Compugen

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Compugen is a clinical-stage, computation-first immuno-oncology company headquartered in Holon, Israel (founded 1993; NASDAQ + TASE: CGEN). Its actual product is not a drug — it is a target-discovery engine called Unigen™: a cloud-based AI/ML platform that ingests public + proprietary multi-omics, single-cell RNA-seq and spatial-omics data, standardizes it through a proprietary pipeline, and predicts novel immuno-oncology targets, biomarkers and mechanisms of action ("From Code to Cure®"). In Feb 2025 it bolted Ultima Genomics' single-cell sequencing onto Unigen to deepen the data layer.

The business model is a discovery-and-partner flywheel: use Unigen to find first-in-class targets, take the best ones into early clinical proof-of-concept itself, then license them to large pharma at value-inflection points, keeping milestones + royalties while pharma funds the expensive Phase 3 / commercial build. It is, in effect, a royalty-and-platform company that happens to run two of its own Phase 1 assets.

The four-program pipeline:

1. COM701 — wholly-owned, potential first-in-class anti-PVRIG Fc-reduced antibody. Lead owned asset; in the MAIA-ovarian platform trial.
2. COM902 — wholly-owned, "best-in-class" anti-TIGIT antibody. Its TIGIT-binding arm is the basis of AstraZeneca's bispecific. No longer the headline owned program; effectively a platform-validation asset.
3. Rilvegostomig — PD-1/TIGIT bispecific, licensed to AstraZeneca (2018 deal), derived from COM902's TIGIT arm. Now in 11 ongoing Phase 3 trials. This is the crown jewel — Compugen's biggest economic exposure.
4. GS-0321 (formerly COM503) — anti-IL-18 binding protein (IL-18BP) antibody, licensed to Gilead, in Phase 1.

Key counterparties: AstraZeneca and Gilead are simultaneously the only customers and the entire revenue thesis. Contract structure is milestone + tiered-royalty (not recurring, not take-or-pay): up to $195M remaining regulatory/commercial milestones + mid-single-digit royalties from AZ, and up to $758M additional milestones + double-digit royalties from Gilead. Headline "~$1 billion in potential milestones plus royalties".

Revenue today is collaboration income only — Q1 2026 revenue was $2.176M. This is not a P&L company; it is a pipeline + a royalty book. Hence the +clinical battery variant.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain (CDMO / development chain)

A development-stage antibody company has no physical supply chain in the industrial sense; its "chain" is the discovery → manufacturing → trial → partner → patient path, and the relevant chokepoints are data, CDMO capacity, and clinical sites.

• Upstream — data & compute: Unigen runs on cloud infrastructure (technology-agnostic) and integrates public-domain genomics + proprietary omics. The key 2025 input addition was Ultima Genomics single-cell sequencing. Single-source dependency on cloud + a thin set of sequencing vendors, but these are commoditizing and not a binding constraint.
• Midstream — biologics manufacturing (CDMO): Compugen does not own manufacturing; antibody drug substance/product for COM701/COM902 is made by contract manufacturers (CDMOs — not named in public PRs). For the partnered assets, AstraZeneca and Gilead carry their own manufacturing once licensed — a major de-risking, because Compugen never has to build commercial-scale biologics capacity. n/a — specific CDMO not disclosed in public sources.
• Clinical sites (the live chokepoint): MAIA-ovarian enrolls across the United States, Israel and France. Enrollment pace at these sites is the single rate-limiter on the only owned catalyst that matters (Q1 2027 interim).
• Downstream — the buyers: AstraZeneca (rilvegostomig commercialization, est. >$5B peak revenue) and Gilead (GS-0321). End customers are oncology patients via those partners' commercial organizations. Compugen sits one step removed from the patient — it collects royalties, it does not sell.

