Rocket Lab

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

Rocket Lab is the only Western company that does both ends of the space value chain at commercial scale: it builds and flies its own rockets and builds the satellites (and, increasingly, the satellite components and payloads) that ride on them. Two reporting engines:

• Launch Services — the Electron small-lift rocket (the workhorse: 50+ successful orbital launches, the second-most-launched US rocket after Falcon 9), plus HASTE, a suborbital hypersonic-test variant that has quietly become a real defense revenue line. The forthcoming Neutron medium-lift reusable rocket (~13,000 kg to LEO) is the franchise-defining bet — it moves Rocket Lab from the niche small-sat market into the megaconstellation/national-security launch market dominated by SpaceX.
• Space Systems — satellite buses (Photon), reaction wheels & star trackers (Sinclair), separation systems (Planetary Systems), flight software (ASI), space solar cells (SolAero — "world's largest production line of space solar cells"), EO/IR national-security payloads (Geost, acquired Aug 2025), laser optical comms terminals (Mynaric, closed Apr 2026), and a new electric-propulsion line (Gauss) and a mass-producible flat satellite (Flatellite). Space Systems is now ~60–68% of revenue.

Customers: a commercial + government mix — NASA, the U.S. Space Force / Space Development Agency (SDA), commercial constellation operators, and defense primes. Contract structure: lumpy, milestone- and delivery-based (launch slots, satellite-build programs), increasingly anchored by multi-year government primes — the SDA Tracking Layer work alone is ~$1.3B of contracted backlog.

Headline scale (calendar Q1 2026, ended Mar 31 2026): revenue $200.3M, +63.5% YoY, a company record; total backlog >$2.2B, +~108% YoY.

---

Supply Chain

Map: inputs → Rocket Lab → end customer. Rocket Lab's defining strategic move is that it has spent the last six years acquiring its own upstream, so much of the chain is now in-house.

Upstream inputs (what it buys / makes):

• Carbon composite (Neutron structures, Electron) — internally fabricated; a differentiator and a chokepoint (specialized autoclaves, the "Hungry Hippo" reusable fairing).
• Propulsion — Rutherford engines (Electron, 3D-printed, electric-pump-fed) and Archimedes (Neutron, methalox, 1.5M lbf) — both designed and built in-house. Archimedes qualification is the gating critical-path item for Neutron.
• Satellite subsystems — now owned: reaction wheels/star trackers (Sinclair Interplanetary, 2020), separation systems (Planetary Systems Corp, 2021), flight software (ASI Aerospace, 2021), space solar cells (SolAero, $80M, Jan 2022), EO/IR payloads (Geost, $275M, Aug 2025), laser comms terminals (Mynaric, $155.3M, Apr 2026).
• Still bought out: raw avionics chips, propellant (LOX/methane/kerosene), certain ground-segment hardware, launch-range services (it operates LC-1 in New Zealand and LC-2/LC-3 at Wallops, Virginia).

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies:

• Archimedes engine = the single most important chokepoint for the entire equity story. No Archimedes qualification → no Neutron → no medium-lift TAM.
• Mahia (NZ) launch range for Electron — geographic + regulatory single point; weather/permit sensitivity.
• Vertical integration cuts both ways: owning SolAero/Geost/Mynaric removes external-supplier risk but converts it into execution + integration + capex risk on Rocket Lab's own balance sheet.

End customers (named): NASA, U.S. Space Force / SDA, the MDA/"Golden Dome" missile-defense architecture, commercial constellation operators (incl. an undisclosed large constellation customer behind the record multi-launch Neutron deal), and satellite-component buyers who purchase Rocket Lab's merchant products (solar cells, reaction wheels, now Gauss propulsion and Mynaric terminals as a merchant supplier).

This lens passes the "names or it didn't happen" test: the chain is largely a list of companies Rocket Lab now owns.

