AbCellera Biologics

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

AbCellera is a clinical-stage antibody-discovery company that is mid-pivot from a fee-and-royalty platform into a drug developer that owns its own pipeline. It is domiciled in British Columbia, headquartered in Vancouver, lists on Nasdaq as ABCL, and is a Canadian foreign-private-issuer that nonetheless files full US-GAAP 10-Ks (large accelerated filer). As of 2025-12-31 it had 562 full-time employees across Canada, the US and Australia.

How it makes money — two engines, in different states:

1. The legacy platform engine (declining by design). Since 2014 AbCellera ran partner-initiated antibody-discovery programs, taking (i) near-term technology-access + research fees, (ii) downstream clinical/commercial milestones, and (iii) royalties on net sales of any drug that reaches market. Royalty/equivalent rates in current contracts run "low single-digits to mid-twenties percent". The company deliberately cut discovery-partnership volume from 2023 onward to redirect resources to its own pipeline, so this engine's near-term cash is shrinking.
2. The internal-pipeline engine (the future bet). AbCellera now spends the bulk of its R&D on AbCellera-owned drug assets it intends to push through Phase 1/2 and then out-license or co-develop — capturing upfront + milestone + royalty economics on assets it controls, instead of renting the platform to others.

Revenue is tiny, lumpy, and currently flattered by a one-off. FY2025 total revenue was $75.1M, but $36.0M of that was a one-time Bruker patent-litigation settlement booked as licensing revenue; recurring research fees were just $27.2M. Strip the settlement and the operating business did ~$39M. Customer concentration is extreme and shrinking: accounts/accrued receivable were due from just 7 customers at 2025-12-31, down from 16 a year earlier.

The single most important fact about this company: it is a pre-revenue drug developer wearing the income statement of a faded platform. Value it as a pipeline, not a P&L.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain (→ manufacturing / CDMO, for a clinical-stage name)

For a clinical biotech the "supply chain" is the target → discovery platform → manufacturing → clinical → partner/payer value chain. AbCellera has deliberately forward-integrated most of it:

• Discovery inputs: AbCellera runs a vertically-integrated, ~$1B-over-15-years antibody-discovery platform (microfluidics, high-throughput single-cell screening, a proprietary CD3-binding T-cell-engager panel, GPCR/ion-channel capabilities). Trianni humanized-rodent platform supplies licensing revenue.
• Manufacturing (newly in-house): In 2025 AbCellera completed and opened a 130,000-sq-ft clinical GMP manufacturing facility in Vancouver, "substantially completing" its platform build-out. Management's stated rationale: control the supply chain, protect IP, accelerate timelines vs outsourcing to a CDMO. This removes a classic clinical-biotech chokepoint (CDMO slot availability) but adds fixed cost — depreciation on the facility began in Q4 2025 (PP&E net $422.8M at Q1 2026).
• Single-source dependency (flagged in 10-K): "We rely on a limited number of suppliers for laboratory equipment and materials and may not be able to find replacements or immediately transition". Reagents/consumables/equipment for the discovery platform are the named chokepoint.
• Downstream: clinical trials run through CROs (Canada-based trials for ABCL635/575); the eventual commercial channel is out-licensing to large pharma — AbCellera does not intend to build its own sales force. So the most important "stakeholder" downstream is the future licensing partner, not a distributor.
• Government as a balance-sheet supplier: Uniquely, the Canadian federal + BC governments fund a large slice of the infrastructure — up to CAD $300M committed in 2023 (CAD $225M Canada + CAD $75M BC) plus the earlier CAD $175.6M COVID-era SIF/SRF grant. This is cheap, non-dilutive, partly non-repayable capital — a genuine structural edge most US biotechs don't have.

Names, not generic: end-buyers of the legacy platform output historically included Eli Lilly (the bamlanivimab partner); litigation counterparties include Bruker Cellular Analysis (ex-Berkeley Lights/PhenomeX). Competitor-modalities in the lead indication are Astellas (fezolinetant/Veozah) and Bayer (elinzanetant/Lynkuet).

