Amphenol

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Amphenol is one of the world's largest designers and makers of electrical, electronic and fiber-optic connectors and interconnect systems, plus antennas, sensors, and coaxial/high-speed/fiber-optic/specialty cable. Predecessor businesses founded 1932; incorporated 1986; NYSE-listed since 1991. Management sizes the served market (interconnect, value-add cable assembly, antenna, cable, sensor) at ~$500B in 2025 — Amphenol's $23B is ~4-5% of a vast, fragmented pool, which is the entire roll-up thesis.

What it sells / how it makes money. A "picks-and-shovels" components business: it sells the physical interconnect (the plug, the cable, the harness, the backplane, the sensor) into nearly every electronics end market. Revenue is overwhelmingly transactional product sales — no single customer was ≥10% of net sales in 2025, 2024, or 2023. ~81% of sales go direct to end customers/contract manufacturers; ~19% through distributors. No take-or-pay; this is a book-and-ship model with long-dated design-in relationships ("relationships typically date back many years").

Three reportable segments (FY2025 % of net sales):

• Communications Solutions — 52% (high-speed, RF, power, fiber-optic interconnect; antennas; cable). The AI/datacom engine.
• Harsh Environment Solutions — 26% (ruggedized interconnect, specialty cable, printed circuits — defense/aero/industrial).
• Interconnect and Sensor Systems — 22% (sensors, busbars/power distribution, value-add interconnect).

End-market mix FY2025: IT datacom 36%, Industrial 19%, Automotive 15%, Communications Networks 10%, Defense 9%, Mobile Devices ~6%, Commercial Aerospace 5%. The "space" coverage bucket is a rounding error — space sits inside Defense; this is an AI-infrastructure + broad-industrial interconnect compounder, not a space company.

Contract structure / payment terms. Standard trade terms; precious-metal and commodity inputs are sometimes passed through but not always (a margin risk, Lens 10). Decentralized "entrepreneurial" GM model — ~each business unit run as its own P&L with its own GM, a structural feature that powers both the acquisition machine and the cost discipline.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream inputs → Amphenol → end customer, named:

• Raw materials: precious metals (gold, silver, palladium — plating), copper, aluminum, steel, titanium, metal alloys, copper wire and optical fiber, engineered plastics. "Generally available throughout the world and purchased locally from a variety of suppliers"; Amphenol is "generally not dependent upon any one source," and uses long-term supply agreements where single-sourced. This is a deliberately multi-sourced, locally-purchased input base — a real moat against the kind of single-supplier chokepoint that sinks other component makers.
• Amphenol itself: a globally distributed manufacturing footprint, heavily weighted to low-cost regions (China long-lived assets $1,050M vs. US $599M — China is the larger manufacturing base even though it is only ~16% of ship-to sales). This is the key supply-chain tension: manufacturing is China-heavy while the demand and the customer base are increasingly US/AI — a tariff and geopolitical pressure point.
• Customers / OEMs / hyperscalers: in IT datacom the buyers are the server/switch/storage OEMs and the AI hyperscalers (the 10-K names "AI, cloud computing, data centers, servers, storage systems, transmission" applications; it does not name individual hyperscalers, consistent with the no-customer-over-10% disclosure). The CommScope CCS acquisition pulls Amphenol deeper into rack-to-rack and fiber inside the data center.
• Distributors/resellers: ~19% of sales, concentrated in Communications Solutions and Harsh Environment.

Chokepoints / single-source: "In limited instances, we depend on a single source of supply or participate in commodity markets served by a limited number of suppliers" — disclosed but framed as immaterial. The real chokepoint is geographic, not supplier-specific: the China manufacturing concentration.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Named competitors: TE Connectivity (the closest large peer), Aptiv, Belden, Corning, Foxconn Interconnect Technology (FIT), Glenair, HUBER+SUHNER, Luxshare-ICT, Jonhon, Molex (Koch), Rosenberger, Sensata, Yazaki — plus a long tail of regional specialists. Amphenol competes on "technology innovation, product quality and performance, price, customer service and delivery time."

