SK On

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

SK On is the world's #6 EV-battery cell maker, spun out of SK Innovation as a standalone company in October 2021 when SK Innovation carved its battery division off the petrochemical/refining parent . The product is high-energy-density lithium-ion cells — historically **high-nickel NCM** (nickel-cobalt-manganese) and NCA pouch cells aimed at premium long-range EVs, now diversifying into **prismatic, cylindrical (incl. the 4680 form factor), and LFP** chemistries .

Business model in plain terms: SK On is a contract cell manufacturer. It wins multi-year offtake/supply agreements with automakers, builds (often via JV) a dedicated gigafactory near the customer's assembly plant, and sells cells/modules at negotiated prices tied to raw-material indices. It is capital-devouring — every unit of revenue requires a gigafactory built years ahead of the cash flow — and for its entire existence as a standalone it has been loss-making, funded by the parent and by external capital raises. It reached its first-ever quarterly operating profit in Q2 2025 (KRW 60.9bn) post-merger, then slid back into losses in H2 2025 and Q1 2026 ``.

Corporate structure (critical): On November 1, 2025, SK On absorbed two sister units — SK Enmove (lubricants/cooling fluids, profitable cash-cow) and SK Trading International — in a merger explicitly engineered to repair SK On's balance sheet, inject ~KRW 1.7tn of equity, and add ~KRW 800bn of EBITDA ``. So the entity now called "SK On" is no longer a pure-play battery maker — it is a battery business with a lubricants annuity bolted on for ballast.

Main customers: Hyundai/Kia (the anchor going forward), Ford (relationship continues post-JV-breakup but de-anchored), Volkswagen, Nissan, Mercedes, and US EV startup Slate Auto (the Bezos-backed pickup startup; $2.8bn deal, 2025) ``. Main suppliers: POSCO Future M, Ecopro BM / Ecopro Materials, L&F (cathode); POSCO and Pilbara/Argentine sources (lithium); China's GEM (precursors) — see Lens 2. Main competitors: CATL, BYD (Chinese leaders), LG Energy Solution, Samsung SDI (Korean peers), Panasonic (Japan).

Contract structure / payment terms: Long-term volume supply agreements, frequently structured as 50/50 JVs (BlueOval SK with Ford; HSAGP/Bartow with Hyundai). Pricing is typically cost-plus with raw-material pass-through, which protects gross margin on metals but exposes SK On to volume/utilization risk — fixed-cost gigafactories are murderous when the customer cuts orders, exactly what happened at Georgia in 2026 (Lens 5). No take-or-pay floor strong enough to have prevented ~1,000 layoffs.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream → SK On → end customer, named at every link:

Raw materials (mined): Lithium — POSCO (supply deal through 2028, up to 25,000t lithium concentrate from Argentina ≈ enough for ~400k EV batteries; plus a separate 3-year POSCO Pilbara Lithium Solution deal for up to 15,000t lithium hydroxide) ``. Nickel/cobalt/manganese sourced through precursor partners.

Precursors (65–70% of cathode cost): SK On + Ecopro Materials + China's GEM joint precursor plant at Saemangeum, Korea — SK On committed up to KRW 1.21tn ``. Chokepoint + FEOC risk: GEM is a Chinese entity; under the OBBBA's tightened Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) rules, Chinese "material assistance" can disqualify the final cell from 45X credits (Lens 5/10). A China-linked precursor JV is exactly the dependency the 2025 law was written to punish.

Cathode active material (CAM): POSCO Future M (unique in Korea as a supplier of both cathode AND anode active material), Ecopro BM, L&F (ultra-high-nickel NCM) ``.

Anode / separator / electrolyte: POSCO Future M (anode); SK IE Technology (SKIET) — a sister SK affiliate — for separators (vertical integration within the SK family); electrolyte from Korean/Chinese suppliers.

Cell manufacturing (SK On): Plants in Korea (Seosan), Hungary (Komárom — Europe hub for VW/Mercedes), China (Yancheng/Changzhou), and the US (Commerce GA; Tennessee ex-BlueOval; Bartow GA with Hyundai).

