Teck Resources

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Teck Resources is a Vancouver-headquartered base-metals miner that, as of mid-2024, is a pure-play copper-and-zinc company — the culmination of a five-year strip-down from a sprawling diversified miner (coal, copper, zinc, energy) to a "critical minerals champion." The pivot is the whole story: in July 2024 Teck sold the last of its steelmaking-coal business, and the entire equity thesis re-pointed onto copper.

What it actually sells: copper concentrate and cathode, zinc concentrate and refined zinc, plus meaningful by-products (molybdenum, silver, lead, and germanium/indium from the Trail smelter). Revenue is commodity-price-taking — Teck sells into global metal markets at LME-linked prices, so the P&L is a leveraged bet on the copper (and secondarily zinc) price against a largely fixed cost base.

Corporate structure: Teck Resources Limited, incorporated in Canada, listed as Class B subordinate voting shares under TECK on the NYSE (and TECK.B on the TSX). Two share classes — 7,599,532 Class A common shares and 480,876,671 Class B subordinate voting shares outstanding as of 2025-12-31 (~488.5M total). CEO Jonathan H. Price, CFO Crystal J. Prystai. Registered debt stack: 3.900% notes due 2030, 6.125% due 2035, 6.000% due 2040, 6.25% due 2041, 5.200% due 2042, 5.400% due 2043.

The single most important fact about the "business" today is that Teck agreed on 2025-09-09 to merge with Anglo American in an all-share merger of equals to form "Anglo Teck plc" — UK-incorporated, headquartered in Vancouver, listed in London/Johannesburg/Toronto/New York. Teck holders receive 1.3301 Anglo shares per Teck share (Class A and Class B alike); Anglo holders end at ~62.4%, Teck holders ~37.6%. That deal is now the dominant driver of the equity (Phase D). So Lens 1's honest summary: Teck is (a) a de-risking copper producer with a flagship ramp problem mostly behind it, wrapped inside (b) a near-completed acquisition by Anglo American awaiting one final regulator.

Customers / contract structure: metals are sold to smelters, traders and industrial off-takers under annual and spot frames at benchmark treatment/refining charges — no take-or-pay, no single-customer concentration of note (customers.csv is empty on the shelf; no material customer concentration disclosed in sources). The buyer of record for the equity, functionally, is now Anglo American.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Teck sits in the upstream of the copper/zinc chain — it is the miner, not the fabricator. Map, with named stakeholders:

Upstream inputs → Teck's mines:

• Mining equipment & haulage — Caterpillar/Komatsu fleets; autonomous-haul programs at Highland Valley.
• Power — Chilean grid power for Quebrada Blanca and Carmen de Andacollo (a cost and ESG variable — Chilean power is decarbonizing); BC Hydro (clean) for Highland Valley and Trail.
• Desalinated water — QB2 runs on a desalination plant + pipeline on the Chilean coast (Teck built it for the project); water is the binding constraint in the Atacama and a genuine competitive asset.
• Reagents/consumables — grinding media, flotation reagents, sulphuric acid.

Teck's assets (the node):

• Copper — Quebrada Blanca (Chile, ~60% Teck / 30% Sumitomo Metal Mining + Sumitomo Corp / 10% ENAMI-Chile), Highland Valley Copper (BC, 100%), Carmen de Andacollo (Chile, 90%), and a 22.5% non-operated stake in Antamina (Peru — one of the world's largest copper-zinc mines, operated by a BHP/Glencore/Teck/Mitsubishi JV).
• Zinc — Red Dog (Alaska, 100%; one of the world's largest zinc mines), Trail Operations (BC smelter/refinery), Antamina zinc by-product.

Downstream → end customer:

• Copper concentrate → third-party smelters (heavily Chinese and Asian smelters) → cathode → rod/wire mills → grid, construction, EVs, and AI data-center power infrastructure (the demand engine, Lens 11).
• Zinc → Trail + third-party smelters → galvanized steel, die-casting → construction/autos.

