Viasat

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Viasat is a global satellite-communications operator and defense-technology contractor, headquartered in Carlsbad, California with an international HQ in London (the legacy of the Inmarsat acquisition). It runs two reportable segments:

1. Communication services — FY2026 revenue $3,299.7M (71% of total), roughly flat YoY. Sub-lines: Aviation (in-flight connectivity / IFC — the crown jewel), Government satcom, Maritime (narrowband + safety, the old Inmarsat franchise), Fixed broadband (the declining U.S. consumer business), and Energy services.
2. Defense and advanced technologies (DAT) — FY2026 revenue $1,340.6M (29% of total), +10% YoY. Sub-lines: information security & cyber defense, space & mission systems, tactical networking (incl. TrellisWare), and advanced technologies.

How it actually makes money. Service revenue is $3,274.4M of $4,640.3M total (71%) — recurring connectivity (IFC, government satcom, maritime, fixed broadband), billed on advance/recurring monthly terms and recognized over time. Product revenue $1,365.9M (29%) is terminals, modems, encryption hardware, and IP/royalty — lumpier, defense-weighted.

Customers / contract structure. Highly diversified. The U.S. Government is the only >10% customer at ~16% of FY2026 revenue (18% FY25, 17% FY24) — government contracts are competitively bid, often terminable for convenience. International = 32% of revenue. Blue-chip base: commercial airlines, the DoD/DHS, NATO, the European Space Agency, foreign governments, maritime fleets. ~7,000 employees, 66% U.S.

The defining corporate fact: On May 30, 2023, Viasat closed the ~$7B+ acquisition of Inmarsat (Connect Topco), funded partly with 46.36M shares plus debt — which is why the balance sheet still carries $6.6B of gross debt and the share count jumped from ~117M (FY24) to ~135M (FY26). Inmarsat is folded into communication services.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Viasat is unusually vertically integrated — it designs its own satellite payloads, builds its own ground network, and manufactures user terminals — so the "supply chain" is really a space-asset supply chain plus a defense-electronics one. Named stakeholders:

Upstream (build the constellation):

• Satellite bus / prime manufacturers — Boeing built the ViaSat-3 class satellites (the F1 antenna reflector that failed was a major-subcontractor component — Viasat recorded liabilities on termination of certain subcontractor agreements after the anomaly). Airbus built the Inmarsat-6 / I-8 satellites.
• Launch — SpaceX (Falcon Heavy launched ViaSat-3 F1 in May 2023; SpaceX also launched F2 Nov 2025 and F3 April 2026). Viasat is structurally dependent on its largest competitor's rockets to deploy its own fleet — a notable chokepoint.
• Space-insurance market — underwrote the ~$770M ViaSat-3 F1 / Inmarsat-6 F2 claims (one of the largest space-insurance losses in history); future coverage is now harder/pricier sector-wide.
• Spectrum / orbital rights — operating authority flows through ManSat Limited (Isle of Man / UK, for ViaSat-1), the UK (ViaSat-2, Inmarsat, ViaSat-3 F2/F3), the FCC (ViaSat-3 F1), and Telesat Canada (Anik F2 / WildBlue-1 Ka capacity). Reliance on third parties maintaining their governmental rights is an explicit risk.

The company (vertical core): payload + antenna design, ground earth-stations, modems/terminals, encryption, network-management software.

Downstream (end customers): commercial airlines (IFC on ~4,580 aircraft + ~2,100 business jets), the DoD/DHS, NATO/ESA, maritime fleets, satellite network integrators, and large telcos. CPE units (customer terminals) are owned/leased by Viasat — $522.9M gross cost on balance sheet.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) launch on SpaceX; (2) the antenna-reflector subsystem that failed on F1 — a single mechanical component vaporized ~$900M of value; (3) third-party spectrum/orbital authorizations held by ManSat and Telesat Canada.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Real moats:

• Spectrum and orbital slots — the single most durable asset. Viasat (via Inmarsat) holds harmonized L- and S-band MSS spectrum (100+ MHz allocated/coordinated) — globally scarce, internationally coordinated, and now the centerpiece of the direct-to-device (D2D) thesis. This is the asset the market is re-rating in 2026.
• Defense embeddedness — Type-1 encryption (up to 200 Gbps), tactical gateways, DHS ECS cybersecurity accreditation, and TrellisWare networking are high-switching-cost, security-cleared products. New DAT awards grew from ~$0.6B (FY2018) to $1.6B (FY2026). This is sticky, recurring, and high-margin (16% segment operating margin).
• IFC installed base + stickiness — ~4,580 aircraft in service with another ~1,000 contracted; airline IFC contracts are multi-year with high switching costs (re-certification, STCs, hardware retrofit). Bundled W-IFE/safety/encryption deepen lock-in.
• Vertical integration — designing its own payloads and beamforming lets Viasat squeeze more yield from on-orbit assets (the "multi-orbit resource management" pitch).

