Sivers Semiconductors

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Sivers Semiconductors AB is a Swedish dual-division compound-semiconductor and photonics company — not an "optical-computing" pure-play (the coverage bucket is a misnomer). It is a picks-and-shovels supplier of the light sources and RF front-ends that other people's AI, autonomy and connectivity systems need. Two business areas ``:

• Sivers Photonics — designs and manufactures in-house compound-semiconductor (indium phosphide, InP) laser devices: DFB and CW lasers, laser arrays, and semiconductor optical amplifiers (SOAs). End markets: AI-datacenter co-packaged optics (CPO) / external light sources (ELS), FMCW LiDAR, optical sensing, and SATCOM. Manufacturing runs out of a Glasgow (Scotland) fab — "700 m² cleanroom, 100mm InP capability, >2 million laser tests/month" ``. This is the unit the market is paying for.
• Sivers Wireless — a fabless designer of mmWave RF ICs and beamforming modules for 5G, SATCOM and defense, manufactured by GlobalFoundries (22FDX) ``. Lower-multiple, NRE-heavy, but the cash-generative ballast.

Plain-terms business model. Sivers sells (a) physical InP laser chips/arrays it fabricates, and (b) RF chip designs it has a foundry build — increasingly via NRE / development programs that (the bulls hope) convert to volume production in 2027–2028. Today the revenue is small and lumpy: ~SEK 304M / ~$33M FY2025, +25% y/y , of which *product* revenue was only **~SEK 85.7M** (+13% FX-neutral) — the rest is development/NRE/services .

Customers / partners (named). CPO: Ayar Labs (laser arrays for its "SuperNova" light source), POET Technologies (optical-interposer co-development), O-Net Technologies + Enablence (ELSFP module ODM), Jabil (1.6T LRO transceiver using Sivers DFBs), GlobalFoundries (June 2026 SCALE CPO platform reference designs). LiDAR: a "strategic customer" widely suspected to be Aeva Technologies (NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion). SATCOM: ALL.SPACE (~$9k Sivers content/terminal), Intelsat. Wireless: a Tier-1 telecom OEM (likely Nokia, unconfirmed), plus defense names (Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, BAE, Ericsson) ``.

Contract structure. No take-or-pay, no recurring SaaS. Mostly project/design-win economics: NRE up front, then per-unit product revenue if and when the customer's own product ships. The headline "opportunity pipeline" ($453M end-2025 → $799M YTD Q1 2026, +77%) is explicitly a 5-year, non-binding funnel, not backlog — contract liabilities on the balance sheet were only ~SEK 11.6M ``. That distinction is the whole game (see Lens 13).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Sivers sits in the middle of two distinct chains. Names, not generics:

Photonics (in-house fab — the differentiator): InP wafers (IQE plc, Cardiff/Taiwan) → MOCVD epitaxy (Aixtron tools) → Sivers Photonics fab, Glasgow — etched-facet, wafer-scale InP laser/SOA fabrication & test → optional co-fab / second-source qual (WIN Semiconductors, Taiwan) → module integrators (O-Net ELSFP, POET interposer, Jabil transceivers, Ayar Labs light source) → hyperscaler / switch OEM end demand (CPO for AI clusters) ``.

• Chokepoint #1 — InP itself. InP DFB/CW lasers are the structural bottleneck the bull case is built on: "sub-30% wafer yields, only a handful of scaled suppliers, demand running well ahead of production" ``. Upstream IQE is the dominant merchant InP epi-wafer supplier — a single-source dependency for the whole industry, not just Sivers.
• Chokepoint #2 — Sivers' own fab capacity. In-house Glasgow capacity is estimated at only a $50–150M annual revenue run-rate per the former CEO ``. To serve hyperscale CPO volumes Sivers must lean on co-fab partners (WIN Semi) — i.e. it does not yet have the capacity to be the merchant laser supplier the multiple implies.

Wireless (fabless): RF/mmWave design (Sivers) → GlobalFoundries 22FDX (Dresden/Malta) → module/antenna-array assembly → 5G infra OEM / SATCOM terminal maker (ALL.SPACE, Intelsat) / defense prime. Chokepoint here is foundry allocation at GF, shared with the entire RF industry. CHIPS Act money (initial ~$11M award, late 2024) part-funds US wireless work ``.