Chokepoints & single-source dependencies:

1. QB2's tailings management facility (TMF) — the binding physical chokepoint on the flagship (Lens 5/10). Not a supplier issue, an in-house geotechnical one.
2. Chinese smelting capacity — the copper concentrate market clears through Chinese smelters; treatment/refining charges (TC/RCs) have been at historic lows, a margin variable Teck doesn't control. This is also why China's SAMR gets a say on the Anglo merger (Lens 12/13).
3. Chilean jurisdiction concentration — QB + Andacollo put a large share of copper growth in one country's permitting/royalty/water regime.
4. Red Dog logistics — a remote Alaskan mine with a seasonal shipping window; concentrate is stockpiled and shipped in a short ice-free season.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Mining moats are orebody, jurisdiction, and cost-curve position — not brand. Teck's:

• Long-life, scalable copper orebodies (the real moat). QB is a multi-decade district with expansion optionality (the Mill Expansion, Lens 5); Highland Valley just had its life extended to 2046 at ~132kt/yr average. Newly-permitted, long-life, Tier-1-jurisdiction copper is genuinely scarce — this is what made Teck a takeover target twice (Glencore 2023, Anglo 2025).
• Water as a durable asset. QB2's desalination + pipeline is a permitted, built, hard-to-replicate piece of infrastructure in the driest desert on earth. New Chilean copper increasingly requires desal; Teck already has it.
• Antamina's cost position. The 22.5% stake is a low-cost, by-product-credit-rich, top-decile asset — cheap pounds Teck could never build today.
• Jurisdiction quality. Canada (HVC, Red Dog-adjacent processing, Trail), Chile, Peru — investment-grade mining jurisdictions vs. the DRC/Panama/Zambia risk that dogs some peers (First Quantum's Cobre Panamá shutdown is the cautionary tale).

Bargaining power: as a price-taker into deep global metal markets, Teck has little pricing power — the moat is cost position and reserve life, not price-setting. Against suppliers (equipment, power) it is a large but not dominant buyer. The most honest statement of the moat: Teck owns irreplaceable long-life copper tonnes in good jurisdictions — which is exactly why the equity's value is being realized through a takeover rather than through its own multiple.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is header-only on the shelf, so segment figures are ``. Post-coal, the business is two segments — Copper (the growth/value engine) and Zinc (the mature cash cow that is slowly shrinking) — plus by-product credits.

Copper (the story):

• 2025 total copper: 453,500 t, of which Quebrada Blanca ~190,000 t, Highland Valley 127,100 t (up from 102,400 t in 2024), plus Andacollo and 22.5% Antamina.
• Trend: accelerating, but bumpily. HVC is up sharply YoY on grade/throughput; QB fell from 207,800 t (2024) to ~190,000 t (2025) — the TMF problem (Lens 5) forced three guidance cuts. Q1 2026 then set a record QB copper-sales quarter of 70,300 t and total copper +32% YoY to 140,000 t — evidence the ramp is finally turning.
• 2026 guidance: 455,000–530,000 t copper (midpoint ~492kt, i.e. growth) at net cash unit cost C$1.85–2.20/lb.

Zinc (the melting ice cube):

• 2025 zinc-in-concentrate 525,000–575,000 t vs 615,900 t in 2024 — declining as Red Dog matures. Red Dog 2026 guidance 410,000–460,000 t — down again. Trail refined zinc 2026 260,000–300,000 t; Antamina zinc 2026 cut to 55,000–65,000 t.
• Trend: structurally decelerating. Zinc is real cash flow today but a shrinking share of the story; it's why "copper pure-play" is directionally true even though zinc still contributes.

Geography: Chile (QB, Andacollo — the copper-growth center), Canada (HVC, Trail, corporate), Peru (Antamina), USA/Alaska (Red Dog). The copper weighting is increasingly Chile/Peru; the legacy cash is Canada/Alaska.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 2026, reported 2026-04-23)

The most recent print was a clean beat driven by the collision of a copper-price spike with QB2 finally producing:

• What drove it: record quarterly copper sales volumes (QB ramp + Antamina grades) × record copper prices × by-product credits. This is the operating leverage the whole thesis rests on — a doubling of EBITDA on a ~30% volume gain because the incremental pound carries a price well above the ~C$2/lb cash cost.
• Guidance: 2026 copper reaffirmed at 455–530kt; net cash unit cost C$1.85–2.20/lb. Management kept copper targets intact even while trimming Antamina zinc — a tell that the copper turnaround is the priority.
• Balance sheet flags — all green: net cash of C$488M at 2026-03-31 (cash C$5,427M vs total debt + leases C$4,939M), up C$415M in the quarter on C$1.0B operating cash flow; liquidity C$9.8B (incl. C$5.7B cash) at 2026-04-22. This is a fortress balance sheet — the coal-sale proceeds paid down debt and left Teck net-cash.
• The catch on capital returns: under the merger arrangement agreement Teck is frozen — buybacks halted since 2025-07-25, and dividends capped at C$0.125/share/quarter (it returned just C$61M in Q1) without Anglo's consent. So the fortress cash is accumulating, not returning — it's dry powder for Anglo Teck, not for current TECK holders.
• Market reaction: the stock rose on the print, but muted relative to the beat — because at this point TECK trades on the exchange ratio to Anglo, not on its own results. A 125% EBITDA jump barely moves a stock whose price is pinned to 1.3301 AAL shares minus deal risk. That is the single most important behavioral fact in this dossier.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ is empty on the shelf, so this is ``-sourced call summaries across the last ~4 quarters. The arc of tone is the signal:

• Mid-2025 (Q2) — defensive/accountable. Repeated QB2 guidance cuts (three in 2025); management on the back foot explaining the tailings-facility problem, announcing a Comprehensive Operations Review (launched August 2025) and a "QB Action Plan" with third-party experts and board-committee oversight.
• Q3 2025 — "we own it, here's the plan." Impairment test run (passed, Lens 10), operational-review completion (Oct 2025), a QB site visit for analysts (Nov 3, 2025). Tone: contrition + credibility-rebuild.
• Q1 2026 (2026-04-23) — vindicated/confident. "Record copper sales," "EBITDA doubled," 2026 guidance affirmed; the language flipped to the growth story and the merger.

Phrases that appeared: "critical minerals champion," "energy transition," "QB Action Plan," "merger of equals," "disciplined capital returns" (now constrained). Phrases that disappeared: anything about coal (gone since mid-2024), and — tellingly — the standalone re-rating pitch, which has been replaced by merger-synergy language. Sentiment trajectory: from apologetic → accountable → confident, tracking QB2's operational turn.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set: global copper majors.

Read: on trailing EV/EBITDA Teck (~8.9x) sits below FCX (~11x) and well below the sector (~14.9x); the forward discount is far larger (~4.5x fwd on peak-copper earnings). Historically the bull case was "Teck should re-rate toward FCX/SCCO once it's a clean copper pure-play." That re-rating thesis is now essentially expressed through the Anglo deal, not the standalone multiple — TECK's price is pinned to Anglo's, and Anglo carries its own diversified-miner discount (De Beers/diamonds, PGMs). So the "cheap vs. copper peers" gap is really an Anglo discount now, not a TECK mispricing you can capture standalone.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (5-yr, >5% moves)

The pattern is unusually clean and increasingly M&A-dominated:

• 2023-04 — Glencore's ~US$23B hostile bid. Teck spikes, rejects. First proof the market values the copper more than Teck's own multiple did.
• 2023-02/05 — dual-class sunset + coal-separation saga (Lens 9). Repricing of the "clean copper co" optionality.
• 2023-11 → 2024-07 — coal sale to Glencore (announced/closed). Balance-sheet transformation + big buyback → re-rating.
• 2025 (H2) — QB2 guidance cuts (×3) + Comprehensive Operations Review — the down catalysts; execution risk, not price risk.
• 2025-09-09 — the Anglo merger announcement — the defining up-move; TECK converts into a deal proxy.
• 2025-12 — shareholder votes (Dec 9) + Canada ICA approval (Dec 16) — de-risking legs; spread tightens.
• 2026-04-23 — Q1 beat — modest reaction (deal-pinned).

