SKY Perfect JSAT

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Business model in plain terms. SKY Perfect JSAT Holdings (renamed "SKY Perfect JSAT Corporation" after an absorption-type merger of holdco + operating sub effective 1 Apr 2026 ) runs two segments:

• Space Business (~¥69.8B rev, FY3/25, +7.9% YoY; segment profit ¥16.1B, +5.6% ). Leases satellite transponder capacity (broadcast, broadband, mobility, government) off a ~18-satellite GEO fleet, plus a fast-growing national-security line (defense communications + Earth-observation imagery for Japan's Ministry of Defense). Revenue is largely recurring multi-year capacity leases — the classic satellite-operator model: high fixed cost (build + launch a ~$200–300M GEO bird, then 15-year amortization), high incremental margin on each transponder sold.
• Media Business (~¥64.3B rev, FY3/25, −1.9% YoY; segment profit ¥7.7B, +74.3% on cost-cutting ). SKY PerfecTV! — Japan's only nationwide multichannel DBS pay-TV platform, ~100+ channels (sports, anime, movies, news) delivered via 110°E satellite, optical fiber (FTTH retransmission, partnered with NTT Plala), and IPTV/OTT. Revenue is monthly subscriber fees + content/platform services.

Group FY3/25 (consolidated): Revenue ¥127,584M (+3.1%); operating income ¥35,273M (+28.3%); EBITDA ¥50,700M (+10.8%); record net income ¥23,311M (+22.0%); EPS ¥82.25.

Main customers. Broadcasters (its own SKY PerfecTV! platform is an internal customer; plus WOWOW, NHK relay, regional broadcasters); telecom carriers and ISPs (maritime/aero connectivity resellers); the Japanese government / Ministry of Defense (the strategic growth account); and other satellite operators — notably SES leases Asia-Pacific capacity from JSAT, a tell that JSAT's orbital slots + Asia coverage are a scarce asset peers rent.

Main suppliers. Satellite primes: Airbus Defence and Space (Superbird-9, OneSat bus), Thales Alenia Space (JSAT-32), historically Lockheed Martin / Boeing / SSL for legacy birds. Launch: SpaceX (Superbird-9 contracted on Starship). EO capacity: Planet Labs (10 Pelican LEO sats, $230M, US subsidiary).

Main competitors. In GEO capacity: SES, Eutelsat (OneWeb), Intelsat/SES (merged), Viasat/Inmarsat, AsiaSat, regionally NTT-adjacent players. In Japanese pay-TV: J:COM (cable), NTT (hikari TV/IPTV), Netflix/Amazon/Disney+ (OTT cord-cutting). In LEO broadband (the existential overhang): Starlink (live in Japan via KDDI's "au Starlink Direct," Apr 2025) and Amazon Leo/Kuiper (JSAT is itself an authorized reseller, Jun 2026 — co-opting rather than fighting).

Contract structure / payment terms. Space = multi-year transponder leases (recurring, take-or-pay-like, concentration risk on a handful of large broadcast/government anchor tenants per satellite). The new defense work is government contracts via consortium/PFI structures (e.g. the ¥283.1B MOD constellation runs through a Special Purpose Company — 5-yr, Feb 2026–Mar 2031 ). Media = monthly subscriber recurring revenue with ~2.4–3.2% monthly churn.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream → company → end customer, named:

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies. (1) Satellite primes — a handful globally; a prime's delay (Superbird-9) directly defers JSAT revenue. (2) Launch — SpaceX dominance. (3) Orbital-slot / spectrum filings — JSAT's regulatory moat (ITU/Japanese MIC slots) is also a single point of dependence: lose/fail-to-defend a slot and the asset evaporates. (4) The Japanese government as the growth customer — see Lens 13.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is regulatory + sovereign, not technological.

1. Sole nationwide DBS license in Japan + the 110°E orbital position — SKY PerfecTV! is the nationwide satellite pay-TV platform; that license and slot are a government-granted near-monopoly in their niche (a melting one, but a monopoly).
2. Asia's largest commercial GEO fleet + scarce Asia-Pacific orbital slots. Peers (SES) rent capacity from JSAT for Asia coverage — a direct revealed-preference signal of slot scarcity.
3. Sovereign-preference moat (the new, widening one). Japan's MOD will overwhelmingly favor a domestic, trusted operator for national-security comms and ISR. JSAT is the incumbent national champion — this is the durable advantage now being repriced. The ¥283.1B constellation PFI and the ¥9B optical-data MOD contract land here.
4. Switching costs / installed base. Broadcast capacity, ground infrastructure, and the IC-card subscriber base create stickiness — but pay-TV switching costs are eroding fast against free/cheap OTT.