---

Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat thesis is "the only credible Western full-stack alternative to SpaceX." Specifically:

1. Proven launch cadence + reliability (real, durable). Electron is the only small-lift Western rocket with a deep, repeatable track record (50+ orbital launches; FY2025 flew 21 missions across Electron+HASTE at a 100% success rate). Reliability is the single hardest thing to fake in launch and the deepest switching cost — payload customers underwrite years of mission planning to a vehicle.
2. Vertical integration (real, but double-edged). Owning launch + bus + components + payloads + comms means Rocket Lab can sell a constellation-as-a-product (design → build → launch → operate) that almost no one else can. Flatellite + Neutron + Geost/Mynaric payloads is the embodiment. The bargaining-power asymmetry: constellation customers increasingly need an alternative to SpaceX more than Rocket Lab needs any single one of them — that's pricing power, on the launch side.
3. National-security entrenchment (strengthening fast). The $816M SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 3 prime (Dec 2025) + Geost EO/IR payloads put Rocket Lab inside the US missile-warning/tracking architecture — a moat made of clearances, qualified processes, and ITAR that takes years and a security posture to replicate.
4. Founder-engineer IP culture (Peter Beck). In-house Rutherford/Archimedes + composites = a process/IP moat, not just a brand.

Where the moat is weaker than bulls claim: on the launch economics axis, Rocket Lab is a price-taker to SpaceX, not a price-setter (see Lens 13). Its moat is "differentiated alternative + national-security trust," not "lowest cost per kilogram." That distinction is the whole bear case.

---

Segments

No our figures in the research layer — all figures `` from the company's own 8-K releases. Rocket Lab reports revenue split as Launch Services vs. Space Systems, and separately as Product vs. Service.

Trend & cause:

• Space Systems is the growth + mix story — it's ~60–68% of revenue and rising, driven by SDA satellite builds + solar/components + the Geost/Mynaric payload stack. This is accelerating and is what's converting Rocket Lab from "a launch company" into "a space prime."
• Launch Services is lumpier — grew ~79% YoY in Q1'26 but fell sequentially on launch timing; HASTE hypersonic-test cadence is the surprise contributor. Launch is the lower-revenue, higher-strategic-optionality segment today; Neutron is what re-rates it.
• Geography: not cleanly disclosed by segment; manufacturing is US (Long Beach CA, Albuquerque, Virginia) + New Zealand (Mahia launch + production). US-government revenue mix is rising with SDA/defense.

---

Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, reported May 7 2026)

The cleanest "beat-and-raise" the company has printed.

• Revenue $200.3M, +63.5% YoY, above the $185–200M guide and above the ~$190.9M Street estimate. First-ever $200M quarter.
• Margins beat: GAAP gross margin 38.2% (guide 34–36%); non-GAAP 43.0% (guide 39–41%). Upside from better launch-cost absorption + strong solar-products performance.
• Adjusted EBITDA loss $(11.8)M — materially better than the guided $(21)–(27)M loss; the loss is shrinking fast.
• GAAP net loss per share $(0.07) — narrowing.
• Balance sheet: cash & equivalents ~$1.48B (up sharply from $828.7M at YE2025 — a capital raise during the quarter), giving multi-year Neutron runwayRunwayHow long the cash lasts at the current rate of spending. It shortens the moment spending rises, which is why a figure taken from a quiet quarter flatters.. Non-GAAP FCF use $(77.4)M, improved from $(114.2)M in Q4'25.
• Backlog >$2.2B, +~108% YoY, on a record bookings quarter (31 Electron/HASTE missions + 5 Neutron contracts incl. the largest-ever multi-launch Neutron deal).
• Guidance (Q2 2026): revenue $225–240M (+~16% sequential midpoint); GAAP GM 33–35%, non-GAAP 38–40% (a step-down on Space Systems mix shift); adj. EBITDA loss $(20)–(26)M.

Unusual vs. its own history: the margin beat + EBITDA-loss compression + raised guide is the inflection bulls have waited for. The one yellow flag is the Q2 gross-margin guide stepping back down (mix shift to lower-margin Space Systems builds) — margins are not yet on a clean monotonic path. Market reaction: the stock has been a momentum rocket — +366% YoY, 52-wk range $25.71–$151.00, ATH close $150.23 (May 27 2026) — so beats are increasingly expected, not rewarded.

---

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts/ in the research layer; sentiment read from web transcripts of the last ~4 calls.

