Veeva Systems

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Veeva is the dominant industry-cloud software, data, and consulting vendor for the global life-sciences industry — pharma, biotech, CROs, med-device, and consumer health. It builds vertical SaaS that spans the drug life cycle from R&D → clinical → regulatory → quality/manufacturing → commercialization, all on its proprietary Veeva Vault content-and-data platform. It is a Delaware public benefit corporation — directors must balance stockholder returns against customer/employee/community interests and a chartered "public benefit purpose".

How it makes money. Two revenue lines, two product groups:

• Subscription — recurring SaaS (84.0% of FY26 revenue; $2,684.2M of $3,195.3M).
• Professional services & other — implementation/consulting, intentionally near break-even, sold to pull through subscription (16.0%; $511.1M).

Product groups:

• Commercial Solutions = Veeva Commercial Cloud (CRM, PromoMats/Vault content, Veeva Network/master data) + Veeva Data Cloud (Crossix/OpenData/Link — HCP/HCO reference + patient/consumer data).
• R&D and Quality Solutions = Veeva Development Cloud (clinical [CTMS, eTMF, EDC/Vault CDMS], regulatory [RIM], safety [pharmacovigilance]) + Quality Cloud (QMS, QualityDocs, training).

Customers. The buyers are the world's biopharma — the top-20 pharma are anchor accounts, plus thousands of emerging biotech and CROs. ~7,928 employees as of Jan 31, 2026 (+637 YoY). ~40% of revenue is outside North America.

Contract structure — a structurally important detail. Veeva's subscriptions are largely annual: "remaining performance obligations for noncancellable subscription services contracts greater than one year was not significant," with the substantial majority of contracted value in deferred revenue and recognized over the next 12 months. This means Veeva has little long-dated backlog to cushion a demand shock — its growth is re-underwritten annually. Bull read: pricing power lets it re-up at higher prices yearly. Bear read: there is no multi-year lock-in shielding it from a competitive defection (relevant to the CRM war below). Most billing is annual upfront, payment 30–60 days.

Founder-CEO. Peter Gassner, co-founder (2007), CEO 17+ years, ex-Salesforce (SVP of Technology) and ex-PeopleSoft — Veeva was literally built on Salesforce's Force.com platform before the 2025 split.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Veeva is software — its "supply chain" is compute, data, and talent, not physical inputs. Mapped upstream → company → end customer with named stakeholders:

• Cloud infrastructure (upstream chokepoint). Veeva runs primarily on third-party public cloud — historically Amazon Web Services, and it migrated the application platform itself off Salesforce's Force.com onto its own Veeva Vault stack (the strategic reason the Salesforce relationship ended). Hyperscaler dependency is the main single-vendor input risk, mitigated by cloud portability.
• Data suppliers (for Data Cloud). Crossix (patient/claims-derived audience data), OpenData (HCP/HCO reference), Link (key-opinion-leader profiles) — these are partly built/acquired data assets and partly licensed third-party feeds (IQVIA historically being the incumbent competitor/supplier Veeva is displacing on the data side).
• The company. Engineering (R&D = $767.4M FY26, 24% of revenue) + a heavy services/consulting organization that does the implementations.
• Distribution / go-to-market. Direct enterprise sales ("reference selling" — Veeva explicitly relies on marquee customers recommending it). Plus a partner ecosystem of SIs (Accenture, Deloitte, IQVIA, Cognizant, plus boutiques like Clarkston) who staff Vault implementations.
• End customers. Top-20 pharma (the whales), mid-cap biopharma, thousands of emerging biotech, CROs, med-device, consumer health.