Durable moats:

1. Scale + breadth in a fragmented market. ~$500B served market, ~thousands of products, no peer with the same end-market and product diversification. This breadth is what lets the no-customer-over-10% diversification hold — and it is genuinely hard to replicate.
2. Design-in switching costs. Interconnect is spec'd into a customer's product at the design stage; once a connector is qualified into a server, an aircraft, or a car platform, it is sticky for the product's life. High mix, low per-part cost, mission-critical reliability → low propensity to re-qualify a competitor for pennies of savings.
3. The acquisition + decentralization flywheel. >50 acquisitions in a decade; the entrepreneurial-GM operating system lets Amphenol buy founder-led niche interconnect businesses and improve their margins by plugging them into global scale and low-cost manufacturing. This is a process moat — the M&A machine itself is the durable advantage, and it has compounded sales from ~$3.5B to $23B.
4. Process/cost moat. 36.9% gross margin and 25.4% operating margin (FY2025) on a components business is exceptional — TE Connectivity, the closest peer, runs structurally lower. The cost-control "mindset" is cultural and decentralized.

Bargaining power: Strong over suppliers (multi-sourced, commodity inputs, scale buyer). Moderate-to-strong over customers (mission-critical, low-cost-per-part, design-locked) — but in a hyperscaler-concentrated AI build-out, the largest buyers have real leverage on price, and pull-forward dynamics cut both ways.

Lens 4 · Segments

FY2025 external net sales / segment operating income / implied margin:

The story is concentration of growth, not concentration of customer. Communications Solutions nearly doubled revenue YoY (+91%) and grew segment OI +139% — operating leverage on AI/IT-datacom is carrying the entire company. Segment margin there expanded to 31.1% (from 24.8%). The other two segments grew respectably (organic +17% Harsh, +13% I&S) but the marginal dollar of growth is overwhelmingly AI.

Geography (ship-to): US $7,987.7M (35%), China $3,673.1M (16%), Other foreign $11,433.9M (49%). Note the conflict with web commentary citing "China ~30% of FY25 sales" — that figure conflates manufacturing/sourcing exposure (China is the larger production base, long-lived assets $1,050M) with ship-to revenue (16%). Both are true and both matter: revenue-by-destination China risk is ~16%; supply-side China risk is materially higher.

Q1-2026 trend (latest): Communications Solutions is now ~60% of sales, +88% USD / +47% organic YoY; IT datacom market +99% USD / +81% organic YoY, "virtually all" sequential organic growth AI-driven. The mix is accelerating, not stabilizing.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest: Q1-2026, reported 2026-04-30)

unless noted.

• Net sales $7,620.1M, +58% USD / +57% cc / +33% organic YoY (vs $4,811.0M). A record quarter.
• Gross profit $2,800.2M → 36.7% GM (flat vs. 36.9% FY2025 — margin held through 58% growth and a giant acquisition, impressive).
• GAAP operating income $1,831.8M → 24.0% OM; income before taxes $1,645.7M (+71% YoY).
• GAAP net income attrib $933.0M; GAAP diluted EPS $0.72. But the GAAP number is depressed by a one-time China tax charge: a $130.0M accrual from "unfavorable determinations" by Chinese tax authorities on prior-period positions + $160.0M of additional China tax obligations from reassessing prior-year rate assumptions — together ~+1,760 bps to the effective tax rate (which printed 42.7% vs. 22.7% a year ago).
• Adjusted diluted EPS $1.06, +68% YoY, beat the high end of guidance. Sequential organic growth +16%, "virtually all" AI.
• Guidance / outlook — RAISED: Q2-2026 revenue $8.1–8.2B (midpoint $8.15B, +43–45% YoY), adjusted diluted EPS $1.14–1.16 (+41–43% YoY). Management guided a further low-teens sequential sales increase as AI data-center investment accelerates. Tone: confidently bullish.
• Balance-sheet flags: Interest expense jumped to $207.9M (from $76.5M) on the CommScope debt load. Working capital a $499.8M drag (normal for hypergrowth). Operating cash flow $1,121.5M; capex $291.6M → FCF ~$830M. Post-CommScope: total debt $18.75B ($16.64B LT + $2.11B current), cash $4,128M, net debt ~$14.6B; goodwill ballooned to $17,543M and intangibles to $5,401M.
• Market reaction: stock rallied ~6% on the print; the market looked through the China tax noise to the organic-growth + guidance beat.

