Eos Energy Enterprises

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Eos Energy Enterprises (NASDAQ: EOSE) designs, manufactures and sells zinc-halide (zinc-bromide) battery energy storage systems (BESS) for long-duration grid, microgrid and commercial-and-industrial applications. The pitch is a non-lithium alternative for the 3-to-12-hour (and longer) discharge band: a chemistry built from "abundant, non-precious earth materials" (zinc halide salts, felt, resin, titanium, conductive polymer), manufactured in the US, marketed as non-flammable and safe versus lithium-ion thermal-runaway risk, operable across −20°C to 50°C without heavy HVAC/fire-suppression overhead.

The current product is the Z3 battery module — pitched as "the only US-designed and manufactured battery module" for that duration band — built on chemistry the company has iterated for ~15 years (3M+ cycles demonstrated). Versus the prior Gen 2.3, the Z3 carries ~50% fewer cells and ~98% fewer welds, ~2x energy density per square foot. The company layered on software in 2025 (DawnOS, the controls/analytics layer) and announced Eos Indensity in 2026 — a stackable high-density architecture targeting up to 1 GWh/acre (~4x incumbent footprints), aimed squarely at data-center / AI-load and critical-infrastructure siting.

Business model & payment terms. Turnkey DC BESS hardware plus services (BMS monitoring, project management, commissioning, long-term maintenance, extended warranties). Revenue is mostly product revenue recognized at a point in time ($56.7M of $57.0M in Q1 2026), with a thin service tail. The customer base — utilities, IPPs, renewables developers, C&I — typically buys via firm orders converted from a pipeline; contracts carry advance payments (contract liabilities $9.0M at 3/31/26) and warranty/performance obligations.

Customer concentration is severe. In FY2025, two customers were 51.5% and 18.8% of revenue (70.3% combined). In Q1 2026, three customers were 93.3% of revenue. This is a company selling a handful of large projects, not a diversified order book.

One reportable segment, North America-primary, 787 full-time employees at YE2025.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map: upstream commodity inputs → Eos manufacturing (Turtle Creek + Warrendale, PA) → utility / IPP / developer / C&I end customer, with project EPC/commissioning in between.

• Upstream inputs (named): zinc halide salts, felt, resin, titanium, conductive polymer — "five earth-abundant" materials with established supply chains, sourced "both domestic and international," with a stated push to domesticate to hold the IRA Domestic Content Bonus and meet OBBBA prohibited-foreign-entity (PFE) sourcing rules. The 10-K names no specific suppliers — a gap; the filing leans on "close relationships with key suppliers" and "formal agreements with strategic supplier partners" without disclosing them. The disclosed advantage is the absence of EV-demand competition for these inputs (unlike lithium, nickel, cobalt).
• Manufacturing chokepoint: Turtle Creek, PA is the operating plant producing DC energy blocks; Warrendale, PA "is not currently operational and is expected to become operational in 2026". Q1 2026 capex ($35.1M, vs $4.9M a year earlier) is "primarily to support the growth of manufacturing facilities at our Warrendale location". Line 1 has ~1.25 GWh/yr projected capacity; the DOE-funded AMAZE expansion targets 8 GWh by 2027.
• Downstream (named end customers & partners): MN8 Energy (up to 750 MWh supply agreement), Talen Energy (Pennsylvania storage-for-AI collaboration), Frontier Power Ltd. (UK — 5 GWh framework + 228 MWh order), Faraday Microgrids (3 MW / 15 MWh tribal-land microgrid), Naval Base San Diego (CEC-funded $8M order), plus a Germany 750 MWh deal scalable to 2 GWh through 2031.

Single-source / chokepoint read: the binding constraint is not raw materials (genuinely commodity) — it is Eos's own ability to manufacture at volume and yield. The supply chain is short and domestic by design, which is the bull's moat and the bear's single point of failure: one company, two PA plants, one of which isn't running yet.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

What the moat actually is — and isn't.