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats) (→ platform / IP / data moat)

Where the moat is real:

• A validated, hard-target discovery platform. AbCellera's calling card is drugging targets that defeat conventional antibody discovery — GPCRs and ion channels (large transmembrane proteins) and multispecifics / T-cell engagers. ~Half its internal programs hit GPCRs/ion channels. The platform is the only reason a 562-person company can run 20+ discovery programs at low marginal cost.
• The COVID proof point. The platform discovered bamlanivimab and bebtelovimab (Lilly's COVID antibodies) on pandemic timelines — a real-world demonstration of speed-to-clinic that few discovery shops can match.
• Forward integration + non-dilutive government capital (Lens 2) is itself a moat: in-house GMP + grant-funded infrastructure lowers the cost and raises the speed of advancing owned assets.
• A portfolio of "free options." Years of partnering left AbCellera holding downstream royalty/milestone/equity stakes in partner-led programs it no longer funds. These are off-balance-sheet call options that cost nothing to carry.

Where the moat is weak / unproven:

• A discovery platform is not the same as a clinical-success moat. AbCellera has never taken its own molecule past Phase 2. The platform de-risks finding an antibody; it does nothing for the binary clinical/regulatory risk that determines value. The 2024 full IPR&D impairment is a reminder that platform-derived "assets" can be written to zero.
• Bargaining power is thin right now. With recurring revenue at ~$27M and partnerships deliberately wound down, AbCellera currently needs partners more than they need it — the opposite of the royalty-rich 2021–22 posture. Bargaining power only returns if ABCL635/575 generate clinical data that pharma wants to license.

Net: a strong discovery moat, an unproven development moat. The thesis is entirely about whether the platform's edge in finding hard-target antibodies converts into clinical wins it can monetize.

Lens 4 · Segments (→ one reportable segment; geography split)

AbCellera reports one operating/reportable segment — the CODM (CEO Carl Hansen) manages on consolidated net loss. So segmentation is by revenue type and geography:

Revenue by type (USD thousands):

*FY2024 total of $28.8M implies licensing/royalty was small; FY2025's jump to $75.1M is almost entirely the $36.0M Bruker settlement plus modest licensing. Recurring research fees have been roughly flat-to-down at $26–36M for three years and are decelerating as partnerships are wound down. There is no growth story in the reported revenue — the growth story is the pipeline.

Revenue by geography (where services performed): FY2025 Canada $64.0M / US $11.1M; FY2024 Canada $26.2M / US $2.7M. Substantially all revenue is billed in USD regardless of where work is performed, while a large share of costs (R&D $164.0M of $186.8M total was incurred in Canada in 2025) is CAD-denominated — a structural USD-revenue / CAD-cost FX mismatch. Long-lived assets: $532.1M Canada, $81.0M US, $15.6M other (2025).

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Phase B — Measure performance (+clinical overlay applied: Lens 5 → Pipeline-by-phase; Lens 7 → Catalyst calendar + mechanism comps; Lens 11 → rNPV + runway)

Lens 5 · Pipeline by phase (replaces "Earnings Result")

The asset table is the company. Sources: 10-K FY2025 + company pipeline disclosures + Q1 2026 update.

PoS figures are my own `` (no analyst PoS was sourced; do not treat as consensus).

The lead asset — ABCL635 — in detail. A potential first-in-class antibody antagonist of NK3R (the neurokinin-3 receptor on KNDy neurons in the hypothalamus that drives thermoregulatory dysfunction in menopause). The Phase 2 portion is a multicentre, randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study in 80 postmenopausal women; first patients dosed in 2026; topline (Phase 1/2) Q3 2026. Interim Phase 1 data (reported on the 2026-05-11 Q1 call) showed strong target engagement, a favorable safety profile, and support for once-monthly dosing.

Latest financial print (Q1 2026, the freshest quarter):

• Total revenue $8.315M (Q1 2025: $4.235M) — research fees $8.124M, +96% YoY. Note: small absolute base, lumpy.
• Net loss $(43.165)M (Q1 2025: $(45.621)M) — modestly narrower YoY.
• Net loss per share $(0.14) (Q1 2025: $(0.15)); weighted-avg shares 303.07M.
• SBC $12.0M (Q1 2025: $14.8M) — material (~28% of net loss) but trending down.
• Liquidity: $504.7M cash + marketable securities at 2026-03-31, down $29.1M Q/Q; management cites ~$655M total available liquidity including loan receivables + government contributions on the Q1 call.
• Collected the first $18.0M of the $36.0M Bruker settlement in Q1; remaining $18.0M expected Q2 2026.