Bargaining power. Over suppliers: moderate-to-weak — only ~4 GEO primes and one dominant launcher, so JSAT is a price-taker on hardware (mitigated by dual-sourcing Airbus + Thales). Over customers: strong in defense (sovereign lock-in, JSAT needs MOD less than MOD needs a trusted domestic operator — actually MOD has leverage as a monopsony buyer; see Lens 13), strong-ish in broadcast capacity (slot scarcity), weak and deteriorating in retail pay-TV (subscribers have abundant OTT alternatives — JSAT is the one losing pricing power).

Verdict on moat: real but bifurcated — a strengthening sovereign/regulatory moat in space-defense layered over a eroding distribution moat in pay-TV. The bull thesis is that the former is worth more than the latter is worth losing.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is empty (web-only); all figures ``.

Geography: Predominantly domestic Japan (both segments). Some international capacity (Horizons JV with Intelsat over the Americas/Pacific; SES Asia lease; Planet's global EO capacity). Not separately disclosed in web sources — n/a for a geographic profit split.

The key tell in the segment data: Media's +74% profit jump is cost-cutting, not demand — and management's own FY3/30 Media segment-profit target is only ¥5B, below the ¥7.7B just printed. Translation: management expects Media profit to fall back as the subscriber base keeps eroding past the one-off cost reset. The entire growth narrative rests on Space.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest reported: FY3/25, full year ended 31 Mar 2025)

(No quarterly research-layer data; FY3/25 full-year is the cleanest sourced print. FY3/26 Q-prints exist but were not pulled clean.)

• Revenue ¥127,584M, +3.1% YoY — modest top-line, all the action is mix.
• Operating income ¥35,273M, +28.3% — the standout: OP grew ~9x faster than revenue. Driven by Media cost optimization (+74% segment profit) + Space operating leverage.
• EBITDA ¥50,700M, +10.8%.
• Net income ¥23,311M, +22.0% — record high; EPS ¥82.25. Both OP and NI beat company forecast.
• Beat/miss vs consensus: n/a (no clean consensus line for the FY3/25 print; company beat its own guidance).
• Margin moves: Operating margin ~27.6% (¥35.3B/¥127.6B), up sharply from ~22.2% prior-year-implied (¥27.5B/¥123.7B) — a genuine, large margin expansion, but the source is non-repeatable cost-cutting in Media, not structural.
• Guidance / FY3/26: Revenue ¥135,000M (+5.8%), OP ¥39,000M (+10.6%), EBITDA ¥54,000M (+6.4%), net income ¥27,000M (+15.8%). Tone is confident, growth-tilted.
• Balance-sheet flags: Total assets ~¥399.8B; shareholders' equity ~¥280–296B; interest-bearing debt ~¥33–39B → net cash. D/E ~11%. Very strong sheet — fortress balance sheet funding a ~¥220B growth-capex cycle without strain.
• Market reaction: The stock did not just react to one print — it re-rated ~3.6x over the trailing 52 weeks (¥1,298 → ¥4,720 range; ¥2,677 as of 2026-06-30) on the cumulative defense narrative (see Lens 8). What's priced in: a multi-year defense-revenue ramp, not just FY3/25.
• Unusual vs own history: The ¥35.3B OP and ¥23.3B NI are records; the OP margin step-up is the anomaly to watch — is 27.6% the new base or a cost-cut peak? Lens 12/13 turn on this.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ empty; sentiment is inferred from public IR materials + the CEO's April 2026 Via Satellite "Live in the Booth" interview + management commentary in coverage.