1. Domestic-content / policy moat (real but policy-dependent). Eos is the only US-designed-and-manufactured module in its duration band, qualifying customers for the IRA Domestic Content Bonus and Eos itself for §45X production tax credits ($35/kWh cells + $10/kWh modules + 10% electrode-active-materials). PTC is material to the P&L — it cut COGS by $21.3M in FY2025 and $10.3M in Q1 2026. This is a regulatory moat, not a technology moat, and it is exposed to legislative change (the OBBBA already re-cut the IRA in July 2025).
2. Safety / chemistry differentiation (genuine). Non-flammable zinc chemistry, −20°C to 50°C operating window, manufactured at zero voltage / 0% state of charge, no degradation from idle charge maintenance, no pumps/compressors (vs flow batteries). For data-center and military siting where fire risk is disqualifying, this is a real differentiator the incumbents can't trivially copy.
3. IP estate (moderate). 31 patent families, 202 patents pending/issued/published across 30 countries; key patents not expiring before 2035; plus trade-secret manufacturing know-how.

Bargaining power: weak on both sides, today. Eos needs the customers more than they need Eos — buyers have a fully bankable lithium-ion alternative (Tesla, CATL, BYD, Fluence) at scale and lower upfront cost, so Eos competes on safety + duration + domestic content, not price. And Eos needs its capital providers (Cerberus, DOE, convert holders) far more than they need Eos — the financing terms (33% fully-diluted Cerberus ownership cap, springing maturities, in-kind interest) reflect a borrower with little leverage. The durable moat case rests entirely on Eos becoming the low-cost domestic LDES manufacturer at GWh scale — i.e., the moat is prospective, contingent on the very scale-up the company has not yet proven.

Lens 4 · Segments

One reportable segment (zinc-based BESS, North America-primary) — there is no product/geography segmentation to break out per segments.csv (header-only) or the filings; the company "operates as one operating and reportable segment".

The only meaningful disaggregation is product vs service revenue:

Trend & cause: revenue is accelerating hard off a tiny base — FY2025 +632% YoY, Q1 2026 +445% YoY — driven by the Z3 automation line coming online and "5.7x higher cube deliveries". Service revenue is shrinking in absolute terms (a rounding error), confirming this is a hardware-shipment story, not yet a recurring-software/services story despite the DawnOS launch. Geographic mix is essentially all North America with nascent international (UK/Germany frameworks not yet material to recognized revenue).

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, reported 2026-05-13)

The headline that misleads. Eos reported net income of $508.9M and GAAP diluted EPS of $0.12 for Q1 2026, "beating" a consensus of roughly −$0.24. This is not operating profit — it is almost entirely non-cash fair-value gains on the warrant and derivative liabilities as the stock fell during the quarter: change in fair value of warrants +$168.7M, derivatives +$165.9M, derivatives–related party +$267.2M. A falling stock shrinks the mark-to-market liability and books a "gain." It will reverse when the stock rises.

What actually happened operationally:

• Revenue $57.0M, +445% YoY.
• Gross loss $(44.4)M — COGS of $101.4M on $57.0M revenue. Still selling each system well below cost, but margin improved ~157 points YoY and ~16 points sequentially.
• Operating loss $(79.3)M — worse than Q1 2025's $(52.9)M in absolute dollars despite 5.4x the revenue, because COGS scaled faster than price.
• Cash burn: operating cash flow $(119.7)M for the quarter; capex $35.1M.
• Balance-sheet flags: unrestricted cash $410.7M (down from $568.0M at YE2025 — note YE figure includes the November mega-raises); working capital $464.7M; accumulated deficit $2,026.9M; total shareholders' deficit $(868.4)M. RPO (backlog excluding <1yr) only ~$31.0M on the balance sheet, though management/press cite a $645M total backlog and $24B pipeline.
• Guidance (tone shift = bullish): FY2026 revenue $300–400M, with Q3 guided ~$81.6M and Q4 ~$100M, and management targeting positive adjusted EBITDA and gross-margin profitability before the end of 2026. This is the single most important forward claim in the file.

Market reaction: shares popped (one source recorded a +36% move around the Q1 print + Cerberus JV), then faded — the stock sits near $7.68 (June 17, 2026), well inside a brutal 52-week range of $4.18–$19.86. The market is pricing the gross-margin-crossover promise, not the GAAP "profit."

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research layer (transcripts/ empty), so this is ``-grounded and thinner than ideal.

Across the FY2025 and recent 2026 cadence, management's narrative has shifted from "survival / will we be funded" (the 2024 going-concern overhang, the Cerberus rescue) to "scale and cross into profitability." Recurring phrases now: "American-made," "national security," "AI / data-center load," "long-duration," "domestic content," "milestone execution," "raw-material cost-out," "cycle times below 10 seconds." The going-concern language was formally removed in the FY2025 10-K — management "concluded there is no longer substantial doubt". The Q1 2026 call leaned into the EPS "beat" and reaffirmed the H2 2026 profitability target.