Unusual vs. its own history: 58% growth and a doubling of the lead segment is wildly out of band for a 90-year connector company — and the only reason it isn't a red flag is that ~33% of it is organic, AI-driven, and corroborated by the +81% organic IT-datacom print.

Full-year context: FY2025 revenue $23,094.7M (+52%), gross profit $8,517.7M (36.9%), operating income $5,868.6M (25.4%), net income attrib $4,270.3M, GAAP & adjusted diluted EPS both $3.34 (FY2024 $1.92/$1.89; FY2023 $1.55/$1.51). The GAAP=adjusted equality is a cleanliness tell — minimal non-GAAP gaming.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

Transcripts not on disk; sourced ``. Across the last several calls the consistent management focus is: (1) AI/IT-datacom as the dominant growth driver ("virtually all sequential growth driven by AI-related products" is now a recurring phrase); (2) the acquisition program (Andrew, Trexon, CIT, then the CommScope CCS "industry's broadest range of high-speed copper, power and fiber optics" framing); (3) operating discipline / margin expansion through growth. Tone has shifted markedly more confident over 2025→2026 as AI demand inflected, and management has repeatedly raised guidance rather than guiding conservatively. What they have not started saying: any caution about AI capex durability or pull-forward — the call narrative treats demand as a durable new baseline, which is itself the contrarian risk (Lens 12/13). CEO Norwitt's "look-ahead" optimism is a brand feature; the absence of hedging in a clearly cyclical demand wave is worth watching.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set is the connector/interconnect complex (the _index.json "space" peers — Rocket Lab, Planet, Iridium — are NOT relevant comps and are excluded). Multiples ``, dated; n/a where not reliably sourced.

Read: Amphenol trades at a very large premium to its closest public peer (forward P/E ~34 vs. TEL ~20) and ~36% above the hardware-industry median forward P/E (~25.1). The premium is earned on growth (33% organic vs. TEL ~mid-single-digit organic) and superior margins/ROE (36.9%), but it is fully priced: GuruFocus tags it "Modestly Overvalued" with a 94/100 quality score. The comp table is the crux of the whole dossier — you are paying a tech-growth multiple for a connector company, justified only if AI keeps the organic-growth engine running.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves APH)

Pattern over the recent multi-year window:

• The dominant driver is AI-datacom demand prints + guidance. Stock roughly doubled in 2025 and is up ~90% over the trailing year (Dec 2025), driven almost entirely by the IT-datacom/AI acceleration and successive guidance raises. From ~$75 early 2025 → >$110 by Aug 2025 → ~$161 by mid-June 2026.
• Earnings beats move it >5% repeatedly (e.g. ~+6% on the Q1-2026 print) — the market reacts to the organic IT-datacom number and the sequential guide more than to the headline GAAP EPS.
• M&A announcements are catalysts: the Aug-2025 CommScope CCS announcement and the Jan-2026 close were narrative-shifting events that re-rated the stock as a deeper AI-infrastructure play.
• Multiple expansion has outrun earnings: over 3 years EPS +28%/yr but price +53%/yr — i.e. roughly half the return is re-rating, which is exactly what reverses in a de-rate.
• Insider selling has been a recurring (so far ignored) bearish signal (Lens 9). The tell: this name now trades on AI capex sentiment, not on the diversified-industrial fundamentals that historically anchored it.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: R. (Richard) Adam Norwitt — at Amphenol since 1998, President since 2007, CEO since 2009, and became Chairman in 2026 (combined CEO+Chair). A genuinely long-tenured operator.
• Track record (quantified): under Norwitt the company executed >50 acquisitions in a decade and grew sales from ~$3.5B to >$23B, transforming a connector business into a diversified interconnect/antenna/sensor compounder. FY2025 ROE 36.9% — elite capital efficiency sustained over a long period. This is one of the best industrial capital-allocation records of the era.
• Capital allocation: reinvest-and-acquire is the engine — $3.8B on five deals in 2025, $2.2B in 2024, then the $10.5B CommScope CCS (largest in company history, closed Jan-2026; CCS expected ~$4.1B FY2026 sales). Shareholder returns are deliberately secondary but disciplined: dividend $0.25/qtr ($1.00/yr), 15 consecutive years of increases, 5-yr DGR ~+25%, payout ratio ~20%; buybacks ~$665M in FY2025 (net of option dilution the share count drifts up slightly — options-funded growth, not aggressive shrinkage).
• Skin in the game / red flags: Heavy, repeated insider selling. Norwitt sold 608,333 shares (~$89.6M) on 2026-02-13 and a further 17,500 shares (~$18.7M) in early May 2026; other execs (CFO Lampro, President Luc, others) also sold through 2025–2026. (Note: some scraped aggregate figures — "$1.5B," "$2.4B" — are not credible as single-sale proceeds and are treated as n/a — not reliably sourced; the share-count + price transactions above are the defensible ones.) Selling into a parabolic move is partly natural diversification, but the scale and persistence is a yellow flag and the bears' favorite. The CEO+Chairman combination in 2026 is a governance-balance flag — concentrates power just as the company makes its biggest, most leveraged bet.
• Archetype: a long-tenured professional manager who operates like a founder-CEO — entrepreneurial, decentralized, acquisitive. For this stage (hypergrowth + mega-acquisition integration), that operator profile is a strength; the governance concentration is the offsetting concern.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

