BYD Company

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

BYD Company Limited (比亚迪) is a Shenzhen-based, dual-listed (H-share 1211.HK / A-share 002594.SZ) industrial conglomerate that became, in 2025, the world's largest maker of new-energy vehicles (NEVs) and one of the top-five global automakers by unit volume, selling >4.6M vehicles in FY2025. It started life in 1995 as a rechargeable-battery maker for mobile phones and remains structurally unusual: it is simultaneously a carmaker, the world's #2 EV-battery maker, a power-semiconductor IDM, and a consumer-electronics contract manufacturer.

Three revenue engines:

• Automobiles & related products — ¥648.65B, 80.68% of group revenue. PHEVs + BEVs across a price ladder from the ~¥70k Seagull to the ¥1M+ Yangwang U8/U9. Brand portfolio: BYD (mass), Denza (premium, ex-Mercedes JV), Fangchengbao (rugged/off-road), Yangwang (ultra-luxury).
• Mobile handset components & assembly (BYD Electronic, 0285.HK) — ¥155.24B, −2.74% YoY. Contract manufacturing for Apple and Android OEMs; the legacy cash engine.
• Batteries, power electronics, semiconductors, rail (SkyRail), solar/storage — the smaller balance, much of it consumed internally (the FinDreams battery/electronics/mould/precision subsidiaries) and increasingly sold to third parties (>40% of BYD Semiconductor chip output goes external).

Customer & contract structure: Autos are overwhelmingly B2C retail through owned/franchised dealers, so revenue is not take-or-pay and carries no single-customer concentration on the auto side — the concentration risk is the opposite (a fragmenting domestic demand base in a price war). BYD Electronic does carry customer concentration (Apple). On the supply side, BYD is famous for extended supplier payment terms (see Lens 10) — its bargaining power over its own supply base is a balance-sheet feature, not a footnote.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

BYD's defining trait is that ~75% of a BYD vehicle's value is made in-house, across 100+ internal factories. Mapping upstream → BYD → end customer with named stakeholders:

• Raw lithium / cathode inputs: lithium-mining rights in Brazil's Jequitinhonha Valley; long-term lithium offtake with SQM (Chile); in-house refining of lithium carbonate → LFP cathode via the FinDreams subsidiary network. (Note: Ganfeng Lithium appears in coverage only via the unrelated Sonora/Mexico project, not as a primary BYD supplier — a common misattribution.)
• Cells & packs: FinDreams Battery makes the Blade Battery (LFP, cell-to-pack, >50% pack space-utilization gain vs conventional LFP blocks) — entirely in-house.
• Power semiconductors: BYD Semiconductor is a full IDM producing IGBTs / SiC power modules at Changsha, Chengdu, Shaoxing; the 12-inch IGBT fab in Chengdu was set to lift capacity ~200% in 2025.
• Motors, power electronics, moulds, glass, even seats: in-house FinDreams units.
• Logistics — the unusual chokepoint move: BYD operates its own RoRo ocean shipping fleet (e.g. BYD Explorer No.1, Shenzhen, Changzhou) to ship exports, deliberately de-risking the third-party car-carrier shortage.
• Downstream: owned/franchised dealer network domestically; localized assembly plants being built in Hungary (EU-tariff circumvention), Brazil (Camaçari), Turkey, Thailand/SE Asia.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: the integration is the concentration. BYD owns the chain end-to-end, so a failure of execution at any node (a fab delay, a lithium-price spike it can't pass through in a price war, a labor scandal at an overseas plant — see Brazil) lands on one P&L. There is no second source because BYD is the source.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is cost, manufactured by vertical integration and scale — and it is simultaneously the most durable and the most eroding thing about BYD.

• Cost leadership: in-house batteries + chips + motors gave BYD a widely-cited ~15% unit-cost edge over Tesla as of 2024, and the highest EBITDA margin among listed EV peers even after the 2025 margin hit.
• Learning-curve / scale: at >4.6M units/yr, every vehicle makes the next cheaper — a flywheel rivals can't cheaply enter.
• Battery IP / safety: the Blade Battery (LFP cell-to-pack, nail-penetration safety) is a genuine product moat and an external revenue line; BYD is the world's #2 EV-battery maker (~13.7% global share Jan–Mar 2026) behind CATL (~40.7%).
• Bargaining power: strong over suppliers (275-day payables, Lens 10) and, given B2C scale, meaningful over the demand curve — but weakening, because in a price war the consumer holds the power.