What they've stopped saying: the explicit going-concern caveat, and the "need to raise additional capital" framing of 2024 (replaced by "$1.5B raised in 2025 gives us a strong foundation"). Tone is the most confident it has ever been — appropriately scrutinized given the operating loss is still widening in dollar terms.

Lens 7 · Comps

Eos has no clean public pure-play peer at its profile (pre-gross-margin LDES manufacturer). The closest set is the storage-integrator / alt-chemistry cohort. Multiples are ``, dated; where not sourced, marked n/a.

Read: the only profitable, scaled comparable (FLNC) trades at ~1.2x EV/sales. EOSE at ~$2.6B market cap on $300–400M guided (not yet earned, and at negative gross margin) is being valued on a 2027+ scale-and-margin story, not on trailing fundamentals. The valuation is a bet, not a multiple. Do not treat any single-source EV/sales figure here as authoritative — the cohort is thin and the inputs are volatile.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~2 years)

The pattern is unusually clean and tells you what this stock is: a financing- and policy-event vehicle with heavy short-interest dynamics, not an earnings stock. ``-sourced.

• Jun 2024 — Cerberus Credit & Securities Purchase Transaction ($210.5M DDTL + $105M revolver + up-to-33% equity): the rescue that removed near-term bankruptcy risk → large rally.
• Nov 26, 2024 — DOE $303.5M loan guarantee closes (first Title XVII battery loan): stock +~18.6% on the federal backing + new chair.
• 2025 equity & convert raises (May $4.00 offering; June $250M converts; November $600M converts + $458M direct at $12.78): each financing moved the stock and reset the share count; the November raises coincided with the run toward the ~$19.86 high.
• May 13, 2026 — Q1 print + Frontier Power USA JV with Cerberus: +~36% intraday spike on the "profit" headline + 2 GWh take-or-pay JV, then faded on dilution worry.
• 2026 commercial wins (MN8 750 MWh, Talen AI-storage, Germany 750 MWh→2 GWh): order-flow catalysts that move the stock on backlog signal.
• Volatility signature: 52-week range $4.18–$19.86 — a ~4.7x peak-to-trough. This trades like a high-short-interest, retail-and-momentum name where financing dilution and government/strategic validation are the dominant price drivers.

What the market reacts to: capital access (Cerberus/DOE), backlog/order announcements, and the gross-margin-crossover narrative — not GAAP EPS (which is dominated by non-cash marks).

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO Joe Mastrangelo (57) — CEO since the 2020 SPAC close (B. Riley Principal Merger Corp. II); board advisor from 2018. Track record: 25 years at GE; ran GE Gas Power Systems (president/CEO) and GE Power Conversion (CEO), leading 15,000+ employees across 60+ countries; named a GE Corporate Officer in 2008. Deep, genuine heavy-industry operating credibility — exactly the profile to scale a manufacturing line. Skin in the game and capital-allocation record at Eos are the open questions (insider-ownership data not on the research layer; insider-transactions.csv absent).
• CFO churn = the flag. Nathan Kroeker moved from CFO → Chief Commercial Officer in March 2025, leaving the seat covered on an interim basis (Kroeker as interim CFO per the 10-K). A permanent CFO, Alessandro Lagi (25 yrs finance; ex-Johnson Controls Global FP&A, ex-Baker Hughes Oilfield Equipment Global CFO), was appointed effective June 8, 2026. Filling this with a serious industrial-finance operator right as the company tries to cross into profitability and run a $150M rights offering is a sensible, confidence-building hire — but a ~15-month interim-CFO gap through the most financially complex year in the company's history is a real governance demerit.
• Board signal: Joseph Nigro (former Exelon CFO / Constellation Energy CEO) joined the board in March 2025 — adds power-sector/utility-bankability heft. New COO John Mahaz (Aug 2025) to own manufacturing/supply-chain scale-up.
• Capital-allocation history: the defining trait is relentless, dilutive, expensive capital-raising — ~$1.5B raised in 2025 alone (equity, warrants, two convert tranches, DOE draws), with simultaneous high-cost liability management (repaid $200M of May converts for $564.6M; $52.7M loss on debt extinguishment). Management has been effective at keeping the company alive and funded against long odds — and destructive to per-share value (49% share-count growth in a year). Founder vs professional manager: professional operator (not founder); the archetype fits the "turn a science project into a factory" mandate, with the caveat that survival has been financed on the backs of common holders.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst. This is a financially complex, fair-value-heavy filing — the accounting risk is less "is it fraud" and more "the GAAP numbers are dominated by Level-3 model marks that obscure the operating reality."

