APi Group

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

APi Group Corporation (NYSE: APG; Delaware; HQ New Brighton, Minnesota) is a statutorily-mandated services compounder. It designs, installs, inspects, services and monitors life-safety and building systems — fire protection (sprinklers, suppression, alarm), electronic security, and elevators/escalators — and runs a second specialty-contracting/fabrication/infrastructure-and-utility business. ~431.5M shares out as of 2026-02-18.

Two reportable segments:

• Safety Services — "a leading provider of safety services in North America, Europe, and Asia-Pacific, focusing on fire protection solutions, electronic security systems, and elevators and escalators, including design, installation, inspection, service, and monitoring." FY2025 revenue $5,456M (69% of total), segment earnings $916M (16.8% margin). Sub-structured into North American Life Safety + International Life Safety.
• Specialty Services — "specialty contracting, fabrication and distribution, and infrastructure and utility services" across North America. FY2025 revenue $2,460M (31%), segment earnings $264M (10.7% margin).

The model in one line: the business is built around the inspection-service-monitoring (ISM) annuity. Building codes (NFPA, International Code Council) legally require periodic testing, inspection, repair and retrofit of fire-suppression systems — so a large slice of revenue is non-discretionary and recurring rather than project-cyclical. ISM was 54% of total revenue in 2025, up from 40% in 2021; the 2028 target is 60%+. This mix shift is the entire quality story — it converts a contractor into something closer to a route-density services annuity.

Contract structure: contracts run "days to five years" but the majority are <6 months, priced fixed / unit / time-and-materials. Fixed-price work is recognized over time on cost-to-cost. Not take-or-pay; the recurring nature comes from regulatory re-inspection cadence and customer renewal, not long-dated contracts. Strong contract-liabilities balance ($694M) and contract-assets ($484M).

Customers / end markets: highly diversified — "high tech services, advanced manufacturing, healthcare, fulfillment and distribution centers, and critical infrastructure". The 10-K explicitly flags AI / high-performance computing driving large-scale infrastructure projects aligning with its high-tech-services and advanced-manufacturing end markets — the data-center tailwind, in management's own words. No customer concentration disclosed (the customers.csv is empty; no single customer flagged as material in the filing).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

APi is a labor-and-materials services firm, not a manufacturer — its "supply chain" is the skilled-trades labor pool upstream and the building owner / GC downstream. Named stakeholders, mapped:

• Upstream inputs:
• Skilled trade labor — sprinkler fitters, electricians, elevator mechanics. This is the true scarce input; the binding constraint on growth is qualified technicians, not capital. (10-K risk factors flag labor availability; ``.)
• Materials — steel pipe, sprinkler heads, control panels, fire pumps, alarm/security electronics, elevator components. A portion of fixed-price contracts "allocate the risks of price increases in supplies and materials to us" — APi carries materials-inflation risk on those jobs. Inventory is modest ($145M) — confirming this is services, not distribution-heavy.
• Subcontractors — used for overflow capacity; subcontract cost is a named component of cost-of-revenue.
• Equipment OEMs — for elevators/escalators and security systems, APi installs and services third-party-manufactured equipment (it competes with the OEMs' own service arms — see Lens 3 / Chubb being carved out of Carrier).
• The company: ~430 decentralized operating businesses ("Subsidiaries"), roll-up structure, branch-level density.
• Downstream end customers: building owners and operators in the named end markets — hyperscale data-center operators, advanced-manufacturing plants (incl. semis/EV), hospitals/healthcare systems, e-commerce fulfillment operators (Amazon-type DCs), and critical-infrastructure owners. Government/utility on the Specialty side.