• Dominant management focus (latest): Space as "the main growth engine"; national security as the explicit driver (CEO Yonekura has personally fronted the EO/defense pivot — the Planet constellation, the MOD optical-data contract, the constellation PFI).
• Tone shift over time: From a defensive "manage the pay-TV decline + maintain the GEO fleet" posture (2019–2022) → to an offensive "space infrastructure + defense growth" narrative (2023–2026). The vocabulary has shifted to standoff defense, satellite constellation, optical data relay, on-orbit servicing, space data center. They talk far less about subscriber counts and far more about MOD budget and "space security."
• Things they stopped saying: pay-TV subscriber growth (now framed as managed decline + monetization); they now lead with Space.
• Recurring phrases: "main growth engine," "national security," "space business as ~90% of operating profit by FY3/29" (Goldman framing the company echoes), FY3/30 targets.
• Sentiment read: Increasingly bullish/promotional on Space — appropriate given the order book, but worth flagging that management's narrative and the sell-side narrative (Goldman) have converged tightly, which is itself a mild contrarian caution.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer multiples are `` with source/date or n/a.

The single most important comp observation: Of the four, SKY Perfect JSAT is the only one earning a profit. SES, Eutelsat, and Viasat are all loss-making (negative EPS) and trade on EV/EBITDA in the 6–9x band. JSAT trades on a 31.5x P/E — there is no clean EV/EBITDA cross-check sourced, but a profitable operator commanding a 31x earnings multiple while every listed Western peer is unprofitable is the entire valuation debate in one line:

• Bull framing: JSAT deserves a premium — it's profitable, net-cash, sovereign-protected, and has a real defense growth ramp the others lack. A Japanese-defense re-rating multiple, not a legacy-satellite multiple.
• Bear framing: 31x earnings already capitalizes the FY3/30 dream; the loss-making peers are loss-making partly because LEO (Starlink) is destroying GEO economics — and JSAT is not immune to the same force, just earlier in the curve.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (the >5% movers)

The defining feature of this name: a ~3.6x range in 52 weeks (¥1,298 → ¥4,720; ¥2,677 on 2026-06-30). This is not a sleepy satellite utility — it has traded like a thematic defense growth stock. The pattern of what moves it:

1. Japan MOD space budget = the macro catalyst. MOD requested ¥597.4B for space in FY3/26 — a +324% YoY jump. This single number reframed JSAT from broadcaster to defense play.
2. Goldman Sachs Buy initiation (PT ¥1,800 at the time — since exceeded), forecasting national-security revenue 26% CAGR from ¥10B (FY3/25) → ~¥25B (FY3/29) and Space → ~90% of operating profit by FY3/29. Sell-side blessing of the defense thesis.
3. ¥283.1B MOD Satellite Constellation PFI award (Dec 2025, consortium led by Mitsubishi Electric w/ JSAT + Mitsui).
4. Planet Labs $230M Pelican EO constellation (Feb 2025) — the EO/defense data pivot made concrete.
5. Astroscale investment (May–Jun 2026) — on-orbit servicing optionality.
6. Record FY3/25 earnings + dividend hike (¥38→¥48 DPS, ≥50% payout policy).

What the pattern reveals: the market reacts to defense/government news and the MOD budget far more than to pay-TV subscriber numbers or even core capacity earnings. The stock has become a liquid Japanese proxy for "space security" and rearmament — which means it will trade on Japanese defense-policy headlines and global space-conflict risk, with high beta to the theme and vulnerability to any cooling of it.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Eiichi Yonekura — Representative Director, President & CEO since 1 Apr 2019. Note a planned governance change: a May 2026 board meeting tentatively decided a change of representative director effective ~19 Jun 2026 — succession/leadership transition is in motion; the architect of the defense pivot may be handing over. Worth tracking — a strategy this CEO-driven carries key-person risk at the handoff. Chairman: Toru Fukuoka (Rep. Director, Chairman).
• Track record: Under Yonekura, the company executed the strategic re-positioning from "declining broadcaster" to "defense-space growth" — landed the Planet EO deal, the MOD optical-data contract, the ¥283.1B constellation PFI, the Astroscale stake, and the Space Compass NTT JV. Quantified result: record FY3/25 earnings and a ~3.6x stock re-rating. That is a genuinely well-executed pivot.
• Tenure & skin in the game: Long tenure (CEO 7+ yrs). Insider ownership: n/a (typical of Japanese listed companies, insider stakes are usually small; not disclosed in web sources).
• Capital-allocation history: Disciplined and shareholder-friendly by Japanese standards — ≥50% dividend-payout policy, min ¥38 DPS, raised to ¥48, plus buybacks; ~¥250B total cash return + growth investment planned FY3/25–FY3/27 (¥220B of it growth capex). Reinvesting the net-cash balance sheet into the defense pivot while returning >50% of earnings — a reasonable balance. ROE ~8% / ROIC ~9.5% — adequate but not high; the capex cycle and the low-return Media legacy weigh on returns.
• Red flags (governance): Classic Japanese cross-shareholding ownership — NTT ~9.2%, Nippon Television ~7.0%, TBS ~6.5%, Sumitomo Corp ~6.5%. The two big broadcasters (Nippon TV, TBS) are both shareholders and the platform's content partners/customers — entrenched related-party relationships that can prioritize incumbency over shareholder value, a standard TSE-Prime governance discount. No accounting red flags surfaced.
• Archetype: Professional manager / national-champion steward (not founder-owner). Implication: execution-focused, government-aligned, lower risk of wild bets — but also lower urgency to disrupt its own dying pay-TV cash cow and a tendency to move at consortium/keiretsu speed.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