Where the moat is weak / eroding:

• Consumer fixed broadband has no moat against Starlink. GEO latency (~600ms round-trip) is structurally inferior to LEO for consumer use; Viasat is deliberately starving its U.S. fixed business of bandwidth (a $133.9M YoY revenue decline in fixed services, reallocated to IFC). This is managed decline, not a defended position.
• Bargaining power is mixed. Strong over fragmented airline/maritime customers; weak versus the U.S. Government (terminable-for-convenience, competitively bid) and weak versus SpaceX (its launch provider and its broadband competitor).

Bottom line: the moat has migrated. The consumer-broadband moat is gone; the spectrum + defense + IFC moats are real and are what the 2026 thesis rests on.

Lens 4 · Segments

Geography: International = 32% of FY2026 revenue (UK/Inmarsat-weighted). The 10-K does not break segment EBITDA by geography.

The trend that matters: Communication services is a flat-line with a favorable internal mix shift — high-value IFC and government satcom growing, low-value consumer fixed deliberately shrinking. The swing from a −$50.2M segment operating loss (FY25) to +$152.6M profit (FY26) is mostly the absence of the prior-year $169.4M EMEA ground-network impairment plus $25.2M lower SG&A — i.e. a clean-up, not organic acceleration. The genuine growth engine is DAT: +10% revenue at a 16% margin, and that is what is dragging the whole company toward profitability.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (FY2026 / latest print)

The print: FY2026 (ended 2026-03-31) — total revenue $4,640.3M, +3% YoY; record revenue and record adjusted EBITDA of ~$1.55B.

Profitability — the turn is real but one-time-aided:

• Income from operations $108.1M (vs −$97.5M FY25, −$889.8M FY24)
• Net income from continuing ops $3.9M (vs −$531.1M FY25)
• Net loss attributable to Viasat −$34.1M (vs −$575.0M FY25, −$1,068.9M FY24) — i.e. ~−$0.25 EPS
• The positive operating swing leans heavily on two non-recurring items: $152.5M Ligado interest income (from the $420M lump-sum received Oct 2025) and a $168.1M gain on the Navarino UK sale (Q4 FY26). Strip those and the underlying business is still around breakeven.

Q4 FY26 specifically: revenue ~$1.2B (+2%), net income +$59M (vs −$246M prior-year quarter). The Navarino gain landed here, which is why Q4 carried the full year.

Gross / operating margin: gross margin ~33.0%; SG&A fell −15% to $999.5M (FY25 carried the $169.4M impairment); IR&D rose +16% to $164.9M (4% of revenue) on multi-orbit + encryption.

Guidance / tone (FY2027): mid-single-digit total revenue growth (low-single-digit comms, mid-teens DAT), adjusted EBITDA flat to slightly up and back-loaded, capex $950M–$1.0B (finally peaking/declining). Tone is confident on deleveraging and D2D optionality.

Balance-sheet flags: cash $1.7B; gross debt $6.6B (down from $7.2B); net debt ~$4.8B, leverage 3.1x (above mgmt's <3.0x target). Operating cash flow $1.6B ($1.2B ex-Ligado); capex $1.0B; FCF $597M ($177M ex-Ligado). Valuation allowance on U.S. deferred tax assets $435.0M (signals persistent U.S. tax losses).

Market reaction: the stock is up +955% from its Nov-2024 low of $6.69; mcap went $1.1B (Jan-25) → $4.67B (Dec-25) → ~$10B (Jun-26). The market has clearly priced the turn — the question is whether it has over-priced the optionality.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research-layer shelf (transcripts/ empty) — this lens is ``-grounded.