Chokepoints / single-source dependencies: (1) hyperscaler concentration; (2) the SI bandwidth needed to execute the CRM-to-Vault migration by 2030 — a real throughput constraint, since Veeva explicitly will not migrate custom code/objects/integrations; (3) regulated-data provenance for Data Cloud.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

Veeva is one of the cleaner vertical-SaaS monopolies in software. The moats, ranked by durability:

1. Regulatory switching costs (the deepest moat). Veeva's R&D/Quality systems (clinical, regulatory, safety, quality) are the systems-of-record that pharma uses to run FDA/EMA-validated, GxP-compliant processes. Ripping out a validated eTMF or QMS mid-pipeline is a multi-year, audit-exposed, patient-safety-adjacent project no pharma undertakes lightly. This is why bulls argue the Development Cloud (~55–60% of revenue) is "highly defensible due to regulatory switching costs".
2. Data + workflow network effects (Data Cloud). Crossix/OpenData get more valuable as more of the industry standardizes on them; Vault content shared across sponsors/CROs/sites compounds.
3. Domain depth / single-industry focus. Veeva does only life sciences. Its AI agents are "pre-trained on pharma terminology and processes" and configured for the specific data structures/compliance of pharma. A horizontal vendor (Salesforce) must generalize; Veeva can specialize.
4. Suite / platform lock-in. Vault unifies content + data across clinical/regulatory/quality/commercial — the more modules a customer runs, the higher the integration cost of leaving.

Bargaining power. Over suppliers (cloud, SIs): high — it is a large, sophisticated buyer. Over customers: high in R&D/Quality (they need Veeva more than Veeva needs any one of them — top-10 customers are only 28% of revenue, no single customer >10%); contested in Commercial CRM, where Salesforce is now a credible alternative (see Lens 12/13). The annual-contract structure (Lens 1) means the moat must be re-won every year on the Commercial side.

Lens 4 · Segments

By product group (subscription + services, $ thousands):

The single most important trend in the business: R&D & Quality has overtaken Commercial as the larger segment and is growing ~7pts faster (+20.9% vs +13.8% subscription FY26). This is the inversion bulls lean on — the defensible, regulatory-moated half is now the growth engine; the contested CRM half is decelerating to low-teens.

Q1 FY2027 (quarter ended Apr 30, 2026) confirms the acceleration:

• R&D & Quality subscription $392.3M vs $329.4M → +19.1% YoY
• Commercial subscription $337.9M vs $305.4M → +10.6% YoY
• Total revenue $882.9M vs $759.0M → +16.3% YoY

By geography: ~60% North America / ~40% international (FY26). International is the stated expansion vector — and carries the EU Data Act cancellation risk (Lens 10).

---

Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print — Q1 FY2027, reported June 3, 2026)

The most recent print is a beat-and-raise, yet the stock sits near 52-week lows — a textbook expectations/sentiment dislocation.

The print (quarter ended Apr 30, 2026):

• Revenue $882.9M, +16.3% YoY — ~3% above the ~$858M consensus.
• Subscription $730.2M (+15.0%); Services $152.8M (+22.9% — a "record services quarter," driven by migration/AI implementation work).
• GAAP operating income $273.1M = 30.9% margin (vs 30.8% prior-year Q1). Non-GAAP operating income $395M = 45% margin — the gap is almost entirely stock-based comp.
• GAAP diluted EPS $1.57 (vs $1.37); non-GAAP diluted EPS $2.24, beating the ~$2.14 Street estimate.
• Other income $74.4M — interest on the ~$7.3B cash pile, a real and growing earnings contributor.

FY2027 full-year guidance:

• Revenue $3.585B–$3.600B (~+12–13% YoY).
• Non-GAAP operating income ~$1.610B → ~44% non-GAAP op margin.
• Provenance conflict to surface: one outlet framed this guide as "well above the $3.2B analysts had penciled in"; that $3.2B looks like a stale/early estimate — the Q1 beat was measured against $858M quarterly ($3.5B annualized) consensus. I treat current consensus as ~$3.5B, so the guide is modestly above, not dramatically. Do not over-read the "$3.2B" framing.

Balance-sheet flags (Apr 30, 2026):

• Cash & equivalents $1,896.6M + short-term investments $5,416.1M = ~$7,312.7M cash & investments, zero debt.
• AR fell to $568.0M from $1,259.7M at Jan 31 — seasonal (Q4 is the big billings quarter, collected in Q1), not a red flag.