financials.csv empty; this is a qualitative read on web-sourced figures — no granular accrual analysis possible without filings. Flag this limitation explicitly.

• Revenue recognition: Two very different models — recurring capacity leases (clean, ratable) and long-dated government PFI/consortium contracts (the ¥283.1B constellation runs through an SPC; revenue timing/recognition across a 5-yr+ build is where to watch for aggressive front-loading once filings are available). Planet's $230M is recognized by Planet over ~7 years; JSAT's side is a capex/operating-cost commitment. Watch for: how JSAT consolidates the SPC and JV economics (Space Compass 50/50 with NTT, Astroscale minority stake) — JV/equity-method accounting can flatter or obscure.
• Margin sustainability (the central forensic question): the +28% OP / +74% Media-segment-profit jump is cost-cutting-driven, and management's own FY3/30 Media target (¥5B) is below the ¥7.7B just earned — i.e. management is implicitly signaling the FY3/25 Media margin is not a sustainable base. A reader extrapolating the record margin forward is mis-modeling.
• Cash flow vs earnings: n/a at the line-item level. Net-cash balance sheet and a satellite-operator's high D&A generally mean EBITDA/FCF are healthy relative to NI — but the ¥220B capex cycle will compress FCF over FY3/26–27; watch capex-vs-D&A.
• Receivables/inventory vs revenue: n/a (need the balance sheet detail in filings).
• SBC: Japanese listed companies typically have minimal stock-based comp — unlikely to flatter non-GAAP; n/a — not specifically sourced.
• Goodwill/intangibles: Watch for any impairment risk in the Media segment if subscriber decline accelerates; n/a.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section). Per regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (generated 2026-06-30 by fetch-regulatory-findings.ts):

• SEC EDGAR (LR + AAER): zero findings — and not applicable. SKY Perfect JSAT has no CIK; it is a Japanese issuer not required to file with the SEC, so no EDGAR enforcement search is possible (the file states this explicitly). total_sec_findings: 0.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search run per the file's guidance): web search "SKY Perfect JSAT" (FTC OR DOJ OR FDA OR CFPB OR consent decree OR settlement OR fine OR penalty) enforcement surfaced no material enforcement actions, fines, or consent decrees against the company. As a Japanese broadcaster/operator its primary regulators are Japan's MIC (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications) for broadcast/spectrum and the TSE/JPX/FSA for listing — no public scandal surfaced.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Not available — no SEC filings exist (TSE filer). Equivalent disclosure would be in the Japanese Yūkashōken Hōkokusho (securities report), not pulled in this web-only run.
• Net: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER — n/a, no CIK), web search, as of 2026-06-30. The one governance (not enforcement) flag is the broadcaster cross-shareholding / related-party structure noted in Lens 9.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (EPS, next three fiscal years)

Bottom-up from FY3/25 actuals + FY3/26 guidance. Base unit: company guidance FY3/26 NI ¥27.0B (EPS ~¥95.3 on 283.44M shares ). Anchors: FY3/30 company target rev ¥185B, NI ≥¥35B; Goldman national-security 26% CAGR; Space → ~90% of OP by FY3/29. All outputs `` with arithmetic shown. (Per --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create is logged in breadth mode.)

Reconciliation to company FY3/30 target: ¥35B NI / 283.44M sh ≈ ¥123 EPS by FY3/30 — so the base path above (¥122 by FY3/28) is modestly ahead of management's own FY3/30 EPS, implying either the company is sandbagging the long-term target or my mid-path defense ramp is slightly aggressive. Flag: the base case essentially reaches management's 2030 earnings target ~2 years early — that is the optimism embedded; haircut toward the bear if defense timing slips.