The honest moat problem — stated by the founder himself. Chairman Wang Chuanfu has publicly conceded BYD's technological lead "isn't as pronounced as in prior years," the "wow factor" has faded, and homogenization is increasing. Cost leadership that was a unique advantage is becoming table stakes across China's EV field. Versus CATL the moat asymmetry is real: CATL supplies ~1-in-3 global EVs and posted a record ~$10B profit in 2025 while BYD's profit fell — the merchant-supplier model is currently out-earning the integrated-OEM model. Versus Tesla, the likely equilibrium is segmentation: Tesla keeps premium/software/autonomy, BYD owns mid-market volume.

Lens 4 · Segments

No segments.csv data exists (empty stub), so all ``:

Geographic split — the only part of the mix that matters right now:

• Domestic China: sales −~8% to 3,556,353 units; this is where the price war lives and where margin is being destroyed.
• Overseas: sales +151% to 1,046,083 units, at a 28.1% gross margin vs the group's blended 17.74% — overseas is explicitly the "profit anchor".
• Trajectory into 2026: Q1 2026 exports were already ~45% of total deliveries; management raised the 2026 overseas target to 1.5M units.

Read: the segment story is a mix-shift bet. Volume is decelerating and de-margining at home; the entire earnings-growth thesis rests on geography (export %) climbing faster than domestic margin erodes. That is a real, datable trend — and a fragile one, because the high-margin destination markets (EU especially) are exactly where the tariff/subsidy walls are going up (Lens 10/13).

---

Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

FY2025 (reported March 2026):

• Revenue ¥804B (~$116B) — record, and ~$26B above Tesla's LTM sales.
• Net profit ¥32.6B, −19% YoY — first annual profit decline since 2021.
• Gross margin 17.74%, down from 19.44% — the core damage.
• R&D ¥63.4B, +17% YoY — exceeding net profit (a defining BYD fact: it out-spends its own earnings on R&D).
• Cash ¥167.8B.

Q1 2026 (reported late April 2026) — the print that matters most:

• Revenue ¥150.2B, −11.82% YoY — a revenue decline, not just a margin one.
• Net profit attributable to parent ¥4.1B, −55.38% YoY — profit more than halved.
• Gross margin rebounded sequentially to ~18.81% (near a one-year high) — the one bright spot, driven by export mix.
• Units 700,463, exports ~45%.
• R&D ¥11.3B (still enormous relative to a ¥4.1B profit).

Why it fell: (1) the domestic price war — BYD cut prices to a two-year peak in March 2026 to fend off Xiaomi and Geely; (2) a demand air-pocket: China halved the NEV purchase-tax exemption to a max ¥15,000/vehicle for 2026–27 (from full exemption in 2024–25), pulling demand forward into Q4 2025 and gutting Q1 2026.

Guidance / outlook: BYD does not give Western-style point guidance; the operative target is 1.5M overseas units in 2026. Tone shift is the real signal — management moved from triumphalism to Wang's "brutal elimination phase" framing.

Balance-sheet flags: cash is large (¥167.8B), but the GMT hidden-debt question (Lens 10) means the net position is contested. The most unusual item vs BYD's own history is simply the direction: after years of acceleration, both revenue and profit are now declining YoY.

Market reaction: brutal and ahead of the prints — H-shares fell from >HK$400 (May–June 2025) to ~HK$95 (31 Dec 2025), a roughly $45B+ market-value drawdown, then traded ~HK$85–97 into June 2026. The market re-rated the margin story long before the Q1 number landed.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ on disk; sentiment is reconstructed from management commentary ``. The tonal arc over the last ~4 reporting cycles is unmistakably downward:

• Early/mid-2025: confident scale narrative; chairman talks of doubling overseas to 800k, "world's largest automaker within five years".
• Q2 2025 (~30% profit drop) → FY2025 (−19%) → Q1 2026 (−55%): the language pivots to survival and consolidation. Wang Chuanfu's "brutal elimination phase" and his candid admission that the tech lead and "wow factor" have faded is the single most important sentiment data point — a founder talking down his own moat is rare and credible.
• Recurring themes management now leans on: overseas as the "second growth engine" (echoed by Goldman Sachs), premium mix (Yangwang/Fangchengbao), R&D intensity.
• What they stopped saying: the easy domestic-share-gain story. The June 2025 60-day supplier-payment pledge and "anti-involution" language mark a shift from "we are winning the price war" to "the price war must end."