• Tone has shifted from "building" to "executing/scaling." Q1'26 (Beck): "the demand signal is clear," the product cadence is "relentless," an "incredibly strong position to continue expanding." He flags record backlog, record cash, record launch contracts.
• The recurring phrase across 2025→2026 calls is "end-to-end space company" — every acquisition (Geost, Mynaric) and product (Flatellite, Gauss) is narrated as a step toward owning the full constellation stack. This is consistent and credible, not a pivot.
• What they keep hedging on: Neutron timing. Beck is candid that "many customers are waiting for the inaugural flight" — i.e., the order book has a Neutron-shaped ceiling until it flies. The honest acknowledgment (vs. promotional hand-waving) is a positive governance signal.
• What they stopped saying: hard first-launch dates for Neutron. After the Nov 2025 slip (2025 → 2026), management shifted to "arrives at LC-3 in Q1 2026, first launch thereafter pending qualification" — deliberately softer.

Net sentiment trend: rising confidence on the commercial/Space-Systems engine; disciplined caution on Neutron. The mix is appropriate and, frankly, more trustworthy than a pure-hype space-SPAC narrative.

---

Comps

Provenance-critical lens. Multiples are `` with source/date or n/a. Peers pulled from _index.json (space topic) + obvious adds (ASTS).

Read: RKLB at ~64x EV/sales is priced like a software hypergrowth name, not a hardware/aerospace manufacturer (the aerospace-&-defense median is a tiny fraction of that). GuruFocus pegs "GF Value" at $15.75 vs. a ~$104 price — i.e., the model says deeply overvalued; treat that as a sentiment data point, not gospel, but the direction is unambiguous. The bull's own math only works on out-year revenue: $1.1–1.2B FY27 revenue × 60–65x EV/sales → ~$120–140. That is a multiple-on-multiple bet: you must believe both that FY27 revenue triples-from-here and that the market keeps paying ~60x sales after Neutron is flying and de-risked (when multiples usually compress). The comps verdict: the company is best-in-class; the multiple is the position's entire risk.

Caveat: I could not source clean EV/Sales multiples for PL, ASTS, IRDM — marked n/a rather than fabricated. A refresh with a market-data pull should populate this table.

---

Stock-Price Catalysts (what actually moves RKLB)

Pattern over the last ~18 months — the stock reacts to (a) Neutron milestones/slips and (b) large government contracts, far more than to quarterly EPS:

• +22.1% on the $816M SDA Tracking Layer Tranche 3 award (Dec 2025) — single biggest single-day catalyst; the market re-rated the national-security revenue line.
• Neutron delay (Nov 2025, 2025→2026 slip) — pressured the stock; Neutron timing is the dominant swing factor.
• Sector beta is huge: RKLB moves with the whole space complex. Examples: +6% on a "SpaceX IPO lifts the sector" day (May 2026); −13% on a "space divergence" risk-off day (Jun 1 2026); a drop on Nasdaq-100 inclusion mechanics.
• Momentum/retail flow: +366% YoY with a $25→$151 range tells you positioning and narrative (Neutron + Golden Dome + SpaceX-comp halo) dominate over fundamentals quarter-to-quarter.

What the market reacts to: Neutron progress, defense primes, and sector sentiment — not the income statement. That means the catalyst calendar (next: Neutron first flight, late 2026) matters more than the next print.

---

Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

• Track record (strong). Peter Beck (Founder/CEO/Chairman) built Rocket Lab from a New Zealand garage into the #2 Western launch provider — Electron is a genuine, repeatable engineering achievement (50+ launches, in-house Rutherford engine, 3D-printing, then the Photon bus and a serial acquisition machine). He has delivered hardware, repeatedly, which is rare in this sector.
• Tenure & skin in the game (high, but trimming). Beck holds ~51M shares (the largest insider position) — meaningful alignment. But he has been a net seller: ~5.0M shares net over ~18 months, including ~1.44M shares for ~$70M in Sept 2025; insiders collectively sold ~$196M over two years. That's a governance yellow flag (see Lens 10) — though for a founder of 18 years at an all-time-high stock, some diversification is normal.
• Capital allocation (aggressive, vertically-integrating, dilutive). The strategy is buy the supply chain: Sinclair, PSC, ASI, SolAero, Geost ($275M), Mynaric ($155M) — funded substantially in stock, plus equity raises (cash jumped $829M→$1.48B in Q1'26). Shares out are ~528.7M, up ~25% in the past year. The bet: spend now to own the full stack before the constellation buildout. ROE/ROIC are negative (pre-profit), so the capital-allocation verdict is unprovable until Neutron + Space Systems generate returns.
• Red flags: founder net-selling into the rally; heavy stock-funded M&A + raises = persistent dilutionDilutionIssuing new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the same company.; Beck holds the combined CEO + Chairman role (concentration of control). None are smoking guns; all are worth monitoring.
• Archetype: quintessential founder-engineer-operator — visionary, hardware-credible, vertically-integrating empire-builder. For this stage (scaling from launch to space prime), that's the right archetype — provided the balance-sheet discipline holds.

