to license or acquire?
5. What is current cash runway at today's burn, and what milestones must hit before the next raise — and would the next round be priced above the Dec-2025 round?
6. Is the exit thesis an IPO or a strategic acquisition? If a major audio/wearables OEM offered to acquire the sensing IP in 18 months, would you sell?
7. How large is the training dataset now (you cited 132 participants), and how does the "we don't collect willy-nilly" stance limit the AI flywheel you're selling to OEMs?
8. How do you defend the focus-classification accuracy claims against an FTC Section-5 / "MIND Act" inquiry — what independent (non-vendor) validation exists?
9. The ADHD product page and "detects patterns associated with ADHD/Alzheimer's" framing flirts with medical claims — what is the bright line that keeps you out of FDA jurisdiction, and who polices it?
10. What is churn/retention on the focus-tracking app, and what % of MW75 owners are still actively tracking after 90 days?
11. How dependent is the business on Master & Dynamic, and what happens to the hardware line if that partnership ends?
12. What did the HyperX esports results actually control for, and will any third party replicate the +43ms/−38ms reaction-time gains?
13. Which is the bigger 2027 revenue line — your own hardware or partner royalties — and when does the crossover happen?
14. What is the most likely reason this company is worth zero in five years, and what are you doing about it?
15. Why has it taken a decade to reach a $35M "Series A," and what changed in the market that makes the licensing model viable now when it wasn't before?

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