Lens 7 · Comps

Multiples are `` with source/date, or n/a. Figures span Jun 2026.

Market-cap conflict, surfaced explicitly: one aggregator reported BYD market cap "$819.64B" (8 Jun 2026); this is inconsistent with HK$97 × ~9.12B shares ≈ HK$885B ≈ US$113B, and with the Tesla-vs-BYD comp piece's "~$121B" / "$120.97B" and Capital.com's market-cap page. The $819.64B figure is almost certainly an HKD total mislabeled USD (HK$819.64B ≈ US$105B). I use a ~$105–121B USD range and flag the discrepancy rather than silently picking one. BYD's reported EBITDA ~$33.98B against ~$105–121B EV gives a rough **EV/EBITDA ~10–12x ** — cheaper than CATL on EBITDA, consistent with BYD trading like a thin-margin automaker while CATL trades like a high-margin components compounder.

Read of the table: BYD at ~17x forward is a fraction of Tesla (which prices unproven robotaxi/Optimus) and below CATL — but above pure China-auto peers like Geely (~10x). The market is paying a modest premium for BYD's scale/integration over Geely, a discount to CATL's superior margins, and treating Tesla as a different (autonomy-optionality) asset class entirely.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (last ~5 yrs, moves the tape reacts to)

Mostly ``:

• 2020–2022 — the Blade Battery + NEV-boom multi-bagger. Blade launch (2020) and explosive NEV volume drove a ~20x+ run from Buffett's cost basis.
• 2022 onward — Berkshire's steady selling repeatedly pressured the H-shares; each 13-F-style disclosure was a catalyst.
• May–Jun 2025 — peak (>HK$400) then a ~$45B plunge as the price war and margin fears took over.
• Sept 2025 — Berkshire fully exits its 17-year stake (value to zero from $415M at end-2024; ~20x lifetime gain) — a sentiment catalyst and the end of the marquee-validator era.
• Q2 2025 (−30% profit) → FY2025 (−19%) → Q1 2026 (−55%) — each earnings print a downward catalyst.
• 2026 — tariff/regulatory headlines (EU Hungary subsidy probe, Brazil labor suit, Turkey setback) and product/strategy catalysts (Blade Battery 2.0, the 1.5M overseas target).

Pattern: for BYD the tape reacts hardest to (a) margin/price-war signals, (b) overseas/tariff news, and (c) marquee-investor and regulatory headlines — not primarily to unit-volume beats (BYD keeps setting volume records while the stock falls). Volume is no longer the variable; margin and the export runway are.

---

Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• Wang Chuanfu — Founder, Chairman & CEO. Orphaned chemist, battery PhD-track engineer; founded BYD in 1995 as a battery maker, willed it into the world's largest NEV maker. Reputation: engineer-operator, ~70-hr weeks, no side projects ("no rocket company, no social app") — the anti-Musk archetype, a pure-focus founder. This is a genuine asset: a technical founder with total focus and a 30-year track record of building the hardest parts of the stack himself.
• Skin in the game: Wang holds ~29% of the Shenzhen-listed shares (directly + via an asset-management plan, per the 2025 semi-annual report); net worth ~$25.7B almost entirely in BYD stock. Founder ownership this large = strong alignment, but also concentrated control.
• Stella Li — EVP / CEO of BYD Americas, Europe, ME & Africa. Joined 1996; the architect and public face of the overseas expansion that is now the entire growth thesis — currently "taking the pitch on the road" in Europe. Given that overseas is the bull case, Li's execution is arguably as load-bearing as Wang's.
• Capital-allocation history: reinvestment-heavy — R&D exceeds net profit (¥63.4B FY2025), funding the in-house battery/chip/fab build-out and the owned shipping fleet. This is the right instinct for a manufacturing-scale moat, but it means low/contested free cash flow and a thin dividend (~1.6% yield). ROE/ROIC are compressing as margins fall and the asset base grows — a watch item.
• Red flags (management): (1) the 275-day supplier payables / supply-chain financing model is an aggressive working-capital posture that GMT frames as debt-masking (Lens 10) — a capital-allocation/governance flag, not just accounting; (2) opacity typical of a founder-controlled, dual-listed Chinese conglomerate with a sprawling FinDreams subsidiary web; (3) overseas governance lapses (the Brazil labor scandal under BYD's contractors landed directly on BYD's reputation and plant timeline).
• Founder vs professional manager: decisively founder-led (Wang) with a long-tenured professional partner (Li) running the growth frontier. For this stage — a scale leader fighting a margin war while globalizing — founder conviction + R&D intensity is a fit; the risk is single-person concentration and the governance/disclosure habits that come with it.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic-analyst lens. All ``; no SEC EDGAR jurisdiction.

