Quantum Computing Inc

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

Quantum Computing Inc ("QCi") is a Hoboken, NJ photonics company that builds room-temperature quantum-optimization and photonic-sensing hardware, and is standing up a thin-film-lithium-niobate (TFLN) chip foundry. It is not a gate-model quantum-computing company.

The product line, all derived from its "Core Photonics Technology" (conditioning/manipulating/measuring single and entangled photons):

• Entropy Quantum Computer ("Dirac" platform) — a photonic optimization machine using controlled feedback through energy loss in a photonic loop. Dirac-3 launched Q1-2024; Dirac-4 in development. Sold cloud-based and as a rack-mountable on-prem box requiring no cryogenics. The pitch is size/weight/power/cost advantage over superconducting (IBM/Google), ion-trap (IonQ/Quantinuum) and annealing (D-Wave) architectures.
• Reservoir-computing AI edge device — "Emucore" (2023), refreshed as "Neurawave" in Nov 2025, a photonic recurrent-neural-net accelerator.
• Photonic sensing — a LiDAR system and a Quantum Photonic Vibrometer (remote vibration sensing via single-photon counting), plus a quantum-networking / quantum-authentication prototype.
• TFLN Foundry Services — the "AZ Chips Facility," a leased TFLN prototyping/small-batch fab in Arizona State University's Research Park (Tempe), buildout "substantially completed" March 2025; a higher-volume "FAB 2" is in planning.

Contract structure: Revenue is project-based — multi-month proof-of-concept and R&D-services contracts plus hardware sales (vibrometers, quantum-networking devices) to "multiple commercial and government customers." No recurring/take-or-pay base; revenue is described as "slow to develop" because customers proceed with "small, exploratory contracts". The company began recognising cloud Dirac-3 access revenue in 2025.

The number that frames everything: FY2025 total revenue was $682 thousand (Services $368K + Products $314K). This is a pre-commercial company by any operating definition.

Feb 2026 — LSI acquisition (material change): QCi acquired Luminar Semiconductor, Inc. ("LSI") for $110 million in cash ($11M escrow), closed Feb 2, 2026, via a Section 363 Bankruptcy-Court-supervised sale out of Luminar Technologies (the LiDAR SPAC). LSI brings an in-house III-V photonic-semiconductor fab in Santa Barbara, advanced packaging, and an existing aerospace-and-defense / optical-comms customer base. This is the first real revenue engine QCi has owned — and it was bought distressed.

Supply Chain

Named stakeholders along the chain:

Upstream inputs →

• TFLN wafers / lithium niobate substrate — crystalline thin-film lithium niobate is the core material for the AZ foundry; QCi notes single-/limited-source supplier risk for key components but does not name the wafer supplier in the 10-KForm 10-KA company’s audited annual report to the US regulator. The most complete thing it publishes..
• III-V compound semiconductor inputs — post-LSI, QCi has its own III-V fab (laser diodes, semiconductor optical amplifiers, avalanche photodiodes), pulling it partway upstream and reducing dependence on external photonic-component vendors.
• Lab/fab capital equipment — depreciation on long-lived lab equipment is a rising R&D cost line, implying meaningful tool vendors (unnamed).

→ QCi (Hoboken HQ; Tempe AZ foundry; Santa Barbara LSI fab) →

→ End customers:

• Government / defense — NASA is the most-cited counterparty (and the most contested — see Lens 10/13); LSI explicitly serves "aerospace and defense."
• Commercial / research — universities, research institutions, early-adopter enterprises running PoCs. our figures is empty (no disclosed concentration), but qualitative disclosure says revenue comes from a small number of exploratory contracts — i.e. high implicit concentration.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) the TFLN material and the foundry-tooling supply chain (the foundry is the differentiator and the most-attacked claim); (2) its own balance sheet — the real "supplier" funding this company is the equity market. With $682K of revenue against $51M operating spend, QCi's "supply chain" upstream is dilutionDilutionIssuing new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the same company., not materials (see Lens 5).

Competitive Advantages (moats)

The claimed moat: room-temperature, low-power photonic architecture (size/weight/power/cost advantage), plus a vertically-integrated TFLN photonics platform — discrete-component EQC migrating onto in-house TFLN PICs, now fed by LSI's III-V fab and packaging. The IP estate: patents + trade secrets; three registered trademarks (QPhoton, QGraph, Qatalyst); the EQC method is "patent-pending".