Brier forecast (would-log if committed): 9412.T FY3/28 net income ≥ ¥31B, p≈0.55 — not logged (watchlist breadth mode; log only on genuine commitment via /thesis).

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Japan is rearming structurally — the MOD space budget quadrupled (+324% to ¥597.4B for FY3/26) and that is a multi-decade trajectory, not a one-year spike. SKY Perfect JSAT is the sovereign-preferred national champion for space-based defense comms and ISR: it already holds the ¥283.1B constellation PFI, the MOD optical-data contract, the Planet EO constellation, and an Astroscale servicing stake. It is the only listed satellite operator in its peer set that earns a profit, sits on a net-cash balance sheet, returns >50% of earnings, and has a credible path to ¥185B revenue / ≥¥35B NI by FY3/30 with Space at ~90% of OP. The Media cash cow, while declining, throws off the cash to fund the pivot. This is a re-rating from "Japanese broadcaster" to "Japanese defense-space prime," and the multiple should follow Mitsubishi Electric / defense-contractor logic, not Eutelsat's.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks):

1. LEO (Starlink/Kuiper) structurally compresses GEO economics. The reason SES/Eutelsat/Viasat are all loss-making is that LEO is eating GEO capacity pricing. JSAT is profitable today but on the same GEO business model — it is earlier in the same curve, not exempt. Its "hedge" (reselling Amazon Leo) is margin-thin distribution, not ownership of the winning architecture.
2. The growth engine is one customer: the Japanese government. Defense revenue concentrated in MOD via consortium/PFI deals = monopsony pricing power on the buyer's side, lumpy timing, budget-cycle and political risk. A change in defense-budget trajectory or a consortium reshuffle (note: JSAT is a partner, not the prime, on the Mitsubishi-Electric-led constellation) could stall the entire thesis.
3. Structural pay-TV death + margin mean-reversion. ~−50k subscribers/month and ~3.2% monthly churn is a melting ice cube; the FY3/25 Media profit (+74%) was a one-off cost-cut, and management's own FY3/30 Media target (¥5B) is below it. Group margins likely mean-revert from the record 27.6% OP margin.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke — what happened?): The MOD constellation PFI revenue slipped/was renegotiated and JSAT (as minority partner) booked less than the market extrapolated; LEO competition forced a step-down in commercial transponder pricing; Media churn accelerated as a major sports/content right moved to a streamer; the new CEO (post-Jun-2026 transition) reset guidance. The 31x multiple compressed to ~18x on a still-growing-but-slower earnings base → the stock round-tripped a chunk of its 3.6x run.