Full-year context: FY2025 net loss $146.4M (FY2024 $162.9M); net cash used in operations $131.3M (FY2024 $108.6M — burn is rising as clinical spend ramps). Accumulated balance flipped to a $29.5M accumulated deficit at 2025-12-31 from +$116.9M accumulated earnings a year earlier — i.e. the entire COVID-era profit cushion has now been consumed.

Market reaction: the stock is a fraction of its post-IPO peak (>$15B in late 2020) and traded ~$5.09 / ~$1.55B at 2026-06-17, inside a 52-week range of $2.75–$6.79. The tape says the platform-royalty story is dead and the pipeline option is only partly priced.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research shelf (transcripts/ is empty); this lens is ``. Across the FY2024 → Q1 2026 calls, management messaging has shifted decisively from "platform/partnership operator" to "clinical-stage drug developer":

• The phrases that appeared and intensified: "first-in-class," "internal pipeline," "shift from building capabilities to building our pipeline," "topline data readouts," "value-inflection." The Q1 2026 call led with positive interim Phase 1 ABCL635 data and reframed the VMS opportunity as a "$6 billion annual US" non-hormonal TAM — a notably bigger number than third-party $2B-by-2030 market estimates.
• The phrases that disappeared: COVID/bamlanivimab royalties, and the old emphasis on discovery-partnership volume (deliberately wound down since 2023).
• Tone: cautiously confident, catalyst-focused, liquidity-reassuring ("capital to fund operations beyond the next three years," repeated in both the 10-K and Q1 10-Q). The consistent through-line is runway is not the risk; the data is.

Lens 7 · Catalyst calendar + mechanism comps (replaces "Comps")

Catalyst calendar — the value drivers are clinical dates, not earnings:

Mechanism comps (by target/indication, not P/E — this is pre-revenue):

• VMS / NK3R class: Astellas fezolinetant (Veozah) — NK3R small molecule, FDA-approved May 2023, ~$300M second-year sales, but carries a boxed liver-injury warning + required LFT monitoring. Bayer elinzanetant (Lynkuet) — dual NK-1/3 antagonist, UK MHRA-approved, not yet FDA-approved; in network meta-analysis the 120mg dose showed the highest VMS-frequency reduction. ABCL635's differentiation thesis: an antibody (vs small molecule) offering once-monthly dosing and the potential to sidestep the hepatotoxicity that dogs the small-molecule class — none of which is yet proven in a pivotal trial.
• Atopic dermatitis / OX40L class: approved anti-type-2 antibodies from Regeneron/Sanofi (dupilumab), Lilly (lebrikizumab), AbbVie, Pfizer; OX40/OX40L clinical-stage rivals include Amgen/Kyowa Kirin rocatinlimab, Sanofi amlitelimab, Apogee Therapeutics, Bristol-Myers Squibb. ABCL575's differentiation: once-every-6-months dosing via Fc-silencing + half-life extension — best-in-class dosing convenience if efficacy holds.

Valuation multiples: n/a. ABCL is pre-product; EV/Sales on a one-off-inflated $75M revenue base is meaningless and no clean forward consensus revenue multiple was sourceable. The right frame is rNPV (Lens 11) and EV-vs-cash, not a peer P/E table.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (5-year pattern)

What has actually moved ABCL >5% over five years, and what it reveals:

• 2020 IPO → >$15B valuation on COVID-antibody euphoria + Lilly bamlanivimab (25% royalty). The market treated AbCellera as a royalty compounder.
• Nov 2022 — FDA revoked bamlanivimab/bebtelovimab authorization. Royalties (which had been $485M in 2022) went to zero; revenue collapsed from >$375M (2021) to $38M (2023). The defining de-rating.
• 2023–24 — the pivot + ~10% headcount cut (Nov 2023). Sell-side reframed ABCL as a clinical-stage story; price targets were cut even on "Outperform" maintains.
• 2025–26 — pipeline catalysts. The stock now trades on clinical-data anticipation — first internal IND clearances, Phase 2 entry, and positive interim Phase 1 ABCL635 data (May 2026). A ~15.6% one-month return around the FY2024 print shows the market rewarding pipeline progress + the >$800M-then liquidity reassurance.

Pattern: the market reacts to (1) royalty/authorization events (now largely behind it) and (2) clinical-pipeline milestones. Going forward it is a single-catalyst stock: ABCL635 Q3 2026 topline will set the tape more than any financial line.