What it reveals: the market reacts to M&A and copper-price regime shifts far more than to quarterly operational beats. Since Sept 2025 the dominant variable is deal completion probability (China SAMR), with copper price as the secondary beta. Operational prints barely move it. Trade the deal and the copper tape, not the earnings.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

CEO — Jonathan H. Price:

• Track record: British metallurgist (Oxford M.Eng; Cardiff MBA). INCO → ABN AMRO metals & mining → BHP 2006–2020 (Chief Transformation Officer, VP Finance, VP IR). Joined Teck Oct 2020 as EVP & CFO, elevated to CEO Sept 2022 (President & CEO Nov 2023).
• What he's actually delivered: he is the architect of the de-conglomeration — the coal sale (~US$7.3B from Glencore + Nippon Steel/POSCO minority), the balance-sheet reset to net cash, the QB2 push, and now the Anglo merger. That's a coherent, value-realizing arc: he took a messy diversified miner and turned it into a takeover-grade copper pure-play in ~3 years.
• The blemish: QB2. The flagship ramped late, ran ~60% over budget (US$4.74B original → US$7.4–7.75B), and needed three guidance cuts and a formal operations review in 2025 on his watch (though the project was sanctioned before his CEO tenure). Capital-project execution is the one thing the market marks him down on.
• Skin in the game / capital allocation: disciplined — debt paydown + buybacks (Class B fell from 506.3M in Feb 2023 to 480.9M by Dec 2025, i.e. ~25M shares retired) + growth capex, all now frozen by the merger agreement. He is a professional manager, not a founder — which fits a company being sold: his job became maximizing exit value, and the 1.3301 ratio + Deputy-CEO role at Anglo Teck is the result.
• Post-merger: Price becomes Deputy CEO of Anglo Teck under Anglo's Duncan Wanblad. Read that as: Anglo is the acquirer despite the "merger of equals" label (62.4/37.6 ownership; Anglo CEO on top).

Control overhang — the Keevil dual-class (resolving): Class A shares carry 100 votes each vs 1 for Class B; the founding Keevil family controlled Teck through Class A for decades. In 2023 Teck introduced a six-year sunset (completed 2023-05-12) collapsing the dual-class structure by ~2029 at 0.67 Class B per Class A. The merger effectively accelerates the endgame — Class A and B convert at the same 1.3301 ratio into Anglo. Dr. Norman B. Keevil's historical veto (he opposed the 2023 Glencore bid) is the reason the coal-first, then merge path happened; his acquiescence to Anglo is a signal the family judged this the right exit.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Read regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (Step 0): 0 SEC Litigation Releases, 0 AAERs naming Teck in 2021–2026. Clean on the SEC-enforcement axis.

Forensic scan (income statement / balance sheet / cash flow), grounded where I can and flagged where I can't:

1. The 40-F "error-correction" checkbox — flagged, not resolved. The FY2025 40-F cover checks the box that "the financial statements … reflect the correction of an error to previously issued financial statements" — while leaving the adjacent clawback/recovery-analysis box unchecked (i.e. not a Rule 10D-1 "Big R" restatement triggering comp recovery). My web sources did not surface a disclosed material restatement. Most probable benign explanation ``: prior-period revisions from reclassifying the coal business to discontinued operations (which restates comparatives) and/or the routine post-2023 SEC cover-page requirement. To verify against exhibit 99.2 (audited statements) — I flag it rather than wave it away, but I found no evidence of an accounting scandal.
2. QB CGU impairment cushion is thin — the real watch item. In Q3 2025 management identified an impairment indicator and ran a test at 2025-09-30; the QB cash-generating-unit's recoverable amount exceeded carrying value by only ~US$900M, so no impairment was booked. On a multi-billion-dollar asset that is a narrow headroom — a copper-price fall or a further TMF setback could flip it to a writedown. Goodwill on the QB CGU was C$421M at 2025-12-31. This is where the accounting risk actually lives, and it's honestly disclosed.
3. Adjusted vs. IFRS gap. Management leans on "adjusted EBITDA/adjusted profit" (Lens 5). The adjustments (QB ramp costs, inventory writedowns, FX) have generally flattered the underlying — normal for a miner mid-ramp, but the gap between adjusted profit (C$1.5B FY2025) and IFRS profit is worth watching; not abusive on the evidence.
4. By-product accounting. Unit costs are quoted net of by-product credits (C$1.85–2.20/lb) — standard but flattering; gross costs are higher. No misrepresentation, just read "net cash cost" with that lens.
5. Mine-safety / environmental. The 40-F carries mandated Dodd-Frank §1503(a) mine-safety disclosure (Exhibit 95.1) — routine for a miner; the legacy Elk Valley selenium water-quality liabilities left with the coal sale, a clean-up positive.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (LR/AAER): none, 2021–2026.
• Non-SEC web search ("Teck Resources" (FTC/DOJ/FDA/consent decree/settlement/fine/penalty) enforcement): no new material enforcement surfaced in the 2025–26 window beyond the historical, already-resolved matters — the 2023 US DOJ/Clean Water Act selenium settlement at the (now-divested) Elk Valley coal operations is the notable legacy item, and it departed with the coal business. Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) of the FY2025 10-K-equivalent (AIF, exhibit 99.1) was not ingested to disk; to verify directly, but no material live litigation surfaced in web sources.
• Net: No material regulatory or accounting enforcement findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER) and web search as of 2026-07-10; two honest watch items (the error-correction checkbox and the thin QB impairment cushion) rather than red flags.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026–FY2028)