Market reaction. Despite the beat-and-raise, VEEV trades ~$153 (down ~1% on the day searched), near the 52-week low of $148 vs a high of $310.50. The tape is telling you the market does not care about the current print — it is discounting the CRM competitive war and an AI-disrupts-SaaS narrative (see Lens 8/12/13). That is the entire investment debate.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on disk (transcripts/ empty), so this is ``. Tracking management's framing across the last several quarters:

• Persistent, rising theme: agentic AI. FY2026 results call (Mar 2026): Gassner — "The agentic transformation underway represents a substantial opportunity for Veeva and life sciences". Q1 FY27 prepared remarks (Jun 3, 2026) lean further into "agentic labor" as a new category, anchored by the Falcon platform unveiled at the May 2026 Summit. The tone has shifted from "AI is a feature in our apps" (2025) to "AI is a new product line / labor category" (2026) — a deliberate reframe to get ahead of the disruption narrative.
• CRM migration: confident but increasingly defensive. Management repeats the Vault CRM migration progress (live-customer counts, top-20 commitments) on every call — a recurring proof-point precisely because the Street is skeptical. The framing has had to add explicit rebuttals to the Salesforce-Agentforce threat.
• What they stopped saying: the old "$3B by 2025 / 20%+ growth" supremacy framing is gone — replaced by margin/FCF and AI-optionality framing, consistent with growth decelerating into the low-to-mid teens.

Lens 7 · Comps

Veeva vs. premium vertical-SaaS peers. Multiples are ``; where not sourced, n/a. Veeva's own figures are anchored to the research layer where possible.

EV math: market cap ~$24.9B − ~$7.3B net cash = EV ~$17.6B; on FY27E revenue ~$3.59B → EV/Sales ~4.9x, on non-GAAP op income ~$1.61B → EV/EBIT ~10.9x. (The ~6.6x EV/Sales in the table uses a less-conservative cash haircut; the cleaner net-of-all-cash figure is ~4.9x.)

Read: Veeva — the highest-margin, net-cash, monopoly-share name in the group — trades at a forward P/E (~20x) below lower-margin peers like Guidewire (~34x) and barely above broad-market software. 5-yr average ROE: n/a (note: ROE is artificially depressed by the ~$8B cash hoard inflating equity; on operating capital, returns are extreme — Veeva earns ~$900M net income on a business with almost no tangible capital). The comps say the de-rating, not the fundamentals, is the story.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what actually moves VEEV)

The 5-year pattern, ``:

• Growth-deceleration guidance cuts are the killer. Late 2023: management cut FY24/FY25 revenue outlook citing macro, biotech funding winter, and a $30M guide trim → sharp selloff; FY24 growth decelerated to ~9%. The market punishes deceleration far more than it rewards beats.
• Nov 2025: −16.8% in 5 days, entered a "bear market" (−25% from highs) on renewed Vault CRM growth fears + "lower-than-expected retention of top pharma clients".
• 2026 H1: the Salesforce-Agentforce war. Each Agentforce Life Sciences logo announcement (AstraZeneca, Novartis, Pfizer, Takeda — Mar–May 2026) pressured the stock; Citi downgraded, cutting its PT from $291 → $176 on Apr 10, 2026. The stock more than halved from $310 to ~$153.
• Beats no longer move it up. Q1 FY27 beat-and-raise → stock flat/down. Classic late-stage "good news doesn't work" — the multiple is hostage to the narrative, not the print.

What the market reacts to: (1) forward growth rate / deceleration, (2) CRM competitive headlines, (3) AI-disruption sentiment (it trades in sympathy with Salesforce on the "agents kill per-seat SaaS" fear). It is not primarily macro- or rate-driven, and not single-customer driven (concentration is low).

---

Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

Peter Gassner — Founder & CEO (since 2007, 17+ years).

