Hesai Group

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Hesai Group designs and manufactures LiDAR (3D laser ranging sensors) — the "eyes" that let cars and robots perceive depth. It is a Cayman-incorporated holding company operating through PRC subsidiaries, HQ in Shanghai, dual-listed: ADSs on Nasdaq (HSAI) and Class B shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (2525.HK) . As of 2025-12-31 there were 156,145,167 ordinary shares (129.1M Class B + 27.0M Class A, dual-class with founder super-voting Class A) .

How it makes money. Two end-markets, one product family:

• ADAS LiDAR — sensors sold to automotive OEMs for advanced driver-assistance / autonomous-driving features. This is now the volume engine: 1,381,133 ADAS units shipped in 2025, +202.6% YoY . The flagship **AT series** alone was **63.0% of total revenue** in 2025 (60.9% in 2024, 37.0% in 2023) — extreme single-product concentration.
• Robotics LiDAR — sensors for robotaxis, robovans, delivery robots, robotic lawnmowers, and now humanoid/embodied-AI. ~239,000 units in 2025 (1.62M total − 1.38M ADAS). Higher ASP, the strategic-growth narrative.

Revenue is overwhelmingly product (LiDAR products = RMB 2,973.3M of RMB 3,027.6M total in 2025, i.e. 98.2%) ``; the rest is engineering/NRE services (RMB 36.1M, shrinking) and a near-dead gas-detection legacy (RMB 3.2M).

Customers / suppliers / competitors. Customers are OEMs and Tier-1s, historically very concentrated (see Lens 4). Disclosed marquee names: a leading Chinese NEV maker (long Hesai's biggest, widely identified as Li Auto), plus design wins with top European automakers and, per Q1 2026, Mercedes-Benz as a strategic LiDAR partner . Suppliers: no single supplier ≥10% of purchases — supply is diversified, a genuine strength. Competitors: RoboSense, Seyond, Huawei, Valeo/Continental (ADAS); Ouster, Innoviz, Luminar (Western).

Contract structure. Purchase-order based, specifying volumes/prices/delivery; terminable by the customer on breach/insolvency. There is no take-or-pay; orders can be cancelled, and one was — the large U.S. OEM suspended a project in 2024, paying a one-off compensation (see Lens 5 / Lens 10) ``. Net revenue mix is volume × ASP, and ASP is falling fast (Lens 4).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream → Hesai → end customer, named where the filing names them:

• Upstream inputs: lasers, photodetectors, optics, and — critically — in-house ASICs. Hesai's differentiator is that it pioneered an ASIC-based architecture, consolidating hundreds/thousands of discrete components into a few custom chips, which boosts production automation and cuts unit cost ``. The ASICs are designed in-house; fabrication is outsourced to foundries (the filing flags sole/limited-source component risk and tariff exposure but does not name the foundry — n/a — not named in 20-F).
• Manufacturing: self-operated. The Maxwell Center (Jiading, Shanghai) is the new R&D + intelligent-manufacturing campus that came online in 2024, designed primarily for R&D with limited line manufacturing; high-volume production runs on automated lines elsewhere in Shanghai . Capacity is being scaled to **>4 million units/year in 2026** .
• Downstream: OEMs (auto) and robotics makers. Named robotics design win: Unitree — Hesai's JT128 equips all the humanoid robots Unitree showed at the 2026 Spring Festival Gala ``.

Chokepoints / single-source risk. The 20-F's own risk language: shortages or price spikes in raw materials and "sole or limited-source components" could be material; developing alternative sources is "time-consuming, difficult, and costly" . **Tariffs** are an explicit cost line — 2024 cost-of-revenue fell partly because U.S. sales (and thus U.S. tariffs) dropped . The dominant chokepoint is not a physical input — it is U.S. policy (the 1260H designation, outbound-investment rules, potential export controls), covered in Lens 10.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

• Scale / cost leadership (the real moat). Hesai is the only LiDAR maker at >1.6M units/year, and the ASIC architecture lets it ride a cost-down curve nobody else can match. The proof is in the ASP collapse with margins holding: blended ASP fell from $1,100 (2023) → $530 (2024) → $260 (2025) while gross margin stayed ~42% ``. That is a manufacturer deliberately trading price for volume from a position of cost strength — the classic commodity-hardware flywheel.
• Market-share lead. Hesai holds ~33% of the global LiDAR market by 2024 revenue, and an estimated ~28% (TechInsights) to 37–39% of automotive LiDAR in 2025 — vs RoboSense at ~16–20% . It also claims **>40% of the long-range automotive LiDAR market** and **No.1 across major robotics submarkets** (humanoid, quadruped, robotaxi, robovan, mower) .
• Design-win lock-in / switching costs. ~22 OEMs across 120+ models ``. Auto design wins carry multi-year lead times and tight co-engineering, so once a model ships with Hesai it is sticky for that model's life — a moderate switching-cost moat, model-by-model.
• IP / vertical integration. In-house ASIC + chip design is a process/IP moat that the asset-light Western peers (who buy more components) lack.