End customers: Hyundai/Kia (Metaplant GA), Ford (F-150 Lightning — cancelled, the proximate cause of the Georgia layoffs), VW, Nissan, Mercedes, Slate; plus a new ESS channel — Flatiron Energy, and US data-center/grid developers (Lens 5).

Single-source / chokepoint summary: The structural vulnerability is two-sided concentration — heavy reliance on a small number of Korean material partners and a China-linked precursor input that now carries policy risk, feeding into a customer base that just lost its biggest anchor (Ford). The cost stack is Korea/China-centric while the demand and the subsidy are US-centric — a geographic mismatch the 2025 FEOC rules turned from inconvenient to existential.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Honest verdict: SK On's moat is the weakest of the five global majors, and it is narrowing.

• Technology / product: Genuine engineering credibility in high-nickel NCM (fast-charging, high energy density) — a real but shrinking advantage as the market shifts toward LFP, where China (CATL/BYD) owns the cost curve and the IP head-start. SK On is a fast-follower into LFP/ESS, not a leader. Solid-state (2028 polymer-oxide / 2029 sulfide pilot) is a credible R&D effort but is table-stakes — every major has the same roadmap ``.
• Scale: This is the core problem. At ~3.7% global share (FY2025) SK On is sub-scale versus CATL (39%) and BYD (16%) ``. In a commodity-ish manufacturing business, scale is the cost moat — and SK On is on the wrong side of it. The Korean trio's combined share fell 3.5pts YoY.
• Switching costs: Some — automakers co-validate cells over multi-year qualification cycles, so an OEM can't swap suppliers overnight. But the Ford breakup proves the switching cost protects during a program, not between programs: when Ford cancelled the F-150 Lightning, SK On's Georgia line went idle regardless.
• Bargaining power: Weak on both sides. Upstream, it competes with larger LGES/CATL for the same Korean material supply. Downstream, a handful of automakers hold the volume whip; the 2026 layoffs were dictated by one customer's production decision. SK On needs its customers more than they need SK On.
• The one real asset: US manufacturing footprint already built and FEOC-cleaner than Chinese rivals. In a world where the US wants non-Chinese cells, SK On's >180 GWh of in-place/under-construction US capacity is a scarce, hard-to-replicate position ``. That is the entire bull case (Lens 12) — and it is a policy-granted moat, not an earned one, which means policy can revoke it.

Lens 4 · Segments

No standalone segment disclosure exists (SK On is itself a segment of SK Innovation). What is observable ``:

• By product: ~100% EV cells historically; pivoting toward ESS/LFP as a deliberate second leg (target 20 GWh of ESS orders in 2026) ``. Post-Nov-2025 merger, the consolidated entity also carries SK Enmove lubricants revenue (profitable, counter-cyclical) — a structural change to the "segment" mix that flatters consolidated margins.
• By geography: Korea (Seosan), Europe (Hungary — VW/Mercedes), China (Yancheng), US (Georgia / Tennessee / Bartow). By end-2026 ~half of global capacity is US-based, with US output capable of >180 GWh once all plants reach full run-rate ``. Europe and the US are the strategic growth geographies; China is a low-margin defensive presence.
• Trend & cause: EV-cell volume decelerating hard in 2025–26 (US demand collapse post-$7,500-credit repeal; Ford F-150 Lightning cancellation idled Georgia). ESS accelerating from a tiny base but at lower ASPs and into CATL's strongest segment. Net: the mix is shifting from a declining high-margin core to a growing low-margin adjacency — a defensive, not offensive, transition.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print)

SK On is reported inside SK Innovation. The relevant battery-business prints ``:

Read: The Q2 2025 maiden profit was the bull-thesis moment — and it did not hold. By **Q1 2026 the battery business was back to a KRW −349bn operating loss on KRW 1.79tn revenue (≈ −19.5% operating margin )**, as US EV demand cratered and Georgia utilization fell. The headline SK Innovation numbers (Q1 2026 consol. revenue KRW 24.21tn, op. profit KRW 2.16tn ) are carried by refining/petrochemicals and the SK E&S energy business — not by batteries. The battery unit remains a cash sink masked by a diversified parent.