The headline forensic issue — supply-chain financing as hidden debt (GMT Research, Jan 2025):

• 275-day average supplier payment in 2023 vs an S&P 500 median of 51.68 days.
• GMT estimates BYD's true net debt ¥323B ($44.1B) as of mid-2024, against BYD's reported ¥27.7B (~$3.78B) — a >10x gap.
• Mechanisms: (a) de-recognizing receivables by selling/borrowing against them; (b) treating payables >90 days as working capital, not debt; (c) the "Dilian/Dilink" promissory-note program — supplier IOUs redeemable later — with ¥400B ($56B) of notes issued as of May 2023; (d) "other payables" ballooning to ¥165B (end-2023) from ¥41.3B (end-2021) with little disclosure.
• Analyst (Nigel Stevenson, GMT): this is "a form of hidden debt that could mislead investors."
• Caveat / the other side: EV peers broadly stretch payables, and reporting noted industrial logic to late payment in the sector. BYD disputes the characterization. But the magnitude of the GMT-vs-reported net-debt gap is the single largest reason to discount BYD's "¥167.8B cash, healthy balance sheet" narrative — do not take net debt at face value.

Regulatory pressure that directly hits this model: China's new 60-day payment rule (effective 1 June 2025) and the CAAM supplier-payment code forced BYD (with ~14–17 automakers) to pledge ≤60-day supplier payments. This is a tailwind for cleanliness but a working-capital headwind: if BYD genuinely shortens payables from 275→60 days, a large free working-capital float unwinds into a real cash/financing need — a quiet but material 2026–27 cash-flow swing factor.

Other forensic watch items:

• Revenue recognition / mix: the export GM (28.1%) vs domestic blended (17.74%) gap means group margin is increasingly mix-dependent; watch for margin "improvement" that is really geography, not cost.
• R&D > net income: legitimate strategy, but it also means reported profit is after very heavy expensing — capitalization policy worth watching.
• Sprawling related-party / subsidiary web (FinDreams, BYD Electronic 0285.HK, BYD Semiconductor): intercompany pricing between the parent and its in-house suppliers is inherently hard to audit from outside.

Regulatory / legal findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): No findings — BYD has no SEC CIK and is not an SEC filer; no EDGAR search possible.
• Brazil — labor (most material): Brazil's Public Labor Prosecutor's Office sued BYD and contractors (May 2025) over "slavery-like conditions" at the Camaçari (Bahia) plant site — 220 Chinese workers rescued, R$257M (~$45M) in damages sought plus per-breach fines. Plant start-up slipped to ~Dec 2026; 2025 hiring cut from 10,000 to 1,000. A guilty verdict could trigger forced-labor scrutiny in the US/EU.
• EU — Hungary foreign-subsidy probe: European Commission opened an early-stage foreign-subsidies investigation into BYD's Hungary EV plant; remedies could include asset divestment, capacity cuts, subsidy repayment, fines. This sits on top of the EU's countervailing tariffs on Chinese EVs — directly threatening the high-margin EU export thesis.
• Turkey: a reported "Turkey setback" on planned investment — localization-strategy execution risk.
• Net: No SEC/accounting-enforcement action, but a materially elevated regulatory-and-governance risk profile — concentrated in (a) the GMT hidden-debt/payables question, (b) overseas labor (Brazil), and (c) trade/subsidy barriers in the very markets the growth thesis depends on. Verified via the pre-fetched regulatory file (SEC: n/a) + web search (Brazil/EU/Turkey) + management disclosure of the price-war/payment context, as of 2026-06-17.

