Certara

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Certara sells the picks-and-shovels of computational drug development. Its product is biosimulation — computer-aided mathematical simulation of how a drug behaves in the human body — sold as the core technology layer of Model-Informed Drug Development (MIDD), the regulator-endorsed approach to using models instead of (or to de-risk) physical experiments.

The business splits two ways:

• Software (44% of FY2025 revenue, $183.3M, +18% YoY) — licenses + cloud subscriptions + maintenance. Flagship platforms: Simcyp (PBPK / physiologically-based pharmacokinetics simulator — the crown jewel, 20+ years of proprietary validated data, used for first-in-human dosing, drug-drug-interaction prediction, virtual bioequivalence), Phoenix (PK/PD analysis, the industry-standard 30-year WinNonlin franchise, now migrating to Phoenix Cloud on AWS), Pinnacle 21 (clinical-data standardization/validation — the de-facto tool regulators use to check submissions), Chemaxon (cheminformatics, acquired 2024), D360, CoAuthor (gen-AI regulatory writing), and Certara.AI (the unifying GPT platform launched 2023).
• Services (56% of FY2025 revenue, $235.6M, +3% YoY) — PhD scientists delivering pharmacometrics, regulatory strategy and (formerly) regulatory/medical writing, on time-and-materials or fixed-fee contracts.

Why the moat claim is credible: per the company's internal data, Certara's customers received 90%+ of all novel FDA drug approvals 2014–2025; its software is licensed to 20 global drug regulatory agencies (FDA, EMA, Japan's PMDA, China's NMPA/CDE, UK's MHRA), used by 160,000+ users, and has served 38 of the top 40 biopharma companies by R&D spend and 2,600+ companies/institutions across 70 countries.

Contract structure: software terms are typically 1–3 years; the recurring base is measured by net software retention. No single customer >10% of revenue; top-10 = 24% of FY2025 revenue (27% FY2024) — moderate concentration, improving. Q4 is the seasonal high (renewal-cycle timing). Customers are R&D-budget-dependent — the demand driver is biopharma R&D spend (~$290B/yr industry-wide), which makes Certara a levered play on the health of the biotech funding cycle.

Corporate: Formed 2008 (Tripos + Pharsight), incorporated Delaware 2017, HQ Radnor PA, IPO'd Dec 2020 (NASDAQ: CERT). Auditor RSM US LLP (since 2022). 1,576 employees in 28 countries, 414 with PhD/MD.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Certara is a software+services company, so the "supply chain" is talent, data, and cloud — not physical inputs:

• Upstream inputs: (1) PhD scientific talent — 414 PhD/MD holders; "our most significant fixed cost" is compensation. This is the true raw material and the binding constraint. (2) Proprietary curated datasets — decades of validated PK/PD and physiology data compiled into Simcyp; the company explicitly calls these "cannot be readily replicated." (3) Cloud infrastructure — AWS is the named single dependency for Phoenix Cloud and Certara.AI ("Certara Amazon Web Services workspace").
• The company itself: turns talent + data + algorithms into validated software and expert services.
• Downstream / end customers (named): biopharma (38 of top 40 by R&D spend), biotech, CROs, academic institutions, and — critically — the regulators themselves (FDA, EMA, PMDA, NMPA, MHRA license the software). The regulators being both gatekeepers and paying users is the structural asset: it makes Certara's formats the submission standard.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) AWS — sole named cloud host; any disruption hits the cloud franchise. (2) PhD labor market — industry has "relatively high employee turnover"; loss of key scientists is a named risk. (3) FDA/regulatory throughput — the 10-K devotes unusual space to FY2025 FDA workforce cuts (Executive Order 14210, ~3,500 FDA positions cut, HHS RIF of ~20,000) as a demand risk: if the FDA slows reviews, customer programs slow, and demand for Certara softens. This is a genuine, currently-live macro chokepoint, not boilerplate.

This lens is concrete: the names are AWS (infra), the FDA/EMA/PMDA/NMPA/MHRA (regulator-users), and the top-40 pharma (buyers).

