Maxar (Advent)

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

What it is. Vantor (ex-Maxar Intelligence) is the U.S. government's largest commercial provider of Earth-observation imagery and is pivoting — under Advent ownership — from selling pixels to selling spatial intelligence software. It owns and operates the WorldView constellation: legacy WorldView-1/-2/-3 + GeoEye-1, now joined by all six WorldView Legion satellites (30 cm-class), giving seven very-high-resolution birds on orbit ``.

How it makes money.

1. Government imagery contracts — the spine. The NRO EOCL award (2022) is worth up to $3.24B over 10 years, with a firm 5-year base of $1.5B (~$300M/yr) + ~$1.74B of options through 2032 — the largest commercial-imagery acquisition the NRO has ever made, and the successor to the EnhancedView Follow-On Maxar has held for over two decades . Plus NGA programs (Luno A, $290M ceiling; Land Cover; Precision3D) and a **$192M Foreign Commercial Imagery (FCIP) IDIQ** to sell to U.S. allies .
2. Software & analytics — the strategic future. Tensorglobe (launched Oct 2025) — an AI platform fusing satellite/drone/ground sensor data into a "living 3D replica of Earth" with 1-meter coordinate extraction, deployable cloud / on-prem / edge ``.

Contract structure. Government IDIQ/firm-base-plus-options — recurring, multi-year, but single-buyer-dominated (the U.S. intelligence community is the anchor). This is the central structural fact: revenue is sticky and concentrated. The carve-out isolated ~$487.5M in annual revenue into the standalone Vantor entity ``.

Customers/suppliers/competitors — see Lenses 2 & 3.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

(Named-stakeholder map. Generic = failed; here are the actual names.)

• Upstream — spacecraft & sensors. Vantor's birds were historically built in-house by Maxar Space Systems — now Lanteris, owned by Intuitive Machines (LUNR) since Jan 2026. This is the single most important supply-chain change in the company's history: Vantor no longer owns its satellite manufacturer. Going forward it must buy spacecraft (Legion bus heritage = the Maxar 1300/SSL line, now a LUNR asset) or contract new builds. The new Vantage (20 cm) and Pulse (40 cm) classes will require a build partner — LUNR is the heritage choice but the relationship is now arms-length commercial, not intra-company ``.
• Launch. Legion 5 & 6 launched Feb 2025; Maxar/Vantor has used SpaceX (Falcon 9) for Legion rideshares — single dominant launch provider ``.
• The company (Vantor). Operates the constellation, runs the ground network + tasking, and now layers Tensorglobe analytics.
• Downstream — buyers. NRO (EOCL), NGA (Luno A, Land Cover, Precision3D), DoD, U.S. allies (via the $192M FCIP IDIQ), and commercial/enterprise (insurance, mapping — Todd Surdey was named SVP/GM Enterprise May 2025) ``.
• Partner-channel risk (a chokepoint of a different kind). The reseller channel is a liability surface, not just distribution: Vantor's partner BSI (Business Systems International, Pakistan) — owned by a man convicted in 2021 of illegally exporting computing gear to Pakistan's nuclear agency — became the center of the Pahalgam scandal (Lens 10) ``.

Chokepoints/single-source: (1) U.S. government as anchor buyer — concentration risk; (2) loss of captive manufacturing — Vantor is now a satellite operator dependent on a now-external builder; (3) SpaceX as dominant launcher.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (Moats)

The moat is real but narrowing.