1. Track record: built Veeva from a 2007 startup into a ~$3.2B-revenue, ~45%-non-GAAP-margin category monopoly — one of the most successful vertical-SaaS companies ever, and famously capital-efficient (IPO'd 2013 having raised very little VC). Prior: SVP Technology at Salesforce, architecture leadership at PeopleSoft/IBM.
2. Tenure & skin in the game: founder-CEO; largest individual shareholder with mid-single-digit % ownership "worth billions"; net worth ~$5.25B (Bloomberg #494) — overwhelmingly Veeva stock. Deep alignment. Gassner has not sold in the trailing 12 months — a positive tell given the depressed price.
3. Capital allocation: historically reinvest-and-build (goodwill is only $439.9M — Veeva built its empire organically, it did not roll up acquisitions). Major 2026 shift: first-ever $2B buyback authorized Jan 5, 2026 over two years; ~$180M deployed so far. For a company that hoarded ~$7B and never repurchased, initiating a buyback at ~$150–230/share is management signaling the stock is undervalued. ROIC is structurally very high (large profit on near-zero tangible capital).
4. Red flags: minimal. SBC is high ($472.7M FY26 ) — the standard SaaS dilution critique. President/CCO Thomas Schwenger sold 1,000 shares (~$231K) under a pre-set 10b5-1 plan in Jan 2026 — immaterial, planned. Gassner also sits on Zoom's board (minor attention split). The PBC structure is a governance nuance — directors legally balance non-shareholder interests — but it has not impaired returns.
5. Archetype: founder-operator with technical depth running a still-founder-led company at scale. Implication: long-term, builder-mindset capital allocation; willing to sacrifice near-term optics (e.g., the costly self-inflicted Salesforce divorce) for platform control. This is the archetype you want through a disruptive transition — but it also means the CRM-migration bet is very much his bet.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Income statement: clean. Revenue recognition is standard SaaS ratable subscription + services; no aggressive long-dated bookings (RPO >1yr is immaterial — Lens 1). Non-GAAP excludes ~$472.7M SBC — the non-GAAP 45% op margin vs GAAP ~29% gap is almost entirely SBC; judge Veeva on GAAP-plus-SBC-awareness. SBC is ~52% of GAAP net income — high but typical for premium SaaS and declining as a % of revenue over time.

Balance sheet — the one item to watch: Accounts receivable grew faster than revenue in FY26 — AR +24% ($1,016.4M → $1,259.7M) vs revenue +16%. Normally a yellow flag (channel-stuffing / collection issues). Here it is largely benign: (i) the allowance for credit losses is tiny ($256K), (ii) DSO is structurally lumpy because Veeva bills annual subscriptions heavily in Q4 (Jan 31 FYE), and (iii) by Apr 30 AR had collected down to $568M. Worth monitoring, not alarming.

Cash flow vs earnings: operating cash flow $1,415.2M FY26 exceeds GAAP net income $908.9M — cash conversion is strong (deferred revenue +$213M and SBC add-back drive it). No earnings-without-cash divergence. Capex is negligible (D&A ~$38M; asset-light) → FCF ≈ ~$1.39B.

Goodwill/intangibles: trivial ($439.9M goodwill, $30.3M intangibles) — almost no impairment risk; this is an organically-built business.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC Litigation Releases: none — 0 LR naming Veeva Systems, 2021–2026.
• AAERs: none — 0 AAER, 2021–2026.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): no material FTC/DOJ/FDA/CFPB enforcement actions, consent decrees, or fines surfaced against Veeva. (Historical note: a 2017 civil IQVIA/IMS Health trade-secret lawsuit existed years ago — competitive, not regulatory, and not a current enforcement item.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): Veeva discloses ordinary-course litigation and commitments/contingencies (note 13) with no single matter flagged as a material going-concern threat.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or accounting-enforcement findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-20. The one structural regulatory exposure (not enforcement) worth flagging: the EU Data Act (effective Sept 12, 2025) lets EU customers cancel subscriptions without cause on notice after a transition period — a churn-mechanics risk on the ~40% international base, not a violation.

---

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (EPS, next three fiscal years — FY27 / FY28 / FY29; FYE Jan 31)

Built bottom-up from FY26 actuals + FY27 guidance. Non-GAAP EPS basis (how Veeva guides/Street models); ~166M diluted shares, modestly shrinking on the buyback.

Anchors: FY26 non-GAAP EPS ≈ $6.85; FY27 non-GAAP op income guide $1.61B; FY27 consensus EPS ~$8.82 ]. FY27 guide: revenue $3.585–3.6B, ~44% non-GAAP op margin.

Input lines (base): Revenue $3.59B → ~$4.06B → ~$4.55B; non-GAAP op margin ~44.5% flat; interest income ~$280M+ on the cash pile (a real EPS tailwind while rates hold); tax ~21%; share count 166M → ~164M → ~162M (buyback net of SBC).

