SBA Communications

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

SBA is a leading independent owner/operator of wireless communications infrastructure — macro towers, rooftops, and other antenna-supporting structures. The model is dead simple and beautiful: own the vertical real estate, lease antenna space to wireless carriers on long-term contracts with built-in escalators, and stack multiple tenants on one fixed-cost asset so every incremental tenant is ~100% margin. As of 2025-12-31 SBA owned 46,328 towers (17,394 domestic / 28,934 international), with an average of 1.8 tenants per site. As of 2026-03-31 the count was 46,358.

Two business lines:

• Site leasing — 97.4%+ of total segment operating profit for each of the last three years (97.9% in FY2025); site-leasing revenue $2,570.6M of total $2,815.1M in FY2025. This is the company.
• Site development — US-only construction/install services for carriers; complementary, low-margin, cyclical. FY2025 revenue $244.5M (+59.9% YoY on a carrier-activity surge).

Contract structure (the moat in the fine print): US tenant leases are 5–10yr initial terms with multiple tenant-option renewals and specific annual rent escalators (mid-single-digit fixed). International leases run 5–15yr with fixed and/or CPI-linked escalators. ~71% of tower structures sit on land SBA owns or controls >20 years (avg remaining ground-lease life 35yr), insulating margins from ground-rent inflation. This is a contractual, escalating, recurring-revenue annuity book.

Customers: highly concentrated in the US "Big 3." FY2025 % of total revenue — T-Mobile 31.1%, AT&T 20.3%, Verizon 15.1% = 66.5% from three counterparties. Internationally, the major carrier in each of 12 markets (Brazil ~30% of towers, Guatemala ~10%; Millicom/Tigo now an anchor after the 2025 acquisition).

Suppliers / competitors: Competes with the other two listed US towercos (American Tower, Crown Castle), private towercos, carrier-owned towers, and increasingly DAS/small-cell/fiber for densification. Few "suppliers" in the input sense — the key counterparties upstream are ground-lease landlords (which SBA is buying out) and tower-construction crews.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Tower REITs don't have a manufacturing supply chain; the "chain" is the capital-and-land-to-rent value chain:

Ground-lease landlords / land → SBA (owns the steel + the land rights) → antenna space leased → wireless carriers (T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon, Tigo/Millicom, Vivo, Claro, TIM, MTN) → mobile subscribers

Named stakeholders along the chain:

• Land layer (upstream chokepoint SBA is collapsing): independent ground-lease owners. SBA's ground-lease purchase program (spent ~$48.9M on land buyouts + $12.2M extending terms in FY2025) is a deliberate move to own the chokepoint under its own assets. Subsequent to year-end it bought land under ~3,900 sites in Guatemala for $109.0M.
• Capital layer (the real "supplier"): the securitization market. SBA funds itself with $7.2B of Secured Tower Revenue Securities (the towers themselves are the collateral via a NY common-law trust), a $2.3B Term Loan, and a $2.0B revolver. Its true upstream dependency is the rate at which it can roll this debt.
• Carrier buyers (downstream concentration): the Big 3 in the US plus Tigo/Millicom (anchor of the 7,110-tower Central America deal, with a 7-yr exclusivity to build up to 2,500 BTS sites), Vivo/Claro/TIM (Brazil), MTN (Africa).
• Single-source / chokepoint risk: carrier consolidation is the dominant chokepoint — when two tenants merge (Sprint→T-Mobile; potentially DISH/EchoStar exiting), overlapping leases churn off. This is the structural fragility of the whole tower model and is live right now (see Lens 13).

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The tower model is one of the best moats in public equities, and SBA has it:

• Irreplaceable local-monopoly real estate + zoning. A tower with carrier tenants and a zoning permit is effectively un-replicable next door — new-build faces NEPA/NHPA/ESA/FAA/FCC review and local opposition. Switching costs are brutal: a carrier moving antennas off a tower means re-permitting, re-engineering coverage, and downtime.
• Operating leverage / scale. Costs are ~fixed per tower; tenant 2 and tenant 3 drop ~straight to operating profit. At 1.8 tenants/site there is real lease-up runway. SBA explicitly runs an asset-light SG&A model — it can "materially increase" the portfolio "without proportionately increasing SG&A".
• Contractual escalators + long land control. ~3% annual built-in domestic price growth regardless of new leasing; ~71% land owned/controlled >20yr caps the cost side.
• Bargaining power — mixed. Over landlords: high and rising (buying the land). Over carriers: weak and concentrated — three US tenants are two-thirds of revenue and they coordinate hard on cost (the Sprint and now DISH churn events show who has the leverage when networks consolidate). This is the single asymmetry that separates SBA's moat from a true toll road.