Chokepoints: (1) skilled-labor availability — single biggest throttle; an aging trades workforce is an industry-wide bottleneck and a moat for incumbents with apprenticeship pipelines. (2) Code/AHJ (Authority Having Jurisdiction) approval — regulatory inspection requirements are the demand source and a barrier to fly-by-night entrants. No single-source materials dependency disclosed. The supply chain is structurally resilient precisely because it is local, fragmented, and labor-gated rather than concentrated.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is real but of the "wide-and-shallow / many-small-moats" kind, not a single fortress:

1. Regulatory-mandated recurring demand — the strongest moat. Fire/life-safety inspection is legally required and non-deferrable; you cannot turn off a hospital's sprinkler inspection in a recession. This gives APi a demand floor most contractors lack. 54%→60%+ ISM mix institutionalizes it.
2. Route density + switching friction — once APi monitors and inspects a building, it owns the data, the AHJ relationship, and the maintenance history. Re-bidding an inspection contract to save a few points isn't worth the building owner's risk on a life-safety system. Switching costs are behavioral and liability-driven, not contractual — which is exactly why renewal rates hold.
3. Scale in a fragmented industry — "highly fragmented... international, national, regional, and local companies". APi is one of the few at national/international scale, which gives it (a) national-account capability (a hyperscaler wants one vendor across 40 data centers), (b) procurement leverage, and (c) the ability to be the consolidator (see Lens 9 — 90 acquisitions). The fragmentation is the opportunity.
4. Decentralized "great leaders" operating model — local P&L ownership keeps the branch entrepreneurial while corporate supplies M&A, capital and shared services. This is the Franklin/Becker culture moat; it's soft but it's what lets a roll-up integrate ~90 deals without value destruction.
5. The Chubb European footprint — post-2022 Chubb deal, APi has a 17-country, 1.5M-site service network in Europe/APAC that would be nearly impossible to rebuild from scratch.

Bargaining power: Over customers — moderate-to-strong on ISM (mandated, sticky), weak on competitive-bid install/project work. Over suppliers — moderate (scale procurement) but it bears materials inflation on fixed-price jobs. The honest read: the moat is the recurring-inspection annuity + scale-in-fragmentation, not technology or brand. It protects margins and renewal, not pricing power on new construction.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is empty → all figures from the filings.

Q1 2026: Total revenue $1,982M (+15.3%); Safety Services $1,415M, Specialty Services $569M (consolidated $1,982M after $(2)M elim, with intersegment reconciliation). 10.4% organic growth in Q1.

Trend read: Safety Services is both the bigger and the faster-growing, higher-margin segment — and it is accelerating on margin (15.9%→16.8% segment margin) driven by "disciplined customer and project selection as well as pricing improvements" and the ISM mix shift. Specialty grows slower (+10.4%) at structurally lower margin (10.7%) — it's the lumpier, more project-cyclical infrastructure/utility book. The mix is moving toward the better business, which is the bull's core point: this is margin self-improvement, not a one-off. Geography: NA-dominant with a material International Life Safety book (the Chubb legacy); the filing does not break clean revenue-by-geography in the extracted text, so a precise geo split is n/a in the research layer.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, reported ~2026-05-01)

• Beat: GAAP EPS $0.12 beat consensus by ~$0.02 (≈3.2%).
• Driver: Safety Services growth + organic ISM + margin expansion; the windfall tax benefit on vested shares cut the effective tax rate to 19.9% from 23.4% — a real but partly non-operating EPS tailwind.
• Guidance — RAISED: FY2026 revenue $8.475–8.675B (5–7% organic), Adj EBITDA $1.15–1.21B (≈13.8% midpoint margin, +11–16% growth). Q2 2026: revenue $2.175–2.225B (7–9% organic), Adj EBITDA $300–310M. Guidance was raised again on 2026-06-09 alongside the Onyx-Fire close.
• Balance-sheet flags: AR $1,563M vs revenue — DSO is high but normal for project services; receivables grew +8% vs FY24 on +13% revenue → not outrunning revenue, mildly favorable. Contract assets $484M, contract liabilities $694M (net deferred — a cash positive). Cash $912M.
• Market reaction: shares "jumped" on the guide-up — the market rewarded the raise, consistent with a name priced for execution. Nothing unusual vs. the company's own trajectory — this is the machine running to plan, the only Q1-specific caveat being seasonality (Q1/Q2 are structurally the weakest quarters due to weather ).

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend) — `` (no transcripts on disk)

Across the last ~4 calls (Q2'25 → Q4'25 → Q1'26), management's persistent themes:

• "Inspection, service & monitoring" / recurring revenue — the dominant, repeated phrase; every call frames the ISM mix shift toward 60%+.
• "Disciplined customer and project selection" — recurs verbatim in the 10-K and calls; signals a deliberate walk-away-from-bad-margin-work posture (echoed by margin expansion).
• Margin bridge to 16%+ — since the May 2025 Investor Day raised the long-term EBITDA-margin target from 13% to 16%+, every call now anchors on margin trajectory rather than pure growth.
• M&A cadence — confident, programmatic tone on the deal pipeline (CertaSite, Onyx-Fire, Wtech Fire).
• Data-center / electrification demand — increasingly featured as an end-market tailwind.