---

Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic equity analyst. Figures `` from company 8-Ks; SEC enforcement from the Step-0 regulatory file.

Accounting / quality-of-earnings risks:

1. Non-GAAP vs. GAAP gap is structural and SBC-driven. Q1'26 non-GAAP GM 43.0% vs GAAP 38.2%; the company guides and is celebrated on non-GAAP. Stock-based comp + acquisition amortization (Geost/Mynaric) flatter the adjusted numbers. Watch the SBC line — with ~25% annual share growth, dilution is a real cost the adjusted metrics suppress.
2. Goodwill & intangibles build-up. Six acquisitions (SolAero/Geost/Mynaric the largest) load the balance sheet with goodwill/intangibles. An impairment risk exists if any acquired unit (e.g., a merchant Mynaric terminal business) underperforms — a non-cash hit that would dent GAAP book value.
3. Backlog ≠ revenue, and is long-dated. The $2.2B backlog is the headline bull metric, but ~$1.3B is the SDA program delivering through ~2029 — i.e., heavily concentrated and multi-year. Backlog quality (cancellation/renegotiation terms on government work) is the thing to interrogate.
4. Cash burn vs. earnings divergence. FY2025 operating cash flow $(165.5)M against a GAAP net loss of $(198.2)M; the company funds itself with equity raises, not operations. This is normal for a pre-profit hardware scaler, but it is the defining balance-sheet fact: the equity story is funded by selling equity.
5. Neutron capex/cost creep. Neutron development ran from a "$250–300M" estimate to ~$360M spent through end-2025 — a ~20%+ overrun. Cost discipline on the critical program is a forensic watch-item.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. Per regulatory/regulatory-findings.md (generated 2026-06-17 via SEC EDGAR EFTS, LR + AAER, period 2021-06-17→2026-06-17): 0 SEC findings. (Note: the LR EFTS query hit a transient HTTP 500 during the run; AAER returned clean. No LR hits are expected for this name, but a future refresh should re-confirm the LR side.)
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search): No material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement actions, consent decrees, fines, or penalties surfaced against Rocket Lab in web search as of 2026-06-17.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Not retrieved in this web-only run (no filings/ in the research layer; WAVE constraint prohibits our model). Open item for refresh: pull FY2025 10-KForm 10-KA company’s audited annual report to the US regulator. The most complete thing it publishes. Item 3 to confirm no material litigation. Routine commercial-space disputes/ITAR-compliance exposure are the category to check.
• Verdict: No material regulatory or legal findings via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR + AAER) and web search as of 2026-06-17; 10-K Item 3 confirmation deferred to the next (research-layer-grounded) refresh.

---

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection (FY2026E / FY2027E / FY2028E)

Bottom-up from the latest actuals + guidance. Every input labeled; outputs ``. No our model create logged — unattended breadth loop per the watchlist rules.

Anchors:

• FY2025 actual revenue $601.8M (+38%).
• Q1'26 $200.3M; Q2'26 guide $225–240M (midpoint ~$232M). Annualizing the H1 run-rate and the order book → company/Street FY2026 ~$880M (+~47%); some analyst models use ~$850M.
• Street FY2027 ~$1.1–1.2B; first GAAP profit (~$0.08 EPS) modeled in 2027.