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Phase C — Judge people & books (+clinical add: Science & exclusivity)

Lens 9 · Management

• Carl L. G. Hansen, Ph.D. — Co-founder, CEO, President, Chairman (since inception, Nov 2012). CalTech PhD (Applied Physics/biotech), ex-UBC professor (65+ papers in microfluidics/immunology/genomics), co-founder of Precision NanoSystems. Founder-operator archetype, scientist-CEO. Skin in the game is exceptional: Hansen owns ~57.0M shares ≈ 19.04% of the company — the largest individual holder — and has been adding to his position.
• Véronique Lecault, Ph.D. — Co-founder, CTO (ex-COO) — co-invented the core high-throughput microfluidic platform at UBC; on the board since 2018.
• Andrew Booth — CFO (since Aug 2019) — ex-CFO/Chief Commercial Officer of STEMCELL Technologies, ex-GE Healthcare M&A (INSEAD MBA).
• Tryn Stimart — Chief Legal/Compliance Officer — relevant given the platform is an IP-litigation machine (Bruker win, Schrader defense).
• Board signal: Stephen Quake, D.Phil. (Stanford bioengineering, microfluidics/sequencing pioneer, co-president of CZ Biohub) joined the board Nov 2025 — a strong scientific endorsement of the platform direction. Lead director Michael Hayden is a serial biotech founder (Xenon, 89bio, ex-Teva CSO).

Capital-allocation history — the crux of the bear/bull split. Bulls: management built a ~$1B vertically-integrated platform largely with partner cash + ~CAD $475M of government grants, and is now redeploying into owned assets — genuinely capital-efficient infrastructure-building. Bears: the company has destroyed enormous shareholder value since the 2020 IPO ($15B → ~$1.5B), took a full IPR&D impairment in 2024, and has now burned through its entire accumulated-earnings cushion (to a $29.5M deficit) while ROE/ROIC are deeply negative by construction. The honest read: excellent at building a platform and harvesting non-dilutive capital; unproven at converting it into value-creating drug assets. Ownership alignment (insiders ~44.8%, Hansen 19%) is a real positive — they sink or swim with holders.

Ownership / float: insiders ~44.8%, institutions ~34.8% (Baillie Gifford 6.88%, Voya 3.77%; 341 institutional holders), retail ~20.4%. Insiders + institutions control >80% — thin public float, which amplifies catalyst-driven moves in both directions.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Ground: 10-K + 10-Qs + the pre-fetched regulatory file.

Accounting quality — generally clean, with the usual clinical-biotech caveats:

• Auditor (KPMG) issued an unqualified opinion on both the FY2025 financials and ICFR; internal controls assessed effective at 2025-12-31 and 2026-03-31. No going-concern language (≥36-month runway).
• Critical Audit Matter: revenue recognition for R&D services using output/input methods on partially-satisfied performance obligations — i.e. percentage-of-completion judgment on research fees. This is the one place where revenue timing is genuinely estimate-driven; worth watching as clinical accruals scale.
• Revenue-quality flag (not a fraud flag): FY2025's headline $75.1M is 48% one-off Bruker settlement. Anyone modeling off the reported number without backing out the $36.0M overstates the run-rate by ~2x. Milestone payments are recognized using the "most-likely-amount" method with significant reversal risk acknowledged.
• SBC is material: $12.0M in Q1 2026 (~28% of net loss); 45.7M options @ $6.54 (2020 plan) + 23.3M deep-in-the-money options @ $1.10 (pre-IPO plan) + 10.1M RSUs outstanding; ~79.1M anti-dilutive shares excluded from Q1 2026 EPS. On ~303M shares that's a ~26% potential dilution overhang — large, though much is legacy and deep-ITM.
• IPR&D impairment (2024): full write-off of acquired IPR&D — a reminder that prior-acquisition intangibles haven't held value. Remaining intangibles modest ($37.5M net at Q1 2026).
• Government grants are a balance-sheet nuance, not a red flag, but require care: $183.4M total recognized at 2025-12-31, split non-repayable / conditionally-repayable / repayable, repayments starting 2032–33 over up to 15 years; conditionally-repayable portions can owe up to 1.4× the original grant if revenue thresholds are hit. No interest imputed. A future success-tax on revenue, but cheap capital today.
• FX mismatch: USD revenue / CAD costs (Lens 4) — a real earnings-volatility source, not an integrity issue.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases: None for AbCellera, 2021–2026 (EDGAR EFTS LR search).
• SEC AAERs: None (EDGAR EFTS AAER search).
• Non-SEC (FDA/DOJ/FTC) web search: No enforcement actions, settlements, investigations or penalties found for 2024–2026. (Note: FDA's 2022 revocation of bamlanivimab EUA was a public-health authorization change affecting partner Lilly, not an enforcement action against AbCellera.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): (1) Bruker Cellular Analysis patent suit (AbCellera filed July 2020) — settled in AbCellera's favor Dec 2025, $36.0M upfront + ongoing Beacon royalties to AbCellera. A win. (2) Estate of John Schrader / ImmVivos Pharmaceuticals civil lawsuit (BC Supreme Court, filed Oct 2022) naming the Company, affiliates and CEO Carl Hansen personally, alleging breach of an implied partnership/JV and infringement of a Canadian patent; company seeks dismissal of certain affiliates and calls the claim "meritless." No hearing date set, no reserve booked. Low-to-moderate materiality but worth tracking because it names the founder-CEO.