Bargaining power. Over suppliers: strong (diversified, no >10% supplier). Over customers: weak — top-5 customers were 55.8% of revenue in 2025 and OEMs hold the whip hand on price (the filing warns of "substantial continuing pressure from automotive OEMs" on pricing) ``. The moat is real on the cost/scale axis; it is thin on the customer-power axis.

Lens 4 · Segments

By product type (RMB; ``):

By application / units (``):

• ADAS: 456,386 units (2024) → 1,381,133 units (2025), +202.6%. Lower ASP, decelerating price but exploding volume.
• Robotics: ~239,000 units (2025, derived: 1,620,406 total − 1,381,133 ADAS) ``. Higher ASP, the margin/growth mix-shifter.
• Total shipments: 222,100 (2023) → 501,900 (2024) → 1,620,406 (2025), ~3.2× YoY ``.

The story the segments tell: revenue +46% is the net of a brutal ADAS price war (ASP −51% YoY) overwhelmed by 3.2× unit volume. The high-margin NRE services line — which juiced 2024 — is collapsing, and management flagged that the 2025 gross-margin dip (42.6%→41.8%) was specifically "due to decrease in revenues from high-margin non-recurring engineering services" ``. So the mix is shifting away from soft, lumpy, high-margin service dollars toward hard, scalable, lower-margin hardware dollars — healthier long-term, optically dilutive to margin short-term.

By geography: the filing does not break out a clean revenue-by-region table in the extracted MD&A; it confirms revenue is "both in China and globally," that U.S. sales fell in 2024 (tariff-driven), and that cash is 69.4% Chinese Mainland / 26.9% Hong Kong ``. Precise geographic revenue split: n/a — not in extracted filing tables.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

FY2025 — the year Hesai turned profitable ``:

• Net revenue RMB 3,027.6M (US$432.9M), +45.8% YoY. Beat its own raised guidance trajectory; +46% headline ``.
• Gross profit RMB 1,265.1M, 41.8% margin (vs 42.6% in 2024) — down 80bps purely on NRE-service mix, not on product cost (product cost improved on scale).
• First-ever full-year GAAP operating income: RMB 168.8M (US$24.1M, 5.6% margin), vs an operating loss of RMB 204.9M in 2024 — a ~RMB 374M swing.
• Net income RMB 435.9M (US$62.3M, 14.4% net margin), vs a RMB 102.4M net loss in 2024. Note net income > operating income: it was flattered by RMB 130.2M interest income (on the US$1.1B cash pile) and RMB 184.6M "other income" (includes a patent-transfer gain and arbitration compensation) ``.
• Opex discipline: R&D fell 6.9% in absolute RMB (855.6M→796.9M) and from 41.2%→26.3% of revenue — operating leverage is the headline efficiency story. G&A −8.9%, S&M flat.

Q4 2025 (the print): revenue RMB 1,000.5M (US$143.1M), shipments 631,095 units, net income RMB 153.2M (US$21.9M) ``.

Q1 2026 (latest actual): revenue RMB 680.6M (US$98.7M, +29.6% YoY), shipments 471,723 (+140.9% YoY), GAAP net income RMB 18.3M (4th consecutive profitable quarter; non-GAAP RMB 47.7M, +452.9%) ``. Growth decelerated from +46% to +30% and quarterly net income stepped down sharply from Q4 — partly seasonality, partly the absence of Q4's one-offs.

Balance-sheet flags (``):

• Cash + ST investments + LT deposits ≈ RMB 7.5B (US$1.1B); total shareholders' equity RMB 8.96B (US$1.28B) — equity more than doubled from RMB 3.93B on a RMB 4.35B 2025 financing inflow (the HK listing + raises). Borrowings RMB 727M (US$104M), so net cash.
• Inventories RMB 482M→670M (+39%) — broadly tracking the 3.2× volume ramp, arguably lean relative to it.
• Accounts receivable build of RMB 525M was the single biggest operating-cash drag — receivables are growing faster than the headline cash conversion, the main thing to watch (Lens 10).

