Rockwell Automation

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Rockwell Automation is the largest pure-play industrial-automation company in the world — and the operative word is pure-play. Where Siemens, ABB, Schneider, Honeywell and Emerson bolt automation onto sprawling conglomerates (grid, power, building tech, aerospace), Rockwell sells one thing: the hardware, software and services that make a factory run. It traces an unbroken line to the Allen-Bradley Company, founded 1903, and was spun out of Rockwell International in 1996 when the aerospace/defense business went to Boeing. That lineage matters for the thesis: Rockwell is structurally barred from defense (it divested it) — which suits a no-defense coverage mandate exactly.

The business is plumbing for the physical economy. Its installed base of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) — the Logix control architecture with Allen-Bradley hardware — sits inside tens of thousands of plants, and the entire value proposition is that once a line is engineered around ControlLogix/CompactLogix and FactoryTalk software, ripping it out is a multi-year, multi-million-dollar risk no plant manager volunteers for.

Three segments:

• Intelligent Devices (FY25 $3,756M, 45% of sales) — drives, motion, safety, sensing, industrial components, and the OTTO/Clearpath autonomous mobile robots (the literal "robotics" of the coverage bucket). The hardware spine.
• Software & Control (FY25 $2,383M, 29%) — the Logix control platform, visualization, FactoryTalk, digital-twin/simulation, Plex (cloud MES) and Fiix (maintenance), network & cyber-security (Verve). The highest-margin, fastest-growing, most strategically important segment.
• Lifecycle Services (FY25 $2,203M, 26%) — engineered-to-order solutions, digital consulting, recurring cyber/safety/asset-management services, and (until April 2026) the Sensia oil-&-gas JV with SLB.

Go-to-market is distributor-led and concentrated. ~65% of global sales run through independent distributors, and the two largest distributors are ~20% of total sales in each of FY23/24/25. That channel is the single most important structural fact about this company — it is both the moat (entrenched local relationships, OEM/machine-builder reach) and the principal source of the cyclical whip (the 2024 destocking, see Lens 8). End markets span discrete (auto/EV/battery, semiconductor, e-commerce/warehouse), hybrid (food & beverage, life sciences, tire) and process (energy, mining, chemicals). Addressable market self-estimated at ~$120B.

Plain-terms verdict: a high-quality industrial razor with a software upgrade in progress — recurring-ish (installed base, ARR) but fundamentally a capex-cycle business whose orders rise and fall with US manufacturing PMI (sub-50 for all of Q4 FY25 ).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Upstream → Rockwell → end customer, named at every node:

• Inputs (upstream): semiconductors and electronic components (microcontrollers, power semis, passives), copper and steel (drives, enclosures, motors), and — flagged explicitly in the 10-K risk factors — rare-earth minerals subject to "embargoes, sanctions, and other trade restrictions". Rockwell discloses it "maintains several single-source supplier relationships" where alternatives don't exist or the incumbent is advantaged on quality/price; it does not name them. Chokepoint: single-source components for "higher volume and more profitable products" — the 10-K states unavailability there "would be more severe".
• Manufacturing (Rockwell): ~10 principal plants — most significant in the U.S., Mexico, Poland, India, Canada, Singapore — plus two principal distribution hubs (one U.S., one Netherlands). Resiliency strategy = redundant manufacturing so high-value product lines can be built in more than one geography (the explicit tariff-mitigation lever).
• Channel (the critical node): ~65% of sales via independent distributors; the two largest ≈ 20% of revenue. In North America the distributor share is even higher. This is a deliberate asset-light reach strategy but it means Rockwell sells to the channel, and channel inventory swings drive reported revenue independent of true end-demand.
• Customers (downstream): OEMs/machine builders, system integrators, and end users — concentrated in the U.S. (>50% of sales ). New demand pull from data-center operators (cooling, power, build-out automation), warehouse/e-commerce automation, semiconductor fabs, and EV/battery plants.

Single-source + rare-earth + China exposure (China is a top-5 destination country) = the supply-chain tail risk. Tariffs are managed via pricing + alternative sourcing + redundant plants, and management guides tariff-neutral to EPS in FY26 — a claim worth tracking, not trusting blindly.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Rockwell's moat is real, narrow, and North-American.