Verdict: No material accounting or regulatory red flags. The genuine watch-items are (a) don't be fooled by the one-off-inflated revenue line, (b) the ~26% dilution overhang from SBC, and (c) rising cash burn. Verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-18.

Science & exclusivity (clinical overlay add)

• Mechanism validation: NK3R is a clinically validated target for VMS (fezolinetant/elinzanetant proved the pathway). That materially de-risks ABCL635's biology — the open question is whether an antibody format delivers efficacy comparable to the approved small molecules while improving dosing/safety. OX40L (ABCL575) is a validated I&I target with multiple competitors in the clinic. AbCellera is taking validated-target / novel-format risk, not novel-biology risk — a deliberately lower-risk posture management explicitly describes ("avoid high-risk science projects").
• KOL/founder credibility: founder Hansen + CTO Lecault invented the core platform; board addition Stephen Quake is a top-tier microfluidics/genomics scientist — strong scientific bench.
• IP estate: AbCellera both enforces (Bruker win) and defends (Schrader) patents; the platform is patent-dense. No near-term LOE/patent-cliff risk because there is no marketed product — exclusivity risk is years away and tied to future composition-of-matter patents on the antibodies themselves.
• Reimbursement path: not yet relevant (no approval near). The eventual payer question for VMS is whether a premium-priced monthly antibody can win formulary position against low-cost generic hormone therapy + branded small molecules — a real long-term commercial risk.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test (+clinical overlay: Lens 11 → rNPV + runway-to-catalyst)

Lens 11 · rNPV + runway-to-catalyst (replaces "Forward EPS projection")

EPS projection is the wrong tool — AbCellera will lose money for years. The two questions that matter: (a) does cash reach the value-inflection catalyst, and (b) what is the risk-adjusted value of the lead asset?

(a) Runway — comfortably clears the catalyst. Liquidity ~$504.7M (cash+securities, 2026-03-31) / ~$655M total available incl. loan receivables + remaining government contributions. Cash operating burn FY2025 was $131.3M; Q1 2026 net loss $43.2M ≈ ~$160–175M annualized cash need as clinical spend ramps. Even at ~$175M/yr cash burn, ~$505M liquid funds ~3 years — consistent with management's repeated "beyond the next three years" / "≥36 months" language. The Q3 2026 ABCL635 readout and Q4 2026 ABCL575 readout are both fully funded. Runway is not the near-term risk.

(b) rNPV of the lead asset (ABCL635) — illustrative ``, every input labelled:

• US non-hormonal VMS TAM: management cites "≥$6B/yr"; third-party estimates ~$2B by 2030. Take a conservative $3B addressable.
• Peak-sales assumption for ABCL635 if approved: ~$500M–$1.0B (mid-single-digit to ~15% share of a $3–6B market, antibody premium pricing, monthly dosing convenience) — call it $700M base.
• PoS from Phase 1/2 to approval for a validated-target antibody: ~25–30%.
• Discount rate 12%, ~6 years to launch, ~50% operating-margin-equivalent value capture (likely out-licensed → royalty/milestone economics rather than full P&L).
• Illustrative rNPV ≈ $700M peak × ~3× peak-sales-to-NPV-multiple × 27% PoS ÷ discounting ≈ $400–700M for ABCL635 alone. Add ABCL575 optionality, the preclinical pipeline, the legacy royalty portfolio, and ~$505M net cash, and a sum-of-parts in the ~$1.3–2.0B range is defensible — bracketing today's ~$1.55B market cap.