Framing caveat (decisive): if the Anglo merger closes (base case, ~early 2027), TECK ceases to exist standalone and these EPS lines fold into Anglo Teck. So the projection below is best read as "standalone TECK if the deal breaks" — i.e. the China-block scenario. In the deal-completes case, the relevant metric becomes Anglo Teck consolidated and TECK holders own 1.3301 Anglo shares. I did not log a forecast.ts Brier forecast (unattended --watchlist rule; and committing an EPS point here would be false precision given the merger binary).

Bottom-up anchors: FY2025 adjusted EPS C$3.10 on adj EBITDA C$4.3B; Q1 2026 adj EPS C$1.75 on adj EBITDA ~C$2.1B; 2026 copper guide 455–530kt at C$1.85–2.20/lb net cash cost; copper spot near record highs, forecast to ease modestly from records in 2026 then tighten structurally from 2027.

• Base logic ``: FY2026 EBITDA ~C$7B (well above FY2025's C$4.3B on volume growth + still-elevated copper, but below the Q1 annualized C$8.4B because copper eases off records and QB carries incremental 2026 TMF downtime) → adj EPS ~C$5.25, scaling from the FY2025 C$3.10/C$4.3B relationship adjusted for operating leverage and the ~40% QB minority interest (Sumitomo + ENAMI). FY2027–28 flat-to-up as QB2 optimization (270–310kt target) and HVC MLE offset copper normalization and zinc decline.
• Sensitivity: copper is the swing — every ~US$0.25/lb on ~1.0Blb of attributable copper is ~C$300–350M pre-tax ``. QB2 volumes are the second lever.
• Valuation cross-check: at ~US$56 / ~C$79, base FY2026 EPS ~C$5.25 → standalone fwd P/E ~15x `` — reasonable for a growing copper producer with a net-cash balance sheet, below FCX's ~22x forward, which is the residual re-rating cushion if the deal breaks and copper holds.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Teck is irreplaceable long-life copper in Tier-1 jurisdictions, arriving exactly as copper enters a structural, AI-and-electrification-driven deficit (ICSG deficit from 2026; Goldman: demand > supply from 2029; ~50kt of copper per 1GW of AI data-center capacity; ~15GW/yr of build = ~750kt/yr of new demand; global ore grades halved since 1980). QB2 — the flagship that broke the stock's confidence — is visibly turning (record Q1 2026 QB sales), with a Mill Expansion and HVC's life-to-2046 extension layering growth on top. The balance sheet is net cash with C$9.8B liquidity. And it's all wrapped in an Anglo merger that hands holders 1.3301 Anglo shares in a top-5 global copper champion with C$4.5B+ of committed Canadian investment and cost/revenue synergies. If copper does what the bulls say and the deal closes, you own a bigger, cheaper slice of the best copper demand story in metals.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) The deal breaks on China. SAMR is the only remaining approval and is running a Phase-3 (deepest) review focused on supply-chain security — China reviewing a copper mega-merger on strategic-resource grounds is a genuine block/delay risk. A break sends TECK back to standalone (its pre-deal range was ~US$30–45) and unwinds the arb. (2) QB2 relapses. The TMF ultra-fines/sand-wedge problem caused incremental 2026 downtime and left the impairment cushion at only ~US$900M — a further setback + a copper dip = a writedown and a broken growth narrative. (3) Copper is at record highs and forecast to ease in 2026 (Goldman) — a cyclical rollover would compress the peak-earnings multiple hard. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): China SAMR blocks or extracts painful remedies; TECK gaps down to ~US$40; simultaneously copper rolls from records and QB2 has another tailings-driven downtime quarter — the "cheap copper pure-play" becomes "single-jurisdiction ramp risk with no takeout." Are multiples too high? Standalone, no (~15x fwd base). As a deal proxy, the risk isn't TECK's multiple — it's Anglo's value and the spread. Contrarian view the market underrates: the market treats the deal as ~done (spread is tight, CIBC moved to "Tender"); the China supply-chain-security review is a fatter tail than the spread implies, and a break would be a violent repricing precisely because it's under-hedged.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• You're not buying a copper miner, you're selling China-approval optionality for a few points of spread. From US$56, the deal is near-priced; the reward for the last leg is thin, and the downside on a SAMR block (-25% to standalone) dwarfs the remaining upside. That is a bad risk/reward for new money at this price.