Honest moat assessment — thin and unproven:

• No scale moat. $682K revenue vs. competitors with longer operating histories and "significantly greater financial, technical, product-development and marketing resources" — the 10-K says this explicitly. The Quantum Insider counts ~700 companies / ~400 pure-play quantum firms — this is a crowded field, not a protected niche.
• No switching-cost / network moat. Exploratory PoC contracts with no recurring base = customers can walk.
• Possible process/IP moat in TFLN — if the AZ foundry is genuinely differentiated and scales. This is precisely the claim two short-sellers say is fabricated (Lens 10/13). Unverifiable from outside; the burden of proof sits with QCi.
• Bargaining power: weak both ways. It needs customers far more than they need it (a $26K-scale government contract is a "win"); upstream, owning the LSI III-V fab is the one genuine structural improvement — it gives QCi a captive component source and a real, if distressed, manufacturing capability.

The actual edge is financial, not technological: ~$1.5B of liquidity (Lens 5). That is a moat against bankruptcy and a moat of time — it buys years of runwayRunwayHow long the cash lasts at the current rate of spending. It shortens the moment spending rises, which is why a figure taken from a quiet quarter flatters. to try to make the technology real. It is not a moat against competition.

Segments

The company reports as a single operating and reportable segment at the consolidated level. our figures is empty — consistent with single-segment reporting. The only available split is the revenue-type breakout:

Trend & cause: Products revenue exploded off a $27K base because QCi shipped vibrometer and quantum-networking devices in 2025 and began selling "off-the-shelf" units rather than bespoke services. Services growth (+6%) was flat. The +83% headline is real but immaterial in absolute terms — a rounding error against a $51M cost base.

Post-LSI the segment picture changes materially: Q1-2026 total revenue was $3,691K vs. $39K in Q1-2025 — a ~95× jump driven almost entirely by newly-consolidated LSI photonics-component revenue, not organic quantum/foundry sales. Going forward, LSI's aerospace/defense/optical-comms book will be the bulk of "revenue," and the quantum story will be a separate, still-pre-commercial line. Watch whether QCi starts segment-reporting LSI separately — single-segment reporting that buries a distressed acquisition's revenue inside a "quantum" headline is itself a flag (Lens 10).

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Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result (FY2025 10-K + Q1-2026 10-Q)

FY2025 income statement:

• Total revenue $682 | Gross profit $67 (10% margin, down from 30% — first-unit assembly costs) | Cost of revenue $615
• R&D $20,473 (+81%) | S&M $3,431 (+89%) | G&A $27,240 (+111%, driven by controls/accounting build-out, financing/M&A legal, and litigation)
• Total operating expenses $51,144 → Loss from operations $(51,077)
• Non-operating: Interest & other income +$20,718 (on the cash hoard) | Change in FV of derivative/warrant liability +$11,750 (non-cash mark on QPhoton warrants) | Interest expense $(65)
• Net loss $(18,674) — i.e. the headline net loss is less than half the operating loss, flattered by $32.4M of non-operating items ($20.7M interest income + ~$11.75M non-cash warrant gain).

The single most important read: the $(18.7M) net loss is not the run-rate. Strip the non-operating noise and the business burned ~$51M operating in FY2025. The warrant gain reverses to a loss if the stock rises above the $10.26 Dec-31 bid — so a rising share price mechanically worsens reported net loss.

Balance sheet (12/31/2025):

• Cash & equivalents $737.9M + short/long-term investments $782.5M = ~$1.52B liquidity
• Total current assets $1,133.7M vs. current liabilities $11.1M → working capital $1,122.6M
• Total stockholders' equity $1,598.3M; accumulated deficit $(219.2M)
• Derivative liability $7.8M; effectively no debt (no lines of credit, no short-term debt)
• How it got there: raised net $1,475.1M in 2025 by selling 86.3M shares of common stock.

Q1-2026 update (latest print, 10-Q filed 2026-05-11):

• Revenue $3,691K (vs $39K Q1-25) — LSI-driven
• Loss from operations $(20,550K) (vs $(8,286K)) — opex more than doubled YoY with LSI integration + scaling
• Cash $257.7M (down from $737.9M — the $110M LSI cash purchase + burn + reallocation into investments; investments still ~$1.2B)
• Shares outstanding 225,534,987 as of the 10-Q cover (8 May 2026)

Flags vs. its own history: (1) operating cash burnCash burnHow much more cash goes out than comes in, per period. The clock on a company with no profits. accelerating ($30.3M used in ops FY25 vs $16.2M FY24, and Q1-26 operating loss alone $20.6M); (2) gross margin collapsed to 10%; (3) the entire "earnings improvement" (net loss −73% YoY) is an artifact of interest income + a warrant swing, not operations.