Logic: Space Systems (~60–68% of mix, SDA-anchored, ~$1.3B contracted) gives a visible base growing ~40–50%. Launch is optionality: the entire bull-vs-bear gap in FY2028 is Neutron cadence — does it reach a reliable, multi-launch-per-year rhythm at a $55M price with 40–50% target margins, or does it stay a single-digit-launches science project through 2028? Operating leverage is real (margins beat in Q1'26), but the Q2 guide-down warns it's non-linear. Dilution (~25%/yr historically; likely moderating as cash sits at $1.48B) is a persistent EPS headwind.

The base call (for a future tracked forecast): RKLB FY2027 (Dec-2027) GAAP profitable / non-GAAP EPS ≥ $0.10, p≈0.45 — genuinely uncertain; hinges on Neutron flying and ramping on schedule. (Not logged via our model — breadth-loop rule.)

---

Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Rocket Lab is the only vertically-integrated, full-stack, Western alternative to SpaceX — and the market is desperate for a SpaceX alternative (national security, commercial diversification, anti-single-point-of-failure). It compounds revenue ~40–50% with a $2.2B backlog (+108% YoY), is approaching EBITDA breakeven, has $1.48B cash, and owns a national-security moat (SDA prime, Geost payloads, Golden Dome exposure) that is nearly impossible to replicate. Neutron is a free call option the market hasn't fully de-risked: if it flies and ramps, Rocket Lab unlocks the medium-lift + megaconstellation TAM and re-rates as a space prime, not a small-launch niche player. Flatellite + Neutron + owned payloads could make Rocket Lab a constellation operator (recurring space-services revenue), not just a contractor — the highest-value endgame. Earnings-surprise potential: every quarter of margin beats + a successful Neutron debut.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. Neutron fails or chronically slips. It has already slipped once (2025→2026) and run 20% over budget ($360M). If the maiden flight fails or the program stretches to 2028+, the entire re-rating thesis evaporates and the stock is left at ~64x sales on a small-launch + components business.
2. SpaceX crushes the launch economics. Neutron's 13,000 kg < Falcon 9's 17,500 kg < Starship's ~150 t. SpaceX can price Falcon 9 rideshare at ~$67–70M and cut prices to undercut Neutron's $55M target at will — capping Rocket Lab's projected 40–50% launch margins. Rocket Lab is a price-taker in its franchise market.
3. The multiple compresses. At ~64x EV/sales (295% above its own 10-yr median; GF Value $15.75), even flawless execution can produce a flat-to-down stock as the multiple normalizes. The valuation is the risk.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): Most likely path — Neutron's maiden flight slips into 2027 (or fails), SpaceX announces aggressive medium-lift/Starship pricing, a risk-off rotation hits unprofitable space/momentum names, and RKLB de-rates from ~64x to ~20–25x sales: a 50–60% drawdown even with revenue growing. Secondary path — a Geost/Mynaric integration stumble + goodwill impairment dents GAAP book and confidence.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on any conventional metric. The only frame in which ~64x sales is defensible is "pre-revenue-scale platform with a near-term inflection (Neutron) + a software-like constellation-services endgame." That's a narrative multiple, not a numbers multiple.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The bull crowd treats Neutron as ~certain and treats vertical integration as pure moat. The contrarian read is that vertical integration at this pace is also a capex/dilution/integration-risk machine, and that Rocket Lab's durable moat is national security, not launch cost — which means the right comp is a high-growth defense-tech prime (clearances, programs, ITAR) trading at maybe 8–15x sales, not a 60x software comp. If the market ever recodes RKLB from "space-growth" to "defense-prime," the multiple halves regardless of execution.