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is real and unusually durable for a sub-$2B company — it is regulatory entrenchment, not just software switching costs:

1. Regulatory standardization / process moat (the strongest leg). Certara's tools are licensed by 20 regulators and its outputs are designed to be "regulatory quality" — accepted in drug-approval filings. When the FDA validates submissions in Pinnacle 21 and runs Simcyp, every sponsor is effectively forced into Certara's ecosystem. New entrants must clear "the time, effort, and investment necessary to develop validated models… a significant barrier to new entrants."
2. Proprietary data + 20-year validation moat. Simcyp's value is the accumulated, validated physiology dataset — not the code. A competitor can write a PBPK engine; it cannot replicate two decades of regulator-accepted validation.
3. Switching costs / installed habit. Software is licensed by 160,000 users; academic seats are given free so the next generation of pharmacometricians trains on Phoenix/Simcyp and carries it into industry — a deliberate, durable demand-seeding flywheel.
4. Net software retention of 105.3% FY2025 (106.1% in Q1-2026) confirms the base is sticky and modestly expanding.

Bargaining power: strong over small biotech (they can't build this in-house), weaker over top-20 pharma procurement (the 10-K repeatedly flags "pricing pressure… from the customer's procurement department" as total spend rises). Net: Certara needs the top-40 more on any single account than they need Certara, but the aggregate ecosystem lock-in tilts power back to Certara.

The honest moat caveat (developed in Lens 12/13): the moat is strongest in mechanistic/regulatory software and weakest in services and in the new AI layer, where general-purpose LLM providers and well-funded entrants could compress the regulatory-writing and analysis value. Management's "expert-in-the-loop, AI-inside-validated-frameworks" framing is partly a moat narrative and partly a defense against exactly this disruption.

Lens 4 · Segments

Certara reports a single operating segment with three goodwill reporting units (Certara Data Science Software / Certara Predictive Technologies / Certara Drug Development Services). It does not disclose a clean product-segment EBITDA split or a US/international revenue split — only the software/services revenue cut and a foreign-currency proxy. (segments.csv on disk is empty.)

By product line (revenue, $000):

Multi-year total revenue: FY2023 $354.3M → FY2024 $385.1M (+8.7%) → FY2025 $418.8M (+8.7%). Organic FY2025 +6%; acquisitions (Chemaxon) +3%.

The trend that matters is the Q1-2026 reversal:

So the story decelerated hard at the top: software growth halved (from +18% FY to +7% in Q1), and services turned negative (the 10-Q attributes the −4% to "lower revenue from a previously acquired business" — i.e., the regulatory-writing unit being run down ahead of divestiture). Mix is shifting toward the higher-margin software, but the absolute growth engine stalled.

Geography: no clean split disclosed; 31% of FY2025 revenue was transacted in foreign currency (28% FY2024) — predominantly GBP, EUR, JPY — the only geographic granularity the filing gives.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print = Q1-2026, reported 2026-05-11)

This is the print that broke the stock (−17% on the day ). The latest filing on disk is the Q1-2026 10-Q (period ended 2026-03-31, filed 2026-05-11).

The numbers:

• Revenue $106.9M vs $106.0M — +1% YoY. A near-total stall vs the +9% full-year 2025 pace.
• Software +7% to $49.7M (decel from +18%); Services −4% to $57.2M.
• GAAP income from operations −$4.3M (vs +$7.6M Q1-2025) — swung to an operating loss.
• Net loss −$8.8M (vs +$4.7M); GAAP diluted EPS −$0.06 (vs +$0.03).
• Adjusted EBITDA $31.7M vs $34.8M — −9% YoY; Adjusted diluted EPS $0.09 vs $0.14 — −36% YoY.

Beat/miss: MISS. Adjusted EPS $0.09 vs consensus ~$0.11.

What drove it: (1) Services decline (regulatory-writing run-off). (2) Cost growth ahead of revenue — G&A jumped to $29.4M from $19.7M (+49%), R&D +17% ($12.3M vs $10.5M), driving the operating loss. (3) A $7.2M change in fair value of contingent consideration (non-cash, vs −$0.2M prior year) — this is the bulk of the optical GAAP swing and is added back in adjusted EBITDA. But note: even adjusted EBITDA fell 9% and adjusted EPS fell 36%, so this was a genuinely soft operating quarter, not merely a non-cash optic.

The forward tell — bookings: Q1-2026 bookings $115.3M vs $118.2M, −2% YoY. Bookings are the leading indicator; a YoY decline is the single most concerning data point in the quarter. Net software retention improved to 106.1% (vs 102.4%) — the installed base is fine; it's new business / services that softened.