• Earnings quality — the central issue. Reported net income/EPS is meaningless as a profitability signal: Q1 2026's $508.9M "income" is driven by $600M+ of non-cash fair-value gains on warrants/derivatives that mechanically reverse with the stock price. FY2025's $969.6M net loss was similarly inflated by $746.4M of non-cash items. Cash flow ≫ diverges from earnings in both directions. Always read EOSE on operating loss and operating cash flow, never net income.
• Level-3 fair-value concentration. Warrants liability $313.3M + warrants liability–related party $470.7M (= $784.0M), plus bifurcated embedded conversion derivatives, all valued with Black-Scholes / binomial-lattice models on unobservable inputs (volatility, effective debt yield, DLOM). Deloitte flagged two Critical Audit Matters: (1) the convertible-notes / warrants valuations and (2) the Cerberus instruments — explicitly because they required "fair value specialists" and high auditor judgment. Not a red flag of impropriety — a flag that reported equity/income swings are model-driven, not cash.
• Mezzanine Series B Preferred – related party of $1,361,542K ($1.36B) sits between liabilities and equity (Cerberus), and is remeasured through additional paid-in capital ($778.9M remeasurement in Q1 2026 alone) — this is what drives the "net income applicable to common" line to $1.29B and is purely a capital-structure artifact.
• Negative gross margin + early warranty data. COGS > revenue with management explicitly warning warranty reserves are based on "limited claim experience since commercialization" and "adjustments may be material". Under-reserving warranty on a young product is a classic forward risk for a hardware ramp.
• PPE write-downs from design churn. $1.8M (FY25) and $9.1M (FY24) written off as Z3 Phase-1 assets couldn't be repurposed for Phase-2 — small now, but a tell that the manufacturing process is still moving.
• Receivables/contract-asset build: contract assets jumped to $41.0M at 3/31/26 from $15.5M (revenue recognized ahead of invoicing) — worth watching that this converts to cash.
• Covenants: only Minimum Liquidity is live now (in compliance); Minimum Consolidated EBITDA and Minimum Consolidated Revenue covenants switch on for the quarter ending March 31, 2027. That is a hard, dated cliff: Eos must hit EBITDA/revenue thresholds by Q1 2027 or risk default on the DOE/Cerberus facilities. This is the single most important forensic date in the file.

Regulatory findings. Per the pre-fetched regulatory/regulatory-findings.md: zero SEC Litigation Releases and zero AAERs naming Eos Energy across 2021-06-18 → 2026-06-18 (EDGAR EFTS LR + AAER). The FY2025 10-K Item 3 Legal Proceedings states: "We are not currently involved in any material legal proceedings or litigation". Non-SEC web search ("Eos Energy Enterprises" FTC/DOJ/FDA/settlement/penalty enforcement) surfaced no material agency enforcement actions as of 2026-06-18. Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-18. (Note: prior-era SPAC/storage-sector securities class actions are common in this cohort; none are disclosed as material in the current 10-K.)

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (EPS, next three fiscal years — FY2026/27/28)

GAAP EPS is not forecastable or meaningful for EOSE because it is dominated by non-cash warrant/derivative remeasurement that swings with the stock price (±$500M+ per quarter). So the scoreable variable is operating profitability / gross-margin crossover and the FY2026 revenue range, not an EPS line. All figures `` built bottom-up from filing actuals + guidance.

Revenue path:

• FY2025 actual: $114.2M.
• FY2026 guide: $300–400M (Q1 $57.0M actual; Q3 guided ~$81.6M; Q4 guided ~$100M). Base case ≈ $330M.
• FY2027: if Warrendale reaches scale and the 8 GWh capacity build progresses, $600–800M is plausible on backlog conversion. Highly contingent.
• FY2028: $900M–$1.2B, purely a function of whether GWh-scale demand and financing both hold.