• Concentration: copper growth is concentrated in Chile (QB) with a flagship that just spent 2025 missing guidance three times. The single most important asset has the single worst execution record. Geotechnical/tailings problems don't always resolve on schedule — Chile is littered with copper projects that under-delivered for years.
• The moat is real but the price-taker economics aren't a moat — Teck earns supernormal returns only when copper is high, which is now. You're marking peak earnings as a multiple base.
• Most dangerous thing bulls underestimate: that Anglo is the acquirer, not an equal. 62.4/37.6, Anglo CEO on top, Teck CEO demoted to Deputy — TECK holders are trading a clean copper pure-play for 37.6% of a diversified miner dragged by De Beers/PGMs. The "champion" narrative masks a dilution of copper purity.
• Capital returns are frozen. The one thing that made post-coal Teck attractive to income/value holders (buybacks) is contractually off until the deal closes — cash builds for Anglo's benefit.
• What must hold for today's price: China clears within ~2–3 quarters and copper doesn't roll over and QB2 doesn't relapse. Three independent "ands."
• -20–30% growth-disappointment: if 2026 copper volumes miss and copper dips 15%, standalone EBITDA could fall toward ~C$5B and the stock de-rates to the mid-US$40s even before deal risk.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: SAMR blocks the deal and QB2's TMF requires a major capital re-do — you'd own a capital-hungry, single-jurisdiction ramp with the takeout premium gone. Plausibility: low-to-moderate, but not priced.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. China SAMR: what specific remedies (offtake commitments, concentrate-supply undertakings, divestitures) are on the table, and what is your walk-away line if SAMR demands structural concessions?
2. If the merger breaks, what is Teck's standalone capital-return and growth plan on day one — resume buybacks, and at what pace?
3. QB2 TMF: is the ultra-fines/sand-wedge fix capital-complete, and what is the residual downtime risk embedded in 2026–2028 guidance — best/worst case?
4. What copper price underpins the QB CGU carrying value, and how much further would copper (or volumes) have to fall to trigger an impairment given the ~US$900M cushion?
5. What exactly is the "correction of an error to previously issued financial statements" flagged on the FY2025 40-F cover?
6. Post-merger, how is copper-growth capital (QB Mill Expansion, HVC MLE, Galore/Schaft/Zafranal/San Nicolás) prioritized inside Anglo Teck vs. Anglo's own book?
7. What are the quantified revenue and cost synergies of the combination, and what's the phasing?
8. How binding are the C$4.5B Canadian-investment commitments, and what happens to them if copper prices fall?
9. Antamina and Red Dog are declining — what replaces zinc cash flow, and is zinc still core to Anglo Teck?
10. What is your through-cycle copper-price planning assumption, and how does it differ from spot?
11. TC/RCs are near historic lows — how exposed is realized copper revenue to Chinese smelter economics?
12. Chile: water, power decarbonization, and royalty/permitting — what's the 5-year cost trajectory at QB?
13. What is the retention plan for Teck's technical/operating talent through a merger where Anglo holds the top seat?
14. Capital allocation inside Anglo Teck: reinvest vs. return — what's the target payout and net-debt band?
15. What would make you not recommend the merger to shareholders today, given the deal was struck at Sept-2025 prices and copper has since made records?

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