Market reaction: despite the profitability inflection, HSAI traded ~$17–22 in June 2026, ~$17.15 on 2026-06-16 `` — below where it sat before the March-2025 short report. The market is not paying for the operational turn; it is discounting the 1260H overhang. That gap is the trade.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on disk (transcripts/ empty). From ``:

• Tone has shifted from "prove we can be profitable" to "we are the physical-AI infrastructure layer." Q1 2026 framed a strategic evolution from "Spatial Perception" to "Spatial Intelligence" . The recurring new phrase is **"physical AI"** / **"eyes and muscles"** — management now positions robotics components as a business that "could meet or surpass the LiDAR segment's scale over the next five years" .
• What they stopped saying: the defensive "path to profitability" language of 2023–24 is gone, replaced by capacity-expansion and TAM-expansion talk (>4M units, humanoid, Mercedes, NVIDIA-ecosystem robotics).
• What they keep saying: market-share leadership ("over 40% long-range," "No.1 in robotics submarkets"), and a steady drumbeat rebutting the military allegation — management repeats that the designation "lacks both factual and legal bases" ``.

Net sentiment: management is increasingly confident and increasingly promotional — the pivot to "physical AI" is both a genuine strategic expansion and a narrative away from the ADAS price war and the DoD cloud. Treat the five-year "could surpass LiDAR" robotics claim as an aspiration, not a forecast.

Lens 7 · Comps

LiDAR is pre-consolidation; multiples are noisy and the Western peers are loss-making, so EV/Sales is the only common yardstick. All multiples ``, June 2026:

5-yr avg ROE: n/a (Hesai was loss-making until 2025; a 5-yr average is meaningless). Read: Hesai is the only member of this peer set with a real P&L, scaled units, and a net-cash balance sheet; on EV/Sales (~3.8× FWD) it trades at a premium to the sector median (~1.2× ``) but a discount to where a profitable, 40%-share category leader growing 30–46% would trade absent the geopolitical tag. The multiple is a geopolitics-adjusted number, not a fundamentals number.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~2024–2026)

The tape says this stock trades on geopolitics and short reports, not earnings ``:

• 2024-01-31 / 2024-10-15 — DoD 1260H listing & relisting: stock fell >30% in a single day on the original inclusion ``.
• 2025-03-18 — Blue Orca short report ("Nasdaq-listed Chinese scam"): −9% to −11% intraday ``.
• 2025-07-11 / 2025-07-13 — District Court upholds DoD designation; Hesai appeals. ``.
• 2026-03-19 — Court of Appeals oral argument (Washington D.C.) — ruling pending ``.
• Earnings prints (Q4'25 profit, Q1'26 beat) moved the stock far less than the policy events — confirming the overhang dominates fundamentals.

Pattern: the dominant variable is the U.S.-government designation; secondary is short-seller credibility attacks; fundamentals are a distant third. This is a policy-binary stock with an operating business attached, not the reverse.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO / Co-founder: Yifan "David" Li. Robotics & motion-control background; positions himself as an autonomous-driving/embodied-AI thought leader (WEF Young Global Leader profile; promotes "physical AI" and tactile robotics) ``. Co-founders Kai Sun and Shaoqing Xiang round out the technical founding team. Founder-led, technical, mission-driven — the archetype you want for a deep-tech hardware platform pivoting into a new modality.
• Track record: built Hesai from a 2014 startup into the global LiDAR volume leader and through a successful 2023 Nasdaq IPO and 2025 Hong Kong listing — and, materially, drove the company to its first GAAP profit in 2025 while cutting R&D as a % of revenue from 41% to 26%. That is real operating delivery, not just storytelling.
• Skin in the game: dual-class structure with founder-aligned Class A super-voting shares (27.0M Class A vs 129.1M Class B) — founders retain hard control. CFO is **Peng Fan**. Precise insider %: n/a — insider-transactions.csv not present.
• Capital allocation: disciplined. Built a US$1.1B war chest, stayed net-cash, funded the Maxwell Center, and is self-funding the >4M-unit capacity expansion. No dividend (PRC subsidiary cash-distribution restrictions apply) and no buyback program disclosed `` — appropriate for a growth-stage compounder.
• Red flags (management-specific): (1) the company is the subject of a short-seller fraud allegation that explicitly accuses management of "actively lying to investors, the DoD, and a federal court" — unproven, vigorously denied, but it targets management integrity directly ``; (2) increasingly promotional framing (the "physical AI"/"could surpass LiDAR in 5 years" narrative); (3) dual-class governance limits minority-holder recourse. The disclosure quality in the 20-F, by contrast, is high and specific — it discloses the very one-off payment the short report implies was hidden (see Lens 10).