1. Switching costs (the core moat). The Logix control architecture is the only platform "that can support many production disciplines — discrete, process, batch, safety, security, motion, robotics, and power control — in a single hardware and software environment". Once a plant standardizes on Allen-Bradley/Logix, the engineering, training, spare-parts and validation lock-in is enormous. This is why gross margins on Intelligent Devices and Software & Control sit at 18–35% segment-operating even through a down-cycle.
2. Installed base + distributor network (network effect). ~65%-distributor reach and a deep partner ecosystem mean Rockwell is the default in U.S. discrete automation. New machine builders design to Allen-Bradley because their North-American customers demand it — a self-reinforcing standard.
3. Brand / trust in critical infrastructure. Allen-Bradley, ControlLogix, PowerFlex, FactoryTalk are category-defining marks. In safety-critical and cyber-critical environments, "nobody got fired for buying Rockwell" is the U.S. analogue to IBM.

Bargaining power: Strong over customers in its installed base (switching cost), moderate over the channel (the channel is concentrated — losing a top-2 distributor would hurt), weak over single-source suppliers and rare-earth (admitted in risk factors).

The moat's boundary — be honest: it is geographic and discrete-centric. Outside North America, Siemens (TIA Portal / S7) is the entrenched standard and Rockwell is the challenger; in process industries, ABB, Emerson (DeltaV), Schneider/AVEVA, Honeywell are stronger. Rockwell is a fortress in U.S. discrete automation and a tenant elsewhere. Grounded in the 10-K's own competitor list: Siemens, ABB, Schneider, Emerson, Mitsubishi, Honeywell, Dassault.

Lens 4 · Segments

All numbers (FY) and (fiscal Q2 FY26):

Revenue by segment ($M):

Segment operating margin:

Geography (FY25, by destination): North America $5,270M (+4%), EMEA $1,488M (−1%), Asia-Pacific $1,024M (−5%), Latin America $560M (−12%). By fiscal Q2 FY26 every region had flipped positive: NA +10%, EMEA +20%, APAC +13%, LatAm +9% reported.

The story the segments tell: FY24→FY25 was a trough — total revenue fell from $9.06B (FY23) to $8.26B (FY24) and only crept +1% to $8.34B in FY25, with volume −2pts offset by pricing +3pts. The recovery is led by Software & Control (+17% organic, 34.9% margin in Q2-FY26) — the secular software/ARR story finally showing in the P&L — while Lifecycle Services is the persistent laggard (organic still negative). Intelligent Devices is the cyclical swing factor turning up. Mix is improving toward the highest-margin segment, which is the entire margin-expansion bull case.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: fiscal Q2 FY2026, period ended 2026-03-31)

The most recent printed quarter is the inflection, and it was a clean beat-and-raise.

• Sales $2,239M, +12% reported / +9% organic (currency +3pts, pricing +3pts). Broad-based: all four regions grew organically (NA +9%, EMEA +9%, APAC +10%; LatAm −1% the only soft spot).
• Diluted EPS $3.10 vs $2.22 (+40%); Adjusted EPS $3.30 vs $2.50 (+32%).
• Enterprise operating margin 22.5% vs 19.0% (+350bps) — driven by "price realization exceeding input costs, including productivity, higher sales volume, and favorable mix".
• Six-month FY26: sales $4,344M (+12%), Adjusted EPS $6.05 (+39%), enterprise margin 20.9%.
• vs consensus / guidance: the print "smashed expectations" and management raised FY26 guidance — see Lens 11.
• Cash: 6-mo operating cash flow $554M, free cash flow $445M (vs $464M PY — flat, as the cash recovery lags the P&L).
• Balance-sheet flags (FY25 year-end): Cash $468M; Receivables $1,931M (up from $1,802M — rising slightly faster than the +1% revenue, worth watching but modest); Inventories $1,247M (down — healthy post-destock); Goodwill $3,839M; total debt ≈ $3,224M (ST $608M + current LTD $2M + LT $2,614M); net debt ≈ $2.76B; commercial paper $522M @ 4.24%.
• Market reaction: the stock "boosted" on the beat and has compounded a ~58% rally off its 52-week low ($305) to ~$482 — i.e., a large amount of the recovery is already in the tape.