Are multiples too high? At ~31x trailing / ~27x forward earnings for a company with ~8% ROE and a structurally declining half-business, yes on absolute terms — the multiple is a defense-theme/re-rating multiple that requires the FY3/29–30 defense ramp to fully materialize. It is not expensive if you underwrite the Goldman path (Space = 90% of OP, national-security 26% CAGR) and assign a defense-prime multiple.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The market is treating JSAT as a defense stock and a space-growth stock, but is under-discounting that (a) it's still ~half a dying broadcaster whose record margins just peaked, and (b) on the part the market loves — satellites — it runs the exact GEO business model that has bankrupted its peers' earnings, just on a delay. The bull and bear can both be right sequentially: a real defense re-rating now, a LEO-driven GEO derating later.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the money machine? GEO transponder pricing collapses under LEO oversupply (the SES/Eutelsat/Viasat playbook) while the defense ramp proves lumpier and lower-margin (PFI/consortium economics, JSAT as junior partner) than the 26% CAGR extrapolation. The profitable-today story becomes loss-adjacent within 3–5 years.
• Where is revenue concentrated, and what if it shifts? Two concentrations: (1) the Japanese government for all the growth (monopsony buyer, political/budget risk, JSAT not even the prime on the flagship constellation); (2) a handful of anchor broadcast tenants per satellite for the legacy base — lose one big broadcaster to OTT and a satellite's economics wobble.
• Why is the moat weaker than bulls think? The pay-TV "monopoly" is a monopoly on a shrinking market — being the only seller of horse-drawn carriages. The orbital-slot moat is real but is exactly what didn't save SES/Eutelsat from LEO. The defense moat depends on government preference that could be re-tendered.
• Most dangerous underestimated competitor: Starlink/SpaceX (already live in Japan via KDDI; vertically integrated launch + sats + direct-to-cell) and Amazon Leo — JSAT reselling Kuiper is co-opting a competitor on thin margin, which is a tell it can't win on its own LEO economics. Also NTT/KDDI as frenemies — partners in JVs (Space Compass) but also rival NTN/D2D platforms.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance issues: The keiretsu cross-shareholding (Nippon TV, TBS as both owners and content counterparties) is a related-party entrenchment that can suppress hard decisions on the dying pay-TV unit; minority stakes/JVs (Astroscale, Space Compass) diffuse accountability and obscure economics.
• What must hold for today's ~31x? Japan's defense-budget trajectory stays steep; JSAT captures a growing slice as a partner; defense revenue compounds ~26%; GEO commercial pricing doesn't collapse before defense scales; Media decline stays "managed." Several of these are outside JSAT's control.
• Valuation if growth disappoints 20–30%: If the FY3/28 base EPS (¥122) comes in 25% light (¥92, i.e. flat vs guidance) and the multiple derates to a still-generous 20x → **~¥1,830 **, roughly −32% from ¥2,677 — and that's before a LEO-driven sentiment break, which could take it toward the ¥1,298 52-week low.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs the business: A structural, lasting collapse in GEO commercial-capacity pricing (LEO oversupply) coincident with the defense ramp under-delivering — the commercial base shrinks faster than defense replaces it, and the company drifts toward its loss-making peers. Plausibility: moderate over 3–5 years, low over 12–18 months (the defense order book provides near-term cover).

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The market models national-security revenue compounding ~26% to FY3/29 — what is the contracted, signed backlog today versus pipeline, and how much of the ¥283.1B MOD constellation PFI flows to JSAT specifically (vs Mitsubishi Electric as prime)?
2. Your FY3/30 Media segment-profit target (¥5B) is below FY3/25's ¥7.7B. What is your honest forecast for the SKY PerfecTV! subscriber base and Media revenue in FY3/28–30, and at what point does Media stop being a cash cow and become a cash drain?
3. GEO peers (SES, Eutelsat, Viasat) are all loss-making, largely due to LEO pricing pressure. What is your forecast for commercial GEO transponder pricing over the next 5 years, and why are you immune when they weren't?
4. Reselling Amazon Leo is margin-thin distribution. What is JSAT's owned role in the LEO/NTN architecture that the market is paying a premium for — or are you conceding LEO to Starlink/Kuiper and monetizing only as a reseller?
5. With a representative-director change effective ~June 2026, how does the incoming leadership's commitment to the defense-space pivot differ, if at all, from the current strategy?
6. The ¥220B growth-capex program (FY3/25–27): what is the expected ROIC on it, and over what horizon — given group ROIC is currently ~9.5%?
7. How should we think about JV/equity-method economics (Space Compass 50/50 with NTT, the Astroscale stake) in your consolidated P&L — how much earnings power sits off the main income statement?
8. Superbird-9 has slipped to 2027. What is the revenue/contract exposure to further prime (Airbus) or launch (SpaceX Starship) delays, and how are you de-risking single-prime/single-launcher dependence?
9. The FY3/25 operating-margin step-up to ~27.6% was cost-cutting-led. What is the structural group operating margin you can sustain through FY3/30?
10. On the Planet Pelican constellation — JSAT funds the build but Planet operates and recognizes the $230M; what does JSAT actually own and what are the data-rights / exclusivity terms for your area of interest?
11. The cross-shareholding with Nippon TV and TBS (both owners and content partners) — are content/carriage terms arm's-length, and does this structure constrain hard decisions on the pay-TV business?
12. What is your appetite for using the net-cash balance sheet on M&A (more Astroscale-style stakes, LEO/EO assets) versus buybacks, and what return hurdle governs the choice?
13. Astroscale on-orbit servicing: what is the realistic commercial revenue timeline for life-extension/debris services, and is JSAT a customer, an investor, or a future operator?
14. How exposed is the defense thesis to a change in Japan's fiscal/defense-budget trajectory or a shift in the US-Japan security posture?
15. If you could only grow one of Space-commercial, Space-defense, or new domains (optical/HAPS/servicing) over the next 5 years, which gets the capital and why?

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