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Income statement:

• Earnings quality / one-offs. 2025 net income RMB 435.9M leans on non-operating items: RMB 130.2M interest income + RMB 184.6M "other income, net" (patent-transfer gain + arbitration compensation + government grants) ``. Core operating income was only RMB 168.8M — so >60% of net income is below the operating line. Quality is improving (operating line is now positive) but the bottom line flatters the run-rate.
• The Blue Orca "$20M breakup fee" claim — a conflict to surface directly. Blue Orca alleged 2024's profitability was driven by an undisclosed ~$20M customer break-up fee . **The 20-F discloses exactly such a payment and says it openly:** "a one-off project-based payment of RMB 203.3 million from a leading global OEM headquartered in the United States in 2024," booked in *other operating income*, following that customer's termination of a March-2023 contract . So the item is disclosed in the audited filing — the short thesis that it was hidden does not survive the 20-F; the legitimate residual question is whether one-off comp should be normalized out of "profitability" (it should). Note 2024 was a net loss anyway, so the fee did not manufacture a profit.

Balance sheet:

• Receivables outrunning revenue is the genuine flag. AR build drove a RMB 525M operating-cash drag in 2025 ; net cash from operations was only RMB 117M (US$16.7M) despite RMB 436M net income — **operating cash conversion is weak**, the classic "are the earnings real / are customers paying" question for a China hardware name. The encouraging counter-signal: the largest customer's share of receivables *fell* from 41.3%→23.5%→**5.3%** (2023→24→25) , i.e. receivables are diversifying, not concentrating.
• Inventory is not a flag (+39% vs +220% ADAS units — lean). SBC: a 2023 IPO-related option expense unwound in 2024 (RMB 66M decrease) `` — non-recurring, disclosed.

Structure: No VIE. Hesai is a Cayman holdco owning PRC operations through WFOE-style direct equity, not contractual-control entities — materially cleaner than the typical China ADR. Auditor is **Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA (Shanghai), PCAOB ID 1113**; the PCAOB's 2021 inspection-denial determination was vacated in 2022, so HFCAA delisting risk is currently dormant (but the filing warns it could resurface) ``.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC EDGAR EFTS: No Litigation Releases and No AAERs naming Hesai Group in 2021-06-20 → 2026-06-20 ``.
• Securities class actions / investigations: (1) IPO-era class action under the Securities Act of 1933 alleging the registration statement was misleading ; (2) a **new Rosen Law investigation** triggered by the March-2025 Blue Orca allegations . Both shareholder-driven, not agency enforcement; outcomes pending.
• U.S. national-security designation (the material item): Section 1260H "Chinese Military Companies List" (DoD). Timeline per the company's own disclosure ``: listed 2024-01-31 → removed → relisted 2024-10-15 → District Court (D.C.) upheld the designation 2025-07-11 → Hesai filed Notice of Appeal 2025-07-13 → Court of Appeals oral argument 2026-03-19, ruling pending → "we remain on the Section 1260H List as of the date of this annual report" (filed 2026-04-24). Consequences: effective 2026-06-30, listed entities are barred from new DoD procurement contracts; effective 2027-06-30, DoD is barred from buying their goods/services indirectly via third parties; also barred from DHS funding. The company stresses the designation "lacks both factual and legal bases."
• Other agencies (FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB): web search surfaced no FTC/DOJ/FDA enforcement actions or consent decrees; the Treasury Outbound Investment Program (31 CFR Part 850, effective 2025-01-02) is a sector-level capital-flow restriction that could impede U.S. investment into Hesai but is not a company-specific enforcement action ``.

Net forensic read: the accounting is more defensible than the short thesis claims — clean (no VIE), Big-4-audited, PCAOB-inspected, with the disputed one-off disclosed. The real risks are (a) weak operating-cash conversion / receivables, and (b) the off-balance-sheet political risk that no amount of accounting cleanliness can cure.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Anchored on management's own guidance + the latest actuals (NOT logged as a Brier forecast — --watchlist rule):

• Company guidance: FY2026 shipments 3.0–3.5M units (~2× the 1.62M of 2025), capacity >4M; management EPS guide ~$0.61 for FY2026 and ~$0.07 for Q1 2026 (Q1 actual GAAP came in at ~$0.02/ADS GAAP / higher non-GAAP) ``.