Unusual vs ROK's own history: the divergence between GAAP EPS $7.67 and Adjusted EPS $10.53 in FY25 ($2.86 gap) is the flag. FY25 GAAP was depressed by a $224M non-cash Sensia JV impairment, a $136M pre-tax legacy-asbestos accounting-method change ($0.91/sh), and restructuring — most of which is genuinely non-recurring, but the asbestos accounting change (from expense-as-incurred to full-future-accrual) is a one-time pull-forward that flatters future GAAP comparisons.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf; reconstructed from filings + web. The arc over the last ~6 quarters is a clean capitulation → stabilization → confidence progression:

• FY24 (destock): repeated guidance cuts; Q2 FY24 EPS guide slashed from $11.24–12.74 to $8.80–9.80; CFO retirement announced. Tone: defensive, "managing through the channel correction."
• FY25 (trough): language pivots to cost productivity and margin expansion — the recurring phrase. The 10-K leans hard on "productivity," "price realization," and "margin expansion initiatives". Restructuring largely complete (FY24 charge $97M; FY25 reversed $5M).
• FY26 (recovery): tone is confident — "solid momentum… led by improving demand in warehouse automation, data center, semiconductor, and energy"; data-center revenue "doubling YoY," Logix ">20% growth globally". Phrases added: data center, AI, mega-projects. Phrase dropped: destocking / channel correction.

Sentiment read: management has earned some credibility back by delivering the margin recovery it promised at the trough — but the same team owns the FY24 air-pocket, so treat the new optimism as cyclically-aided, not vindication of a step-change.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = the 10-K's named competitors with public multiples.

Read: Rockwell is the most expensive name in the group on every comparable metric — ~35x forward earnings and ~24x NTM EV/EBITDA vs a peer-group EV/EBITDA average cited around 14x and the closest pure-ish peers (Emerson ~15.5x, Schneider ~16.9x) materially cheaper. ABB is the only peer in the same EV/EBITDA zip code (~22.6x). The premium is defensible on quality (pure-play, highest software content, best U.S. discrete moat) but it is a full premium with little margin for error — the market is paying up for the recovery it can already see.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, last ~5 years)

The pattern is unusually legible: this stock trades on the order/destocking cycle and on guidance revisions, far more than on any single product. [all web unless noted]

• 2021–22: rode the post-COVID capex + reshoring boom; total-return index $100→$135 (FY21) then back to ~$101 (FY22) as rates/multiples compressed.
• 2024 — the defining negative catalyst: distributor destocking drove FY24 revenue −8.8% to ~$7.5B and forced repeated guidance cuts; the Q2 FY24 EPS guide was slashed ~25% (to $8.80–9.80) and the CFO retired — multiple sharp down-moves. Q4 FY24 showed a 21% sales drop / 32% EPS decline and shares plunged.
• 2024–25 bottom: stock troughed near $305 (52-wk low).
• 2026 — the positive catalyst: the Q2-FY26 beat-and-raise plus the data-center/AI narrative drove a ~58% rally to ~$482, near the 52-wk high $486.

What the market actually reacts to: (1) order rates & channel inventory (the leading indicator), (2) guidance revisions (the trigger), (3) end-market narrative shifts (data center is the current one). It is not a single-customer story and not primarily a margin-surprise story — it is a cyclical-revisions stock. The practical implication for entry: the best risk/reward historically comes at the destock trough (FY24/early-FY25), not after the re-rate.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

Blake Moret — Chairman, President & CEO:

1. Track record / tenure: CEO since July 2016 (~10 years), Chairman as well — a long-tenured, lifer-style operator (Rockwell career man). Total comp ~$15.4M, ~92% variable (stock/options/bonus) — reasonable equity orientation.
2. Capital-allocation history — mixed: Post-tax-reform he repatriated ~$2.3B (2018), took a $1B equity stake in PTC (a software bet that has had value swings — a PTC investment gain flattered FY23, its absence pressured FY24 ), raised the dividend (now $5.24/sh FY25, 15 consecutive-ish years of increases ), and ran steady buybacks ($419M FY25 @ $279 avg, $594M FY24; $927M remaining authorization). The strategy has now shifted to favor capex + buybacks over M&A ($2B+ five-year internal investment plan). The Sensia JV (with SLB) was a value-destroyer — dissolved April 2026 after a $224M FY25 impairment; honest cleanup, but it was their deal.
3. ROE/ROIC on his watch: ROE ~24% in a trough year (FY25) — structurally high because the model is asset-light and buyback-shrunk (treasury stock $3.5B, shares ~112M). But the FY24 destock shows the earnings are cyclical, so the through-cycle return is lower than the spot figure implies.
4. Red flags: the 2024 guidance-cut sequence is the real scar — repeated misses + CFO departure inside one fiscal year is an execution/forecasting black mark. Independent analysts frame the open question precisely: can Moret restore Intelligent Devices margin to 22%+ and avoid another order "air-pocket". Routine insider selling (Moret sold ~$8M of stock ) — normal for comp of this structure, not a standout flag.
5. Archetype: professional manager / steward, not founder-operator. For a mature compounder that's appropriate; it implies steady execution and shareholder returns, not bold reinvention.

Net: competent, aligned, shareholder-friendly steward who delivered the promised margin recovery — but carries a genuine forecasting-credibility ding from 2024 and one clearly-failed JV.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst across the three statements:

• Non-GAAP vs GAAP gap: the $2.86 FY25 wedge between Adjusted EPS $10.53 and GAAP $7.67 is the headline item. Drivers are mostly legitimate non-cash/one-time: $224M Sensia impairment, $136M asbestos accounting-method change, restructuring, intangible amortization. But note the asbestos change is a one-time accounting election (expense-as-incurred → accrue-all-future) that pulls a charge forward and makes future GAAP look better by construction — track that the Adjusted bridge stays clean as the cycle normalizes.
• Cash vs earnings: FY25 FCF $1,358M vs net income $869M — FCF exceeds GAAP earnings (coverage >1.5x), the opposite of a red flag; it reflects the non-cash impairments and working-capital release post-destock. Healthy. (Caveat: FY24 FCF was only $639M, so the series is volatile.)
• Receivables/inventory vs revenue: Receivables +7.2% on +1% revenue (FY25) — a mild watch-item, plausibly timing/mix. Inventories down — good. Nothing screaming channel-stuffing, though the distributor model inherently obscures true sell-through (sell-in ≠ sell-out is the structural caveat for this whole name).
• SBC / segment defns: Adjusted EPS excludes acquisition-intangible amortization and (new in FY26) Sensia dissolution costs/tax — the FY26 definition change is disclosed and immaterial-to-prior-years, but definition creep in the adjusted bridge is the thing to monitor.
• Presentation change: FY25 reclassified to break out Engineering & development from Cost of sales (~$162M/qtr) — explicitly "no impact on net income, EPS, cash flows, or segment earnings"; aligns with peers. Benign, improves comparability.
• Tax: effective rate rising (FY24 13.8% → FY25 18.3%), and BEPS Pillar Two (Singapore) adds ~+3pts from FY26 — a real, structural EPS headwind already in the adjusted tax rate (Q2-FY26 adjusted rate 20.6%).
• Off-balance-sheet / contingencies: legacy asbestos (net liability ~$151M, scheduled payouts to "thereafter") and environmental remediation as a potentially-responsible party — long-tail but quantified and modest vs a $54B market cap.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases: None. "No LR found for this company in the search period [2021-06-29 → 2026-06-29]".
• SEC AAERs: None. "No AAER found".
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/FDA/etc.): web search surfaced no material enforcement actions, consent decrees, fines, or penalties against Rockwell Automation in the period. (The company sells to regulated end-markets but is not itself a notable enforcement target.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Rockwell points Item 3 to Note 17 — ordinary-course litigation plus the legacy asbestos (divested-business product-liability) and environmental matters; management states none are expected to be material to financial condition.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 / Note 17, as of 2026-06-29. Clean book.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (FY2026 → FY2028 Adjusted EPS)

Built bottom-up from the latest actuals + management's raised FY26 guidance. Base year anchored on guidance; out-years on revenue × margin × buyback.