Guidance / outlook (set at this print, post-divestiture): FY2026 revenue $395–405M (includes ~$18M of stub regulatory-writing revenue; implies ~0–4% growth ex-divestiture), adj. EBITDA margin 30–32%, and adj. diluted EPS $0.35–$0.41 — a guide-down from FY2025's $0.44. (Note a sourcing conflict: one feed cited $0.44–$0.48; the $0.35–$0.41 range is the post-Veristat-divestiture figure carried in the May 11 release and is treated as current — flagged, not silently reconciled.)

Balance-sheet flags (FY2025 year-end): cash $189.4M; total debt ~$298.5M gross ($295.5M term loan); net debt ≈ $104M; deferred revenue $77.8M. Healthy liquidity, modest leverage (~0.8x net-debt/adj.EBITDA).

Market reaction: −17% on the print; the stock hit an all-time low of $4.45 on 2026-05-15, four days after earnings. What the market priced: a growth company that stopped growing, a new CEO with no track record yet, and a guide-down — re-rated from "GARP compounder" toward "show-me / sum-of-parts."

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ on disk is empty — this lens is ``.

Tone shift over the last several quarters:

• FY2024 / early-FY2025 (Feehery era): confident — "pleased with… strong commercial execution and demand for our software and services."
• Q1-2026 (Resnick's first call, 2026-05-11): distinctly more defensive and strategic-realignment-flavored. The framing pivoted from "growth" to "sharpening focus on areas where we have defined competitive and scientific advantage," "improving revenue predictability," and "creating closer alignment between expert services and technology." Software was talked up (Phoenix Cloud + Simcyp "robust pipeline," "demand consistent across all customer tiers"); services and bookings were addressed defensively. Certara.AI was positioned as the future unifying platform — "still in development… expected to create new business models."

Recurring phrases now: "expert-in-the-loop," "MIDD platform," "revenue predictability," "operational excellence," "defined competitive advantage." What they stopped saying: the unqualified "strong demand across software AND services" line — services is now spoken of as a focus/realignment area, not a growth driver. The sentiment arc is confident-compounder → focused-turnaround, which is exactly what a new CEO inheriting a stalled quarter would signal.

Lens 7 · Comps

Pure-play biosimulation comps are scarce — the cleanest is Simulations Plus, and it is being taken private, which is itself the most important comp datapoint. Multiples are `` with date, or n/a.

for the named competitor set (Mathworks, Dassault Systèmes, Ansys, Simulations Plus, NONMEM/ICON; services peers Metrum Research, qPharmetra, Pharmetheus).

The read-through that matters: SLP — the closest listed pure-play — is being taken private at ~2.5x sales / a premium multiple. Bulls (Leerink, 2026-05-15) argue this "supports a higher multiple" for CERT and establishes a credible M&A / take-private floor, especially with Arsenal Capital already owning ~22% (Lens 9). CERT trades richer than SLP on EV/Sales (~3.8x vs 2.5x) but that reflects CERT's larger scale and software mix; on 2026E EV/EBITDA the ~14x is below CERT's own history and below where a strategic/PE buyer paid for SLP.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (last ~5 years)

Mostly ``; the pattern is unusually clean.

• Dec 2020 — IPO at $23, popped; the stock is a post-COVID-bubble de-rating story. All-time high $45.48 in Nov 2021. From there a multi-year grind down (~80% off the high) as biotech funding froze and rates rose.
• Nov 2022 — Arsenal Capital $449M stock purchase (taking it to ~22% diluted) — a PE sponsor re-upping; a structural support event.
• 2023 — $47.0M goodwill impairment (regulatory-writing reporting unit) + a $55.4M net loss; the first hard signal that the services/regulatory-writing side was the weak link.
• Mar 2026 — UBS PT cut $15→$10 (Buy) — pre-earnings de-rating.
• 2026-05-11/12 — Q1 miss + guide-down + Veristat divestiture → −17%, then all-time low $4.45 on 2026-05-15, and a wave of PT cuts (Craig-Hallum $10→$8, BMO $7→$6, Stephens $10→$9, Baird $7→$6, Morgan Stanley $11→$10; KeyBanc $10→$8 OW).
• Jun 2026 — SLP take-private at $18.50 → positive read-through, Leerink flags higher-multiple support; stock recovers off the low to ~$9–11.