• 30 cm-class resolution leadership + government entrenchment — the durable moat. WorldView Legion delivers 29 cm native, matched only by Airbus Pléiades Neo (30 cm) and beaten on paper by China Siwei SuperView Neo (25 cm) — but the latter is irrelevant to the U.S. IC for sovereignty reasons ``. Two-decade incumbency on EnhancedView→EOCL is a switching-cost moat: the U.S. IC's tasking workflows, archives, and accreditation are built around Maxar/Vantor.
• Proprietary 20+ year imagery archive — a data moat rivals can't replicate retroactively. You cannot buy 2008 imagery of a location after the fact.
• Vertical integration — eroded Jan 2026. The historic moat ("we build and fly and analyze") was structurally broken when Lanteris went to LUNR. Vantor kept the operate + analyze layers, surrendered build. Bulls will say software is the higher-multiple layer; bears will say Vantor just became a capex-heavy imagery utility that has to buy its own birds (Lens 13).
• Bargaining power. Strong over commercial customers (few alternatives at 30 cm). Weak over its anchor: the U.S. government can — and in 2025 did — switch the data off (the Trump-administration cutoff of Maxar imagery to Ukraine). When one buyer can unilaterally kill your largest use-case, that is not pricing power ``.
• Tensorglobe = the moat bet. Advent's wager is that fused multi-sensor AI ("insights-as-a-service") creates a stickier, higher-margin software moat than selling scenes. Unproven at scale; competitors (Planet's analytics, Google Earth AI — with which Vantor has integrated Tensorglobe) are moving the same direction ``.

Lens 4 · Segments

No segment-level disclosure exists for the private Vantor entity — segments.csv is empty. Historical (pre-take-private, public Maxar) is the only hard split:

• 2022 total revenue: ~$1.6B (down 9.3% from $1.77B in 2021) ``.
• Earth Intelligence: ~$1.08B of that $1.6B (~67%) — this is the lineage of Vantor ``.
• Space Infrastructure: ~$0.5B (~33%) — the lineage of Lanteris.
• Post-carve-out standalone figures ``:
• Vantor (Intelligence): ~$487.5M ARR isolated at carve-out — note this is far below the ~$1.08B 2022 Earth Intelligence line, implying the carve-out stripped out lower-margin/non-core imagery revenue to leave a leaner "software + core IC" entity (or the figures are scoped differently — flag the discrepancy, do not silently reconcile) ``.
• Lanteris (Space Systems): ~$630M revenue for the 12 months to Sep 30 2025, $685M backlog `` — now a LUNR segment.
• Combined (post-LUNR deal): >$850M revenue, $920M backlog, "positive adjusted EBITDA" ``.

Trend & cause: the deliberate bifurcation is the story — Advent split a declining-growth $1.6B conglomerate into a hardware half (sold to LUNR) and a software-positioned half (Vantor) to re-rate the multiple (Lens 11). Provenance-critical: the $487.5M vs $1.08B gap is unreconciled in public sources — n/a — not cleanly sourced for a like-for-like segment trend.

---

Phase B — Measure performance (+private overlay: Lens 5→funding/valuation, Lens 7→cap table/marks)

Lens 5 · Funding & Valuation Trajectory (swapped for "Earnings Result" — private, no P&L)

• 2017 — Maxar formed from MDA's acquisition of DigitalGlobe; traded NYSE/TSX as MAXR.
• Dec 16 2022 — Advent agrees to take Maxar private at $53.00/share cash, ~$6.4B EV (incl. ~$2.4B debt) ``.
• May 3 2023 — deal closes. Equity: Advent ~$3.1B + BCI ~$1.0B minority. Debt: Sixth Street led a ~$2.3B loan package . Post-deal **annual debt service ~$220M** (vs ~$158M pre-deal) — higher leverage at higher post-COVID rates .
• Sep 2023 — split into Maxar Intelligence + Maxar Space Systems.
• Oct 2025 — rebrand: Vantor + Lanteris; Tensorglobe launch.
• Nov 2025–Jan 13 2026 — Lanteris sold to Intuitive Machines for ~$800M ($450M cash + $350M LUNR Class A stock). This is a partial Advent exit — monetizing the hardware half ~2.5 years in, on a normal PE clock ``.
• **Implied valuation math :** bought at **~4× revenue** on the Intelligence line; the carve-out thesis targets a **~$14.5B exit ≈ 7–8× revenue or 15–20× EBITDA** for Vantor — *a re-rating toward defense-software comps* . Burn/leverage signal: the ~$800M Lanteris sale likely paid down acquisition debt and de-risked the Vantor balance sheet ahead of an exit — but specific post-deal Vantor leverage is not disclosed.