Trajectory of management's narrative (last ~4 calls):

• Q1 FY26 (Aug 2025): "narrowing losses" — beat with +$0.08 EPS vs −$0.20 est; theme = integration cost-out + FCF inflection.
• Q2 FY26 (Nov 2025): −$0.02 vs ~−$0.25 est; first real talk of D2D / NTN spectrum value and the Space42 / Equatys JV; ViaSat-3 F2 launch.
• Q3 FY26 (Feb 2026): sentiment lifts further — Ligado lump-sum received, Navarino sale agreed, deleveraging on track.
• Q4 FY26 (May 2026): "record revenue, record adjusted EBITDA"; Equatys contract closed (2,800-sat constellation); ViaSat-3 F3 launched; pivot language is now firmly defense + spectrum + multi-orbit, away from consumer broadband.

The phrases that appeared: "multi-orbit," "direct-to-device," "spectrum monetization," "deleveraging," "capital efficiency," "Equatys." The phrase that disappeared: anything about growing U.S. fixed consumer broadband — that business is now openly framed as a managed-down bandwidth donor to IFC. Tone has gone from defensive (post-anomaly survival) to offensive (spectrum optionality) over four quarters — a genuine, evidence-backed sentiment improvement.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set: satellite-communications operators. Multiples are `` with date, or n/a. No multiple here is fabricated.

Read: Sector trailing EV/EBITDA is ~8.85–10.46x. Viasat at ~9.5x sits in line with the sector on EV/EBITDA — it screens neither cheap nor expensive on the cash-flow metric. But two caveats cut against it: (1) it is the most leveraged name here (3.1x net debt), so equity-holders sit behind $4.8B of net debt — small EBITDA misses lever the equity hard; (2) it is GAAP-unprofitable while Iridium pays a dividend and buys back stock. The bull's defense is that ~9.5x EV/EBITDA assigns zero value to the D2D/Equatys spectrum optionality that EchoStar just monetized at $19.6B — that is the entire re-rating debate.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~5 years)

• May 2023 — ViaSat-3 F1 antenna-reflector failure. Launched May 1, 2023 on Falcon Heavy; antenna failed to deploy → <10% of expected throughput. The defining negative catalyst; triggered the ~$420M+ insurance claim and the eventual $1.67B carrying-value writedown.
• Aug 2023 — Inmarsat-6 F2 power anomaly. A second satellite failure compounded the first.
• Through 2024 — grind to capitulation. Stock bottomed at $6.69 (Nov 20, 2024) as the market priced existential leverage + lost flagship capacity.
• 2025 — choppy recovery. Opened 2025 at $46, closed at $31.65 (−31% for the year), but mcap still 3x'd off the lows; Sep 2025 +22% on FCF turning positive ($60M vs −$210M).
• 2026 — the explosive re-rating. FCF inflection + Ligado cash + Navarino sale + the D2D/NTN spectrum narrative + a U.S. Space Force contract win (~+12% day). Analyst targets leapt (Deutsche Bank $48→$97, Raymond James $50→$74→$93, Oppenheimer initiated $140).

What the tape reveals: for most of its history VSAT traded on satellite execution risk and leverage. In 2026 the driver changed — the stock now trades on spectrum optionality and defense awards, not consumer-broadband subscriber adds. That regime change is exactly what makes the current price both justified (new value vector) and fragile (optionality, not yet earnings).

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

Mark Dankberg — Chairman & CEO, co-founder (1986), age 70.

• Track record: built Viasat from a 1986 startup into a $4.6B-revenue global operator; engineered the $1.96B Link-16 sale to L3Harris (Jan 2023) at a strong price, and the ~$7B Inmarsat acquisition (May 2023) — a transformational, debt-heavy bet whose integration is still being digested. Returned as CEO in late 2020 after a CEO transition. Genuine domain authority in satcom/defense.
• Skin in the game: holds 1.08M shares ($65M+) post a June-2026 sale of 400K shares ($25.9M at $63–69) under a 10b5-1 plan adopted March 2026. The sale is pre-planned and into strength (rational), but founder ownership at ~0.8% of the company is modest for a 40-year founder-CEO — and selling into the spike is a mild signal worth noting, not alarming.
• Capital-allocation history — mixed-to-poor on the big swing. The Inmarsat deal loaded $7B+ of debt right before the ViaSat-3 F1 flagship — the asset meant to anchor the growth story — failed. ROE/ROIC have been negative for three straight years (cumulative net losses of >$1.6B FY24–FY26). The offsetting good calls: the Link-16 and Navarino divestitures at strong prices, the Ligado settlement extraction ($568M), and disciplined deleveraging ($743M paid down in FY26).
• Red flags: combined Chair/CEO role (mitigated by Lead Independent Director Sean Pak); a heavily promotional D2D/spectrum narrative arriving exactly as the stock 10x'd; serial impairments and a $435M deferred-tax valuation allowance.
• Archetype: founder-operator, deep technical credibility, but one whose signature M&A bet was nearly sunk by a hardware failure. The recovery is as much insurance + asset sales + a spectrum-narrative bull market as it is operational excellence.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Accounting risks to watch:

• Earnings quality / one-time dependence (highest priority). FY2026's swing to ~breakeven net income is propped by $152.5M Ligado interest income + $168.1M Navarino gain — together >$320M of non-operating, non-recurring benefit against a −$34.1M net loss. Without them, GAAP losses continue. Adjusted EBITDA ($1.55B) flatters the picture vs. the GAAP net loss — the gap is heavy D&A and interest on a capital-intensive, levered balance sheet. Cash interest paid was $326.5M in FY26.
• Capitalized interest. Viasat capitalized $240.7M of interest in FY26 (on satellites under construction) — this keeps interest off the P&L and inflates reported operating income relative to cash reality. As ViaSat-3 F3/GX satellites enter service, that capitalized interest converts to D&A + expensed interest — a forward earnings headwind.
• Impairment history. The $1.67B ViaSat-3/Inmarsat-6/ViaSat-4 writedown (FY24) and the $169.4M EMEA ground-network impairment (FY25) show the asset base has been repeatedly over-stated and then marked down. Goodwill/intangibles from Inmarsat are large (acquired-intangible amortization ~$263M/yr for several years; total remaining ~$2.0B) — a future impairment risk if Inmarsat cash flows disappoint.
• Revenue recognition (the auditor's Critical Audit Matter). PwC (auditor since 1992) flagged communication-services revenue recognition as the CAM — over-time recognition on connectivity contracts requires judgment on usage/period measures. Not an allegation, but the disclosed area of estimation risk.
• Unbilled receivables rose $47.0M (IFC + large development projects) — revenue recognized ahead of billing; worth monitoring vs. collections.
• SBC dilution. Share count crept from 117M (FY24) → 128M (FY25) → 135M (FY26); plus PSO/PSU plans with price-hurdle vesting up to 175–250% of target — quiet but persistent dilution.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases: None — "No LR found for this company in the search period".
• SEC AAERs: None — "No AAER found".
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): No material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement actions, consent decrees, or penalties surfaced for Viasat in a 2026 web scan. (Note: as a defense contractor it is subject to government contract-compliance and debarment risk, and routine government audits/transfer-pricing reviews — disclosed generically, none material.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Boilerplate only — "we believe that the resolution of our current pending matters will not have a material adverse effect". Inmarsat-deal fiduciary-duty litigation is referenced as a generic risk, not an active material case.
• Verdict: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-29. The forensic concern here is earnings quality and leverage, not fraud or enforcement.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Approach: bottom-up from FY2026 actuals + FY2027 guidance. Because GAAP EPS is distorted by D&A, one-timers, and the noncontrolling interest, the more honest projection is adjusted EBITDA and FCF (which is how the levered equity is actually valued), with a GAAP-EPS path shown for completeness. All outputs `` with arithmetic; inputs labeled.

Base inputs:

• Revenue: FY26 $4,640M; FY27 guide mid-single-digit growth (~+5%); assume +4–5%/yr.
• Adj. EBITDA: FY26 $1.55B; FY27 guide "flat to slightly up"; modest expansion thereafter as ViaSat-3 F2/F3 capacity sells in and capex/integration costs roll off.
• Capex: FY27 $950M–$1.0B, then management-guided declines (the deleveraging thesis).

• Base case: revenue compounds ~5%; the deleveraging-via-capex-decline story is the real engine — FCF inflects from ~$177M (ex-one-time) toward $500–800M as ViaSat-3/GX capex rolls off and the in-service fleet monetizes. Net leverage falls below 3.0x in FY27. GAAP EPS turns durably positive only by ~FY28 once capitalized interest/D&A is absorbed.
• Bull case: DAT keeps compounding mid-teens; D2D/Equatys spectrum gets monetized (a partnership, capacity-prepay, or an EchoStar-style spectrum transaction) — this is not in the base; it would be a step-function to EV. FCF >$1B by FY29; equity re-rates on spectrum value, not EBITDA multiple.
• Bear case: Starlink/Amazon Leo accelerate IFC share loss; a ViaSat-3 F2/F3 or GX satellite under-performs or fails (the F1 precedent); EBITDA flat-lines while $4.8B net debt + ~$330M cash interest grind the equity. GAAP losses persist; leverage stays >3x; the optionality premium deflates.