Market reaction context: consensus/transcripts unavailable on disk (transcripts/ empty); QUBT has no meaningful sell-side EPS consensus — it trades on theme and headline flow, not numbers.

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

transcripts/ is empty — no call transcripts on disk, and QCi's calls are not a primary price driver (the stock moves on sector flow and short reports, not guidance). From the filings' own narrative, management's consistent focus is: "quantum-ready solutions for solving real-world problems," the TFLN foundry build-out, the product roadmap (Dirac-4, Neurawave), and — increasingly in FY2025 — building out financial controls and accounting staff (a tell that the prior controls were inadequate; see Lens 10).

What they started saying more of: capital deployment (FAB 2, "high-volume chip manufacturing facility"), M&A ("acquire complimentary businesses"), and — post-Iceberg/Capybara — defensive framing around the foundry being real and customer revenue being "slow to develop." What is conspicuously absent: any disclosed marquee, named, multi-year commercial customer or backlog figure. `` sentiment: analysts (Rosenblatt's John McPeake, Buy, PT $22) frame the story around "upcoming product launches and commercial adoption" — i.e. all forward, nothing in the trailing numbers. Honest read: management tone is promotional-forward; the gap between narrative and the $682K P&L is the entire short thesis.

Comps

Pure-play quantum cohort. Multiples are `` with date or n/a. All four are pre-profit and trade on theme; P/S figures are extreme and not value-investing inputs — they are sentiment gauges.

5-yr avg ROE: n/a (all four have negative equity returns / short public histories; meaningless for pre-revenue names).

What the table says: QUBT is the smallest of the cohort by market capMarket capitalisationThe share price multiplied by the number of shares. What the market says the equity is worth. and by orders of magnitude the most expensive on revenue — its ~$2.5B cap sits on the least organic revenue of the four. Even on the LSI-inflated Q1-26 run-rate it is richer than IonQ on a per-dollar-of-revenue basis. The comp set's saving grace for QUBT bulls: this entire cohort is priced on TAM and theme, so "expensive vs. revenue" is the cohort's baseline, not an outlier — but QUBT is the extreme of an already-extreme group.

Stock-Price Catalysts (what actually moves QUBT)

QUBT is a high-beta theme stock; it "routinely moves 10-15% on no news". The >5% movers over the cycle:

• Late-2024 → 2025 quantum melt-up — sector-wide; QUBT ran toward its $25.84 52-wk high.
• Nov 2024 — Iceberg Research short report ("perma-scam," foundry "will amount to nothing") — sharp drop.
• Jan 16–17, 2025 — Capybara Research short report ("rampant fraud") — −5.8% then ~−10%.
• Feb 25, 2025 — securities class action filed — overhang.
• 2025 — US-government quantum-stake / National-Quantum-Initiative-driven sector rally — broad lift across IONQ/RGTI/QBTS/QUBT.
• May 21, 2026 — "quantum trade roars back" — QUBT +14% in a single session, D-Wave +25%, Rigetti +24%.
• June 16, 2026 — rally reversal — whole cohort −5% to −7%; earlier, Quantinuum (QNT) breaking its IPO price triggered a sector selloff.

Pattern / what the market reacts to: (1) sector sentiment and government/policy headlines (the dominant driver — QUBT trades as a basket constituent, not on its own fundamentals); (2) short-seller reports (asymmetric downside catalyst, still live via the litigation); (3) capital-markets events (raises, the QNT IPO break). Company-specific operating news barely registers because there is barely any operating performance to react to. Implication for a position: this is a sentiment/flow instrument with a fraud-allegation tail — sizing and stop discipline matter more than the fundamental view.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

CEO & Chairman: Dr. Yuping Huang — founder/principal of QPhoton (the photonics company QCi reverse-merged in June 2022), and the architect of the Core Photonics / EQC technology. He signs the 10-K as Chairman of the Board and CEO (Principal Executive Officer); a new employment agreement was executed Dec 16, 2025. Vice Chairman: Robert Fagenson (a Wall Street / former NYSE-governance figure).