Lens 6 · Founder/Operator Sentiment Trend (swapped: founder interviews, not earnings calls)

No earnings calls (private). Sentiment from CEO Dan Smoot's public posture (appointed CEO Nov 2023; ex-enterprise-software operator, not a satellite lifer — a deliberate "software-ization" hire) and Advent's messaging:

• Consistent thread: "more than a satellite imagery provider," "end-to-end spatial intelligence," "digital twin of Earth." The Maxar-name retirement (Oct 2025) was itself a sentiment act — severing the imagery-utility brand identity ``.
• What they started saying: "AI," "spatial intelligence," "sovereign," "autonomy," "Tensorglobe." What they stopped saying: "imagery provider," "Maxar."
• Tone: confident, exit-prep — TerraWatch (May 2026) reads Advent as entering the "convert transformation into return on equity" phase, i.e. the narrative is now optimized for a buyer/IPO audience, not customers ``.

Lens 7 · Cap Table & Secondary Marks (swapped for "Comps")

Ownership (private):

• Advent International — control owner (~$3.1B equity).
• BCI (British Columbia Investment Mgmt) — minority (~$1.0B). A pension-fund LP co-invest = patient capital, supports a longer hold.
• Intuitive Machines (LUNR) — not a Vantor holder, but Advent now holds LUNR stock ($350M of the Lanteris consideration) — a public marker that partially marks Advent's space exposure to market.
• Sixth Street — lead lender (debt, not equity).

No crossover-fund (Fidelity/T. Rowe/Coatue) primary round is visible — Vantor is a PE-controlled carve-out, not a venture-backed startup, so the usual "crossover entry = IPO-proximity" tell doesn't apply. The IPO-proximity tell here is instead the Lanteris divestiture itself (cleaning the entity to a pure-play) + the explicit $14.5B exit framing in trade press.

Peer multiple context (for the eventual exit, not a current mark): Defense software 15–25× EBITDA; satellite imagery 6–10× EBITDA / ~4× revenue . Public comps for the read-across: **Planet Labs (PL)**, **BlackSky (BKSY)** — BlackSky did **$26M Q3 revenue, +32% YoY** ; Airbus Defence & Space (private division of AIR.PA); L3Harris (LHX) as a strategic-acquirer comp. Exact current EV/EBITDA multiples for PL/BKSY: n/a in this pass.

Lens 8 · Funding / Product / Price Catalysts (last ~5 yrs)

(Private → no stock to move; these are the value-inflection events.)

• 2017 — DigitalGlobe merger creates Maxar.
• 2022 — NRO EOCL win (up to $3.24B) — the franchise-defining contract ``.
• Feb 2022 → — Ukraine war makes Maxar imagery globally famous (the 40-mile convoy, Bucha) — peak brand equity, peak demonstrated strategic value ``.
• Dec 2022 / May 2023 — Advent take-private.
• Feb 2025 — Legion 5 & 6 launch — constellation complete.
• 2025 — Trump administration cuts off Maxar imagery to Ukraine — the starkest demonstration that the anchor customer controls the kill-switch ``.
• May 2025 — Pahalgam / BSI scandal breaks (Lens 10).
• Oct 2025 — Vantor/Lanteris rebrand + Tensorglobe.
• Jan 13 2026 — Lanteris → Intuitive Machines close (partial exit).
• Apr 9 2026 — Vantage (20 cm) + Pulse (40 cm) constellation expansion announced; 5× revisit, imaging same spot every ~15 min; first Pulse "as soon as 2027," first Vantage "as soon as 2029" ``.

Pattern: the value of this asset moves on (a) government contract awards, (b) geopolitical demand shocks (war), and (c) corporate structuring — not on operating cadence. That tells you what an exit buyer is really buying: a privileged position in the U.S. national-security imagery supply chain, levered to conflict and defense budgets.