Chokepoint summary: the binding constraints are (1) MAIA-ovarian enrollment speed, and (2) AstraZeneca's execution on 11 Phase 3 trials — an entirely exogenous dependency Compugen cannot influence.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

• Platform IP + data flywheel (the real moat): Unigen's edge is the proprietary analytic pipeline plus 30 years of accumulated IO target-discovery know-how. Its validation is empirical and rare: PVRIG and TIGIT were both Compugen-discovered targets via computational prediction, and TIGIT became a multi-company class while PVRIG remains first-in-class to Compugen. That is a genuine "we found targets the field then chased" track record — the strongest possible proof a discovery platform can offer. Strength: medium-high, but hard for the market to price because the output is lumpy and partner-gated.
• Composition-of-matter IP: COM701 and COM902 carry composition-of-matter and use patents (COM902 added EU composition-of-matter + use patents in 2019). PVRIG first-in-class status gives COM701 a clear IP runway if it works.
• Switching costs / bargaining power: weak and asymmetric. Compugen needs AZ and Gilead far more than they need Compugen — once a target is licensed, the partner controls development, timing, and disclosure. Compugen's December 2025 royalty-monetization (selling a slice of rilvegostomig royalties for cash) is itself evidence of weak bargaining position: it had to give up future upside to fund the present.
• Brand / perceived value: within IO drug-discovery circles, Compugen is respected as a pioneer of computational target ID; to generalist investors it is a sub-$250M micro-cap option. No consumer brand; brand value is entirely scientific-credibility.

Moat verdict: the durable asset is the platform + its discovery track record, not any single antibody. The moat is real but narrow and partner-dependent — Compugen captures a fraction of the value it creates.

Lens 4 · Segments

No reportable product segments — a single development-stage entity with collaboration revenue. The only meaningful "segment" breakdown is by program economic exposure (all figures /):

Geographically, R&D is Israel-centric; trials are US/Israel/France; the commercial value accrues through US/EU/global partner sales. Trend: the mix has shifted decisively toward partnered, royalty-bearing assets (the AZ monetization + the Gilead milestone weighting), and away from the owned antibodies — management is explicitly leaning on partner economics to fund the platform.

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Phase B — Measure performance ( +clinical overlay: Lens 5 → Pipeline-by-phase; Lens 7 → Catalyst calendar + mechanism comps )

Lens 5 · Pipeline by phase (replaces Earnings Result — pre-revenue)

The asset table is the company:

Q1 2026 financial print (for the cash-shell math, all ``):

• Revenue $2.176M (vs $2.284M Q1 2025) — collaboration income; modest YoY decline
• Net loss $7.669M (vs $7.181M) → EPS −$0.08 (flat YoY)
• R&D $6.937M (up from $5.773M — MAIA-ovarian clinical costs); G&A $2.298M
• Weighted-avg shares 94,556,230
• Cash + ST deposits + marketable securities = $135.0M at 31-Mar-2026 ($12.4M cash + $79.3M ST deposits + $43.2M securities); debt-free
• Runway: into 2029
• Note: Investing.com flagged Q1 revenue "beat" ($2.2M vs $1.63M consensus) → stock +12.7% pre-market. For a pre-revenue name a "revenue beat" is noise — the move reflects pipeline/runway confidence, not the $0.5M delta.

The pleiotropic / mechanism note: PVRIG (COM701) is hypothesized to "turn cold tumors hot" and sensitize tumors to PD-1 and TIGIT blockade — i.e., it may have value as a combination backbone even if single-agent maintenance underwhelms.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

From the Q1 2026 call (2026-06-01):

• New CEO Eran Ophir: "2026 is shaping up to be a significant year for Compugen," framing a "solid financial position" enabling focus on "key value-creating milestones." Tone: confident, milestone-anchored, capital-disciplined — the posture of a team that just bought itself runway and wants to look unhurried.
• CMO Dr. Michelle Mahler gave the single most important disclosure: the control-arm benchmark PFS is ~5.5 months (range 3.8–5.8) and Compugen is "hoping to show meaningful single-agent clinical activity" with a hypothesized ≥3-month PFS improvement at interim. This is the de-facto success bar for Q1 2027 — quantified for the first time.
• Heavy emphasis on partner validation: AZ peak >$5B reaffirmed; Gilead milestones up to $758M + double-digit royalties spelled out.
• Tone shift over time: since the Sept-2025 CEO transition and Dec-2025 AZ monetization, management language has moved from "preserving optionality / strengthening the balance sheet" toward "executing to value-creating milestones into 2029." The stopped-saying tell: less dilution-anxiety language, more catalyst-calendar language — consistent with a freshly-funded shell.
• What they did not do: no explicit COM902 standalone roadmap (it has quietly become a platform-validation asset, not a program with its own catalyst).