Forecast tracking: per the --watchlist rule, no forecast.ts create logged in this unattended sweep. A natural base call to log later: "VSAT FY2028 (ending 2028-03-31) adjusted EBITDA ≥ $1.7B" and/or "VSAT FY2027 FCF ex-one-time ≥ $250M."

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Viasat is a deleveraging, FCF-inflecting defense-and-spectrum compounder masquerading as a dying consumer-broadband stock. The market spent 2023–24 pricing bankruptcy risk; the reality is $1.55B of adjusted EBITDA, $1.7B cash, $743M of debt paid down in a year, and a defense business growing 10%+ at 16% margins with a record $4.9B of new awards. The crown jewel is harmonized L/S-band MSS spectrum — the exact asset EchoStar just sold to SpaceX for $19.6B — which Viasat is activating through the Equatys 2,800-satellite D2D JV with Space42 and the AST/Ligado coordination agreement. At ~9.5x EV/EBITDA the equity assigns essentially zero value to that spectrum optionality. ViaSat-3 F2 (Nov 2025) and F3 (April 2026) finally restore the capacity the F1 failure cost, capex peaks this year, and FCF scales toward $500M–$1B as it rolls off. The contrarian view: the market still thinks of VSAT as "the company whose satellite broke," when it has quietly become a spectrum + defense + multi-orbit infrastructure play.

Bear case. Three things can permanently impair this business:

1. Consumer/IFC erosion to LEO is structural, not cyclical. Starlink has ~10,000 sats, 9M+ subscribers, and is winning IFC in North America/Europe/ME/APAC; Amazon Leo (Kuiper) is deploying ~700 sats by mid-2026 with JetBlue signed. GEO latency can't match LEO for consumer/many IFC use-cases. Viasat is already managing down fixed broadband ($133.9M revenue cut). If IFC share follows, the 71% comms segment stalls or shrinks.
2. Leverage leaves no error budget. $4.8B net debt at 3.1x, ~$330M cash interest/yr, against a business that is still GAAP-loss-making before one-time gains. Another satellite anomaly (F1 is the precedent), an integration miss, or an EBITDA stall and the equity — which sits behind all that debt — gets hit disproportionately.
3. D2D is contested before Equatys launches. Starlink Direct-to-Cell (T-Mobile, 300+ sats, live) and AST SpaceMobile (AT&T/Verizon) are years ahead of Equatys (constellation not yet built; Telesat Lightspeed integration ~2028). The spectrum is valuable, but the execution path to monetize it is long, capital-hungry, and crowded.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): ViaSat-3 F3 commercial service slipped or under-delivered; FY27 adjusted EBITDA came in down, not flat, as IFC pricing compressed under Starlink; the D2D/spectrum "monetization" turned out to be a low-cash JV with a 2028+ payoff, not an EchoStar-style cash event; leverage stayed above 3x; and the +955% momentum trade unwound 40% as the optionality premium evaporated.