Anchor (FY26 guidance, raised May 2026): sales ~$8.9B; Adjusted EPS $12.50–$13.10 (midpoint $12.80, ~+22% YoY); organic revenue 5–9% (midpoint 7%). Price realization ~250bps (100bps tariff pass-through + 150bps structural); S&C "several hundred bps" margin expansion.

Scenarios (FY27 Adj EPS):

• Bull ~$15.00: data-center scales from ~low-single-digit to ~5% of revenue, organic +10%, S&C margin >35%, full price-cost capture.
• Base ~$14.00: 7% organic, steady mix shift, Pillar-Two tax drag absorbed.
• Bear ~$11.50: a new destocking air-pocket (the FY24 playbook) — organic flat-to-down, ID margin stalls below 20%, operating de-leverage. This is the live tail, not a tail-of-the-tail — it happened two years ago.

Brier forecast (logged for calibration — base case committed):

• Question: ROK FY26 (ending 2026-09-30) non-GAAP Adjusted EPS ≥ $12.50 — p = 0.80 (already 6-mo Adj EPS $6.05 + raised guide floor $12.50; risk is only a sharp H2 reversal). Note: per --watchlist rules the forecast.ts create step is skipped in the unattended loop; recorded here for promotion if this goes to /thesis.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Rockwell is the cleanest U.S.-listed pure-play on three durable secular tailwinds at once — reshoring (244k U.S. manufacturing jobs announced 2024, 88% in high-tech: EV/semi/electronics — Rockwell's exact end-markets ), data-center/AI build-out (data-center revenue doubling YoY, a market going from low-single-digit to ~5% of sales ), and the software/ARR margin mix-shift (Software & Control +17% organic at 34.9% margin ). The moat (Logix switching costs, 65% distributor reach) is intact; capital allocation is shareholder-friendly (dividend aristocrat-adjacent, steady buybacks); and the company just proved it can expand margin +350bps off the trough. FY24's destock cleared the channel, so the recovery has clean comps and operating leverage on the way up.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment / de-rate risks).