Read-through: at ~$1.55B, the market is roughly paying for net cash + a partial-credit lead asset. That means: a clean Phase 2 win in Q3 2026 is materially undervalued (rNPV PoS jumps, peak-sales conviction rises); a failure takes the stock toward net cash (~$505M ≈ ~$1.65/sh of cash value) — i.e. meaningful downside but cash-cushioned, not a zero. This is the textbook cash-backed binary.

Brier forecast (would-log in non-watchlist mode; not created here per --watchlist rules): "ABCL635 Phase 1/2 VMS topline (Q3 2026) meets primary efficacy endpoint with placebo-adjusted VMS-frequency reduction sufficient to advance to Phase 3, p≈0.45, resolves 2026-09-30, tags abcellera,deep-dive." (Not committed in this breadth pass.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. AbCellera is a de-risked platform bet trading near cash ahead of two 2026 clinical catalysts. The discovery moat is real and battle-tested (it built COVID antibodies on record timelines); it now owns — rather than rents — a vertically-integrated platform substantially paid for by partners and ~CAD $475M of government money. The lead asset targets a clinically-validated mechanism (NK3R) with a differentiated antibody / once-monthly format that could dodge the boxed-warning hepatotoxicity hobbling Astellas' Veozah, in a $2–6B women's-health market with huge unmet need and a tailwind of menopause-care normalization. Founder-CEO owns 19% and is buying; insiders own ~45%; Stephen Quake just joined the board. Liquidity funds operations >3 years, so there's no financing gun to the head before the data. A clean Q3 2026 readout re-rates the rNPV and likely triggers out-licensing interest from large pharma — exactly the pattern that built the 2021–22 royalty narrative, now with an owned asset.

Bear case (2–3 ways it permanently impairs).

1. The lead asset fails or underwhelms. It's an n=80, first-antibody-at-this-MoA Phase 2 with no efficacy precedent for the format; a placebo-adjusted miss (or a safety surprise) in Q3 2026 takes the equity toward net cash and removes the central thesis. Small molecules already work here — an antibody must clear a high efficacy/convenience bar to matter.
2. The platform never proves it can monetize owned drugs. AbCellera has never taken its own molecule past Phase 2; the 2024 IPR&D write-off shows platform "assets" can zero out. If 635 and 575 both disappoint, the company is a cash-burning discovery shop with a wound-down partnership engine and no royalty catalysts — a multi-year value trap.
3. Structural drift: burn up, recurring revenue down, dilution overhang. Cash op-burn rose to $131M (2025) and is climbing; recurring research fees are ~$27M and shrinking; ~79M anti-dilutive shares (~26% overhang) sit on the cap table; the entire accumulated-earnings cushion is gone. Government-grant repayments and a 1.4× conditionally-repayable success-tax begin 2032–33.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): ABCL635 Phase 2 missed on placebo-adjusted VMS reduction (or showed a tolerability signal); the stock halved to near-cash; ABCL575 Phase 1 was unremarkable; with no clinical proof point, partnering interest stayed cold, burn kept the cash melting, and the market re-rated AbCellera permanently to "cash + a lottery ticket." Alternatively: 635 worked but the antibody had no advantage over cheap small molecules, so peak-sales conviction never built.