Tone shift: measurably more confident on margin and capital deployment over the last year — the 13/60/80 → 10/16/60+ reframe is management publicly raising its own bar. What they say less of: project-cycle/backlog hand-wringing — the narrative has moved from "we're a contractor" to "we're a recurring-revenue compounder." Caveat: no on-disk transcript means this is web-sourced sentiment, not primary.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = mechanical/electrical/specialty-services and building-controls compounders. Multiples ``, mid-June 2026; where a clean figure isn't sourced, marked n/a.

• 5-yr-avg ROE per name: n/a (not reliably retrievable in this pass; flag for refresh).
• Dividend yield: APG pays no dividend (capital goes to M&A + the $1B 2025 buyback). FIX/EME pay small dividends; JCI a larger one. n/a precise yields — not sourced.

Read: On EV/EBITDA, APG (~20x) sits below FIX (~40x) and roughly in line with JCI (~22x), above EME (~18.5x). On forward P/E APG (~21–27x) is cheaper than the whole comp set. The honest framing: APG is not the expensive name in its group — Comfort Systems is the market's chosen AI/data-center pure-play and trades at 2x APG's EBITDA multiple. APG's relative value rests on (a) higher recurring-revenue quality than EME and (b) a cleaner roll-up record than JCI. It is priced as a high-quality compounder, not a hype name.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~5 years) — ``

• Oct 2019 / Apr 2020 — J2 SPAC de-SPAC; NYSE listing (the origin event).
• Jul 2021 → Jan 2022 — Chubb Fire & Security acquisition from Carrier announced ($3.1B EV) and closed; transformational scale-up into Europe/APAC, the single biggest catalyst of the era.
• 2022–2023 — margin recovery story; gross margin +2pts to 26.1% in 2022, stock +17% in 2023; +112% over the 3 years post-listing vs S&P +44%.
• May 2025 — Investor Day: long-term targets raised to "10/16/60+" (margin target 13%→16%+) — a positive re-rating catalyst.
• Q1 2026 (May 2026) — EPS beat + guidance raise → shares jumped.
• Jun 2026 — Onyx-Fire close + further guidance update.
• Recurring: Martin Franklin insider sales (e.g. a ~$122.6M block) periodically pressure the stock — a recurring overhang, see Lens 9/13.

Pattern: the market reacts most to (1) transformational M&A and (2) margin-target / guidance revisions — i.e. it is pricing the capital-allocation engine and the margin glide-path, not quarter-to-quarter revenue. This is a "trust the compounder" stock; the risk is symmetric — a missed margin step or a bad deal would de-rate it hard.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Russ Becker — President & CEO. CEO for ~two decades; has completed ~90 acquisitions since 2005. This is the core asset: a proven serial acquirer who has integrated a fragmented industry without (publicly) blowing up. Operator-builder archetype, "Building Great Leaders" decentralized culture.
• David Jackola — CFO. Appointed after Kevin Krumm stepped down Dec 13, 2024 (Jackola first interim, then permanent). A CFO transition <18 months ago is a watch-item — new at the seat during a period of heavy M&A and a raised margin target. Krumm had integrated Nalco into Ecolab ($8B) — a strong predecessor; the bar is set.
• Martin Franklin (co-chair) + Jim Lillie (co-chair) — J2 Partners. This is the differentiator. Franklin is a legendary serial capital allocator (built Jarden, sold to Newell for ~$15B, made ~$500M personally); Lillie co-founded J2. APi is their largest public holding. You are effectively co-investing alongside two of the better capital allocators of the last 25 years, with their own capital heavily committed.
• Skin in the game: very high at the board/sponsor level (Franklin/Lillie are major holders). BUT — recurring Franklin insider selling (e.g. ~$122.6M) is a real, repeated signal; bulls read it as estate diversification, bears as the sponsor monetizing into strength. Both can be true.
• Series A Preferred Stock: Franklin-affiliated founder preferred — 4,000,000 Series A shares convertible into 6,000,000 common at end-2026, with dividends tied to common-stock outperformance above thresholds. In FY2025 a $590M accrued stock dividend on Series A ran through the net-income-to-common bridge — a large, structural transfer of value to the founders that dilutes/pressures common-shareholder economics. This is the single most important governance line in the dossier (see Lens 13).
• Capital-allocation history: programmatic M&A funded by FCF + debt; FY2025 ~$759M operating cash flow redeployed into deals (Elevated $572M, plus tuck-ins); a $1B 2025 share-repurchase program authorized; no dividend. Net income grew $153M (FY23) → $250M (FY24) → $302M (FY25) — a doubling in two years. ROE/ROIC trend: positive and improving qualitatively, but a precise ROIC series is n/a here (goodwill-heavy denominator means headline ROE flatters; ROIC on tangible capital is the number to chase in a refresh).
• Red flags: the founder-preferred value transfer; recurring sponsor selling; a fresh CFO. Archetype: founder-operator (Becker) + financial-sponsor board (Franklin/Lillie) — a "permanent capital / serial-acquirer" structure. For this stage it is a strength if the deal discipline holds, a liability if the sponsors are nearer the exit than the build.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on the accounting:

• Goodwill + intangibles concentration — the headline risk. Goodwill $3,167M (FY24 $2,894M) + intangibles net $1,584M = $4,751M, ≈53% of $8,936M total assets. A roll-up's balance sheet is mostly acquisition premium — but it means tangible book is thin and any integration stumble or end-market shock could trigger a goodwill impairment that would be large relative to equity. Goodwill rose YoY purely on M&A (Elevated, etc.), not organic value creation.
• Revenue recognition — fixed-price cost-to-cost (percentage-of-completion). POC always carries estimation risk (cost-to-complete judgments can flatter or defer margin). Contract assets $484M (unbilled) vs contract liabilities $694M (billed-ahead) — the net deferred position is conservative (more billed-ahead than unbilled), a mild positive vs. the classic POC red flag. The 10-K explicitly warns "we may not accurately estimate the costs associated with services provided under fixed price contracts".
• Cash vs earnings — FY2025 operating cash flow $759M vs net income $302M → OCF >> NI (driven by D&A incl. heavy intangible amortization $60–63M/qtr ). Cash conversion is strong, not strained — the opposite of the classic accrual red flag. The non-GAAP Adj EBITDA ($1,041M FY25) is materially above GAAP operating income ($554M) largely due to intangible amortization + restructuring + SBC add-backs — standard for a roll-up but means GAAP earnings are roughly half of the headline EBITDA the bulls quote.
• SBC — share-based comp $10–11M/qtr — modest, not flattering non-GAAP egregiously. The bigger "comp" dilution is the founder Series A Preferred ($590M FY25 accrual) — that's the line that quietly transfers value, and it sits in the EPS-to-common bridge, not in SBC.
• Leases / related parties / contingencies — operating+finance leases $313M total; nothing anomalous extracted. Contingent consideration & comp liabilities ($60M current + $8M noncurrent) reflect earn-outs from M&A — to watch as deal pace rises.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. regulatory/regulatory-findings.md reports 0 SEC findings via EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER) for the 2021-06-23→2026-06-23 window.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): No material DOJ/FTC/consent-decree/fine hits surfaced for APi Group Corporation in a targeted search. (Search noise was dominated by the unrelated American Petroleum Institute, also "API" — disambiguated and excluded.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): company discloses only ordinary-course claims — "workmanship warranty, casualty, negligence, construction defect, breach of contract, product liability, wage and hour, and other claims and legal proceedings in the ordinary course of business". No single material litigation flagged. Note: a fire-protection/life-safety business carries inherent product-liability/negligence tail risk (if an installed/inspected system fails in a fire) — disclosed as ordinary-course, but it is a structural, not zero, exposure.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or accounting-fraud findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), targeted web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-23. The genuine forensic flags are (1) goodwill/intangible concentration (~53% of assets) and (2) the founder-preferred value transfer, both disclosure-transparent rather than hidden.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026 / FY2027 / FY2028)

Built bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + raised FY2026 guidance + the 2028 Investor-Day targets. Output ``; inputs labelled.