---

Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Dan Smoot (since Nov 2023). Archetype: professional manager / enterprise-software operator, installed by Advent specifically to execute the imagery→software re-rating — not a founder, not a space-hardware engineer. That is the correct hire for a PE value-creation-then-exit playbook, and a tell that the plan is the product: transform the narrative, exit the multiple ``.
• Key execs: Arvind Srinivasan (CTO), Anat Gan Eden (CHRO), Todd Surdey (SVP/GM Enterprise, May 2025 — a commercial-growth hire) ``.
• Owner-operator: Advent International — the de-facto capital allocator. Capital-allocation track record on this asset: textbook PE — (1) lever up at acquisition, (2) carve into hardware/software, (3) monetize the hardware half early (Lanteris→LUNR, ~$800M) to de-risk and pay down debt, (4) reposition + re-rate the software half for a premium exit. Disciplined and legible. Skin in the game: Advent + BCI ~$4.1B equity at risk — fully aligned to a high exit.
• Red flags (governance): the BSI partner-vetting failure (onboarding a partner whose owner had a 2021 U.S. export-control conviction) is a real management/compliance black mark — it points to weak channel-partner due diligence on a company that handles dual-use national-security data (Lens 10). For a name whose entire value rests on being the trusted U.S. IC vendor, a trust lapse is more dangerous than a financial miss.
• Founder vs professional: fully professional/PE-governed. Implication: decisions optimize for exit value on a clock, which can mean under-investment in long-horizon capex (note: Vantage doesn't fly until ~2029 — after a likely Advent exit, so the next owner inherits that capex bill).

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags (+private: web-only, unaudited)

Accounting: n/a — no audited financials are public. No income statement, balance sheet, or cash-flow to forensically examine; financials.csv is empty. The honest forensic statement for a PE-owned carve-out: leverage is the risk you can't see — ~$2.3B+ acquisition debt at ~$220M/yr service, partially addressed by the Lanteris sale, but current Vantor net leverage is undisclosed. The carve-out revenue discrepancy ($487.5M standalone vs ~$1.08B historical Earth Intelligence) is itself a reporting-perimeter flag — be skeptical of any single revenue number until an S-1 forces consistent disclosure.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): 0 findings — confirmed via regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (Stage 1). Maxar/Vantor has no CIK and no SEC filing obligation as a private company ``.
• Data-breach litigation (material): In re Maxar Data Security Litigation — class action over an October 2024 data breach that exposed current/former employee PII. Settlement received preliminary court approval March 2026; class members may claim up to $3,500 + 3 yrs credit monitoring; claim deadline July 16 2026 ``. Material as a security-hygiene and reputational signal for a national-security vendor; financially modest.
• National-security / export-control (the serious one): the Pahalgam–BSI affair. Unusually high-volume orders (≥12, ~2× normal, Feb 2–22 2025) for high-res imagery of Pahalgam, J&K were placed weeks before an April 2025 terror attack that killed 26, routed via an Indian intermediary but traced to Pakistani-linked interests, after Maxar had partnered with BSI (owner Obaidullah Syed — convicted 2021 for illegal export of computing equipment to Pakistan's nuclear agency). Maxar denies BSI placed the Pahalgam orders but removed BSI from its partner list after the exposés ``. No formal U.S. enforcement action has been reported — but this is the single largest reputational/regulatory tail risk for the name: it directly threatens the trusted-vendor premise that justifies the EOCL franchise.
• Geopolitical control event: the 2025 Trump-administration ban on supplying Maxar satellite data to Ukraine — not an enforcement action, but a demonstration that the U.S. government will exercise control over the company's data flows for policy reasons ``.
• Net: No SEC/accounting findings (private, verified via EDGAR LR/AAER + 10-K-Item-3 n/a). One settled employee-data-breach class action. One unresolved, severe national-security/partner-vetting scandal (BSI/Pahalgam) with no formal enforcement to date but real franchise risk.

---

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · IPO-Readiness & Path-to-Tradeable (+private swap for "Forward Projection")

No private-watch.json entry — this is web-derived. (Recommend adding maxar/vantor to research/private-watch.json so the privates ledger tracks it.)