1. It's a cyclical at a secular multiple. ~35x forward / ~24x EV/EBITDA prices ROK like a software compounder, but ~70% of revenue is still cyclical hardware/services tied to manufacturing PMI (sub-50 as recently as Q4 FY25). The single biggest risk is multiple compression — if the cycle wobbles, a 35x stock can lose a third of its value without any "impairment" at all (it did exactly this in 2024).
2. Channel fragility is structural, not solved. 65% distributor / top-2 = 20% means sell-in can decouple from sell-out at any time; the 2024 air-pocket was not a one-off bug, it's a feature of the model. Another destock resets the EPS path to the bear case (~$11.50).
3. The moat is geographically boxed. Siemens is winning the rest of the world and pushing software (TIA/Xcelerator); if Rockwell's premium depends on the data-center narrative and that decelerates, the "why pay 2x Emerson's EV/EBITDA" question gets ugly.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): US manufacturing PMI never sustained >50, the data-center automation TAM proved smaller/slower than the doubling-YoY headline implied (off a tiny base), distributors who over-ordered into the 2026 recovery began destocking again in late FY26, and a 35x multiple compressed to 25x on a single guide-down — a 30–35% drawdown with EPS only modestly lower. Plausibility: moderate-high — it is literally the 2024 movie replayed.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on an absolute and relative basis — ROK is the most expensive name in its peer group with the most cyclical revenue mix. The valuation is justifiable on quality but offers negative margin of safety at a 52-week high; consensus price target ~$462 already sits below the ~$482 price.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the bulls are extrapolating a doubling off a low-single-digit data-center base into a structural growth re-rate, while under-weighting that this is the same distributor-driven cyclical that cut guidance four times in 2024. The market is paying a software multiple for a business whose order book it cannot actually see in real time. The asymmetry is wrong here — the time to own ROK is the next destock scare, not the post-beat melt-up.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• Where revenue is concentrated / what breaks it: ~65% through independent distributors, top-2 = ~20%. A single large distributor consolidating, defecting, or over/under-ordering moves reported revenue independent of demand. The "data center doubling" is off a low-single-digit base — management's own framing is ~5% of revenue near-term — so it cannot offset a discrete-hardware downturn; it's a narrative, not yet a needle-mover.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: outside North America Rockwell is the challenger to Siemens, and in process industries it trails Emerson/ABB/Honeywell. The Logix lock-in is real in U.S. discrete but does not travel — and software-led entrants plus open-automation initiatives chip at the edges.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Siemens — bigger R&D budget, global installed base, and an aggressive software/digital-twin push (Xcelerator) that directly attacks Rockwell's highest-margin S&C growth engine.
• Worst capital-allocation moves: the Sensia JV (impaired $224M, dissolved 2026) and the $1B PTC stake whose mark-to-market swings have whipsawed reported earnings (gain flattered FY23, absence pressured FY24). Management has used the balance sheet for bets that added volatility, not durable value.
• Assumptions that must hold for today's price (~$482, ~35x fwd): sustained ≥7% organic growth, S&C margin holding ~33–35%, no destocking relapse, data-center scaling on schedule, and the Pillar-Two tax drag fully absorbed without an EPS miss. That's a lot of "and."
• If growth disappoints 20–30%: FY27 EPS to ~$11.50 (bear) and a multiple de-rate to ~25x → ~$290, roughly −40% — and note that's near the actual 52-week low of $305, so it's not a hypothetical floor, it's a recent one.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs the business: hard to construct — the franchise is durable; the realistic damage is valuation, not solvency. The honest short thesis is "great company, wrong price, wrong moment in the cycle," not "broken business."

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Your reported revenue is ~65% distributor-routed with the top two at ~20% — what real-time sell-through visibility do you now have that you lacked in 2024, and how confident are you that the FY26 recovery isn't channel re-stocking that reverses?
2. Data-center automation is "doubling" but ~low-single-digit % of sales — at what revenue share does it actually move enterprise growth, and what's the realistic FY28 number?
3. Intelligent Devices margin is back to ~21% in Q2 — what gets it sustainably to the 22%+ target, and is that volume-dependent or structural?
4. Software & Control is at 34.9% margin and +17% organic — how much is durable ARR vs. one-time license/project, and what is the actual ARR base and growth rate in dollars?
5. You've shifted capital allocation to capex + buyback over M&A ($2B+ plan) — what ROIC hurdle are you underwriting, and why is organic the better use than acquisitions now?
6. Tariff-neutral to EPS in FY26 — what specifically offsets the cost, how much is price vs. redundant-manufacturing, and what's the FY27 exposure?
7. Pillar-Two adds ~3pts to the tax rate from FY26 — is ~20% adjusted the new structural rate, and are there mitigations?
8. Siemens is pushing Xcelerator hard globally — where are you winning and losing share in software outside North America, specifically?
9. The Sensia dissolution closed April 2026 — what's the pro-forma revenue/margin impact, and what did you learn about JV structures for future partnerships?
10. Your single-source and rare-earth dependencies are flagged in risk factors — which product lines are most exposed, and what's the dual-sourcing roadmap?
11. ARR is guided to high-single-digit growth — what's the path to double-digit, and which offerings (Plex, Fiix, Verve, FactoryTalk) drive it?
12. How are you embedding AI into the Logix/FactoryTalk stack in a way customers will pay incrementally for, not just expect for free?
13. With the stock at ~35x forward and near all-time highs, how does that change your buyback pace vs. dividend vs. debt paydown?
14. What leading indicators are you watching that would tell you a demand air-pocket is forming before it hits orders?
15. Five years out, what share of revenue is recurring software/services, and what does that do to the through-cycle margin floor?

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