Lens 7 · Catalyst calendar + mechanism comps (replaces P/E comps — pre-revenue)

Catalyst calendar (the thing that actually moves CGEN):

Mechanism comps (by target, not by P/E — the relevant peer frame for an IO discovery shop):

• TIGIT class (cautionary): Roche tiragolumab — scrapped July 2025 after ~5,000 patients across 12 Ph2/3 trials, failures in lung/liver/esophageal/H&N. Gilead/Arcus domvanalimab — discontinued in Phase 3 gastric (STAR-221 missed OS vs Opdivo); "Au Revoir TIGIT". GSK, Merck, BeOne all retreated. AstraZeneca's rilvegostomig is "TIGIT's last man standing". This is the central tension: Compugen's most valuable asset is the sole survivor of a class graveyard.
• PVRIG class: COM701 is first-in-class — no direct approved comparator. Closest adjacent is iTeos/GSK's broader IO portfolio (TIGIT-adjacent), but PVRIG has no validated rival, which is both the bull (white space) and the bear (no precedent that the target works in pivotal trials).
• Computational-discovery peers (platform comps): Recursion (RXRX), Schrödinger (SDGR), Exscientia/Absci — all richer-multiple AI-drug names, but none is a pure royalty-on-pharma model with a Phase 3 partnered asset. CGEN is the cheapest, most de-risked-by-partner of the AI-bio cohort, and the most binary.

Standard multiples (EV/Sales, P/E, ROE): n/a — pre-revenue development-stage; not meaningful.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves the tape)

CGEN is a catalyst stock — it moves on pipeline/partner news, not fundamentals (`` throughout):

• Dec 16, 2025 — AZ royalty monetization ($65M up + $25M milestone): re-rated the balance sheet, extended runway to 2029, removed the dilution overhang. Stock supported into year-end; Leerink raised PT to $13 (from $10), HC Wainwright initiated Buy.
• May 18, 2026 — Q1 "revenue beat": +12.7% pre-market — but the real driver was reaffirmed runway + MAIA-ovarian timeline, not the $0.5M revenue delta.
• 2023 — rilvegostomig advances to Phase 3: validated the AZ-partnered TIGIT arm; a structural up-leg for the royalty thesis.
• 2025 TIGIT-class failures (Roche, Arcus): sector-wide overhang on anything TIGIT — a recurring downside catalyst for CGEN even though rilvegostomig is differentiated, because the market tars the whole class.
• Pattern read: the market reacts most to (1) partner/regulatory de-risking (monetization, Phase 3 entry, PT hikes) and (2) class sentiment (TIGIT failures drag it; survivorship lifts it). It barely reacts to Compugen's own P&L. The dominant single variable is AstraZeneca's rilvegostomig newsflow — CGEN is a high-beta proxy on AZ's TIGIT program.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO — Eran Ophir, Ph.D. (since Sept 2025). Former Chief Scientific Officer; ~a decade at Compugen, built the IO pipeline and architected the Gilead deal. Archetype: scientist-operator promoted from within — deep platform credibility, less-tested as a public-company CEO / dealmaker-to-Wall-Street. Skin in the game: as a long-tenured insider he holds equity/options (exact % n/a — not disclosed in public sources).
• Executive Chair — Anat Cohen-Dayag, Ph.D. CEO 2010–2025 (15 years); transformed Compugen from a genomics-tools company into a therapeutic IO-discovery company; now focused on corporate strategy, collaborations, IR. Continuity of strategic vision retained at board level — a stabilizing handover, not a rupture.
• Outgoing Chair — Paul Sekhri (8 years). Departure of an experienced biotech board chair is a mild governance watch-item but appears orderly.
• CFO — David Silverman — delivered the Q1 2026 cash/runway numbers.
• Capital-allocation history: prudent for a micro-cap biotech. Debt-free; historically low burn (~$9M operating cash burn in the year to mid-2025 per Simply Wall St ); the standout move is the Dec-2025 non-dilutive royalty monetization — selling a slice of rilvegostomig royalties for $65M up-front rather than diluting equity at a depressed price. That is shareholder-friendly capital allocation: it priced the balance-sheet hole against future royalty upside and chose non-dilutive cash. Counter-read: monetizing future royalties is also a tell that organic funding options were unattractive.
• Red flags: none material. No related-party deals, no promotional pattern, no governance scandal surfaced. The CEO transition is the main "change" risk — a new, internally-promoted CEO carrying a binary 2027 catalyst.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags ( +clinical re-point: trial-design integrity · going-concern · dilution )