SBA is the smallest and most US-mid-cap-concentrated of the big three — more domestic-organic-growth-levered than AMT (data-center/global) and structurally cleaner than CCI (which just exited fiber/small-cell). That makes SBA the purest macro-tower play of the three.

Lens 4 · Segments

By reportable segment, FY2025 (all ``):

Trend read:

• Domestic is flat-lining (+0.2%) — the tell of the whole story. Organic growth + new sites is being almost entirely offset by Sprint and other lease non-renewals. Domestic segment operating profit actually fell -0.4%. This deceleration deepened in Q1-2026, where domestic site-leasing revenue fell -2.3% YoY as Sprint + EchoStar + other churn outran organic.
• International is the growth engine (+24.8% in Q1-2026) — entirely the Millicom/Tigo 7,110-tower Central America acquisition, not organic. Brazil = 13.5–13.6% of site-leasing revenue. International carries lower margin and FX + churn risk (Oi wireline churn ongoing).
• Geography: US still ~72.6% of site-leasing revenue (FY2025); no single US state >10%; Brazil the only >5% foreign market.

The mix is shifting toward lower-margin, FX-exposed international precisely as the high-margin US book stalls on churn. That is a quality-of-growth headwind, not a tailwind.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, period ended 2026-03-31)

Headline (all GAAP figures ``):

• Total revenue $703.4M vs $664.2M PY = +5.9% YoY (international acquisition-led; domestic down).
• Net income $184.9M vs $217.9M PY = −15.1% YoY.
• Diluted EPS $1.74 vs $2.04 PY = −14.7% YoY. The decline is driven by higher interest expense, a higher tax provision, EchoStar bad-debt, and the absence of PY one-time gains — not an operational collapse.
• Segment op profit: domestic site leasing −3.3% YoY (Sprint + EchoStar churn); international +26.2% (Millicom); site leasing = 98.5% of segment operating profit.
• AFFO/share ~$3.19 (company release; one secondary source cited $3.03 — see conflict note) ``. This is the REIT cash metric that matters and it held up better than GAAP EPS.
• Market reaction & guidance: despite a GAAP EPS miss, management raised full-year 2026 guidance for site-leasing revenue, Tower Cash Flow, Adjusted EBITDA, AFFO and AFFO/share, citing Q1 outperformance, higher straight-line revenue and favorable FX ``. Crucially, they removed all future recurring EchoStar revenue from guidance and are litigating to recover it.

Conflict surfaced (provenance discipline): Q1-2026 AFFO/share is reported as $3.19 in the primary release summary and $3.03 in one aggregator. I use ~$3.19 (the figure tied to the company release and the "industry-leading AFFO/share" framing) but flag the ~5% discrepancy as unverified against the 8-K exhibit (the press-release PDF/HTML 403'd and the SEC 8-K exhibit was not fetched). n/a — exact AFFO/share not verified against 8-K.

FY2025 full-year backdrop (all ``):

• Total revenue $2,815.1M (+5.1%); Adjusted EBITDA $1,912.1M (+1.4% reported, +1.4% cc) — note EBITDA grew far slower than revenue, a margin-pressure signal from churn + impairments.
• GAAP net income $1,054.5M (+40.8% YoY), but flattered by a $208.4M gain on asset sales + a $121.5M FX intercompany-loan remeasurement gain vs a $236.5M loss PY — i.e. the net-income jump is largely non-operating.
• Diluted EPS $9.80 (FY2025) vs $6.94 (FY2024) vs $4.61 (FY2023) — again, the YoY surge is non-operating.
• Asset impairment & decommission costs $184.2M (+93.4%), "primarily related to EchoStar and Oi" — management is already writing down towers tied to the churn risk.