Three-year EPS path (``, ADS = 1 ordinary share; ~156M shares):

• FY2026 (base): revenue scaling with ~2× units but ADAS ASP still falling → model revenue ~US$650–720M (``: 1.6M→~3.2M units, blended ASP −20% to ~$210, plus robotics mix). At ~40% GM and continued opex leverage, net income ~US$95–130M, EPS ~$0.60–0.75 — consistent with the company's $0.61 guide. Base ≈ $0.61.
• FY2027 (base): units ~4.5–5M, ASP −15%, robotics/"physical-AI" components begin contributing higher-margin revenue → revenue ~US$900M–1.0B, EPS ~$0.90–1.15 ``.
• FY2028 (base): units 6M+, robotics segment scaling toward management's "could rival LiDAR" framing (heavily caveated) → revenue ~US$1.2–1.4B, EPS ~$1.20–1.50 ``.

Bull: robotics/embodied-AI inflects faster, ASP stabilizes as the price war eases post-MIIT-mandate, global (non-China) design wins (Mercedes) ramp → FY2028 EPS >$1.80. Bear: the 1260H ruling goes against Hesai and/or broader sanctions follow, U.S./EU OEMs freeze Hesai out, ADAS price war compresses margin below 35%, robotics stays a rounding error → FY2026 EPS <$0.40 and multiple de-rates hard.

Inputs labeled; outputs ``. Every line is sensitive to the ASP-decline assumption and the binary policy outcome — the bear and base diverge less on operations than on whether the company keeps full market access.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. The global LiDAR volume leader just proved the unit economics work: first GAAP profit, ~40% share, 3.2× volume, net-cash US$1.1B balance sheet, R&D leverage from 41%→26% of revenue. China's MIIT mandate putting L2 ADAS (LiDAR-inclusive) into the standard from Sept 2025 is a structural demand tailwind, and Hesai is the cost leader positioned to capture it. The second act — robotics/physical-AI sensing (Unitree humanoids, robotaxis, the "eyes and muscles" thesis, NVIDIA-ecosystem robotics) — is a genuine new TAM where Hesai already ranks No.1 across submarkets and where ASPs are higher and the price war hasn't arrived. If the DoD overhang clears, the stock re-rates from a geopolitics-discounted ~3.8× EV/Sales toward a growth-leader multiple — that alone is a double, before any robotics optionality.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks). (1) The 1260H designation becomes permanent and metastasizes. It already cost a >30% one-day drawdown and, per the company, has "disrupted existing and potential customer relationships globally, in particular in the United States." If the Court of Appeals affirms and broader sanctions/export-controls follow, Hesai is structurally locked out of the U.S. and possibly allied OEMs — a permanent TAM amputation, not a multiple wobble. (2) The ADAS business is a commodity price war — ASP fell 76% in two years; if volume growth ever stalls while ASP keeps falling, the model inverts fast (operating margin is only 5.6%). (3) Single-product / single-geography concentration — AT series is 63% of revenue and the customer base is overwhelmingly Chinese OEMs in a brutally competitive domestic NEV market.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the Court of Appeals affirmed the DoD designation in 2026; the June-30-2026 contract ban and follow-on Western-OEM caution froze Hesai's ex-China expansion; a Chinese NEV demand air-pocket + continued ASP erosion pushed operating margin back toward zero; robotics revenue stayed sub-10% of total. The stock halved from an already-depressed base.