• Stage: Mid-hold PE carve-out, ~3 years into a typical 4–6yr clock (acquired May 2023). The Lanteris divestiture (Jan 2026) is the cleaning step that turns Vantor into an exit-ready pure-play geospatial-software entity.
• IPO-readiness: Medium, rising. Milestones that unlock an S-1: (1) completed pure-play separation — done (Lanteris gone); (2) a software-margin story to show — Tensorglobe traction/ARR mix, in progress, unproven; (3) debt paid down to a public-market-acceptable leverage — partially, via the $800M Lanteris proceeds; (4) a clean compliance slate — the BSI/Pahalgam overhang is a problem here.
• Path-to-tradeable & window: Two routes — (a) IPO (an S-1 would be Vantor's first real financial-transparency moment) or (b) strategic sale to a defense prime seeking organic geospatial capability — L3Harris, Leidos, or similar. TerraWatch frames the next ~3 years (≈2026–2028) as the exit window at a ~$14.5B target ``.
• **The re-rating math :** bought ~4× revenue; exit thesis ~**7–8× revenue or 15–20× EBITDA** on the defense-software comp set. On ~$487.5M revenue, $14.5B = **~30× revenue** — which is **far above** the 7–8× the same sources cite, so either (a) the $487.5M figure understates the exit-entity's revenue, (b) the $14.5B reflects significant projected ARR growth + Tensorglobe scaling, or (c) the number is aspirational. **Flag the inconsistency; do not reconcile silently** — this is exactly where a private name's "valuation" is softest .
• No Brier forecast logged (per --watchlist rule — no EPS line for a private; the natural binary would be "Vantor files an S-1 or announces a strategic sale before 2028-12-31" — left for a /thesis pass to log if promoted).

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear (adversarial)

Bull case. Vantor sits on a two-decade, contractually-entrenched monopoly-ish position in U.S. government 30 cm imagery (EOCL up to $3.24B/10yr), an irreplaceable 20-year imagery archive, and a secular tailwind stack: rising global defense budgets, AI-fused intelligence demand, and "insights-as-a-service" margins. Advent has run the playbook cleanly — split, sold the capital-intensive half (Lanteris→LUNR) at a fair price, and is repositioning the software half for a multiple re-rating from ~4× to 7–8×+ revenue. If Tensorglobe lands as a sovereign-AI platform, Vantor exits at a double-to-triple the entry multiple via IPO or to a defense prime hungry for organic geoint. The Vantage/Pulse roadmap (15-min revisit, 20 cm) extends the resolution + persistence moat.

Bear case (permanent-impairment risks).

1. The anchor customer owns the kill-switch. A business whose largest use-case the U.S. government can switch off by policy (Ukraine, 2025) has structurally capped pricing power and a single point of demand failure. Government budget/priority shifts (or a decision to in-source via NRO/proliferated-LEO) impair the EOCL franchise directly.
2. The vertical-integration moat is gone. Post-Lanteris, Vantor is an imagery operator that must buy its own satellites from a now-external builder, with Vantage not flying until ~2029 — heavy capex deferred onto the next owner, and execution risk on a constellation it no longer manufactures.
3. The trust premium is impaired by BSI/Pahalgam. The entire valuation thesis is "the trusted U.S. IC vendor." A partner-vetting failure that put high-res imagery in front of adversary-linked interests is the kind of event that can cost contracts or invite export-control scrutiny — a tail risk uniquely lethal to this business.
4. Commoditization from below. Planet, BlackSky, ICEYE, Capella, Umbra win on revisit + usage-based pricing; Airbus matches resolution; China Siwei beats it (25 cm). "Good-enough + faster + cheaper" erodes the premium-resolution rent.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): The exit stalled because (a) an IPO window for defense-space closed / multiples compressed toward imagery-utility levels, and/or (b) the BSI/Pahalgam matter escalated into formal scrutiny that spooked acquirers, and/or (c) Tensorglobe ARR failed to materialize, leaving Vantor visibly an imagery utility wearing a software costume — so it cleared at 5–6× revenue, not 8×, and Advent's IRR disappointed.