Balance-sheet flags (FY2025, ``):

• Total debt $12.90B ($1.94B current + $10.96B long-term).
• Cash $264.6M + restricted $167.8M; net debt ~$12.6B.
• Net debt / Adjusted EBITDA ≈ 6.6x. Covenant ceiling is 6.5x Consolidated Net Debt/EBITDA at the credit-agreement borrower level (a different, looser definition); SBA reports it was in compliance. Still, this is a high-leverage REIT operating near the top of its comfort band.
• Shareholders' deficit −$4.85B — normal and expected for a mature tower REIT that has returned more than its book equity via buybacks/dividends; not a solvency flag, but it means there is no equity cushion and the whole structure rides on stable cash flows.
• Operating cash flow $1,291.3M (−3.3% YoY, on higher interest + working capital).

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on disk; sentiment from web ``. Tone trajectory across the last several calls:

• 2023–2024: defensive — "managing Sprint churn," rate-environment headwinds, strong-dollar drag, refinancing focus ``.
• Late 2025 / Q4-2025: more constructive — Millicom integration, domestic leasing "steady," capital-allocation discipline.
• Q1-2026 (latest): two-faced — bullish on raising the full-year outlook, but management openly conceded 2026 AFFO/share will DECLINE year-over-year, weighed by "DISH and Oi churn, the last big year of Sprint, and financing headwinds," and called 2026 the peak year for international churn ($36–40M guided, incl. $14M Oi wireline) . They also flagged a target of an **inaugural investment-grade bond issuance in 2026** — a strategic shift toward IG that, if achieved, lowers the cost of capital.
• Recurring phrases: "quality assets," "return criteria," "AFFO per share," "opportunistic." What they started saying: "investment grade," "litigate our contractual rights" (EchoStar). What they stopped saying: the confident multi-year AFFO/share growth narrative — replaced by a "trough year, growth resumes after" framing.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = the listed tower REITs. Multiples ``, dated; SBA's own forward multiple derived from AFFO guidance.

Reads:

• SBA carries the lowest dividend yield (~2.3%) of the three by a wide margin — because it runs the lowest payout ratio (~41% of AFFO) and retains cash for buybacks/builds. That is a quality signal, not a cheapness signal.
• On forward P/AFFO, SBA (~15.5x) screens modestly cheaper than AMT (~16.5x) — but AMT is growing AFFO/share in 2026 while SBA's is declining, so the lower multiple is arguably deserved this year, not a gift.
• 5-yr average ROE: n/a (and structurally meaningless for a negative-equity tower REIT; ROIC on towers is the right frame and is not cleanly sourced this run). n/a.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~5yr)

Pattern ``:

• 2022–2023 rate shock: the dominant driver. Long-duration bond-proxy REITs (SBAC, AMT, CCI) de-rated hard as the 10-yr ripped — SBA fell well off its highs purely on rates, not fundamentals ``.
• Sprint/T-Mobile churn disclosures (2023–2025): each guidance update quantifying $25–30M+ of annual Sprint churn pressured the stock — churn is the name's idiosyncratic risk and the market reacts to it.
• April 2, 2026 — the big one: Bloomberg reported SBA is exploring a sale after preliminary takeover interest from infrastructure funds (KKR, Brookfield named, rumored ~$250/share). Stock jumped ~14% intraday to ~$204–205 ``. It has since fully round-tripped to $186.87 (2026-06-18) — i.e. the entire takeover premium has bled out, signaling the market now assigns low odds to a near-term deal at a premium.
• EchoStar/DISH force-majeure + sector downgrades (2025–2026): AMT and CCI were downgraded as the EchoStar dispute clouded tower leasing; SBA caught the same draft ``.