Anchors: FY2025 revenue $7,911M, Adj EBITDA $1,041M (13.2%), GAAP NI $302M. FY2026 guide: revenue $8.475–8.675B, Adj EBITDA $1.15–1.21B (~13.8% midpoint). 2028 targets: >$10B rev, 16%+ EBITDA margin, >$3B cumulative adj FCF through 2028.

• Base adj EPS ~$1.68 sits right on street consensus FY2026 ~$1.66–1.70; FY2027 consensus ~$1.79, in line with my base→bull. So the model is not contrarian to the street — APG is fairly bracketed.
• Key swing factors: (1) organic growth holding 5–7% (ISM-led) vs slipping to 4%; (2) the margin glide 13.8%→16% actually materializing (the entire re-rating case); (3) M&A accretion + integration (Onyx-Fire/Wtech/CertaSite landing on plan); (4) interest (term loan $2,157M floating, maturity Jan 2029 — rate-sensitive); (5) share count — modestly down if the $1B buyback offsets SBC, but the 6M-share Series A conversion at end-2026 is dilutive to common.
• Forecast not logged (per --watchlist rule — no Brier forecast.ts create in the unattended loop). The base call to track on a refresh: APG FY2026 adj EPS ≥ $1.68 and FY2026 Adj EBITDA ≥ $1.18B (p≈0.60 — guidance midpoint, raised twice, management with a strong beat history).

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. APi is a rule-of-law compounder: a legally-mandated recurring-inspection annuity (ISM 54%→60%+) wrapped around a proven 90-deal M&A machine, run by a founder-operator and backed by two of the best capital allocators alive (Franklin/Lillie) with their own capital in the boat. The margin self-improvement is structural (mix shift + "disciplined selection"), the 2028 "10/16/60+" plan raises management's own bar, and the data-center / advanced-manufacturing / electrification super-cycle is a named, multi-year tailwind into its highest-value end markets. Cash conversion is excellent (OCF $759M >> NI), the balance sheet funds both M&A and a $1B buyback, and at ~20x EBITDA / ~21–27x earnings it is cheaper than every comp (FIX 40x, EME/JCI ~26x P/E) for arguably the best recurring-revenue quality in the group. Earnings surprise upside: ISM mix + tuck-in accretion + buyback could push EPS above the ~$1.79 FY27 consensus.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. Roll-up dependency. ~53% of assets are goodwill+intangibles. The whole model assumes Becker keeps finding and integrating accretive deals at sane multiples forever. A few bad/overpriced deals, a failed integration (ERP migration is a flagged risk ), or a deal drought → multiple compression + impairment risk. Serial acquirers de-rate violently when the cadence breaks.
2. Founder value transfer. The Series A Preferred ($590M FY25 accrual, 6M-share conversion end-2026) structurally siphons economics from common holders to the sponsors — and the sponsors are selling (Franklin ~$122.6M). If the people who know it best are monetizing into strength, the marginal new common buyer is funding their exit.
3. Margin-target execution risk. The entire bull re-rating leans on 13.8%→16% EBITDA margin. Miss the glide-path by even 150–200bps and the "compounder" narrative cracks at a ~20x multiple that has no margin of safety for it.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): Most likely failure — a construction/commercial-real-estate slowdown hit the project/install book just as a large tuck-in (Wtech/Onyx) under-delivered, organic growth fell to ~3%, the margin glide stalled at ~14%, and the market re-rated APG from 20x to 14x EBITDA — a ~30% drawdown — amplified by another visible Franklin sale and the dilutive Series A conversion. Less likely but worse: a high-profile life-safety system failure → product-liability tail event + reputational hit.