• Accounting cleanliness — broadly strong. GAAP diluted EPS = adjusted diluted EPS ($3.34 FY2025) — the company is not inflating a non-GAAP number. SBC is tiny: $135.4M = ~0.6% of sales (FY2025), so non-GAAP is not flattered by add-backs. FCF/NI conversion ~103% (FCF ~$4,378M vs. NI attrib $4,270M) — earnings are backed by cash.
• Receivables/inventory vs. revenue: AR grew to $4,717M and inventory to $3,425M, but revenue grew 52% — both grew slower than sales, so no channel-stuffing or demand-pull red flag; DSO/DIO actually improved. Q1-2026 inventory build to $4,087M is consistent with the AI ramp.
• Goodwill/intangibles risk — the real one. Post-CommScope, goodwill $17,543M + intangibles $5,401M = $22,944M, or ~54% of $42,134M total assets and ~164% of equity. A roll-up's balance sheet is a tower of acquisition goodwill; if a major acquisition (CommScope) underperforms in a datacom downcycle, impairment risk is concentrated here. No impairment to date, and the M&A track record is strong, but this is where the bodies would be buried.
• China tax exposure — active and material. Q1-2026 took $130.0M (unfavorable China tax determinations) + $160.0M (reassessed prior-year China rate assumptions) = ~$290M in charges, spiking the effective tax rate to 42.7%. This is a recurring-risk flag, not a one-off: it signals ongoing disputes with Chinese tax authorities over historical positions, and the China manufacturing concentration makes it a live, multi-year overhang.
• Leverage: net debt ~$14.6B post-CommScope; against pro-forma EBITDA (FY2025 EBITDA ~$6,791M plus CommScope contribution) net leverage is ~2x — manageable, but interest expense more than doubled and the balance sheet is no longer the fortress it was.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. "No LR found" and "No AAER found" for Amphenol since 2021-06-20 via EDGAR EFTS.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): incorporates Note 14 — the company is party to ordinary-course legal/regulatory actions but "does not believe that the resolution of any existing legal or regulatory action is expected to have a material adverse effect".
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB etc.): no material enforcement actions surfaced in web search; the only live regulatory matter is the China tax dispute noted above (a tax-authority determination, not a US-agency enforcement action).
• Conclusion: No material US securities/accounting enforcement findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), 10-K Item 3/Note 14, and web search as of 2026-06-20. The one genuine forensic watch-item is the China tax/manufacturing concentration, not accounting integrity.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026 / FY2027 / FY2028)

Built bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + Q1-2026 actual + management Q2-2026 guidance. All EPS outputs ``; input lines labeled.