What the market actually reacts to for SBAC: (1) interest rates (it's a bond proxy), (2) carrier-churn events (Sprint, now DISH/EchoStar), (3) M&A/consolidation headlines. Not quarterly organic beats — those are too steady to move it.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO Brendan Cavanagh — CEO since January 2024; a 27-year SBA lifer, including 15 years as CFO before the top job ``. This is a deep insider promotion, not an outside parachute.
• Track record (quantified): on Cavanagh's watch as CFO, SBA's total revenue grew ~555% and enterprise value expanded from ~$6B to ~$43B; the company closed ~1,400 tower M&A transactions over the years ``. He owns the balance sheet and the capital-allocation playbook cold — the IG-bond push and the disciplined buyback program are his fingerprints.
• Capital allocation (the scorecard from the filings): FY2025 — $497.8M of buybacks (2.5M shares at avg $200.73), $479.0M of dividends paid, $1.01B of tower acquisitions (Millicom-led), and net debt repayment of the cheap tower securities as they matured. The stated priority stack: quality assets → buybacks → dividend growth → (in a high-rate world) debt repayment. One flag: buying back $497.8M at ~$200.73 in 2025, then watching the stock sit at $186.87 in mid-2026, means the FY2025 repurchase is currently underwater — defensible for a long-term compounder, but not the masterstroke timing the buyback narrative implies.
• Skin in the game: insiders ~16.7% (a notably high figure for a large-cap REIT, though largely driven by long-tenured founder/early-holder stakes; Richard Worley ~7.68% is the largest individual holder) . Institutional ownership ~98.8%; Vanguard ~7.6–12.8%, BlackRock ~10.5% .
• Red flags: none material on governance/related-party from the filings (Item 13 of the 10-K incorporates by reference; no related-party deals surfaced). The honest strategy tell is that management itself is guiding to a down AFFO/share year — credibility-positive (not sandbagging the churn) but a growth-narrative negative.
• Archetype: professional manager / financial operator (vs founder). For a mature, leverage-and-allocation-driven tower REIT at this stage, that is exactly the right archetype — the value is created in the financing and M&A math, which is his home turf.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on FY2025 (`` unless noted):

• Revenue recognition / straight-line: site-leasing revenue includes non-cash straight-line leasing revenue (the escalator smoothing). FY2025 non-cash straight-line revenue was only $6.4M (down from $10.9M) — small and shrinking, so reported revenue is overwhelmingly cash. Clean. Management raising guidance partly on "higher straight-line revenue" in Q1-2026 is worth a mild eyebrow (straight-line is non-cash), but the magnitude is immaterial.
• Net income quality: GAAP net income is heavily flattered by non-operating items — a $208.4M asset-sale gain + $121.5M FX intercompany remeasurement gain in FY2025. The +40.8% net-income jump and the $9.80 EPS overstate operating momentum; Adjusted EBITDA (+1.4%) and the declining 2026 AFFO/share guide are the truer signals. This is the most important forensic point: don't be fooled by the GAAP EPS line.
• Impairments: $184.2M asset impairment/decommission (+93.4%), explicitly tied to EchoStar and Oi — management is pre-emptively writing down tower carrying values as churn risk crystallizes. Honest, but a leading indicator that the churn is real, not theoretical.
• Cash flow vs earnings: operating cash flow $1,291.3M vs GAAP net income $1,054.5M — OCF comfortably exceeds net income (D&A + non-cash items), normal and healthy for a REIT. No divergence flag.
• Receivables: AR rose to $171.3M from $145.7M (+17.5%) on roughly flat revenue — partly the EchoStar bad-debt issue (SBA is accruing then reserving for a tenant that stopped paying). Watch this; it's the balance-sheet footprint of the DISH dispute.
• Leverage / SBC / goodwill: net debt ~6.6x EBITDA (high but covenant-compliant); non-cash comp $75.7M (~2.7% of revenue, modest, not flattering non-GAAP egregiously); intangibles $2.88B (rose with Millicom — acquisition-driven, watch for future impairment if international churn worsens).