Valuation cross-check: at ~$153, the stock is 17–18x base FY27 nGAAP EPS ($8.85) and 15x base FY28 ($10.1) — for a >40%-margin, ~13%-grower, net-cash monopoly. A re-rate to even 25x FY28 EPS = ~$253; the consensus median PT ~$245–279 sits in that zone. The asymmetry is the thesis.

(Per --watchlist rules, NOT logging a forecast.ts Brier forecast in the unattended loop. The base case to log later, if promoted: "VEEV FY27 non-GAAP EPS ≥ $8.75," p≈0.62, resolves 2027-01-31.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

BULL CASE. Veeva is a regulatory-moated vertical-SaaS monopoly whose defensible half (R&D & Quality, ~55–60% of revenue, FDA-validated systems-of-record) is the faster-growing half (+20%+), now trading at ~20x forward EPS near 52-week lows because the market over-extrapolated a CRM skirmish onto the whole company. ~45% non-GAAP operating margins, ~$1.4B FCF, $7.3B net cash, a first-ever $2B buyback signaling management thinks it's cheap, and a founder-CEO who hasn't sold. Growth levers: (1) Veeva AI / Falcon "agentic labor" as a new monetizable line (early access Nov 2026) — Veeva is positioned to sell AI agents into its installed base, not just be disrupted by them; (2) Data Cloud (Crossix/OpenData) displacing IQVIA; (3) international (~40% → higher); (4) Vault CRM migration, if executed, locks customers deeper onto Veeva's own platform through 2030. Earnings surprise potential: services revenue is surging (+23%) on migration/AI work — a leading indicator of subscription pull-through.

BEAR CASE — three permanent-impairment risks:

1. Salesforce wins the CRM war. Agentforce Life Sciences already claims 140+ customers including AstraZeneca, Novartis, Pfizer, Takeda, AbbVie, Moderna, CSL. If the 2025→2030 Veeva-CRM-to-Vault forced migration becomes the moment customers re-evaluate and defect (because Veeva won't migrate their custom code anyway), Veeva could lose its Commercial base during the very transition meant to deepen it. Veeva's annual contracts give no multi-year lock-in to prevent this.
2. AI collapses the per-seat SaaS model. If agentic AI compresses the number of human seats pharma needs (fewer reps, fewer coordinators), Veeva's seat-based subscription pricing deflates even if Veeva "wins" technically. This is the fear sinking Salesforce (−32% YTD) and dragging Veeva with it.
3. Growth permanently settles into the low teens / high single digits. Three+ consecutive years of sub-20% growth, decelerating to ~12–13% guided FY27. If it keeps stepping down, the stock is a ~12x-EPS GARP name, not a ~30x compounder — and much of that de-rate has already happened (which is the bull's point).

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It's late 2027. Two of the top-20 pharma publicly chose Salesforce Agentforce over Vault CRM during their migration window; Commercial subscription went negative YoY; R&D/Quality decelerated to ~13% as biotech funding stayed tight; Falcon/Veeva AI monetization slipped and was dilutive to margin; the buyback was too small to matter; the stock is $110.