Anchors: FY2025 adj EPS $3.34. Q1-2026 adj EPS $1.06. Q2-2026 guide $1.14–1.16 (mid $1.15). H1-2026 adj EPS ≈ $2.21. TTM EPS already $3.66.

• FY2026 base: annualizing the H1 run-rate with the guided low-teens sequential ramp into H2 (AI acceleration + full CommScope quarters): H2 ≈ $2.50–2.70 → FY2026 adj EPS ≈ $4.75. Bull ≈ $5.05 (sequential ramp sustains, CommScope accretive faster, mix richer). Bear ≈ $4.45 (China tax drag recurs, AI sequential growth flattens H2).
• FY2027 base: assume organic growth decelerates from ~33% toward ~15–18% as AI comps harden + CommScope laps, modest margin expansion, ~flat share count: ≈ $5.60. Bull ≈ $6.30 (AI durable, 20%+ growth holds). Bear ≈ $4.90 (datacom normalizes to high-single-digit, multiple AND earnings de-rate).
• FY2028 base: normalize to a ~12–14% grower (still premium, but post-hypergrowth): ≈ $6.35. Bull ≈ $7.40. Bear ≈ $5.30.

Valuation cross-check: at ~$161 the stock is ~34x FY2026 base ($4.75) and ~29x FY2027 base ($5.60). Even on the FY2028 base ($6.35), ~25x — still a premium multiple three years out. The price already discounts the base case; you need the bull path (AI durable through 2027+) to make money from here, and any reversion toward the ~25x hardware median on a decelerating tape is a 25–30% drawdown.