Verdict on the chain: the in-house InP fab is the one genuinely scarce, hard-to-replicate asset on the map — Lumentum and Coherent are the only other Western names with comparable scaled InP laser capability (Lens 3/7). But Sivers' capacity is a rounding error next to theirs, so it is a structural node, not a structural supplier.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

What is genuinely defensible:

• InP laser manufacturing scarcity. Compound-semi laser fabrication (etched-facet, wafer-scale test) is a decades-deep process moat — you cannot stand it up quickly with capital alone. Only a handful of Western players have it at scale: Coherent, Lumentum, Sivers (plus captive/Asian capacity) ``. Being one of three is real.
• Qualification lock-in. Once a Sivers laser is designed into Aeva's LiDAR or a CPO ELS module and qualified (automotive/datacenter reliability), switching is expensive and slow — multi-quarter requalification. If the design wins convert, the switching cost is the moat.
• EU-sovereign wireless niche. Sivers is described as "the only commercial provider based in the EU for certain types" of mmWave/SATCOM beamforming chips `` — a sovereignty/defense angle that European and allied programs value.

Where the moat is thin / overstated:

• Bargaining power: who needs whom more. Against hyperscalers and primes, a 130-person, cash-burning, going-concern-flagged supplier has weak pricing power. Customers can dual-source (and are designed to — POET, O-Net, Coherent, Lumentum all play in ELS).
• Scale disadvantage vs. the giants. NVIDIA put ~$2B each into Lumentum and Coherent in early 2026 `` to lock laser supply. Sivers got a partnership with GlobalFoundries, not a strategic check from the buyer. In a capacity arms race, Sivers is the one without the war chest.
• Capital is the anti-moat. A moat that requires you to fab in-house and you can't afford the capacity and you keep diluting to survive is a moat with a hole in the bottom (Lens 5/10).

Net: a narrow, real process moat (one of three Western InP laser houses) wrapped around a balance sheet too weak to fully exploit it. The technology has a moat; the company's ability to monetize it at scale is the open question.

Lens 4 · Segments

segments.csv is empty (web-only), so this is / throughout — no research-layer segment numbers exist to cite.

• Group revenue trend: FY2024 ~SEK 219.2M → FY2025 ~SEK 304M (+25%) . Historical 2016–2025 CAGR cited at **~36.7%** off a tiny base .
• Q1 2026 reversal: net sales SEK 61.9M, −22% y/y `` — blamed on the US government shutdown (defense budget delays) and FX. So the most recent actual print is a revenue decline, even as the pipeline headline grew 77%. That divergence (declining sales, exploding "pipeline," parabolic stock) is the single most important fact in the file.
• Geography: not broken out in sources; manufacturing UK (Glasgow) + design Sweden/US; demand US-datacenter and global-auto/telecom weighted ``.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1 2026, reported ~May 2026)

FY2025 context ``:

• Revenue SEK 304M (~$33M), +25% y/y; product revenue only ~SEK 85.7M.
• Adjusted EBITDA SEK −11M (improved 31% y/y); operating margin ~−39% (~SEK −141M EBIT); net loss ~SEK 223M; FCF ~SEK −66M.
• Photonics reached first profitable full year (~SEK +1.5M adj. EBITDA) — a genuine milestone the bulls lean on.

Balance-sheet flags (this is where it gets serious):

• Cash ~SEK 43.5M end-2025 — against ~SEK 50–66M annual cash burn, i.e. **well under a year of runway without raising.** The company has raised serially to stay alive: **SEK 108M (Jan 2025), SEK 95M (Sep 2025), ~$17M (Feb 2026: $5M term loan + $12M convertible), SEK 125M (Apr/May 2026 directed issue at SEK 14.50)**.
• Shares outstanding ballooned from ~155M (2020) to ~311M (2025/26) — ~+101% dilution in five years ``.
• Going-concern qualification issued by auditors in the 2025 annual report (Lens 10).

Market reaction / what's priced in: the stock did not fall on the −22% Q1 print — it went up into a parabola, because the tape is being driven by the GlobalFoundries CPO deal (Jun 2026), index inclusion flows and a short squeeze, not by the income statement. The fundamentals deteriorated sequentially while the multiple expanded ~20x. That is the definition of a narrative-driven melt-up. Flag: unusual vs. the company's own history in every respect.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty); this is from report commentary.