Accounting / books (limited — FPI, 6-K/20-F reporter; figures ``):

• Revenue recognition: collaboration income only ($2.176M Q1 2026), recognized off milestone/license arrangements with AZ + Gilead. Low fabrication risk — there is almost no revenue to manipulate.
• Cash vs earnings divergence: the headline net loss (~$7.7M/qtr → ~$31M annualized) is larger than the oft-cited ~$9M annual cash burn. This is a real conflict to flag: the $9M figure is operating cash burn net of collaboration/interest income and dated to mid-2025 before MAIA-ovarian costs ramped, whereas the P&L net loss is the cleaner forward indicator. Do not anchor on $9M — the forward burn against the $135M cash is closer to $30M+/yr as the ovarian trial fully enrolls. At ~$30M/yr, $135M ≈ 4–4.5 years of runway, consistent with "into 2029." ``
• Balance sheet: debt-free, $135M liquid, no goodwill/intangible bloat issues typical of acquisitive names.
• SBC / dilution: share count ~94.5M; some option/SBC dilution but no large equity raise needed near-term thanks to the AZ monetization — the key positive. The dilution risk is post-2027 (if MAIA-ovarian succeeds and they need pivotal funding, or if it fails and the platform needs recapitalizing).
• Going-concern: not a near-term concern — runway into 2029 is genuine and partner-backstopped.
• Trial-design integrity (the +clinical red flag that matters): MAIA-ovarian's interim is a 60-patient, single sub-trial, 2:1-randomized maintenance-monotherapy readout against a ~5.5-month benchmark. Risks: (a) small N → wide confidence intervals; (b) single-agent checkpoint in maintenance is an unproven setting — even a clean readout may not be pivotal-grade; (c) the ≥3-month-PFS-improvement "hope" is management's own bar, not a regulatory endpoint. Watch for any change to the interim timing or the analysis population.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section) — read from regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (Stage 1, fetched 2026-06-17):

• SEC Litigation Releases: none found naming Compugen (EDGAR EFTS LR, 2021–2026).
• SEC AAERs: none found (EDGAR EFTS AAER, 2021–2026).
• Non-SEC enforcement (FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB): web search surfaced no material enforcement actions, consent decrees, settlements or fines against Compugen as of 2026-06-17.
• Item 3 / Legal Proceedings: as a 6-K/20-F filer the equivalent is in its 20-F; no material litigation surfaced in public sources. n/a — 20-F Item not on disk; none disclosed in public PRs.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and public disclosures as of 2026-06-17.

Science & exclusivity (+clinical Phase-C add-on): PVRIG is a Compugen-discovered, computationally-predicted novel target — mechanism validation rests on the platform's track record (it also discovered TIGIT, now a validated class). IP estate: composition-of-matter + use patents on COM701/COM902 (incl. EU). Scientific-founder/KOL credibility is high within IO. The exclusivity question is whether PVRIG biology translates to pivotal efficacy — unproven, first-in-class risk.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · rNPV + runway-to-catalyst (replaces EPS projection — pre-revenue)

EPS projection is not meaningful (loss-making, ~−$0.08/qtr; FY runs at roughly −$0.30 to −$0.35 EPS/yr `` on ~$31M loss / 94.5M shares). The right frame is sum-of-parts rNPV vs. cash, and runway-to-catalyst.

Runway-to-catalyst (the question that actually matters): $135M cash at ~$30M/yr forward burn → into 2029, comfortably past the Q1 2027 MAIA-ovarian interim and into the window where AstraZeneca Phase 3 reads start landing. Yes — cash reaches the next value-inflection catalysts with multi-year margin. This is the single strongest fact in the dossier.