(Per --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create logged in this unattended sweep. Suggested base forecast to log later: "APH FY2026 adjusted diluted EPS ≥ $4.70", p≈0.6, resolves 2027-02-15.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. The best-run interconnect compounder on earth just bought the missing piece (CommScope fiber/rack-to-rack) at the exact moment AI data centers became the largest interconnect demand event in history. 33% organic growth, 37% gross margin, 37% ROE, a >50-deal M&A machine, and management raising guidance every quarter. IT datacom +81% organic with "virtually all" sequential growth AI-driven means Amphenol is a direct, diversified beneficiary of every hyperscaler dollar — copper, power, and fiber, the "industry's broadest range." Diversification (no customer >10%, 7 end markets) means even a datacom air-pocket is cushioned by defense/aero/industrial. Secular tailwinds (AI, electrification, defense rebuild, content-per-device) stack. Earnings could surprise to $5+ in FY2026.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. AI capex pull-forward / normalization. The single biggest risk: 33% organic / +81% datacom is a cycle, and "recent strength reflects demand pulled forward rather than a steady baseline". If hyperscaler capex flattens in 2026–2027, the lead segment (now ~60% of sales) decelerates hard — and the stock de-rates from ~34x toward ~20x simultaneously. Bull-to-bear range $135–$215 hinges on exactly this.
2. Valuation with no cushion. 50% above its own 10-yr P/E, ~36% above the hardware median; multiple expansion provided ~half the 3-yr return. A re-rate alone (no earnings miss) is a large drawdown.
3. China concentration (manufacturing + tax). Larger production base in China than the US; active tax disputes ($290M Q1-2026 charge); tariff exposure. A US-China escalation hits both cost and the tax line.
4. Integration + goodwill. $22.9B goodwill+intangibles (~164% of equity); the $10.5B CommScope bet must clear a high bar, and impairment risk is concentrated if datacom turns.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): Hyperscaler capex guidance was cut in late 2026; APH's IT-datacom organic growth fell from +80% to +10% in two quarters; the Street re-rated APH from 34x to 22x; CommScope synergies slipped on integration; a fresh China tax/ tariff headline added a tax-rate overhang. Stock is ~$110 (−30%) despite EPS still growing — a textbook growth-stock de-rate on a cyclical peak, even though the business never broke.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on any normalized view — they price the bull case. Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market is treating Amphenol's AI-datacom revenue as a permanent secular annuity and paying a software-like multiple for it, when interconnect demand into hyperscaler capex is more cyclical than the diversified history implies — the diversification that justified the old multiple is exactly what's being diluted as datacom heads toward 60% of sales.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Where revenue is concentrated: the marginal growth dollar is AI/IT-datacom, now ~36% of total and rising, with Communications Solutions ~60% of sales — the "diversified compounder" is quietly becoming an AI-infrastructure pure-play at a peak multiple. If AI capex disappoints by 20–30%, the segment carrying ~all the growth and operating leverage reverses, and so does the multiple. On FY2027 bear ($4.90) at a de-rated 22x, that's ~$108 — ~33% downside.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: in hyperscaler AI, the buyers (a handful of mega-cap clouds) have enormous purchasing leverage and second-source aggressively; design-in stickiness is real for legacy industrial/auto/defense but thinner in fast-moving AI hardware where the buyer dictates terms and dual-sources copper/fiber. TE Connectivity, Corning (fiber), and Chinese names (Luxshare, Jonhon, FIT) are all chasing the same datacom dollars.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Corning (fiber, directly overlapping the CommScope CCS rationale) and Luxshare/FIT (Chinese cost + scale moving up the interconnect stack). A fiber price war in the data center would hit the very capability Amphenol paid $10.5B for.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance: persistent, large insider selling by the CEO and execs into the top; the CEO+Chairman consolidation in 2026 removing a governance check right before the largest, most-levered acquisition in company history; goodwill at ~164% of equity.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: AI capex durable through 2027+; CommScope integrates cleanly and accretes ~$4.1B at good margins; China tax/tariff stays contained; the 34x multiple holds. Break any one and the stock re-rates.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: FY2027 EPS toward the bear $4.90 and a multiple compression to the hardware median (~22–25x) → low-$100s to ~$120 — a 25–35% impairment of the stock even with the business intact.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a structural China decoupling (forced manufacturing relocation + punitive tariffs + escalating tax determinations) simultaneous with an AI-capex digestion year — hits cost base, tax rate, demand, and multiple at once. Plausibility: moderate, not remote.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of the +81% organic IT-datacom growth, how much do you estimate is durable run-rate vs. capex pull-forward, and what early indicators would tell you hyperscaler demand is normalizing?
2. How concentrated is IT-datacom revenue among your top 3–5 hyperscaler/OEM customers, and how has that concentration trended as the segment grew to ~36% of sales?
3. What is the realistic operating-margin and revenue trajectory for CommScope CCS over 2026–2027, and what synergy or dis-synergy are you underwriting vs. the ~$4.1B FY2026 sales target?
4. Walk us through the China tax determinations behind the Q1-2026 $290M charge — is this a closed prior-period matter or an ongoing exposure that could recur in coming quarters?
5. What share of COGS and manufacturing capacity sits in China today, and what is your contingency plan (cost and timeline) for relocating capacity under a tariff/decoupling scenario?
6. As Communications Solutions approaches ~60% of sales, how do you preserve the diversification that historically justified Amphenol's premium multiple?
7. With goodwill+intangibles now ~164% of equity, what impairment triggers are you watching, and what datacom-demand level would put CommScope goodwill at risk?
8. How do you think about valuation discipline on the next acquisition when your stock trades at ~34x forward and 50% above its 10-year average multiple?
9. What is your second-source/competitive exposure in AI datacom specifically — how sticky are these design-ins vs. legacy industrial/defense, and where are you seeing the most aggressive pricing pressure (Corning, Luxshare, FIT)?
10. Net leverage is ~2x post-CommScope and interest expense doubled — what is your target leverage, and does it constrain the M&A cadence in 2026–2027?
11. Given the scale and frequency of insider sales, how should shareholders read management's conviction at current prices?
12. What was the rationale for combining the CEO and Chairman roles in 2026, and what governance safeguards offset the concentration of authority?
13. Where is pricing power strongest and weakest across your end markets right now, and how much of FY2025 growth was price vs. volume?
14. What is the long-term content-per-unit growth opportunity in AI servers/switches specifically (copper vs. power vs. fiber), and how does CommScope change your share of the rack?
15. If AI capex entered a digestion year in 2027, what is the decremental margin you would expect, and how far could organic growth fall before it pressures the dividend-growth track record?

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