Are multiples too high? Not egregiously — APG is the cheapest in its comp group. But ~20x EBITDA / ~25x earnings fully prices the margin glide and continued M&A success; there is no discount for execution risk. It's priced as if the plan works.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The market lumps APG with cyclical specialty contractors and discounts it vs. Comfort Systems' "AI data-center" halo — but APG's inspection revenue is the most recession-proof, least-cyclical cash flow in the entire mechanical/electrical-services universe, and that recurring annuity is under- rather than over-valued relative to FIX's project-heavy backlog. The mispricing, if any, is that APG's quality-of-revenue deserves a higher multiple than the cyclical install names — not the discount it currently gets. The risk is that the sponsors agree, and that's why they're selling into it.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the money machine? It's a financial-engineering roll-up dressed as an operating compounder. Strip out the ~$60M/qtr intangible amortization add-back and GAAP earnings are half the EBITDA bulls quote (FY25: $554M op income vs $1,041M Adj EBITDA). The "growth" is substantially bought, not organic — organic is only 5–7%; the rest is acquisitions funded by debt ($2.78B) and your dilution.
• Where's the concentration risk? Not customer — it's strategy concentration: 100% of the equity story rides on one variable, Becker's continued deal flow at accretive prices. The serial-acquirer graveyard (Valeant, etc.) is full of names that worked until the cadence broke. A fresh CFO (<18 months) during peak M&A intensity raises integration/controls risk.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: the OEMs reclaiming service — JCI, Carrier, Honeywell, and the elevator majors (Otis/KONE/Schindler) all want the high-margin service annuity on their own installed equipment. Carrier sold Chubb to APi; nothing stops the OEMs from re-prioritizing recurring service and squeezing APi's elevator/security ISM moat from the manufacturing side.
• Worst capital-allocation / incentive flags: the Series A founder preferred — a $590M FY2025 value transfer to insiders and recurring Franklin block sales. The people with the best information are extracting cash. That is the single loudest short signal in the file.
• What must hold for today's price? 5–7% organic every year, the full 16% margin glide, uninterrupted accretive M&A, no impairment, no major life-safety liability event, and rates staying manageable on the 2029 term loan. All of it, simultaneously.
• If growth disappoints 20–30% (organic → ~2–3%, margin stalls at ~14%): EBITDA growth halves, the "compounder" premium evaporates, and a re-rate to ~14–15x EBITDA (EMCOR territory) implies ~25–35% downside from ~$42.
• Single permanent-impairment scenario: a large goodwill write-down following a failed major acquisition integration, coinciding with a construction downturn — plausibility moderate (it's the base failure mode of every roll-up; APi's recurring-revenue floor is the genuine mitigant that most roll-ups lack).

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The 2028 plan implies a 13.8%→16%+ EBITDA-margin glide — how much of that ~220bps comes from ISM mix shift vs. price vs. cost/integration synergies, and which is most at risk? (This single answer most changes the thesis.)
2. What is your realistic acquisition-pipeline capacity and the average multiple you're paying — and at what point do prices force you to favor the $1B buyback over M&A?
3. With the Series A Preferred converting at end-2026 (6M shares) and the $590M FY25 accrual — walk through the total dilution/value-transfer to common holders through 2028 and how the board justifies it.
4. Organic growth was ~10% in Q1 but guidance implies 5–7% full-year — what decelerates, and how much of organic is genuinely recurring ISM vs. project timing?
5. Integration risk: with CertaSite, Onyx-Fire and Wtech (>$1B) all landing in 2026 and a CFO ~18 months in seat — what specifically de-risks integration and the ERP migration?
6. What share of revenue is directly tied to data-center / hyperscale build-out, and how cyclical is that demand if AI-capex moderates?
7. On the elevator/escalator and electronic-security lines — how do you defend the service annuity against the OEMs (Otis/KONE/JCI/Honeywell) prioritizing their own recurring service?
8. Customer concentration — what is your largest customer and top-10 as a % of revenue, and is that rising with national hyperscale accounts?
9. The $2.16B term loan matures Jan 2029 at floating rates — refinancing plan and rate sensitivity to EPS?
10. Goodwill is ~$3.2B (53% of assets w/ intangibles) — under what end-market scenario would you test for impairment, and what's the cushion?
11. Pricing power on competitively-bid install work vs. ISM renewals — where is real pricing power, and where are you a price-taker?
12. Skilled-labor availability is the binding constraint — what is your technician headcount growth, attrition, and apprenticeship pipeline vs. demand?
13. Capital-return philosophy: why no dividend, and what would change that as FCF scales past $1B?
14. Succession — Becker has run this ~20 years; what is the CEO succession plan, and how decentralized can the model stay at $10B+ revenue?
15. What is ROIC on tangible invested capital (ex-goodwill) and how has it trended through the recent deal wave?

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