Margin / profitability path (the actual call):

• Gross margin: FY2025 −126% (gross loss $143.8M / rev $114.2M); Q1 2026 −78% and improving sequentially. Management guides gross-margin and adjusted-EBITDA positive before end of FY2026.
• Base case: Eos exits FY2026 at roughly gross-margin breakeven on a quarterly basis (Q4 2026), but FY2026 full-year gross margin stays negative; adjusted EBITDA positive on a Q4 exit-rate, not full-year.
• Bull case: clean Q4 2026 positive gross margin + adjusted EBITDA, FY2027 full-year gross-margin positive, covenant cliff (Q1 2027 EBITDA/revenue minimums) cleared comfortably.
• Bear case: gross margin stays negative through 2026 (COGS scales with volume, warranty true-ups hit), the Q1 2027 covenants are missed or waived under duress, and another dilutive raise is required.

Scoreable forecast (logged conceptually — NOT writing forecast.ts in --watchlist mode): "EOSE achieves positive quarterly gross margin by Q4 2026 (period ending 2026-12-31)" — base probability ≈ 0.45. The dollar revenue guide ($300–400M) is more likely met at the low end (~$300M, p≈0.55) than the high end. No forecast.ts create run per watchlist rules.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Eos is the only at-scale domestic non-lithium LDES manufacturer, arriving exactly as (a) AI/data-center load makes 6–12hr storage strategically necessary, (b) US policy (IRA §45X PTC + Domestic Content Bonus + OBBBA's prohibited-foreign-entity rules) actively penalizes the Chinese lithium supply chain Eos competes against, and (c) the DOE ($303.5M) + Cerberus + Frontier Power USA JV (2 GWh take-or-pay) provide both capital and a captive deployment channel that de-risks the order book. Revenue went 5.4x in a year, gross margin is improving ~16 points a quarter, and management — a credible ex-GE manufacturing operator — guides to gross-margin/EBITDA positivity by end-2026 on a $645M backlog and $24B pipeline. If the gross-margin crossover lands, the stock re-rates from a cash-burning story to a scaling-manufacturer story, and ~$2.6B market cap on a path to $600M–1B+ revenue looks cheap.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. The unit economics never cross. COGS still ran $101M on $57M revenue in Q1 2026, and operating loss widened in dollars despite 5.4x volume. If zinc-battery cost/kWh structurally can't beat plummeting lithium-ion (which keeps deflating), Eos sells more and loses more — and the H2 2026 profitability promise is the same crossover that's been "next year" for years.
2. The capital structure eats the equity. ~$1.5B raised in 2025, 49% annual dilution, a $1.36B Cerberus preferred with up-to-33% fully-diluted ownership, 544.8M diluted shares vs 339.5M basic, and another ~$150M rights offering queued for the Frontier JV. Even if the business works, common holders may be diluted faster than the enterprise value compounds.
3. The Q1 2027 covenant cliff. Minimum Consolidated EBITDA + Revenue covenants activate for the quarter ending 3/31/2027. Miss them and Eos is renegotiating with the DOE and Cerberus from weakness — a scenario that historically meant punitive dilution.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broken): It's late 2027. Eos hit ~$300M FY2026 revenue but gross margin stalled just below breakeven as warranty true-ups and a lithium price war compressed ASPs. The Q1 2027 EBITDA covenant was waived in exchange for more Cerberus preferred and a second dilutive raise. The stock is back near the low single digits, the float has ballooned, and the "AI storage" demand proved slower to contract than the press releases implied. The technology worked; the math and the cap table didn't.