---

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026–FY2028 EPS)

No consensus EPS line was cleanly sourced; analyst price targets span widely — average ~HK$133 (26 estimates; low ~HK$93, high ~HK$174 ) up to ~HK$280 (Moomoo ). Revenue is modeled at ~11% p.a. over 3 years, with one FY2026 revenue point of ¥208.88B that is clearly a quarterly-scale or mis-stated figure (FY2025 was ¥804B) — flagged as unreliable, not used.

Bottom-up `` — share count ~9.12B:

• FY2025 actual: net profit ¥32.6B → EPS ≈ ¥3.57 (¥32.6B / 9.12B).
• Base — FY2026: revenue roughly flat-to-modestly-up (domestic decline offset by overseas +; H1 weak on the tax-credit air-pocket, H2 recovers). Margin stabilizes near the Q1-2026 ~18.8% GM on export mix, but absolute profit still pressured by price cuts. Net profit ~¥30–34B → EPS ≈ ¥3.3–3.7.
• Base — FY2027: overseas hits ~1.5M+ units and the 60-day payment normalization is digested; modest operating leverage returns. Net profit ~¥36–42B → EPS ≈ ¥4.0–4.6.
• Base — FY2028: continued export-led growth, premium mix (Yangwang/Fangchengbao) lifts blended ASP. Net profit ~¥42–50B → EPS ≈ ¥4.6–5.5.
• Bull: export % compounds, EU localization beats the tariff wall, price war eases under "anti-involution" policy → FY2028 EPS ~¥6+.
• Bear: EU subsidy probe forces capacity/asset action, domestic price war persists, 275→60-day payables unwind drains cash → FY2026–27 EPS flat-to-down vs ¥3.57, multiple compresses.

(Per --watchlist rules, the Brier forecast is NOT logged — breadth loop. A base call worth tracking later: "BYD FY2027 net profit > ¥36B," ~55% confidence, resolves ~2028-03.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. BYD is the lowest-cost, most vertically-integrated maker of the two products (cars + batteries) that the energy transition needs most, at a ~17x forward P/E — i.e. Tesla-like scale and an EV/battery franchise at a fraction of Tesla's multiple. The growth engine has cleanly relocated to exports at 28% gross margin (vs 17.7% group), already ~45% of Q1-2026 volume and targeted at 1.5M units in 2026; localization in Hungary/Brazil/Turkey/SE Asia is built to defend that. R&D out-spends net profit, so the cost/tech flywheel keeps turning. The Blade Battery and an external battery/chip business give a second, CATL-adjacent earnings stream. Capital allocation is founder-aligned (Wang ~29%) and disciplined toward the moat. Earnings surprise to the upside if the Chinese "anti-involution" policy actually ends the price war and domestic margins normalize while exports keep ramping.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) The export margin pool gets walled off — EU countervailing tariffs plus the Hungary foreign-subsidy probe could force capacity cuts/divestment in the exact market carrying group margin; the 28.1% overseas GM is not a birthright. (2) The moat is commoditizing — by the founder's own admission — cost leadership is now table stakes, and CATL is out-earning BYD from the merchant-supplier seat, so BYD may be the structurally lower-return node of the chain it dominates in volume. (3) The balance sheet may not be what it looks like — if GMT is even half right (~¥323B true net debt vs ¥27.7B reported) and the 60-day rule unwinds the payables float, BYD's "cash cushion" thins fast in a downturn. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the China price war did not end, domestic margins kept bleeding, EU tariffs/subsidy remedies throttled the export ramp below 1.5M, the payables normalization sucked ¥100B+ of cash out of working capital, and a forced-labor finding (Brazil) triggered Western procurement/ESG bans — earnings stayed flat-to-down and the ~17x multiple compressed to Geely-like ~10x.

Are multiples too high? Not obviously — ~17x forward for the #1 NEV maker is below CATL and a fraction of Tesla, and above Geely. The multiple is fair-to-cheap on reported earnings; expensive if you haircut earnings for hidden debt and tariff risk. The valuation question is really an earnings-quality question.