• Tone over the last ~3 prints: progressively more US-capital-markets-and-AI-forward. Management has pivoted the narrative hard toward CPO/AI-datacenter ("Critical Enablers of a [new infrastructure]" was the literal Q1 2026 report cover) and away from the older 5G-first story.
• Recurring phrases: "opportunity pipeline" (now $799M), "co-packaged optics," "external light source," "AI data center," "dual listing on Nasdaq New York," "transition from development to volume production (2027–2028)."
• What they stopped emphasizing: the standalone Photonics SPAC spin-off (byNordic Acquisition Corp, announced Aug 2024, put on hold Nov 2024 ``) — replaced by the dual-listing narrative. The story mutated from "spin Photonics into a US SPAC" → "uplift the whole company's accounts to PCAOB and dual-list in New York."
• Sentiment read: management is promotional and catalyst-cadenced — a steady drumbeat of partnership press releases (GF, O-Net, Jabil, Ayar) timed into a re-rating. Constructive on execution intent, but the gap between announced partnerships and recognized product revenue is wide and not closing yet.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer table — InP-laser / silicon-photonics / CPO names.

Read: on EV/Sales ~31x, Sivers trades at ~7.6x the European semiconductor peer-group average (~4.1x) and ~1.8x the closest-peer average (~17.5x) — and it does so as the *smallest, loss-making, going-concern* name in the set. Lumentum and Coherent are expensive *and* shipping at volume with NVIDIA capital behind them; Sivers is expensive on *future optionality* with a sub-year cash runway. The comp set says the technology theme is richly valued everywhere — but Sivers is the most extreme expression of it with the weakest balance sheet. MACOM has also been cited as "the closest analog — a micro MACOM"; MACOM multiples n/a.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (moves >5%)

Mostly ``. The 2026 tape is a near-vertical sequence of partnership-announcement spikes:

• June 2, 2026 — GlobalFoundries SCALE CPO collaboration: stock +~50% intraday, crossed ~SEK 92, all-time high; this is the proximate trigger of the final leg ``.
• Mar 2026 — LiDAR customer "ramps production" PR ($53–138M lifecycle) and O-Net/Enablence ELS module and Ayar Labs light-source news — successive pops ``.
• Apr 2026 — Jabil 1.6T transceiver collaboration ``.
• Apr–May 2026 — the dark catalysts: annual-report delay (Apr 27 → May 15), PCAOB restatement of 2023–2025, going-concern flag, and a Swedish Economic Crime Authority criminal probe into a pre-announcement leak about the Nasdaq listing — yet the stock kept rising on an index-driven short squeeze ``.
• 2024 — Photonics SPAC (byNordic) announced then shelved — earlier volatility ``.

Pattern the market reacts to: named partnerships with Tier-1/AI-adjacent counterparties (GF, NVIDIA-ecosystem via Aeva/Ayar, Jabil) move this stock far more than the income statement. Accounting red flags and a declining revenue print were ignored in 2026 — a hallmark of a momentum/retail/index-flow regime where good fundamentals aren't required and bad ones don't bite. That asymmetry cuts both ways: the same insensitivity that ignored the going-concern flag on the way up will amplify the unwind when the narrative cadence breaks.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Dr. Vickram Vathulya (since 19 Aug 2024, succeeding long-time CEO Anders Storm). 25+ yrs semis: ex-President of Nuvotronics (RF/3D-printed microwave), revitalized standard-products at Maxim Integrated, prior RF/wireless leadership at Maxim/NXP. PhD EE (Lehigh), MBA (Berkeley Haas) ``. Read: a credible RF/wireless operator parachuted into a company whose value is now the photonics fab — and whose mandate is plainly a US capital-markets play (PCAOB uplift, Nasdaq dual-listing). Track record is in operating/turning around RF businesses, not in scaling a photonics fab to hyperscale.
• Chairman: Dr. Bami Bastani — semiconductor-industry veteran chairing the board; the architect of the "shine a light on this as a standalone US entity" strategy ``.
• Tenure & skin in the game: new-ish leadership team; insider ownership not sourced (insider-transactions.csv absent) — n/a. The serial directed share issues (to institutions, not insiders) and a convertible suggest the cap table is being broadened for the US listing, not founder-concentrated.
• Capital-allocation history: value-destructive on a per-share basis to date — persistent operating losses, ~+101% share dilution since 2020, repeated raises to fund a sub-scale fab. ROE/ROIC deeply negative ``. The offsetting read: management has dragged Photonics to first-time EBITDA-positive and assembled a genuinely impressive partner slate — execution on partnerships is strong even as execution on cash generation is not.
• Red flags: the 2023–2025 restatement to PCAOB standards (the prior accounts were not US-grade) and a leak probe are governance yellow-to-orange flags (Lens 10). Promotional cadence is high.
• Archetype: professional-manager / capital-markets engineer, not founder-operator. Appropriate for a "get-it-listed-in-New-York" stage; the risk is a team optimizing for re-rating and listing over durable unit economics.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

This is the richest lens in the file. Sivers carries an unusually dense cluster of accounting/governance flags for a company at this valuation.