What the market actually reacts to for this name: (1) bookings + software growth rate (the GARP thesis lives or dies on re-acceleration), (2) biotech-funding / FDA-throughput macro (it's a levered R&D-spend play), and (3) M&A / sponsor signals (Arsenal's stake and the SLP deal). It does not trade on quarterly GAAP EPS (chronically near zero from amortization) — it trades on the growth narrative and the strategic/ownership setup.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

The single most important governance fact: a brand-new CEO and a PE sponsor with effective control.

• CEO — Jon Resnick (effective 2026-01-01). Succeeded William Feehery (CEO 2017–2025, who stepped down 2025-12-31 to an advisory role). Resnick brings 20+ years at IQVIA — a commercial/data-services pedigree, not a scientific-founder one. The Q1-2026 miss is his first quarter; the divestiture + "sharpen focus" messaging is the opening move of his playbook. Track record at Certara: zero quarters of proof. This is the central people-risk and people-opportunity.
• Skin in the game / ownership: Arsenal Capital Partners owns ~22% of diluted shares (post the Nov-2022 $449M purchase) and holds up to 2 board seats — the largest economic holder and effectively a control-adjacent sponsor. Arsenal founded/controlled Certara historically (sold control to EQT in 2017, EQT sold back to Arsenal in 2022). Other top holders: BlackRock 8.3%, Vanguard 7.8%, Mubadala 6.0%; institutions ~70%. The presence of a PE sponsor at 22% + a beaten-down stock + a take-private of the nearest comp = a credible LBO/take-private setup.
• Capital-allocation history: acquisition roll-up — 21 companies since 2013, 14 with software (Simcyp, Pinnacle 21, Vyasa, Formedix, Applied BioMath, Chemaxon $96.4M in 2024). This built the platform but loaded the balance sheet with $773M goodwill + $447M intangibles = 78% of total assets, and produced the 2023 $47M impairment. 2025 marked a pivot: first-ever $42.6M buyback (3.9M shares, treasury up to $66.7M) and the 2026 Veristat divestiture — i.e., from "acquire everything" to "buy back stock + prune." A constructive capital-allocation inflection if sustained.
• Red flags (capital-allocation): chronic GAAP losses masked by adjusted metrics; rising capitalized software ($13.5M→$19.4M→$24.8M) flatters operating cash flow (Lens 10); contingent-consideration volatility from the deal spree. None are fraud-flavored; they're roll-up hygiene issues.
• Archetype: professional managers + PE sponsor, not founder-operators. For this stage (a scaled, moaty asset that stopped growing), that archetype is appropriate IF the new CEO can execute a focus-and-re-accelerate turn — and dangerous if "professional manager + PE" simply means "dress it up for a sale."

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Forensic lens — every figure labeled. Findings are hygiene-level, not fraud-level.

• Capitalized software development is the #1 watch item. $24.8M capitalized in FY2025 (up from $19.4M / $13.5M). This moves development spend off the income statement (flattering operating margin and adjusted EBITDA) and into cash-from-investing. It also inflates operating cash flow: reported OCF $96.3M, but FCF ≈ $69.7M after capex ($1.8M) + capitalized software ($24.8M). Rising capitalization into a decelerating revenue line is the classic spot where SaaS roll-ups flatter the P&L — track the ratio.
• Cash flow vs earnings: healthy direction — OCF $96.3M dwarfs the $1.6M GAAP net loss (the gap is D&A $75.2M + SBC $33.1M, both real non-cash). No divergence red flag; the quality issue is the capitalization above, not a receivables/earnings mismatch.
• Receivables vs revenue: AR $103.5M on $418.8M revenue (DSO ~90 days) — flat YoY ($102.2M), not outrunning revenue. Allowance for credit losses $2.2M (stable). Clean.
• SBC flatters non-GAAP: equity comp $33.1M (FY2025), ~47% of adjusted net income ($70.9M) and added back in every non-GAAP bridge. Material but disclosed and stable; standard for the category.
• Goodwill/intangibles: $1.22B (78% of assets); one $47M impairment in 2023; annual test, no impairment 2024/2025. The asset base is acquisition air — an impairment risk if the growth-rate de-rating persists, but the auditor (RSM) issued an unqualified opinion + clean ICFR.
• Critical Audit Matter (RSM): revenue recognition on fixed-price services contracts (input-method % completion) — the one area flagged as high-estimation-uncertainty. Worth noting given services is the softening line.
• Contingent-consideration volatility: the $7.2M Q1-2026 fair-value swing is non-cash earn-out remeasurement — noise, not a flag, but it distorts GAAP optics.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases: None. Verified via EDGAR EFTS (LR) 2021-06-20→2026-06-20.
• SEC AAERs: None. Same source/window.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Certara discloses no material legal proceedings — "not presently a party to any legal proceedings relating to intellectual property that… would individually or taken together have a material adverse effect."
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/FDA) web search: no material enforcement actions, consent decrees, fines, or penalties found against Certara. The only AI-adjacent risk is self-flagged in the 10-K (potential exposure if AI capabilities are alleged to be "overstated") — a forward risk, not an existing action.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-20.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (EPS, next three fiscal years — FY2026/27/28)