---

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• What structurally breaks the money machine: Rocket Lab doesn't actually have pricing power in launch — its anchor franchise. It survives on (a) being a SpaceX alternative and (b) government programs. SpaceX is one pricing decision away from compressing Neutron's economics; the DoD is one budget/политика shift away from re-allocating the SDA/Golden Dome spend. Neither lever is in Rocket Lab's hands.
• Revenue concentration: ~$1.3B of the $2.2B backlog is the SDA program — a single government customer/program. If SDA Tranche timelines stretch, get re-scoped, or the next tranche goes to a competitor (L3Harris, Lockheed, York, Terran Orbital-type players), the backlog's quality collapses. Concentration in a single multi-year defense program is the hidden fragility under the "diversified" story.
• Moat weaker than bulls think: "vertical integration" is also a euphemism for "we had to buy six companies and dilute 25%/yr because none of these capabilities existed in-house." Each acquisition is integration + culture + impairment risk. The composites/engine IP is real, but it's not a network effect or a switching-cost moat — it's an engineering lead that SpaceX, Blue Origin, Firefly, Stoke, and Relativity are all racing to erase.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not SpaceX (everyone sees that) — it's the reusable-medium-lift cohort behind Neutron (Blue Origin New Glenn, Stoke Space, a re-financed Relativity, Firefly+Northrop) plus a potential SpaceX IPO that gives public investors direct access to the category leader and drains RKLB's "only-way-to-own-space" premium.
• Worst capital-allocation moves: stock-funded M&A at a sky-high multiple + founder net-selling ~$70M into the rally + 25% dilution. Bulls call it "building the stack"; a short calls it "printing shares while the narrative is hot."
• Assumptions that must hold for today's ~$104 price: (1) Neutron flies and ramps on schedule at target economics; (2) the market keeps paying ~60x sales after de-risking; (3) SpaceX doesn't price-war; (4) SDA funding holds and renews; (5) no goodwill impairment; (6) dilution moderates. All six.
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: FY2027 revenue ~$0.8–0.9B instead of $1.1–1.2B → the bull's own valuation math ($1.1–1.2B × 60–65x) breaks → fair value drops toward ~$70–90 on the bull framework, and toward GuruFocus's ~$16 on a normalized one. Asymmetry is to the downside at this price.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs the business: a catastrophic Neutron maiden-flight failure (loss of vehicle + multi-year requalification) coincident with a SpaceX medium-lift price cut — would strand the medium-lift thesis, force more dilutive raises into a falling stock, and recode RKLB as a sub-scale launch+components shop. Plausibility: moderate (maiden flights fail often; SpaceX pricing is real) — not tail-risk-remote.

---

Management Questions (15, ordered by information value)

1. Neutron: What is the specific gating item between today and the maiden flight, and what is the realistic probability the first orbital flight occurs in calendar 2026 vs. slipping to 2027?
2. On Neutron unit economics: at what launch cadence does Neutron hit the 40–50% gross-margin target, and what is the breakeven cadence if SpaceX cuts Falcon 9 / Starship pricing 20%?
3. Customer concentration: what % of the $2.2B backlog is the SDA/Golden Dome program, and what are the cancellation/re-scope terms if DoD tranche timelines shift?
4. What is the planned share-count trajectory — do you expect dilution to continue at the recent ~25%/yr pace, and under what conditions would you stop issuing equity given the $1.48B cash balance?
5. Walk through the path to GAAP profitability (not just adjusted EBITDA): which year, and what are the 2–3 biggest swing factors?
6. On the acquisition strategy (Geost, Mynaric): what are the integration milestones and the impairment-test assumptions, and how do you avoid goodwill write-downs if a merchant unit underperforms?
7. Why should RKLB trade as a high-growth platform (~60x sales) rather than as a defense-tech prime (~10–15x sales)? What recurring, software-like revenue actually justifies the multiple?
8. Flatellite / own-constellation: are you committing capital to operate your own constellation (becoming a recurring space-services operator), and how do you fund that without competing for capital against Neutron?
9. How do you think about the SpaceX IPO as a competitive and capital-markets event — does direct public access to SpaceX change your cost of capital or customer pipeline?
10. What is the realistic medium-lift TAM you can win given New Glenn, Stoke, Firefly/Northrop, and Relativity all targeting the same reusable-medium-lift niche?
11. On the Q2'26 gross-margin step-down: is the Space-Systems mix structurally lower-margin, and where does blended gross margin settle at scale?
12. HASTE/hypersonics: how durable and how large is the defense hypersonic-test revenue line, and is it tied to specific multi-year programs?
13. How exposed is the business to ITAR/export-control and the foreign (NZ/Germany via Mynaric) operations under a more protectionist US defense-procurement posture?
14. What is your make-vs-buy framework going forward — is the acquisition phase substantially complete, or should we expect more stock-funded deals?
15. Capital allocation: at what point do buybacks or self-funded growth replace equity issuance, and what ROIC hurdle do you hold acquisitions to?

---