Are multiples too high? Not on a sum-of-parts basis — EV is roughly net cash + partial lead-asset credit, which is reasonable for a funded binary, not euphoric. The risk isn't a rich multiple; it's binary outcome risk.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): consensus treats ABCL as a busted COVID-royalty story and a serial value-destroyer — so it underweights that this is now a cash-backed, validated-target option with a credible differentiation angle and a founder buying stock, where the downside is cushioned by ~$505M cash and the upside catalyst is dated (Q3 2026) and fully funded. The market is anchored on the 2020→2025 chart, not the 2026 option payoff.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• Revenue concentration is now near-total binary risk. Strip the $36M Bruker one-off and the operating business is ~$27M of decelerating, 7-customer research fees. There is no recurring revenue engine — value is 100% future clinical success. If 635 misses, what's left is cash and hope.
• The moat protects the wrong thing. AbCellera is great at finding antibodies; that has zero correlation with clinical efficacy/regulatory approval, which is where 90%+ of biotech value is made or lost. A discovery platform is a cost-saver, not a success-guarantor — and the 2024 IPR&D write-off proves platform output can be worthless.
• Format risk is underpriced. Bulls assume an antibody beats a pill in VMS. But small molecules already deliver efficacy at low cost; an injected/monthly antibody must justify premium pricing and a needle against generic HRT + branded orals. "Monthly dosing" and "maybe no liver warning" are hypotheses, not data.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Bayer (elinzanetant/Lynkuet) — a dual NK-1/3 antagonist with best-in-class VMS-frequency reduction in meta-analyses and Big-Pharma commercial muscle, already approved in the UK and advancing toward the US. By the time ABCL635 could launch (~2030+), the non-hormonal VMS market may be fully colonized by two entrenched, possibly-cheaper, orally-dosed incumbents.
• Capital-allocation skeletons: $15B → $1.5B of value destroyed; IPR&D fully impaired; burn rising; ~26% dilution overhang; a founder-CEO personally named in an ongoing partnership/IP lawsuit (Schrader). Government grants look free until you read the 1.4× conditionally-repayable success-tax and 15-year repayment tail starting 2032.
• What must hold for today's price: that ~$505M cash is real and not consumed by a financing before data (true near-term), and that ABCL635 delivers a clean, differentiated Phase 2 — a single binary 3 months out.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: there's no "growth" to disappoint — the relevant shock is a clinical miss, which is ~binary and would take the stock toward net-cash ($505M, ~⅓ of today's cap).
• Single permanent-impairment scenario: ABCL635 Phase 2 fails on efficacy or shows a safety signal → lead asset to ~zero, 575 unproven, partnership engine wound down → AbCellera becomes a slowly-melting cash pile with a discovery platform nobody pays a premium for. Plausibility: moderate (~50–55% the readout is not a clean, clearly-differentiated win).

Lens 14 · Management Questions (15, ordered by information value)

1. ABCL635 Phase 1/2 (Q3 2026): what placebo-adjusted reduction in VMS frequency and severity would you consider a clear go-to-Phase-3 win, and how does that bar compare to fezolinetant's and elinzanetant's pivotal results?
2. On what evidence do you believe an antibody can match or beat approved small-molecule NK3R antagonists on efficacy — and what specifically would the antibody format have to demonstrate to command premium pricing vs generic HRT?
3. Have you seen anything in the ABCL635 Phase 1 safety/PK data that speaks to the hepatotoxicity that gave Veozah its boxed warning — i.e. is "no liver signal" a real differentiator you can stand behind?
4. What is your base-case path to value for ABCL635 — independent development through Phase 3, or out-license after Phase 2 — and what data package would trigger a partnering process?
5. Walk me through cash runway under your actual 2026–27 clinical-spend plan (not the headline): at what quarter does liquidity fall below 18 months, and what is your financing red line?
6. Recurring research fees are ~$27M and decelerating. What is the floor for partnership revenue, and should investors model it to ~zero as you complete legacy obligations?
7. The legacy downstream royalty/milestone portfolio: which 2–3 partner programs are closest to a milestone or commercial event, and what's the realistic 3-year cash contribution?
8. ABCL575's once-every-6-months dosing is the headline differentiator — what efficacy trade-off, if any, comes with that interval vs dupilumab/amlitelimab/rocatinlimab, and when do you have human efficacy (not just safety) data?
9. You took a full IPR&D impairment in 2024. What did that teach you about converting platform output into durable assets, and how does it change capital allocation now?
10. Insiders own ~45% and you (Hansen) own 19% and have been buying — at what point does that concentration + thin float become a liquidity/governance concern for outside holders?
11. The government-grant structure carries conditionally-repayable amounts up to 1.4× and repayments from 2032. At what revenue level does this become a meaningful cash drag, and is it fully modeled in your long-range plan?
12. What is the 2027 pipeline-depth plan beyond ABCL688/ABCL386 — how many DCs/INDs per year does the platform sustainably produce at the current ~$165M R&D run-rate?
13. SBC is ~28% of net loss with ~79M anti-dilutive shares outstanding. What's your multi-year dilution trajectory, and is the deep-ITM pre-IPO option block (23M @ $1.10) a near-term overhang?
14. On the Schrader litigation naming you personally: what's the realistic range of outcomes, and does it constrain any partnership or financing activity?
15. If both ABCL635 and ABCL575 disappoint in 2026, what is Plan B — does the company pivot back toward partnership/platform monetization, and what does that look like?

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