Built bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + FY2026 guidance. Output ``; inputs labeled.

Anchors: FY2025 adj. diluted EPS $0.44; FY2026 guide $0.35–$0.41, revenue $395–405M, adj. EBITDA margin 30–32%. The FY2026 decline is mechanical — the Veristat divestiture removes ~$50M revenue / $17M adj. EBITDA (a 34% margin unit), so EPS steps down even though the remaining business is healthier-mix.

• FY2026 (base): adj. EPS ~$0.38. Revenue ~$400M (−4% reported on divestiture; ~+2% organic ex-divestiture). The trough year.
• FY2027 (base): adj. EPS ~$0.45. The "back to FY2025 level" year — re-acceleration of software to ~10%+ is the swing factor.
• FY2028 (base): adj. EPS ~$0.54. Requires the turnaround to be working.
• Bull FY2028 ~$0.65. Bear FY2028 ~$0.35.

The number that actually matters is not EPS — it's the software growth rate. GAAP EPS will hover near zero on amortization regardless; the equity re-rates on whether software re-accelerates from +7% back toward the mid-teens. Watch bookings (turned −2%) as the leading tell.

No forecast.ts create run (watchlist/breadth mode — forecasts are logged only on committed base cases, per skill).

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Certara owns the regulator-embedded standard for computational drug development — a moat (90%+ of FDA approvals touch it; 20 regulators license it; 20-yr validated Simcyp data) that does not erode in a quarter. The 44% software mix is high-margin, 105–106% net-retention sticky, and grew 18% in FY2025. The new CEO is doing the right things — shedding the low-multiple regulatory-writing drag (Veristat), buying back stock at a trough, and pushing Certara.AI as a platform up-sell. The stock printed an all-time low at $4.45 on a single soft quarter and ~14x 2026E EV/EBITDA — and the nearest pure-play comp (SLP) was just taken private at a premium, with Arsenal already owning 22%. Earnings surprise vector: any bookings re-acceleration or a take-private bid.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks). (1) The moat is in mechanistic software; the growth was in services + acquisitions — and both just rolled over (services −4%, bookings −2%, software decel to +7%). If MIDD adoption is maturing and biotech R&D stays funding-constrained, Certara is a ~mid-single-digit grower wearing a software multiple. (2) AI cuts both ways — the regulatory-writing/analysis value (the very unit just sold) is exactly where general-purpose LLMs compress price; Certara.AI is "still in development" and unproven as a revenue engine. (3) Roll-up air — $1.22B goodwill+intangibles (78% of assets) with one impairment already; a sustained de-rating forces more. Multiple too high? vs its own stalled growth, ~3.8x EV/Sales / 14x EBITDA is not cheap if this is a 0–4% grower; it's cheap only if software re-accelerates.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): biotech funding stayed tight + FDA throughput stayed disrupted; software never re-accelerated past high-single-digits; Certara.AI slipped; bookings declined two more quarters; the new CEO's "focus" turned out to mean "shrink to a sale that didn't materialize at a good price"; another goodwill impairment; the stock re-based to ~$5–6 as a no-growth ~12x-EBITDA services-y asset.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market is treating CERT as a broken SaaS name, but it's really a regulatory-infrastructure monopoly with a temporarily-stalled growth optic and a motivated 22% PE owner. The most underpriced scenario is not operational re-acceleration — it's a take-private, where the moat + recurring software + the SLP precedent + Arsenal's stake make a bid at a meaningful premium to $9 plausible. The market is pricing the bad quarter; it is under-pricing the ownership setup.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the model: Certara monetizes biopharma R&D spend. That spend is cyclical and currently pressured (IRA drug-pricing, OBBBA, FDA RIFs cutting ~3,500 staff, frozen biotech funding). A multi-year R&D-budget contraction isn't a soft quarter — it's a smaller TAM, and Certara is a levered bet on it.
• Revenue concentration / shift: top-10 = 24%; more dangerous is the services concentration in regulatory work that AI is commoditizing — management just sold that unit, which is a tell that they couldn't defend its margin. What's the next AI-exposed line?
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: the durable moat is mechanistic biosimulation (Simcyp) — a relatively small, slow-growing, already-penetrated core. The growth came from acquisitions and services, neither of which is moaty, and both just decelerated. Strip the acquisitions: organic FY2025 was +6%, and Q1-2026 organic is ~flat.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not Simulations Plus (being absorbed) — it's well-capitalized general-purpose AI (and in-house pharma data-science teams) eating the regulatory-writing/analysis layer, plus Dassault/Ansys/Mathworks pushing simulation. The "expert-in-the-loop" framing is a hedge against precisely this.
• Worst capital-allocation: a 21-company roll-up that produced $1.22B of goodwill+intangibles, a $47M impairment, chronic GAAP losses, and rising capitalized-software that flatters cash flow — then a pivot to buybacks at a stock that proceeded to an all-time low. Returns on the acquisition spend are not evident in the (negative) ROE.
• Assumptions that must hold for $9–11: software re-accelerates to ≥10%, services stabilizes post-divestiture, Certara.AI monetizes, and the FDA/funding macro normalizes. If FY2027 growth disappoints by 20–30% (i.e., revenue ~$385M vs ~$405M base, margin stuck at 30%), adj. EPS is ~$0.35 not ~$0.45, and a 12x-EBITDA no-growth multiple puts the stock back at ~$5–6.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: structural MIDD maturation + AI commoditization of services → Certara becomes a low-growth, mechanistic-software utility with a melting services tail. Plausibility: moderate — the regulatory moat caps the downside (it won't go to zero), but it caps the upside re-rating too if growth doesn't come back.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (15, ordered by information value)