Multiples too high? No — if you believe the designation clears, ~3.8× FWD EV/Sales for a profitable 40%-share leader growing 30%+ is cheap. The multiple is low precisely because the binary is unresolved. You are not paying for growth; you are pricing a coin-flip.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market treats Hesai as un-investable because of the military tag, yet the 1260H list carries no securities-trading or investment prohibition (it bars DoD/DHS procurement, a market Hesai barely serves) — and the District Court itself "recognized there is no evidence linking Hesai's products to military use." If the appeal even narrows the designation, the gap between the operating reality (profitable category leader) and the equity (priced as a fraud-suspect pariah) snaps shut. The asymmetry is the thesis.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• Revenue concentration & the lost anchor customer. The large U.S. OEM that was 28% of 2023 revenue is now <5% and terminated its project; the top Chinese NEV customer fell from 34% to 15% of revenue. Bulls cheer "diversification," but it can equally read as losing your two biggest customers and back-filling with lower-quality, lower-ASB volume. Top-5 is still 55.8% — one more defection hurts.
• The moat is a price war you're winning by losing money on each unit later. A 76% ASP collapse is not pricing power; it's a commodity race to the bottom that Hesai is leading because it has no choice — differentiation in ADAS LiDAR is eroding and the customer (the OEM) holds the pricing whip. 5.6% operating margin is razor-thin; any volume stumble flips it negative.
• Earnings quality. Strip the RMB 184.6M of "other income" (patents, arbitration, grants) and RMB 130M interest income, and the core business earned RMB 169M on RMB 3B of revenue. Operating cash conversion was a fifth of net income. For a Chinese hardware name with a fraud allegation outstanding, that gap is exactly where a skeptic lives.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: RoboSense just hit its first profitable quarter with robotics-product sales up 25× in 2025 — it is coming for the robotics second act that is supposed to be Hesai's premium-margin savior. Huawei is the wildcard that could commoditize ADAS LiDAR inside its own auto stack.
• The capital-allocation / governance flag: dual-class control + a US$1.1B cash pile + no buyback/dividend means minority holders are wholly dependent on founders deploying that cash well into an unproven robotics pivot, with no recourse.
• The scenario that permanently impairs: the appeals court affirms, the U.S. escalates from "procurement ban" to an investment/trading restriction (the filing explicitly warns "if we were to be included on a more restrictive sanctions list… the ability of U.S. investors to invest in or hold our securities could be further affected"). That is a plausible path to the ADRs becoming untradeable for U.S. holders — the tail risk that justifies the discount and could justify zero for a U.S. investor.

What must hold for today's price: that the appeal does not escalate into a trading/investment ban, that ADAS volume keeps outrunning ASP decline, and that robotics becomes a real margin contributor. Knock 20–30% off the growth and add an adverse ruling, and the equity halves.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. What is your concrete contingency if the Court of Appeals affirms the 1260H designation and the U.S. moves toward an investment or securities-trading restriction — at what point does a Hong Kong primary listing / ADR conversion become the base case?
2. The District Court found "no evidence linking your products to military use," yet upheld the designation on a military-civil-fusion basis — what specifically is the appeal's strongest legal argument, and what is your honest read on timing and probability?
3. Blended ASP fell 76% in two years. What is the floor, and at what ASP/volume combination does ADAS operating margin go negative?
4. AT series is 63% of revenue. What is the revenue contribution and design-win pipeline for the next platform, and how do you de-risk single-product dependence?
5. Operating cash conversion was ~RMB 117M against RMB 436M net income, driven by a RMB 525M receivables build. When does cash generation catch up to reported earnings, and what are your DSO targets by customer type?
6. You guide robotics could "meet or surpass" LiDAR scale in five years. What does the robotics revenue and gross-margin bridge look like in 2026 and 2027 specifically, and what are the named, contracted design wins behind it (beyond Unitree)?
7. With RoboSense now profitable and scaling robotics 25× and Huawei building in-house, where is your durable moat in robotics LiDAR specifically — cost, IP, or design-win lock-in?
8. How much of the 2025 profit do you consider recurring operating profit versus one-off items (patent transfer, arbitration, the 2024 break-up comp), and what is the normalized run-rate operating margin?
9. The Mercedes-Benz and European OEM wins — how do you ship to Western OEMs while carrying the 1260H tag, and have any Western customers paused engagement because of it?
10. You hold US$1.1B net cash with no buyback or dividend. What is the capital-allocation framework — at what point is the stock cheap enough (given the discount) that a buyback beats the robotics reinvestment?
11. China's MIIT L2-ADAS mandate — quantify the incremental unit demand you expect it to drive in 2026–2027, and your expected share of it.
12. What share of revenue is now ex-China, and what is the realistic ceiling on international given the geopolitical constraints?
13. How exposed is your cost structure to U.S./allied export controls on the chips and components in your in-house ASIC supply chain?
14. The Blue Orca report alleged revenue inconsistent with your largest customer's purchasing — walk through, specifically, how your revenue recognition on OEM programs ties to delivered-and-accepted units.
15. What is the single internal metric you watch most closely as a leading indicator that the ADAS price war is either rationalizing or worsening?

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