1. Track record: Huang is a credentialed photonics scientist (the technology is genuinely his). What he has not demonstrated is commercialization — six-plus years post-merger, revenue is sub-$1M. The "build" here is scientific and capital-markets, not commercial.
2. Tenure & skin in the game: founder-CEO; the 10-K references Huang holding ~10.9% of common stock — though that reference predates the 86.3M-share 2025 raise, so his current economic stake is materially diluted. our figures not present — insider buy/sell pattern not verifiable from the research layer (chase via Form 4s).
3. Capital allocation — this is the whole story. Management's defining act was raising $1.475B in equity in 2025 at elevated prices — opportunistic, value-accretive to the company's balance sheet (and arguably the single best decision available: monetize the theme bubble to fund the science). They then deployed $110M of it into the LSI bankruptcy purchase — a cheap, strategically-coherent vertical-integration buy. But: ROE/ROIC are deeply negative; the cash is parked in Treasuries/money-market earning interest, not yet generating operating returns. The capital-allocation grade is "raised brilliantly, deployment unproven."
4. Red flags: (a) material weaknesses in internal controls persisting through FY2025 (Lens 10); (b) a securities class action + four derivative suits naming current/past officers and directors; (c) short-sellers allege related-party revenue and misrepresentation (Lens 13); (d) G&A up 111% partly on "ongoing litigation" and "multiple financings, M&A" legal — a lot of motion, little operating output.
5. Archetype: founder-scientist + capital-markets operator, not a commercial operator. For this stage that is a double-edged implication: good at raising money and advancing science, structurally weak at converting either into revenue or institutional-grade controls.

Forensic Red Flags

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC Litigation Releases / AAERs: None. Per the pre-fetched file, "total_sec_findings: 0" — no LR or AAER names QCi in 2021-06-17 → 2026-06-17 via EDGAR EFTS.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web check): No FTC/DOJ/SEC government enforcement action, subpoena, settlement or penalty found in 2025–2026; the legal activity is private securities class action, not government enforcement.
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings) — company's own disclosure:
• Securities Class Action (NJ District Court, filed Feb 25, 2025): class period Mar 30, 2020 – Jan 15, 2025, §10(b)/20(a), alleging false/misleading statements and omissions about "the Company's customers, contracts and business operations." Second amended complaint filed Feb 13, 2026; QCi intends to move to dismiss. Unresolved.
• Four shareholder derivative actions (Mar/May/Jun/Sep 2025) against current/past officers & directors — breach of fiduciary duty, waste, unjust enrichment, common-law fraud, Exchange-Act violations. All stayed pending the class-action MTD.
• BV Advisory matter (QPhoton legacy) — settled Jul 17, 2025: QCi paid $750,000 + issued 1,900,000 shares to Barksdale/BV Advisory; resale S-1 effective Aug 4, 2025.
• Verdict line: Material litigation exists and is unresolved — a securities-fraud class action (period ending Jan 15, 2025) plus four stayed derivative suits — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (0 LR/AAER), web search (no govt enforcement), and 10-K Item 3, as of 2026-06-18.

Accounting risk map:

• Internal controls — MATERIAL WEAKNESS, the headline forensic flag. Disclosure controls and ICFR were "not effective" as of 12/31/2025. Root cause: insufficient trained accounting staff, inadequate control environment, insufficient segregation of duties, inadequate risk-assessment process. These weaknesses persisted across FY2023, FY2024 and FY2025 — i.e. unremediated for three straight years. For a company whose short-thesis is "fabricated revenue," ineffective controls is the most damaging possible disclosure.
• Revenue recognition: revenue is tiny but the quality is the issue — short-sellers allege a portion was related-party (Lens 13). With ineffective controls, revenue-recognition risk is elevated despite the trivial dollar amount. Post-LSI, purchase accounting and the consolidation of an acquired (bankrupt) entity's revenue introduce fresh estimation risk.
• Cash vs. earnings divergence: net loss $(18.7M) but operating cash used $(30.3M) — earnings understate the cash burn because of non-cash interest income accrual timing and the warrant gain. The "improving net loss" narrative diverges from worsening cash burn. This is the right direction of skepticism: trust the $51M operating loss, not the $18.7M net loss.
• Derivative/warrant liability (critical audit matter): the QPhoton warrant liability ($7.8M at 12/31/25) is marked to market each period using significant management judgment; the auditor flagged its valuation as a critical audit matter. Non-cash, but it injects earnings volatility and a judgment-dependent estimate.
• SBC: stock-based comp is a recurring non-cash add-back; option pool churn was heavy (7.2M options exercised in 2025) — dilutive and flattering to non-GAAP if presented.
• Dilution: shares went 129.0M → 224.2M (12/31/25) → 225.5M (May 2026) — ~75% share-count growth in one year. The balance sheet was built entirely by issuing stock into a theme bubble.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection

This is an operating battery, but QUBT is operationally pre-commercial, so an EPS projection is near-meaningless — the right framework is cash runway × the option value of the technology, with EPS shown only to make the loss trajectory explicit. No our model create is logged (breadth/watchlist loop).