Contrarian view — what the market is refusing to see: the consensus frame is "cheap EV champion vs expensive Tesla." The thing being under-priced is that BYD's entire forward earnings story now depends on a single, politically-contested variable — the export margin — at the exact moment the destination markets are erecting tariff and subsidy walls specifically aimed at it. BYD is not really an "EV growth" stock anymore; it's a bet on Chinese-export-access into hostile high-margin markets, dressed as one. That is a very different (and more binary) risk than the multiple implies.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Where the money is concentrated: ~81% of revenue is autos, and the profit is increasingly concentrated in exports (28% GM) while domestic (the volume base) is at ~17.7% and falling. Shift the export variable and the whole earnings story moves — and exports are the most policy-exposed revenue BYD has.
• The moat is weaker than bulls think — per the CEO. Wang said the lead has faded and the industry is homogenizing. Cost leadership that everyone can match is not a moat; it's a margin trap. CATL earning a record ~$10B while BYD's profit fell 19% is the tell: the integrated-OEM is the worse business than the merchant battery supplier.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not Tesla — Xiaomi and Geely domestically (they forced BYD's two-year-peak price cuts in March 2026), and CATL on the battery economics. Xiaomi in particular is bringing brand + software + a fresh balance sheet into BYD's mid-market.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance: the 275-day payables / Dilian ¥400B note program — financing growth off suppliers' backs in a way GMT calls hidden debt and Chinese regulators just forced to stop. Plus the Brazil labor catastrophe (slavery-like conditions, 220 workers) — a governance failure with direct Western-market and ESG-ban consequences.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price: export ramp to ~1.5M units at high margin survives EU tariffs + the Hungary subsidy probe; the price war ends; the payables unwind doesn't drain cash; reported net debt is roughly real. That's four fragile assumptions stacked.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: strip the export-ramp optimism and you have a flat-revenue, sub-¥30B-profit automaker with contested net debt — the ~17x forward multiple compresses toward Geely's ~10x, i.e. ~30–40% downside on de-rating alone, before any earnings cut.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a forced-labor finding (Brazil) that triggers US/EU import restrictions combined with an adverse EU foreign-subsidy remedy on Hungary — simultaneously closing the high-margin export markets the entire thesis rests on. Plausibility: not base-case, but non-trivial and rising, and it's the asymmetric tail the cheap multiple isn't paying you for.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. GMT estimates true net debt near ¥323B vs your reported ¥27.7B — walk us through the Dilian note program and "other payables," and reconcile the gap precisely.
2. As you comply with the 60-day payment rule, how much working-capital cash unwinds, and over what schedule — what is the 2026–27 free-cash-flow impact?
3. The entire profit-growth thesis is export margin (28% GM). What is your contingency if the EU's Hungary foreign-subsidy probe forces capacity cuts, divestment, or repayment?
4. Wang has said the technological lead has faded and the industry is homogenizing — so what is the durable moat in three years, beyond cost?
5. CATL earns more profit than BYD from supplying batteries. Is the integrated-OEM model structurally lower-return than the merchant-supplier model, and how do you close that gap?
6. What gross margin do you actually need domestically to make the China auto business stand alone, ex-exports — and when do you get there?
7. What concrete governance and audit changes followed the Brazil Camaçari labor case, and how do you guarantee it doesn't recur across Hungary/Turkey/SE Asia?
8. How much of reported group margin improvement is genuine cost reduction vs simply export mix-shift — quantify it.
9. R&D exceeds net profit. What is the explicit ROI hurdle on that spend, and which programs would you cut first if margins compress further?
10. How do you defend the 1.5M overseas-units target against simultaneous EU/US/Turkey tariff and localization barriers?
11. With Xiaomi and Geely forcing price cuts, what is your line in the sand — at what point do you defend margin over volume?
12. What is the real intercompany-pricing and margin picture between the parent and FinDreams/BYD Semiconductor/BYD Electronic?
13. Wang owns ~29% and is Chairman/CEO/founder — what is the succession and key-person plan, given how load-bearing both he and Stella Li are?
14. What does the external (third-party) battery and semiconductor business contribute, and is it a real second earnings engine or a capacity-utilization play?
15. If the Chinese "anti-involution" policy fails to end the price war in 2026, what does your 2027 plan look like?

---