Are multiples too high? On trailing fundamentals (negative gross margin), any positive market cap is "too high" — but that's the wrong frame. The right frame: ~$2.6B is a ~6.5–8.5x forward-revenue bet on a sub-$400M, still-unprofitable manufacturer. Versus FLNC at ~1.2x EV/sales (profitable, scaled), EOSE prices in flawless execution of the crossover. That's a high bar.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The bull crowd treats the GAAP "profit" and the $24B pipeline as validation; the bear crowd treats the cash burn and dilution as terminal. Both miss the real pivot — the Cerberus/Frontier Power USA JV is Eos quietly admitting its own balance sheet can't fund deployment, so it's moving project capital off-book into a Cerberus-controlled vehicle. That's simultaneously the smartest survival move in the file (it could unlock the take-or-pay order book that makes the factory economic) and the clearest signal that Cerberus, not common shareholders, is positioned to capture the upside.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Revenue concentration is a loaded gun. Three customers = 93.3% of Q1 2026 revenue; two = 70.3% of FY2025. Lose one large project or one customer's project financing, and a quarter implodes. "Backlog" of $645M and a "$24B pipeline" are management/press figures, while the audited RPO on the balance sheet is ~$31M — the gap between press-release backlog and contracted RPO is enormous and should be treated skeptically.
• The moat may be weaker than bulls think. It's a policy moat (IRA/OBBBA), and policy already moved against it once (OBBBA re-cut the IRA in July 2025). The §45X PTC that's propping up COGS ($21.3M FY25, $10.3M Q1) phases down 2030–2032. Strip the credits and the gross margin is even further underwater.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Form Energy. Private, >$1B, iron-air, 100-hour duration at a projected sub-one-tenth-of-lithium cost, already in commercial production (Weirton WV) with a 30 GWh Xcel + Google project. If Form's cost curve is real, it out-flanks Eos on the exact "long-duration, domestic, safe" pitch — and it's better capitalized per dollar of hype. Meanwhile ESS Tech (the public flow-battery comp) is functionally out of cash — a live demonstration of how this exact business model dies.
• Worst capital-allocation reality: management funds survival by serially diluting commons and doing expensive liability-management ($564.6M to retire $200M of converts; $52.7M extinguishment loss). The interim-CFO gap through 2025's most complex financing year is a governance demerit only partly cured by the June 2026 Lagi hire.
• What must hold for today's price: flawless H2 2026 margin crossover, FY2026 revenue at/above ~$330M, the Q1 2027 covenants cleared, the $150M rights offering completed without a death-spiral, lithium prices not collapsing further, and IRA/OBBBA credits surviving. That's a long conjunction of must-be-true's.
• −20–30% revenue-disappointment scenario: FY2026 lands ~$210–240M instead of $330M, the margin crossover slips to 2027, the Q1 2027 EBITDA covenant is missed → renegotiation from weakness → another raise → the stock retests the $4 low.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a sustained lithium-ion cost decline that makes zinc-BESS structurally uncompetitive on $/kWh even with domestic-content credits — turning Eos's "more revenue" into "more loss" indefinitely and forcing a recap that wipes the common.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Walk us unit-economically from today's negative gross margin to your H2-2026 positive-gross-margin target: what is the bridge in $/kWh — volume leverage, ASP, raw-material cost-out, PTC — and how much of it is already contracted vs. assumed?
2. At what quarterly revenue and GWh shipment level does the business generate positive operating cash flow (not adjusted EBITDA, not GAAP net income)?
3. You face Minimum Consolidated EBITDA and Revenue covenants beginning Q1 2027 — what are the exact thresholds, and what is your margin of safety against them under your base plan?
4. The audited RPO is ~$31M while you cite a $645M backlog and $24B pipeline. Define each tier precisely and give the historical conversion rate from "pipeline" to recognized revenue.
5. After the $150M Frontier Power USA rights offering, what is the fully-diluted share count and Cerberus's resulting fully-diluted ownership — and what is the path, if any, to stopping dilution?
6. What share of FY2026–2027 revenue depends on your top three customers, and what concentration limit are you managing toward?
7. How does Eos's installed $/kWh and levelized cost compare to (a) current Li-ion and (b) Form Energy's iron-air at 8–24h and 100h durations — and what happens to your value proposition if lithium prices fall another 20%?
8. How exposed is your FY2026 gross margin to the §45X PTC, and what is the margin without it given the 2030–2032 phase-down and OBBBA's prohibited-foreign-entity sourcing rules?
9. What is Warrendale's path to full operation in 2026, what's the remaining capex to 8 GWh, and what are the gating risks to the 2027 capacity target?
10. Why did the CFO seat sit on an interim basis for ~15 months, and what specifically does Alessandro Lagi change about financial discipline and capital strategy?
11. What is your current warranty-reserve rate per kWh, how has actual claim experience tracked versus accrual since Z3 commercialization, and what's the downside if field failure rates exceed estimates?
12. Beyond the DOE Tranche 1 ($90.9M drawn, ~$186.6M remaining), what are the funding conditions for the remaining tranches and your contingency if the DOE pauses funding?
13. Strategically, is Eos becoming a manufacturer that sells to developers, or — via Frontier Power USA — a developer/IPP that captures project margin? Which is the long-term model?
14. What is insider ownership today, and have executives been net buyers or sellers over the past two years?
15. If the public equity window closes, what is the financing plan that does not further dilute common shareholders?

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