Are multiples too high? No — that is the contrarian crux. At ~17–20x forward EPS, expectations are already depressed; the multiple is below lower-quality peers. The risk is earnings, not multiple.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): The market is treating Salesforce's logo announcements as Veeva CRM losses, but many of those pharma are signing Agentforce for specific modules or as dual-vendors, not ripping out Veeva's R&D/Quality stack (which Salesforce doesn't even compete in). The market is pricing a 100%-CRM-loss scenario onto a company where CRM is <40% of revenue and the other 60% is barely contested. If R&D/Quality keeps compounding ~18–20%, Veeva grows through a CRM loss and the de-rating reverses.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• The moat the bulls cite is the half that's decelerating, and the growth they cite is cyclical. R&D/Quality's +20% is partly a catch-up from clinical-trial digitization that will mature; it is not guaranteed to stay ahead of the contested Commercial side forever.
• Revenue concentration is in the exact accounts Salesforce is courting. Top-20 pharma anchor both segments. A whale that moves its Commercial relationship to Salesforce is also the whale Veeva needs to keep expanding R&D modules into — losing the CRM relationship can poison the cross-sell. "No customer >10%" understates the strategic concentration in ~20 logos.
• The forced migration is an unforced strategic error that opened the door. Veeva chose to leave Salesforce, creating a 2025–2030 window in which every CRM customer must re-platform — and "we won't migrate your custom code" hands a competitive opening to Salesforce's own life-sciences cloud on a plate. Bulls call this "deepening the moat"; a short calls it "Veeva voluntarily put its entire Commercial base into play."
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Salesforce — not on features, but on AI distribution + price. Salesforce can bundle Agentforce Life Sciences into existing enterprise agreements and undercut, while pharma CIOs increasingly prefer one agentic platform. AstraZeneca/Novartis/Pfizer signing Agentforce is not noise.
• Capital-allocation tell, inverted: initiating a buyback can mean "cheap stock" — or it can mean "growth optionality is shrinking, so we're returning cash because we've run out of high-ROI things to build." For a company that always reinvested, a first-ever buyback is also a maturity signal.
• What must hold for $153 to work: R&D/Quality stays >15%, Commercial doesn't go negative, and AI is net-accretive (Veeva sells more agents than seats it loses). If growth disappoints by 20–30% (say FY28 revenue +8% instead of +13%), the GARP case breaks and you re-rate toward ~$110–120.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: agentic AI structurally deflates per-seat pharma software industry-wide AND Salesforce captures the agent layer for life-sciences commercial — Veeva keeps R&D/Quality but loses Commercial and the seat-pricing model erodes. Plausibility: moderate — the R&D/Quality regulatory moat makes total impairment unlikely, but Commercial impairment is a live, watchable risk.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of the top-20 pharma, exactly how many have contractually committed to Vault CRM vs. how many have signed Salesforce Agentforce Life Sciences for any commercial workload — and how many are now dual-vendor? (The single number that would most change the thesis.)
2. In the CRM-to-Vault migrations completed so far, what is the gross retention rate — and have you lost any migrating customer to a competitor at the re-platform decision point?
3. How does Veeva AI / Falcon pricing work — is it consumption/agent-based revenue additive to subscriptions, or does it cannibalize seat-based pricing? Quantify the FY27/FY28 revenue contribution you're underwriting.
4. If agentic AI reduces the number of human seats your customers need, what happens to your seat-priced Commercial subscriptions — and are you re-architecting pricing toward outcomes/consumption ahead of that?
5. Why was leaving the Salesforce platform worth opening every Commercial customer to a competitive re-evaluation during 2025–2030 — what did you gain that outweighs that risk?
6. R&D/Quality is now your larger, faster segment — how much of its ~20% growth is durable secular digitization vs. a one-time catch-up that mature-rates toward the low teens?
7. With ~$7.3B net cash and a first-ever buyback, what is the capital-allocation framework now — buyback pace, the bar for M&A, and why initiate returns rather than reinvest?
8. International is ~40% of revenue and the EU Data Act now lets EU customers cancel without cause — what churn impact are you modeling, and how do you defend the international base?
9. What is your honest assessment of where Salesforce's life-sciences cloud is genuinely competitive vs. where it isn't — and what is your win-rate trend in contested new-logo Commercial deals over the last four quarters?
10. Services revenue grew 23% — how much is migration vs. AI implementation, and is the surge a leading indicator of subscription growth or a one-time migration bulge that fades post-2030?
11. What are the realistic limits to non-GAAP operating margin (already ~44–45%) — is there leverage left, or do AI compute costs and competitive pricing cap it here?
12. How do you keep SBC (~$473M, ~15% of revenue) from chronically diluting holders, and what's the multi-year share-count trajectory net of the buyback?
13. Which single product area (Data Cloud, Falcon/agentic, a clinical/safety module) do you expect to be the largest new growth driver three years out, and why?
14. As a public benefit corporation, name a concrete decision in the last two years where the PBC duty led you somewhere a pure-shareholder company wouldn't have gone.
15. What is the one competitive or technological development that worries you most about Veeva's position in 2030?

---