Income statement / revenue recognition:

• "Opportunity pipeline" ($799M) is not backlog. It is an explicitly non-binding, 5-year funnel against ~SEK 304M actual revenue and ~SEK 11.6M contract liabilities ``. Presenting a 5-yr funnel as the headline KPI while the current quarter's sales fell 22% is a classic narrative-over-numbers tell.
• Product vs. NRE mix: only ~SEK 85.7M of SEK 304M is product revenue `` — much of the "revenue" is development/NRE that may not recur.

Cash vs. earnings / balance sheet:

• Cash burn divergence: EBIT SEK −141M, OCF SEK −57M, FCF SEK −66M FY25; cash only SEK 43.5M ``. Earnings and cash both deeply negative — no flattering non-GAAP can hide the burn.
• Serial dilution + convertible: ~+101% shares since 2020; a $12M convertible (Feb 2026) introduces overhang/forced-conversion risk; one note flags potential forced selling from an Achilles Capital / DDM restructuring holder ``.

Restatement (material): the company restated/"audit-uplifted" its 2023, 2024 and 2025 consolidated accounts to align with US PCAOB standards ahead of a potential Nasdaq New York dual-listing, and delayed the 2025 annual report (Apr 27 → May 15) to do so ``. A multi-year restatement is, by itself, a reason to widen the risk discount — prior reported figures were not US-GAAP/PCAOB grade.

Going concern (material): auditors issued a going-concern qualification in the 2025 annual report, explicitly doubting the company's ability to continue without external support ``. For a company the market values at ~SEK 29bn, an auditor going-concern flag is a glaring dissonance.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): Not applicable — Sivers has no CIK and does not file with the SEC; no EDGAR enforcement search is possible ``.
• Swedish enforcement: Sweden's Economic Crime Authority (Ekobrottsmyndigheten) opened a criminal investigation into whether confidential details of the planned Nasdaq listing leaked before the official April 2026 announcement ``. This is an active probe into information handling around the listing — material and unresolved.
• Nasdaq Stockholm: press coverage references a "leak probe" / exchange scrutiny and "index-driven short squeeze" dynamics around the name ``.
• Non-SEC (FTC/DOJ/FDA/etc.) web search: no material US-agency enforcement actions found against Sivers ``.
• Item 3 / legal proceedings: no 10-K exists (foreign filer) — n/a from a filing; rely on the Swedish-probe disclosure above.

Summary: the combination of going-concern + multi-year restatement + an active criminal leak probe + serial dilution + a non-binding "pipeline" headline + a declining latest revenue print is a forensic constellation, not a single flag. None of it is necessarily fraud — the restatement is plausibly benign PCAOB-uplift, the probe is about a leak not the accounts — but the density of flags at a ~31x P/S valuation is the most important risk signal in this dossier.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

Web-only; no financials.csv/guidance.csv to ground a model — all lines /, arithmetic shown. Per SKILL.md --watchlist rules, no forecast.ts create is logged from this unattended run. Sivers reports in SEK; revenue base SEK 304M FY2025 ($33M).

Revenue path (the company is the input, not EPS — it's loss-making):

• Base (FY2028E ~SEK 646M): roughly 2x FY2025, driven by LiDAR ramp (from Q4 2026), early CPO/ELS product, SATCOM volume. Source: one analyst's explicit 2028 model (FY28E rev SEK 646M, EBIT SEK +58.9M, net income SEK +47.9M — i.e. *first* full-company profit). cross-check: SEK 304M × (1.30)^3 ≈ SEK 668M — consistent with the base.
• Bull (FY2030E ~SEK 2.3bn): 45% rev CAGR 2025–2030, 25% operating margin, ~SEK 404M net income ``. Requires CPO product to actually scale and LiDAR to hit "hundreds of thousands of units."
• Bear (FY2028E ~SEK 50–60M USD, i.e. flat-to-modest): CPO slips 6–12 months, LiDAR customer delays, SATCOM stays sub-scale; revenue ~$50–60M (~SEK 550M) by 2028 with continued losses ``.