Runway (the number that matters): ~$1.46B liquidity at Q1-26 ($257.7M cash + ~$1.2B investments) against an operating burn trending to ~$80–100M/yr post-LSI. Runway is effectively a decade+ absent a major fab build — the company cannot run out of money on any reasonable horizon. The risk is value erosion and dilution, not insolvency.

EPS path (next three fiscal years, FY2026–FY2028) — all ``, base case:

• Inputs: organic quantum revenue stays sub-$5M; LSI contributes ~$15–25M/yr; opex $90–120M/yr (R&D + G&A + FAB-2 ramp); non-operating interest income ~$40–50M/yr on the $1.5B at ~3%; share count creeping up modestly (less raise pressure given the war chest).
• FY2026E EPS ~$(0.30) to $(0.45). FY2027E ~$(0.35). FY2028E ~$(0.40) as FAB-2 spend hits. Bull path narrows losses only if LSI scales fast or a real foundry order book appears; bear path is wider losses + a capital-intensive fab that consumes the cash hoard. There is no credible path to positive EPS inside three years on disclosed economics.

Conclusion: you are not buying earnings; you are buying (a) $1.5B of cash ($6.6/share of net cash+investments ) and (b) a call option on photonics/TFLN/quantum commercialization. At ~$11/share and ~$2.5B cap, ~$1B of the market cap is the technology option above net liquidity — that is the bet.

Bull vs Bear

Bull case. QCi monetized the quantum theme bubble flawlessly — $1.475B raised — and now sits on a fortress balance sheet with a decade of runway while competitors burn. Room-temperature photonics is a genuinely differentiated architecture; the TFLN foundry addresses a real, fast-growing PIC/TFLN market (cited 20–39% CAGRs ); and the LSI bankruptcy purchase bought a real III-V fab, packaging, and aerospace/defense revenue for a distressed $110M. If any of photonic optimization, reservoir-computing AI accelerators, photonic sensing, or merchant TFLN foundry hits product-market fit, the option pays off many times over — and the company has the cash to wait for it. Catalysts: government quantum funding, defense contracts via LSI, a marquee foundry customer, continued sector melt-ups.

Bear case. Three impairment risks: (1) the fraud allegation is true enough to stick — the class action over customers/contracts/NASA/foundry claims resolves badly, or the unremediated material weaknesses surface a restatement; (2) the technology never commercializes — six years and <$1M revenue is not a base rate that improves easily; the science is real but the market isn't paying; (3) the cash hoard gets consumed by a capital-intensive FAB-2 with no demand, converting a balance-sheet story into a cash-incineration story. Expectations baked into price: ~$1B above net cash for a business with $682K of revenue and ineffective controls — the market is pricing a successful pivot that has not started.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the class action survived the motion to dismiss (or QCi settled expensively), confirming the market's worst read of the customer/foundry claims; FAB-2 capexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. started without an order book; the quantum theme deflated (as it began to on June 16, 2026 ); the stock re-rated toward net cash (~$6–7) and the ~$1B option premium evaporated. The cash protected against zero, but holders still lost ~40%+ from ~$11.

Are multiples too high? On any operating metric, absurdly (P/S ~3,670× organic). But the relevant valuation is sum-of-parts: net cash ~$6.6/share + an option. The option is overpriced relative to demonstrated commercial traction; the cash is not. So: too high, but with a hard floor.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): Both sides are wrong about what this is. Bulls think it's a quantum-computing company (it has no quantum-computing revenue); bears think it's a fraud headed to zero (it has $1.5B of real, audited cash and now owns a real fab). It is neither — it is a closed-end fund trading at a premium to NAV, where the premium is a venture-style call option on its own R&D, run by a scientist who is excellent at raising money and unproven at selling product. Priced that way, the asymmetry is "limited downside to net cash, lottery upside on commercialization" — but you are paying a ~$1B premium for the lottery ticket.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case. Two professional short-sellers already wrote this thesis and the market believed them enough to spawn a class action:

• Iceberg Research (Nov 2024): called QUBT a "perma-scam" and alleged the foundry "will amount to nothing".
• Capybara Research (Jan 2025): called it a "rampant fraud," alleging (a) QCi grossly misrepresented its NASA relationship — "NASA confirmed... they have no relationship with QUBT beyond a single $26,000 'computer programming' contract"; (b) fabricated revenues through related-party transactions; (c) misrepresented the AZ facility as a "fully operational foundry" when it is "merely a small R&D lab".