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. total_sec_findings: 0 over 2021-06-20 → 2026-06-20 via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER).
• Item 3 (Legal Proceedings), FY2025 10-K — quoted: "We are involved in various legal proceedings relating to claims arising in the ordinary course of business. We do not believe that the ultimate resolution of these matters will have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations, or liquidity.". (Note: SBA is a plaintiff against EchoStar/DISH in US District Court, Colorado — that is offensive litigation to recover rent, not a liability.)
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): No material FTC/DOJ/FCC enforcement actions, consent decrees, fines, or penalties against SBA surfaced . The only material litigation is the **EchoStar/DISH non-payment suit where SBA is the plaintiff** alongside AMT and CCI .
• Verdict: No material regulatory or accounting-enforcement findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-20. The one forensic caveat is the GAAP-net-income-flattered-by-non-operating-gains point above — a quality-of-earnings issue, not an integrity issue.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (AFFO/share — the right metric for a REIT)

For a tower REIT, AFFO/share is the projection target, not EPS (GAAP EPS is distorted by D&A, impairments, and FX gains, as Lens 10 shows). Building from the company's own framing + guidance:

Anchor: FY2026 AFFO/share guidance ~$12.0 midpoint (total AFFO $1.27–1.32B), explicitly guided DOWN vs FY2025 ``. FY2025 AFFO/share was therefore ~$12.5–13.

Refi math (the financing headwind, quantified): SBA's outstanding Tower Securities include tranches at 1.631%–2.593% (2020-1C, 2021-1C, 2021-2C, 2021-3C) maturing/repaying 2026–2028. They are being refinanced into a ~5.25% world (revolver is 4.815%, 2024 securities 4.65–4.83%, term loan blended 5.165%). Every billion that rolls from ~2% to ~5% is ~$30M/yr of incremental interest — a direct, mechanical AFFO headwind that persists for years. This is the under-appreciated structural drag.

Forecast NOT logged (forecast.ts create skipped per --watchlist rules — breadth mode produces the dossier; the Brier forecast is logged only on a committed base case in a focused pass).