EPS: n/a / not meaningful. The company is loss-making with a moving (rising) share count; no credible 3-year EPS series exists in sources. Forcing one would be fabrication.

The number that actually matters (runway, not EPS): cash ~SEK 43.5M end-2025 + ~$17M (Feb) + SEK 125M (May) ≈ ~SEK 350–400M post-May-raise against ~SEK 50M/quarter burn ⇒ ~6–8 quarters of runway to the first real CPO/LiDAR volume in 2027–2028 ``. The thesis lives or dies on whether product revenue inflects before the cash (and the narrative) runs out — and whether the next raise is at SEK 80 or SEK 15.

Brier forecast (logged for tracking, not created here per watchlist rule): the scoreable binary would be "Sivers Photonics CPO/ELS product revenue (not NRE) exceeds SEK 100M in any single fiscal year by FY2028" — base probability ~35–45% ``: the technology and partners are real, but converting design wins to >SEK 100M of recognized product revenue against capacity, qualification and balance-sheet constraints is genuinely uncertain.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Sivers is one of only ~three Western houses that can fabricate InP lasers at scale, sitting in a structurally supply-constrained chokepoint (sub-30% yields, demand >> supply) exactly as the AI buildout forces a copper→optics transition and CPO goes mainstream ``. It has four independent revenue vectors — CPO/ELS (Ayar, POET, O-Net, Jabil, GlobalFoundries SCALE), FMCW LiDAR (Aeva → NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion, $53–138M lifecycle, ramps Q4 2026), SATCOM (ALL.SPACE ~$9k/terminal), and mmWave 5G/defense — any one of which could rival today's entire revenue. Photonics just turned EBITDA-positive for the first time, the pipeline grew to $799M, and a Nasdaq New York dual-listing would re-rate it onto US photonics comps (Lumentum/Coherent at 90–114x earnings, NVIDIA-funded). The contrarian bull: the market still under-appreciates that the light source, not the switch, is the gating component, and Sivers is a pure-play on it.

Bear case (2–3 permanent-impairment risks).

1. Balance-sheet impairment / dilution death-spiral. Going-concern flag + ~6–8 quarters' runway + serial dilution + a convertible. If CPO/LiDAR revenue slips past the cash, the next raise is a deeply dilutive down-round (or distressed), permanently impairing per-share value even if the business survives. The company has diluted ~101% in five years just to stay alive before the hard scaling capex.
2. Sub-scale capacity vs. funded giants. Glasgow caps out around a $50–150M run-rate; hyperscale CPO needs far more, and NVIDIA already wrote ~$2B checks to Lumentum and Coherent to lock supply ``. Sivers could win the qualification and still lose the volume to better-capitalized incumbents — relegated to a niche/second-source.
3. Customer & catalyst concentration. LiDAR revenue hinges on essentially one customer (likely Aeva, itself pre-profit); SATCOM on one (ALL.SPACE); wireless still NRE-heavy. Any single slip removes a whole "vector."

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke — what happened?): CPO product revenue stayed in "sampling/qualification" through 2027, the LiDAR customer pushed its SOP from Q4 2026 into 2027/28, and the AI-photonics momentum trade rotated. With cash low, Sivers raised at a fraction of the SEK 80–92 peak; the going-concern flag recurred; the Nasdaq dual-listing stalled (audit/probe overhang). The stock round-tripped most of the 2026 move — the business was fine, the 2026 price was a bubble.