Subsidy dependency, quantified: AMPC (IRA §45X production credits) contributed KRW 101.3bn in Q4 2025 alone ``. For a unit whose quarterly losses run in the hundreds of billions of won, AMPC is the difference between "bad" and "catastrophic" — which is precisely why the OBBBA 45X phase-down (2030→2033) and FEOC tightening is the single most important variable for this name (Lens 10/12/13).

Balance-sheet flags: ~KRW 4.2tn pre-tax impairment on the BlueOval SK restructuring (non-cash, but a hard admission that ~$11.4bn of planned Ford capacity is worth far less than built) . Parent SK Innovation carries **adjusted debt/EBITDA of 7.4x (2025E), easing to 5.4x (2026E)** per S&P — elevated, capex-driven .

Market reaction: No SK On security exists. The read-through instrument is SK Innovation (KRX: 096770), whose share price blends refining, E&S energy, and the battery drag — so battery sentiment is heavily diluted in the only tradeable proxy.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No SK On standalone calls; signal comes from SK Innovation IR calls + management commentary ``. Tonal arc across 2025→2026:

• Early/mid 2025: Cautiously optimistic — "turnaround," "first profitability," merger synergies, US footprint as a differentiator. The Q2 2025 maiden profit was framed as an inflection.
• Late 2025: Defensive pivot — the Ford JV dissolution (Dec 2025) reframed as "boosting solo US capacity" and "flexibility," not as the loss of the anchor customer it was ``.
• 2026: Survival/restructuring language — "manufacturing efficiency," "financial structure improvement," "stabilising the North American business," pivot to ESS/BESS. The May 28 2026 resignation of co-CEO Lee Seok-hee ("health and stamina") and reversion to a sole-CEO (Yong-wook Lee) structure after just ~7 months signals stress at the top ``.

Phrases entering: "BESS / ESS," "LFP," "data-center demand," "manufacturing efficiency," "financial structure." Phrases exiting: confident EV-volume ramp guidance, the BlueOval SK 120 GWh narrative, near-term standalone IPO. The trajectory of management language is unmistakably from growth story to defensive restructuring.

Lens 7 · Comps

SK On has no listed equity, so a P/E table is n/a — no tradeable security. The honest comp set is the listed peer group plus the parent proxy. Multiples are `` where sourced, n/a otherwise (I will not fabricate).

The comp that matters: SK On at ~3.7% sits below LGES (9.2%) and roughly level with Panasonic, while CATL+BYD together command ~55% of the global market ``. In a scale business, being the smallest non-Chinese major with the weakest balance sheet and the anchor customer just lost is the comp story. I am deliberately not quoting market caps/multiples I cannot source to a dated figure.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (read via SK Innovation, KRX:096770)

There is no SK On equity, so "what moves the stock" is necessarily about the parent, where battery is one of three drivers. Events that materially moved SK Innovation / the SK On narrative over ~5 years ``:

• 2021-04 — LG settlement ($1.8bn) removing the US import-ban risk: large overhang lifted ``.
• 2021-10 — SK On spun out as standalone; battery-business value crystallized.
• 2022 — IRA passage: structural positive — turned US gigafactories into subsidy magnets.
• 2023 — MBK/Korea Investment $2bn pre-IPO raise at SK On (IPO-by-2026 obligation attached).
• 2024-11 — SK Innovation ⇄ SK E&S merger (created APAC's largest private energy co, $80.7bn assets) ``.
• 2025-07/11 — SK On ⇄ SK Enmove merger + KRW 8tn group capital raise; CPS buyback eliminating the IPO-deadline/put ``.
• 2025-12 — Ford / BlueOval SK JV dissolution + ~KRW 4.2tn impairment — the defining battery negative ``.
• 2026-03 — Georgia ~1,000 layoffs (Ford F-150 Lightning cancelled) ``.
• 2026 (ongoing) — OBBBA EV-credit repeal (30D gone 2025-09-30; 45X phase-down 2030–2033) + FEOC rules — the macro/policy swing factor ``.