Are multiples too high? On EV/EBITDA, no — ~9.5x is sector-average. But the equity has run +955% off the low and ~3x in 18 months, so it now requires the bull spectrum/FCF story to keep compounding. The risk is not a rich EBITDA multiple; it's that a sector-average multiple on a leveraged, loss-making name is itself an optimistic price once the easy recovery beta is exhausted.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the model: GEO satellite broadband is the high-cost, high-latency answer to a question LEO now answers better and cheaper for consumers and increasingly for aviation. Viasat's own behavior — starving fixed broadband to feed IFC — is an admission that capacity is too scarce and too costly to compete on price. The "multi-orbit" and Equatys pivots are tells that the core GEO franchise is not a growth asset.
• Revenue concentration / fragility: U.S. Government is 16% and terminable-for-convenience; a defense-budget air-pocket or a continuing-resolution/shutdown (FY26 already cited a U.S. government shutdown as a headwind) dents the one segment that's actually growing. Aviation IFC depends on a finite set of airlines that can — and increasingly do — dual-source or switch to Starlink.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the spectrum is real but un-monetized and capital-intensive to activate; the defense business is genuine but only 29% of revenue; the IFC base is sticky but addressable by LEO over the contract-renewal cycle.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not Starlink (everyone sees it) — Amazon Leo (Kuiper). Amazon has the balance sheet to subsidize IFC/enterprise indefinitely, is already signing airlines (JetBlue), and turns satellite broadband into an AWS/Prime ecosystem feature where margins don't have to clear a cost of capital. Viasat cannot win a capital war against Amazon and SpaceX simultaneously.
• Worst capital-allocation moves: levering up ~$7B for Inmarsat immediately before the ViaSat-3 F1 flagship failed; three years of >$1.6B cumulative net losses; relying on insurance proceeds, a litigation settlement (Ligado), and an asset sale (Navarino) to manufacture a "turnaround" headline.
• What must hold for today's ~$10B equity: (1) no further satellite anomalies on F2/F3/GX; (2) IFC holds share against LEO through 2028; (3) adjusted EBITDA at least flat with capex actually declining so FCF scales; (4) the spectrum/D2D optionality stays credible (doesn't need to pay off, just can't be falsified). Break any one and the levered equity de-rates.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: with 3.1x leverage and ~$330M cash interest, a 20–30% EBITDA shortfall pushes leverage back toward 4x, kills the FCF-inflection thesis, and likely halves the equity — the optionality premium is the first thing to go.
• The single permanently-impairing scenario: a ViaSat-3 F2 or F3 (or GX) on-orbit failure. It already happened once (F1, <10% throughput) and to Inmarsat-6 F2. A repeat — now without the same insurance recovery and with a stretched balance sheet — would be thesis-ending. Plausibility: low per-satellite, but non-trivial given the F1 antenna-reflector precedent and the same satellite-manufacturing supply chain.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Spectrum monetization: Given EchoStar sold spectrum to SpaceX for $19.6B, what is your explicit framework for monetizing the L/S-band MSS spectrum — a sale, a capacity-prepay, an equity stake in Equatys, or operating it yourselves — and on what timeline would investors see cash, not just a JV?
2. D2D competitive reality: Starlink Direct-to-Cell and AST SpaceMobile are live/near-live with mobile-network partners. Equatys' constellation isn't built. Why do you win the D2D market you're years behind in, and what is the realistic first-revenue date?
3. IFC vs. LEO: As airline IFC contracts renew over the next 3 years, what share are you winning vs. losing to Starlink/Amazon Leo, and at what price/margin — show the renewal cohort data, not just gross aircraft count.
4. FCF bridge: Walk us from FY26 adjusted EBITDA of $1.55B to sustainable FCF: how much capex actually rolls off in FY28–29, and what is steady-state cash interest after the F3/GX satellites capitalize their interest into expense?
5. Earnings quality: FY26's near-breakeven leaned on $152.5M Ligado interest and a $168.1M Navarino gain. What does underlying net income look like in FY27 without one-time items?
6. Leverage path: You're at 3.1x vs a <3.0x target. What's the glide path to 2.0x, and will you prioritize debt paydown over any new satellite/spectrum investment if FCF disappoints?
7. Satellite risk: After the F1 antenna-reflector failure and the Inmarsat-6 F2 anomaly, what specifically changed in design/test/supplier oversight for F2, F3, and the GX fleet — and how much insurance covers a repeat?
8. Consumer broadband: Is U.S. fixed broadband a managed-decline-to-zero business, and if so, what's the revenue/margin tail and the cost of exit?
9. DAT durability: Defense is your growth engine. How concentrated is the $1.6B of new awards by program/customer, and how exposed are you to a U.S. budget air-pocket or shutdown (which already hit FY26)?
10. Equatys economics: What is Viasat's cash contribution, ownership %, and expected return profile in the 2,800-satellite Equatys JV — and what's the total capex to first service?
11. Capital allocation: Given three years of net losses, what is the bar (ROIC) a new satellite or M&A deal must clear, and would you ever return capital to shareholders before that?
12. Inmarsat intangibles: With ~$2.0B of acquired intangibles still amortizing, are Inmarsat's cash flows tracking the acquisition model, and what's the impairment risk?
13. Multi-orbit margins: Reselling Telesat Lightspeed LEO capacity — is that accretive or dilutive to comms-services margins vs. your own GEO capacity?
14. Founder transition: You're a 70-year-old founder-CEO who has sold into the rally. What is the succession plan, and how should investors read the Chair/CEO combination?
15. Insider sales: Your 10b5-1 sales coincide with the stock's 10x. What signal, if any, should shareholders take from management's net selling into strength?

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