Multiples too high? The $14.5B/~30×-revenue framing (vs the same sources' own 7–8× yardstick) looks aspirational on disclosed revenue — the bull case requires either much higher actual revenue or a genuine software re-rating to justify it.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): Everyone frames "Maxar" as a single asset. It isn't — the tradeable Maxar today is LUNR (which bought the satellite-building half). The private Vantor half is the higher-quality, higher-margin business, but it's only accessible at exit — and its valuation is being marketed as software while its cash flows are still mostly government-imagery. The gap between the software narrative and the imagery reality is the whole trade.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Revenue concentration: overwhelmingly U.S. government / IC. If EOCL options aren't fully exercised, or NRO shifts spend toward proliferated-LEO or in-house capacity, the base case craters. One buyer, one budget cycle, one policy administration.
• The moat bulls overweight: "20 cm resolution + archive." But the marginal government buyer increasingly values revisit over resolution (Planet/BlackSky's pitch), and Tensorglobe's "digital twin" competes head-on with Google Earth AI (with whom Vantor partnered — i.e. it's renting a competitor's models, not out-innovating them).
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not Planet — it's the U.S. government itself (NRO proliferated architecture / in-sourcing) plus Google/hyperscaler geospatial AI that could commoditize the analytics layer Vantor is betting its re-rating on.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance: the BSI partnership — onboarding a convicted-export-violator-owned firm as a reseller of dual-use imagery. For a national-security vendor, that's not a footnote; it's a thesis-level competence question.
• Assumptions that must hold for $14.5B: (1) defense-software multiples stay at 15–25× through the exit window; (2) Tensorglobe converts to real, disclosed ARR; (3) the BSI matter never becomes a formal enforcement/contract problem; (4) the IC keeps Vantor as primary post-EOCL-base. If growth disappoints 20–30%, the multiple collapses back toward imagery-utility (6–10× EBITDA), and a "$14.5B" exit becomes a $6–8B exit — a mediocre-to-poor PE outcome on $4.1B equity + leverage.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a formal U.S. export-control/national-security finding stemming from BSI/Pahalgam (or a similar future lapse) that disqualifies or constrains Vantor from sensitive IC work. Plausibility: low-to-moderate, but non-zero, and it's the asymmetric tail — it would gut the trusted-vendor premium that is the entire moat.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Post-Lanteris, what is your spacecraft-procurement plan for Vantage/Pulse — and what binding commercial terms govern your relationship with Intuitive Machines/Lanteris as your now-external builder?
2. What is Vantor's standalone revenue, revenue mix (government vs commercial; imagery vs software), and adjusted EBITDA for FY2025 — and how do you reconcile the ~$487.5M "carve-out" figure with the ~$1.08B historical Earth Intelligence line?
3. What is Tensorglobe's recurring software revenue today, the ARR growth rate, and the gross margin — i.e. how much of the "software re-rating" is real cash flow vs narrative?
4. What is current net leverage, the maturity schedule, and how much of the ~$800M Lanteris proceeds went to debt paydown vs distribution to Advent/BCI?
5. Walk me through exactly what happened with the BSI partnership and the Pahalgam imagery orders — what vetting failed, what has changed in partner due diligence, and is there any open U.S. government inquiry?
6. The U.S. government cut off your Ukraine imagery in 2025 by policy. What contractual protections, if any, exist against unilateral demand destruction by your anchor customer?
7. What share of revenue is EOCL, and what is your realistic expectation for option-year exercise vs an NRO shift to proliferated-LEO or in-house capacity?
8. Is the base case an IPO or a strategic sale — and what specifically has to be true (margins, debt, compliance) before you'd file an S-1?
9. How do you defend premium 30/20 cm pricing as revisit-led competitors (Planet, BlackSky, ICEYE) and Airbus close the resolution gap and undercut on usage-based pricing?
10. The Google Earth AI integration — are you a platform that uses Google's models, or one that competes with them? What stops Google/hyperscalers from disintermediating your analytics layer?
11. Vantage doesn't fly until ~2029. How do you defend the constellation's competitiveness in the 2026–2028 gap, and who funds that capex if Advent exits first?
12. What is the contractual structure of the FCIP allied-imagery IDIQ and the NGA Luno A / Land Cover programs — recurring, take-or-pay, or order-by-order?
13. How dependent is launch cadence on SpaceX, and what is your second-source plan for getting Pulse/Vantage to orbit?
14. What did the October 2024 data breach actually compromise beyond employee PII, and what changed in your security posture for customer/IC data?
15. Three years into Advent's ownership, what is the single biggest unfinished piece of the value-creation plan that a public-market or strategic buyer should price?

---