Pattern: The market reacts to (1) US policy (IRA up, OBBBA down), (2) anchor-customer events (Ford on/off), and (3) balance-sheet/capital-structure moves (mergers, raises). It does not reward incremental battery tech. For this name, policy + customers >> product.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Track record: SK On was led under a co-CEO structure (Lee Seok-hee + Lee Yong-wook) from Oct 2025; Lee Seok-hee resigned May 28, 2026 citing "health and stamina," reverting to sole CEO Lee Yong-wook ``. Seok-hee Lee (ex-SK Hynix CEO, a heavyweight semiconductor operator) was brought in for credibility and drove the chemistry/form-factor diversification (LFP, cylindrical, prismatic) and the ESS pivot — directionally correct moves. A ~7-month co-CEO tenure ending in resignation is, however, an instability signal at the worst possible time.
• Tenure & skin in the game: As a chaebol subsidiary, "insider ownership" is not the right lens — control sits with SK Inc. / the Chey family atop the SK Group pyramid. Professional managers run SK On; their incentive is group-strategic (protect the chaebol's electrification bet) as much as standalone-economic. No insider-transactions.csv exists (private).
• Capital-allocation history: Mixed-to-poor on the battery bet specifically. The strategic call to build out massive US capacity ahead of demand looked visionary under the IRA and now looks overbuilt under the OBBBA — a ~KRW 4.2tn impairment is the scoreboard. But the group-level financial engineering has been genuinely skillful: the SK E&S merger, the SK Enmove merger, the KRW 8tn raise, and the CPS buyback collectively defused the IPO-deadline time bomb and cut SK Innovation net debt by >KRW 9.5tn in 2025 ``. So: bad operating timing, good balance-sheet defense.
• Red flags: Chaebol related-party complexity is inherent — SK On buys separators from sister SKIET, merged with sister SK Enmove, and is propped by parent equity. These are defensible as vertical integration but are exactly the related-party webs a forensic analyst must watch (Lens 10). Rapid CEO turnover is a governance amber light.
• Archetype: Professional managers inside a founder-controlled conglomerate — implies survival/strategic-fit priorities over standalone shareholder-value maximization, and a near-certainty that the parent will not let SK On fail (the implicit backstop that is most of the bull case).

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

No audited standalone statements exist, so forensic scrutiny is necessarily second-hand via SK Innovation disclosures + web ``:

• Impairment / asset quality: The ~KRW 4.2tn BlueOval-SK impairment (H2 2025) is the headline item — management flags it as non-cash with no cash-flow impact, but it is a real mark-down of overbuilt US capacity ``. Watch for further impairments if Georgia/Tennessee utilization stays low.
• Revenue/earnings vs. cash: Cost-plus raw-material pass-through can flatter revenue while volume/utilization collapses underneath — the KRW 1.79tn Q1-2026 revenue alongside a KRW −349bn operating loss shows revenue is not the problem; operating deleverage on idle fixed assets is.
• Subsidy-dependent profitability: A unit that needed KRW 101.3bn of AMPC in a single quarter to flatter results is one whose "profit" line is policy-contingent. Any analyst must back AMPC out to see the true operating economics — and they are deeply negative.
• Related-party density: Sister-company separator supply (SKIET), the SK Enmove absorption, parent equity injections, and a China-linked (GEM) precursor JV — all legitimate but all related-party/strategic, reducing the arm's-length transparency a public-market investor would want.
• Stock-based comp / dilution: Not standalone-disclosed (private).

Regulatory findings (required sub-section) — per regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (fetched 2026-06-18):

• SEC (EDGAR EFTS — LR + AAER): No CIK; SK On is not an SEC registrant — no EDGAR enforcement search possible. 0 findings. ``
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): Web search surfaces no material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement action against SK On. The one historically material legal matter is the LG Energy Solution trade-secret dispute, settled April 2021 for KRW 2tn (~$1.8bn) — SK Innovation paid to avert a 10-year US import ban after the USITC ruled against it on trade-secret misappropriation ``. This is settled and historical, but it is a documented finding of misappropriation against the SK battery business and belongs in the file.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): n/a — SK On files no 10-K.
• Net: Aside from the settled 2021 LG matter, no material open regulatory or legal findings were identified via SEC EFTS (n/a — no CIK), web search, and parent disclosure as of 2026-06-18. The dominant "regulatory" risk for this name is not enforcement — it is legislative (OBBBA 45X/FEOC), covered in Lens 12/13.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

No EPS is computable — SK On has no shares, no standalone EPS, and no listed security. Per the SKILL's provenance discipline, I will not fabricate an EPS line. Instead I project the unit's operating trajectory (the decision-relevant variable), built from the latest actuals + disclosed strategy. All figures from actuals.