Crude sum-of-parts rNPV `` (all inputs labeled; illustrative, not a model output):

• Net cash: ~$135M (Q1 2026). Call it ~$100–120M by the 2027 catalyst after burn ``.
• Rilvegostomig royalty/milestone strip (post-monetization): retained mid-single-digit royalty on an AZ asset with >$5B peak-sales estimate. At, say, a blended 4% royalty on a risk-adjusted $2–3B realized peak (Phase 3 PoS-haircut from $5B), that is ~$80–120M/yr of peak royalty, rNPV'd back at a high discount + ~40–50% Phase 3 success → $150–350M present value ``, plus up to $195M milestones. This single line can exceed the entire current market cap.
• GS-0321 (Gilead): $758M milestone book + double-digit royalty, but Phase 1 → heavy PoS haircut → $30–80M rNPV ``, high-variance.
• COM701 (owned): pure binary. If MAIA-ovarian works, a first-in-class PVRIG maintenance asset in ovarian could be worth hundreds of millions in a partnering deal; if it fails, ~$0 standalone (platform value persists). rNPV with ~25% PoS and a $400–800M success value → $75–175M ``, but bimodal.

Crude SOTP: cash ($120M) + rilve ($150–350M) + Gilead ($30–80M) + COM701 ($75–175M, bimodal) ≈ $375–725M `` vs. a current market cap of ~$143–214M. The market is pricing CGEN at or below net-cash-plus-a-stub — i.e., assigning little value to the royalty strip or the platform. That is the bull case in one number. The market's skepticism is the TIGIT-class graveyard + the binary owned readout.

Brier forecast (would-be): the trackable binary is "MAIA-ovarian interim shows ≥3-month median-PFS improvement over the ~5.5-mo benchmark by Q1 2027," p ≈ 0.30 ``. Not logged — forecast.ts create is skipped in --watchlist breadth mode per the SKILL.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Compugen is a partner-validated computational-discovery platform trading at roughly net cash, with a free option on the last surviving TIGIT asset in big pharma. AstraZeneca is running rilvegostomig across 11 Phase 3 trials / ~9,000 patients with a >$5B peak-sales ambition; Compugen keeps a mid-single-digit royalty plus up to $195M milestones — and AZ, not Compugen, funds all of it. Gilead adds a second shot ($758M milestones + double-digit royalty). The Dec-2025 monetization removed dilution risk and funds operations to 2029, past every near catalyst. Unigen has the rarest credential a discovery platform can have — it found PVRIG and TIGIT before the field did. If MAIA-ovarian shows single-agent activity in 2027, Compugen owns a first-in-class asset outright. You are paid to wait. Contrarian read: the market is so scarred by the TIGIT graveyard that it is pricing rilvegostomig's royalty at near zero — when the differentiated bispecific is structurally distinct from the failed monospecifics and AZ is doubling down, not retreating.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. The TIGIT thesis is the thesis — and TIGIT keeps failing. Roche (~5,000 patients), Gilead/Arcus, GSK, Merck, BeOne have all abandoned TIGIT. If rilvegostomig's Phase 3 program disappoints — entirely possible given the class's track record — Compugen's single most valuable asset deflates and the royalty strip goes toward zero. The bispecific differentiation is plausible but unproven at Phase 3.
2. COM701 single-agent maintenance is unproven biology in a tiny trial. A 60-patient interim against a soft ~5.5-month benchmark, in a setting (single-agent checkpoint maintenance) that has rarely worked. A miss erases the owned-asset value.
3. Compugen captures a fraction of what it creates and controls none of the timing. Every value catalyst sits inside AstraZeneca's or Gilead's clinical org. It is a price-taker on its own thesis.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It's late 2027. AstraZeneca reported the first rilvegostomig Phase 3 and it missed (TIGIT class strikes again), or the readout slipped; simultaneously MAIA-ovarian's interim showed no separation from the 5.5-month benchmark. CGEN re-rated to net cash ($1/sh-equivalent), ARK trimmed, and the platform narrative ("we find targets others chase") couldn't offset two clinical disappointments. The stock that was "trading below sum-of-parts" turned out to be correctly pricing a high probability of class failure.

Are multiples too high? No — the opposite. There is no earnings multiple; on rNPV the market is below a reasonable SOTP, pricing the optionality at a steep discount. The risk is not over-valuation; it is value-trap risk if both catalysts fail.