1. Q1 bookings fell 2% YoY — is that timing, or a demand-level reset? What was the book-to-bill and the bookings trend exiting the quarter, and what does your pipeline say about 2H-2026 re-acceleration?
2. Software growth decelerated from +18% (FY2025) to +7% (Q1-2026). How much of the +18% was Chemaxon/acquisition vs organic, and what is the organic software growth rate now?
3. You sold the regulatory/medical-writing business (34% EBITDA margin) — was that a strategic-focus decision or a defensive one because AI was about to compress its economics? Which other service lines face the same AI threat?
4. Walk through the path from FY2026's ~$0.38 adj. EPS back to and beyond FY2025's $0.44 — what are the specific growth and margin levers, and what's the realistic timeline?
5. Capitalized software development rose to $24.8M (from $13.5M two years ago) while revenue decelerated. What's the policy, and what is true FCF after that capitalization?
6. Certara.AI is "still in development." What is its current revenue run-rate, what business model will it carry (seat / consumption / outcome), and when does it move the consolidated growth rate?
7. With Arsenal at ~22% and the stock at an all-time low, has the board evaluated strategic alternatives, including a take-private? How do you think about the SLP/Altaris precedent?
8. What share of revenue is exposed to the small/emerging-biotech cohort whose funding is most stressed, and how did that cohort's spend trend in Q1?
9. The FDA workforce reductions feature prominently in your risk factors — quantify the observed impact on customer program timing and your bookings to date.
10. Net software retention improved to 106% even as bookings fell — reconcile those two. Is expansion within the base masking weak new-logo acquisition?
11. What is the long-term operating-margin model post-divestiture, and how do you balance reinvestment in AI/cloud against the buyback you started in 2025?
12. After 21 acquisitions, what is your forward M&A appetite vs. organic build vs. returning capital — and what ROIC hurdle do deals now have to clear?
13. Top-10 customers are 24% of revenue. What is the renewal/expansion posture of your largest pharma accounts into 2026, and where is procurement pressure most acute?
14. Goodwill + intangibles are 78% of assets with one prior impairment. At what sustained growth rate would the annual test trigger another, and how are you stress-testing it?
15. Jon — as the first CEO from outside the scientific-founder lineage (20 years at IQVIA), what specifically will you do differently from the Feehery era, and how should we measure you over the next four quarters?

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