Base case (most likely): Battery unit stays operating-loss-making through FY2026 and into FY2027, narrowing as (a) ESS/LFP volume ramps (20 GWh order target 2026), (b) the SK Enmove lubricants annuity cushions consolidated margins, and (c) AMPC continues pre-2030 phase-down. Inputs: Q1-2026 run-rate ≈ KRW 1.79tn rev / −KRW 349bn op ; US EV demand flat-to-down post-30D-repeal; Georgia utilization depressed; ESS additive but low-ASP. **FY2026 battery op. loss ≈ KRW −0.8tn to −1.2tn .** Group-level SK Innovation stays profitable on refining/E&S regardless.

Bull case: ESS pivot lands faster than expected (data-center/grid demand is real and US-policy-favored), US "non-Chinese cell" preference drives Hyundai/Slate/new-customer volume into the in-place US footprint, and the unit reaches sustained operating breakeven by late FY2027 ``. Requires ESS ASPs/margins to hold and FEOC rules to help (penalize Chinese rivals more than SK On).

Bear case: US EV demand stays depressed, ESS is a margin-thin race SK On loses to CATL/BYD on cost, FEOC disqualifies SK On's China-precursor-linked cells from 45X, and the unit needs continued parent capital injections to remain solvent into FY2028+ ``. The ~KRW 4.2tn impairment is followed by more.

Brier forecast: Skipped — per the --watchlist breadth-loop rule (forecast.ts create is not run in unattended sweeps), and there is no binary EPS/clinical readout to log for a private subsidiary. The closest scoreable proposition for a future pass: "SK On battery business posts a full-year operating profit in FY2027 (ex-impairments)" — p ≈ 0.30 ``.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. SK On owns something scarce and hard to replicate: >180 GWh of in-place / under-construction US battery capacity that is not Chinese, exactly when US policy (FEOC, reshoring, data-center power demand) wants non-Chinese cells . The Ford breakup, painful as it was, *freed* that Tennessee capacity for higher-value redeployment, and the Hyundai Metaplant JV is a genuine anchor with a committed OEM building cars next door. The **ESS pivot** taps a structurally growing, policy-favored US market (grid + data centers), with a real first deal already signed (Flatiron, 7.2 GWh, ~$1.4bn) and a 20 GWh 2026 order target . Crucially, the balance sheet has been defused — the IPO-deadline put is gone, SK Enmove adds profit ballast, and the SK Group will not let its flagship electrification bet fail. Contrarian read the market is missing: SK On is being priced (inside SKI) as a melting EV-cell ice cube, but it may be quietly re-rating into a US energy-storage infrastructure supplier — a different, better business with a longer runway than the EV-only bears assume.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) Scale is destiny in cells, and SK On has lost it — at ~3.7% global share against CATL+BYD's ~55%, it lacks the cost curve to win a commoditizing market; the Korean trio's share is falling. (2) The growth pivot runs straight into China's stronghold — LFP/ESS is CATL/BYD's home turf on cost; SK On is a sub-scale fast-follower competing on a metric (price) where it is structurally disadvantaged. (3) Subsidy cliff — the business needed KRW 101bn/quarter of AMPC to look less-bad; OBBBA phases 45X down (2030–2033) and FEOC threatens to disqualify China-precursor-linked output now. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broken): US EV demand never recovered post-credit-repeal, Georgia/Tennessee ran far below breakeven, ESS orders came in but at margins that didn't cover fixed costs, a second impairment landed, and SK Innovation had to inject more equity — confirming SK On as a permanent capital sink kept alive by chaebol patience, not economics. Multiples: there's no multiple to call too-high (no listed equity) — the bear expression is via SK Innovation (KRX:096770) carrying a battery drag, or avoiding the name entirely since there is no clean instrument.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case as a skeptic:

• What structurally breaks the model: A cell maker is only as good as its utilization of multi-billion-dollar fixed assets. SK On's utilization is hostage to a handful of OEM volume decisions — and one of them (Ford) just walked, idling Georgia and forcing ~1,000 layoffs ``. The model breaks not from a single event but from structural overcapacity meeting collapsing demand.
• Revenue concentration: Historically Ford-heavy in the US; now Hyundai/Kia-concentrated going forward. Swap one anchor for another and you've still got dangerous single-customer dependence in the key US market. If Hyundai's EV volumes disappoint, Bartow becomes the next Georgia.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: The "US non-Chinese footprint" moat is policy-granted, not earned. It exists because Washington decided to favor non-Chinese cells. A future administration, a budget fight, or a US-China détente can erode it. Earned moats (scale, cost, IP) are where SK On is weakest; its one strength is the one most exposed to political reversal.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: CATL in ESS. Bulls frame ESS as SK On's escape hatch; it is actually CATL's strongest and most cost-advantaged segment. SK On is pivoting into the teeth of the global cost leader, not away from competition. LFP is also where SK On is a latecomer.
• Worst capital-allocation / accounting concerns: A ~KRW 4.2tn impairment is an admission that ~$11.4bn of planned Ford capacity was mis-built. AMPC-flattered "profitability." Dense related-party structure (SKIET, SK Enmove, GEM JV) that obscures arm's-length economics. The Q2-2025 "first profit" that evaporated by Q1-2026.
• Assumptions that must hold for the (implied) value: US EV demand recovers; ESS margins hold against China; FEOC helps rather than hurts; the parent keeps funding losses indefinitely. If volume disappoints another 20–30%, the unit's operating loss widens toward KRW −1.5tn+ and a second impairment becomes likely ``.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: FEOC disqualifies SK On's US cells from 45X (because of China-linked precursors/equipment) while EV demand stays depressed — removing both the subsidy crutch and the volume, turning the US footprint from an asset into a stranded-cost liability. Plausibility: medium — the rules are written, the precursor JV with GEM is real, and the demand weakness is already here.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Back out all AMPC/45X credits — what is the true unsubsidized operating margin of the battery business today, and at what utilization does it breakeven without subsidy?
2. Under the OBBBA FEOC rules, what fraction of your US cell output is at risk of 45X disqualification due to China-linked precursors (GEM) or equipment, and what is the de-risking plan and timeline?
3. Post-Ford, what is the contracted vs. uncontracted volume across Georgia, Tennessee, and Bartow through 2028 — and what utilization do you actually expect in 2026–27?
4. The ESS pivot: at what gross margin are you winning ESS/LFP orders, and how does that compare to CATL/BYD's cost on the same product? Where is your durable edge?
5. Does the SK Group consider SK On a permanent strategic asset to be funded through the cycle, or is there a point at which standalone economics force a different outcome (sale, further merger, partner)?
6. What is the realistic timeline to sustained operating profitability (ex-impairments, ex-AMPC), and what are the two or three milestones that gate it?
7. After the ~KRW 4.2tn BlueOval impairment, what is the risk of further impairments on US assets if utilization stays depressed, and how are you stress-testing carrying values?
8. With the IPO-deadline put eliminated, what is the actual long-term liquidity/listing plan for SK On — standalone IPO, stay embedded in SK Innovation, or another structure?
9. The co-CEO structure ended in a resignation after ~7 months — what does the sole-CEO mandate prioritize, and how is leadership stability being ensured at this moment?
10. How Hyundai-concentrated is the US book becoming, and what is the plan to avoid repeating the single-anchor risk that the Ford breakup exposed?
11. Solid-state (2028/2029) and 4680 — are these defensible differentiators or table-stakes, and what is the capex and probability you actually lead rather than follow?
12. How does the SK Enmove merger change the consolidated entity's margin profile — and are you using lubricants cash flow to subsidize battery losses?
13. What is your raw-material cost position vs. LGES and CATL after the POSCO/Ecopro/GEM arrangements — are you cost-competitive or cost-disadvantaged at the cell level?
14. In Europe (Hungary), how exposed are you to the same EV-demand softness and Chinese competition, and what is the utilization outlook there?
15. If US EV demand does not recover by 2027, what is the contingency — how much further parent capital is the group prepared to commit, and on what conditions?

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