Contrarian view of what the market refuses to see: that rilvegostomig is structurally not tiragolumab — a single-molecule PD-1/TIGIT bispecific with reduced Fc and TIGIT-first anchoring is a different mechanism from a monospecific TIGIT mAb added to a PD-(L)1, and AstraZeneca's ~9,000-patient commitment + >$5B ambition is the most informed bet in oncology that the class isn't dead — it was just being run wrong.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• Concentration: the entire equity thesis rests on one partner's one molecule (rilvegostomig) plus one owned 60-patient readout (COM701). Two correlated binary bets, both in/adjacent to a class that has failed repeatedly. That is not a diversified pipeline; it is a double-or-nothing on TIGIT-adjacent biology.
• The class is the tell. When Roche burns 5,000 patients and quits, Arcus/Gilead kill their Phase 3, and GSK/Merck/BeOne walk, the prior probability that TIGIT blockade meaningfully extends survival is low. Rilvegostomig being a "differentiated bispecific" is exactly what every failed program claimed about its own design. Bulls are underestimating base rates.
• Most dangerous competitor: not a rival drug — it's the null hypothesis. The biggest threat is that TIGIT/PVRIG simply don't deliver clinically meaningful benefit, which no competitor can fix.
• Capital-allocation read (skeptic's version): monetizing future rilvegostomig royalties for $65M up-front is what a company does when it doesn't believe the market will fund it on the come, or wants cash in hand before a risky readout. Selling future upside to survive the present is rational but not bullish.
• Valuation if growth disappoints 20–30%: there is no "growth" to disappoint — there is binary readout risk. If MAIA-ovarian misses AND a rilvegostomig Phase 3 misses, fair value ≈ net cash minus wind-down, i.e., the stock is dead money or worse, and the "below-SOTP" cheapness was illusory because the parts were over-PoS'd.
• Single permanent-impairment scenario, plausibility: rilvegostomig Phase 3 program broadly fails (à la tiragolumab) → AZ deprioritizes → royalty strip → ~0, owned pipeline can't carry the platform → recapitalization/dilution. Plausibility: moderate-to-high given class base rates — this is the scenario the short would underwrite.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What single-agent median-PFS delta over the ~5.5-month benchmark would you consider a clear "go" at the MAIA-ovarian interim — and what would you call a "no-go"? (Defines the binary objectively.)
2. Given the comprehensive TIGIT-class failures (Roche, Arcus, GSK, Merck), what is the specific mechanistic and clinical evidence that rilvegostomig's bispecific design behaves differently — and have you seen Phase 2 data that supports it?
3. What does AstraZeneca's actual newsflow / internal prioritization on rilvegostomig look like across the 11 Phase 3 trials — which reads first, and when?
4. After monetizing a portion of rilvegostomig royalties, what royalty rate and milestone exposure do you actually retain, in dollars, at AZ's >$5B peak-sales scenario?
5. Why monetize royalties now rather than fund through equity or partnership — what did that decision say about your read of the capital markets?
6. If MAIA-ovarian's interim is positive, what is the path and the funding to a pivotal/registrational trial — and would you partner COM701 rather than go alone?
7. Is COM701's real value as single-agent maintenance, or as a combination backbone (PVRIG sensitizing to PD-1/TIGIT) — and which are you actually developing toward?
8. What is GS-0321's near-term Phase 1 readout cadence at Gilead, and what would trigger the next milestone in the $758M book?
9. What is the forward annual cash burn now that MAIA-ovarian is fully enrolling — and does "into 2029" assume any further milestone inflows?
10. What is COM902's future as a standalone asset, or is it now purely platform validation?
11. How do you quantify Unigen's edge versus other AI/computational-discovery platforms — what is your hit-rate from prediction to validated clinical target?
12. As a CEO promoted from CSO, how will capital allocation and business-development decision-making change versus the prior regime?
13. What new wholly-owned programs is Unigen generating, and when does the next IND-stage owned asset arrive to diversify the two-bet concentration?
14. Under what circumstances would you consider selling the company or the platform rather than continuing as a standalone micro-cap?
15. What insider buying has occurred since the September 2025 transition, and how is management's equity aligned to the 2027 catalyst?

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