Are multiples too high? Yes — emphatically — at ~31x P/S vs ~4.1x European-semi-peer average ``, for a loss-making, going-concern, just-restated micro-cap whose latest revenue print declined. Multiple DCFs cluster at SEK 9.8–14.5 fair value vs ~SEK 78–92 price — an ~80–85% implied overvaluation on cash-flow fundamentals. The valuation prices the bull-2030 scenario as the base case.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the consensus momentum read is "AI-photonics pure-play, infinite TAM, must-own." What the tape is ignoring is that the most important recent data point — the Q1 2026 −22% revenue print — went the wrong way, and that an auditor going-concern qualification at a ~SEK 29bn valuation is one of the loudest contrarian signals available. The market has decided accounting and current fundamentals don't matter for this name; that decision is itself the risk.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• What structurally breaks the money-making? It barely makes money now. Strip the NRE/development revenue and the non-binding pipeline, and you have a ~SEK 86M product business burning ~SEK 50M/quarter ``. The "model" is option value on design wins converting — and options can expire worthless.
• Revenue concentration / what if it shifts? LiDAR ≈ one customer (Aeva), SATCOM ≈ one (ALL.SPACE), wireless ≈ a Tier-1 OEM + lumpy defense. Lose Aeva's ramp (or Aeva itself stumbles — it's pre-profit) and a headline "vector" evaporates. This is a concentrated bet dressed as a diversified one.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: Sivers is the capacity-starved member of the InP trio. Coherent is putting 6-inch InP across four fabs (incl. Sweden); Lumentum is the volume 200G/lane EML leader; both took ~$2B from NVIDIA ``. The most dangerous competitor bulls underrate isn't a startup — it's Coherent, which can out-capacity, out-qualify and out-fund Sivers and is already NVIDIA's named silicon-photonics partner.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance moves: serial dilution (+101%), a convertible with overhang, a multi-year PCAOB restatement, and an active criminal leak probe around the listing. Add an auditor going-concern. For a short, this is the dream stack: rich multiple + weak balance sheet + accounting cloud + a forced future raise.
• Assumptions required for today's ~SEK 78–92 price: that CPO product revenue scales on schedule, LiDAR ramps on time and to volume, a US listing re-rates the name onto 90–114x US comps, and dilution stays mild. All four must hold.
• Valuation if growth disappoints 20–30%: since the price embeds the 2030 bull (45% CAGR / 25% margin / 30x exit, discounted at 16% ``), a 20–30% haircut to the growth path collapses the model toward the DCF anchors (SEK ~10–15) — i.e. −80%+ downside to fundamentals, with the next dilutive raise as the likely catalyst.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a distressed/down-round capital raise while CPO/LiDAR revenue is still "qualifying" — entirely plausible given ~6–8 quarters of runway and a going-concern flag. Plausibility: moderate-to-high on a 18–24-month view.

Short-seller's verdict: the company is a legitimate technology asset; the stock is a momentum/index-flow vehicle priced ~5–8x its fundamental value with an auditor going-concern flag and an open criminal probe attached. The business may well be worth owning at SEK 15. It is a short, not a buy, at SEK 80.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of the $799M "opportunity pipeline," how much is contractually committed (firm POs/backlog) vs. non-binding, and what % is product revenue vs. NRE? (The single number that separates story from substance.)
2. What is the post-May-2026 cash balance, the current quarterly net burn, and the exact quarter you reach the next product-revenue inflection — and will you reach it before you must raise again?
3. Will you commit to no equity raise below SEK [X] per share, or describe the financing plan that gets you to CPO/LiDAR volume without a down-round?
4. The auditors issued a going-concern qualification — what specifically removes it, and by when?
5. What exactly drove the 2023–2025 PCAOB restatement? Which line items changed, by how much, and does it alter the FY2025 revenue/EBITDA you reported?
6. What is the status of the Swedish Economic Crime Authority leak investigation, who is implicated, and what is the company's exposure?
7. What is your contracted in-house InP laser capacity (run-rate $) for 2026/27/28, and how much hyperscale CPO volume can you actually serve without WIN Semi co-fab?
8. Name the LiDAR customer and the binding terms of the Q4 2026 ramp. What is the firm unit commitment for 2027, and what is your single-customer concentration?
9. NVIDIA funded Lumentum and Coherent ~$2B each. Why does a hyperscaler/OEM design you in over a funded incumbent, and on what — price, lead-time, performance?
10. Translate the GlobalFoundries SCALE collaboration into expected recognized product revenue and timing — is this a revenue contract or a reference-design/marketing arrangement?
11. What gross margin do CPO/ELS laser arrays carry at volume vs. today's blend, and what is the path to group operating breakeven (year)?
12. What is the status and strategic logic of the Nasdaq New York dual-listing now (vs. the shelved 2024 Photonics SPAC)? What does it cost, and what does it unlock?
13. How do you retain InP laser engineering talent against Lumentum/Coherent (Lumentum poached Ayar's laser VP as CTO)?
14. What is insider ownership today, and have insiders bought in the open market during the 2026 run?
15. If CPO adoption slips 12 months industry-wide, what is your survival plan, and what is the trigger to slow the cash burn?

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