Where the business structurally breaks:

• Revenue concentration is near-total and possibly related-party. $682K from a handful of exploratory contracts; if the short-sellers are right that some was related-party, the organic revenue is even smaller than it looks. The class-action class period (ends Jan 15, 2025) lines up exactly with the Capybara report.
• The moat (TFLN foundry) is the exact claim under attack. If AZ Chips is an R&D lab dressed as a foundry, the differentiator is marketing, not manufacturing — and FAB-2 becomes a capital sink, not a growth engine.
• Ineffective controls for three years is the short-seller's gift: it makes "fabricated revenue" credible and a restatement plausible.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underrate: not IonQ — it's classical computing + the rest of the well-funded quantum field (IBM, Google, IonQ, PsiQuantum, D-Wave) that will define "real" quantum/photonics commercialization and leave a sub-scale player stranded.
• Worst capital-allocation read: issuing 86.3M shares to build a $1.5B treasury can be framed as dilution-into-hype that enriches the enterprise's optionality while existing holders' per-share claim on the technology shrinks — and parking it in T-bills is an admission there is no high-return operating use for it yet.
• Assumptions that must hold for ~$11: that the class action is meritless, that controls get fixed without a restatement, that the foundry is real and scales, and that the quantum theme keeps the premium alive. If growth disappoints 20–30% (i.e. LSI underdelivers and organic stays flat), there's no earnings cushion — the stock re-rates straight to net cash.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: an adverse class-action outcome or SEC enforcement validating the misrepresentation claims — reputational + the foundry narrative dies together. Plausibility: non-trivial (the case survived to a second amended complaint), though no government enforcement exists yet.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of FY2025's $682K revenue, what portion was from related parties or entities affiliated with officers, directors, or their networks — and will you disclose customer-by-customer?
2. The securities class action alleges misrepresentation of your NASA relationship; precisely what is the current scope and dollar value of all active NASA/US-government agreements?
3. The AZ Chips Facility — is it producing TFLN chips for paying external foundry customers today? Name the foundry customers and the revenue, or confirm it is pre-revenue R&D.
4. Internal controls have been "not effective" for three consecutive fiscal years (2023–2025); what is the dated remediation plan, and have you concluded there is no risk of restatement of any period in the class-action window?
5. What is FAB-2's expected capex, the demand/order book underwriting it, and the go/no-go gate — and what happens to the cash hoard if foundry demand doesn't materialize?
6. What did LSI generate in revenue, gross margin, and operating loss in the 12 months before you bought it out of bankruptcy, and what is your standalone organic (ex-LSI) revenue plan for FY2026–27?
7. Why was LSI available via a Section 363 bankruptcy sale — what failed at Luminar Semiconductor, and what convinces you those problems don't transfer?
8. With ~$1.5B in Treasuries/money-market earning interest, what is the hurdle-rate framework for deploying it into operations vs. continuing to clip the coupon?
9. You raised $1.475B in 2025 at elevated prices; do you intend to raise further, and how do you weigh further dilution against the existing war chest?
10. What is the single named, multi-year, recurring commercial contract that best proves product-market fit for any QCi product — and if none exists, when will one?
11. Dr. Huang — what is your current personal economic ownership after the 2025 raises, and have you bought shares in the open market?
12. Which of your four product lines (Dirac/EQC, reservoir-computing AI, photonic sensing, TFLN foundry) gets the marginal R&D dollar, and why — or are you spreading too thin?
13. How do you respond, point by point, to Capybara's specific claim that the facility is "merely a small R&D lab" and revenue was "fabricated through related-party transactions"?
14. What is your realistic timeline to positive gross margin at scale and to operating cash-flow breakeven, and what revenue level does that require?
15. If the quantum-computing theme deflates and the stock trades to net cash, does your strategy change — and would you consider returning capital?

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