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. SBA owns ~46,000 irreplaceable, zoned, multi-tenant towers throwing off contractual, escalating, ~85%-margin (domestic) cash flows — one of the highest-quality recurring-revenue books in public markets. It is the purest macro-tower play (no fiber/DC distractions), run by a financial operator who 10x'd EV as CFO. 2026 is a clearly-telegraphed trough: DISH + Oi + the last big Sprint year + the 2%→5% refi wall all hit at once, and then the churn abates (mgmt: 2026 = peak) while ~3% domestic escalators + Millicom lease-up + a 41%-payout buyback engine compound AFFO/share at high-single-digits again. The stock has fully round-tripped the April takeover spike — you're buying back at the un-bid price with an embedded, real strategic-buyer put (KKR/Brookfield at a rumored $250 = ~34% above spot). An inaugural IG bond rating would structurally lower the cost of capital. Contrarian read: the market is over-extrapolating a one-year trough into a broken compounder.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. Customer concentration meets carrier consolidation. 66.5% of revenue from three US carriers, and the industry is consolidating (Sprint gone, DISH/EchoStar dying). If EchoStar liquidates its network and a fourth carrier never re-emerges, the long-run US tenant count structurally shrinks — the moat's one weak wall.
2. The refi wall is real and multi-year. ~$4B+ of sub-3% securities reprice to ~5%+ through 2028; this is a mechanical, not cyclical, AFFO drag that can keep AFFO/share flat for years even if leasing is fine.
3. It's still a bond proxy at 6.6x leverage. If the 10-yr stays high or rises, a negative-equity, highly-levered REIT yielding only ~2.3% has limited valuation support — the multiple can compress further. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): EchoStar defaults with zero recovery, the takeover interest evaporates entirely (deal premium already gone — that's the early warning), rates grind higher forcing the cheap securities to refi at 5.5%+, international churn (Oi) runs hotter than the $14M guide, and AFFO/share is still down in 2027 — the "trough" was a step down, not a dip. The ~15.5x AFFO multiple re-rates to ~13x and the stock has a 1 in front of a lower number. Are multiples too high? Not egregiously — ~15.5x AFFO is below AMT's ~16.5x. But for a name with declining current-year AFFO/share, even a fair multiple offers no margin of safety until the churn cliff is visibly behind it.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• The "trough year" framing is a tell, not a comfort. Management is guiding AFFO/share DOWN — the first down year in a long time for a supposed compounder. Bulls treat 2026 as a clean dip; the short treats it as the first visible crack in the tower super-cycle as US carrier consolidation runs out of tenants. There is no fourth national carrier coming.
• Revenue concentration is the kill-shot vector. 66.5% from T-Mobile/AT&T/Verizon. The Sprint churn already flat-lined domestic revenue to +0.2%. EchoStar/DISH is the same movie, Act II — and DISH is selling its spectrum to AT&T ($23B) and SpaceX ($17B), i.e. dismantling the very network that leases the towers. If DISH's force-majeure claim wins (or it simply liquidates), SBA loses the revenue and has to litigate for years for partial recovery. The $184M impairment already names EchoStar — management is telling you it's real.
• The moat is weaker than bulls think on the demand side. Carriers are the customer and the competitor (they can build, they can densify with small cells/fiber, they can consolidate leases). SBA has pricing power over landlords, not over the three buyers who are two-thirds of its book.
• Worst capital-allocation move: buying back $497.8M at ~$200.73 in 2025 into a stock now at $186.87 — value-destructive timing on the largest discretionary use of cash, right before a guided-down year.
• What must hold for $186.87: that 2026 is genuinely the trough, churn abates on schedule, the 2%→5% refi drag is absorbed by escalators+lease-up, and EchoStar is recovered or immaterial. If AFFO/share growth disappoints by 20–30% (i.e. stays flat through 2028 instead of compounding 6–7%), the name is worth ~$150–160 on a 13x AFFO multiple.
• Single permanently-impairing scenario: the US settles into a stable three-carrier oligopoly that has finished consolidating — meaning the multi-tenant lease-up thesis (1.8 → 2.x tenants/site) caps out and reverses, while international (Brazil/Oi FX + churn) never compensates. Plausibility: moderate — this is a slow-burn structural risk, not a 2026 event, but it's the one that breaks the compounder permanently.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Post-2026, what is the normalized organic domestic leasing growth rate once Sprint, DISH/EchoStar, and Oi churn fully roll off — and what's the bridge from +0.2% (2025) back to it?
2. On EchoStar/DISH: what is your realistic recovery range (litigation + the FCC $2.4B escrow), over what timeframe, and how much recurring revenue have you permanently removed vs temporarily?
3. What is the all-in weighted-average cost of debt you expect by end-2028 as the 1.6–2.6% tower securities refinance, and how much AFFO/share does that refi wall cost cumulatively?
4. You're targeting an inaugural investment-grade rating — what's the timeline, the leverage target it requires, and how many bps of funding cost does it actually save?
5. Given the April takeover interest at a rumored ~$250 vs $187 today, how is the Board weighing a sale/take-private against the standalone plan — and what would make you transact?
6. Is there a fourth-carrier or new-tenant-class thesis (FWA, private networks, satellite/AST, edge DC) large enough to offset US carrier consolidation, or is the US a structurally three-tenant market now?
7. Why is buyback still ahead of debt repayment in the priority stack at 6.6x leverage and a ~5% marginal refi cost — what IRR hurdle does a buyback clear vs deleveraging?
8. What are the realistic returns on the Millicom/Central America build-out (the 2,500-site BTS exclusivity), and how do you underwrite FX + churn (Oi-style) risk internationally?
9. How should investors think about AFFO/share growth vs dividend growth — you raised the dividend ~13% into a down AFFO year; is the ~41% payout the floor or does it expand?
10. What's the edge-compute / regional-data-center optionality really worth — is it a rounding error you're "learning" on, or a future segment? (You own 3 regional DCs + tower-based DCs.)
11. How exposed is the international book to further FX devaluation (BRL especially at ~13.5% of leasing revenue), and what's hedged vs unhedged?
12. What's your M&A pipeline and return discipline now that private infra capital (KKR/Brookfield) is bidding up tower assets — are you a buyer or a seller of towers at these multiples?
13. What share of the portfolio is at risk of decommissioning over 3 years if a major tenant exits, and what's the carrying value exposure beyond the $184M already taken?
14. How do you defend pricing power as carriers push densification toward small cells/fiber/CBRS that partly bypass macro towers?
15. What is the long-term target leverage and the path to it — is 6.5x the ceiling you manage to, or are you committed to bringing it down toward an IG-consistent level?

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