MYR Group

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

MYR Group is a leading U.S./Canada specialty electrical contractor, founded 1891, HQ Thornton, Colorado, ~9,000 employees (~7,200 craft, ~85% unionized under IBEW/NECA agreements). It operates through wholly-owned subsidiaries under many trade names (The L.E. Myers Co., Sturgeon Electric, CSI Electrical Contractors, Huen Electric, Powerline Plus, etc.) and reports two segments:

• Transmission & Distribution (T&D) — since 1891. Design/engineer/build/maintain electric transmission lines, distribution networks and substations for electric utilities and power-generation companies; also EV-charging infrastructure, clean-energy interconnects and emergency storm-restoration. Serves utilities as prime contractor (design-bid-build or EPC), much of it under multi-year Master Service Agreements (MSAs). FY2025 revenue $2,002.4M.
• Commercial & Industrial (C&I) — since 1912. Electrical contracting for data centers, airports, hospitals, hotels, stadiums, manufacturing/processing/water-wastewater facilities, clean-energy projects, transportation/roadway lighting & signalization. FY2025 revenue $1,655.4M.

Contract structure & key terms: Fixed-price contracts were 57.0% of total revenue in FY2025 — the rest is time-and-materials, time-and-equipment, unit-price and cost-plus. This 57% fixed-price share is the single most important risk fact in the file: fixed-price = MYRG owns the cost-overrun risk, which is exactly what blew up in 2024 (Lens 5/13). MSAs run 1-4 years and are cancellable for convenience. No customer-concentration disclosure surfaced in the filing tables (customers.csv is empty); the customer base is utilities, hyperscaler/data-center developers, general contractors, governmental agencies and facility owners.

The datacenter angle, sized honestly: data centers are a growth vector inside C&I, not the company. Management would not give a hard %; the sell-side estimate is ~6% of total revenue in 2026, growing 30%+ next year. FMI data cited on the Q1 call: data-center construction starts up ~100% YoY. So the datacenter thesis is real and accelerating, but it is a single-digit slice riding a much larger grid-capex wave — not a pure-play.

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

MYRG sits in the middle of the electrical-infrastructure chain as the labor-and-execution layer:

• Upstream inputs → Electrical equipment and materials: transformers, switchgear, conductor/wire, cable, structural steel, poles, EV-charging hardware, and fuel for a large mobile fleet. The filing flags letters of credit to guarantee subsidiary obligations and exposure to commodity prices (copper/steel) and interest rates. Named single-source dependency: not disclosed at the vendor level — MYRG self-supplies much of its specialty tooling (it is a final-stage manufacturer of several of its own specialty vehicles — wire pullers, tensioners, digger derricks — via a centralized fleet group, reducing supplier reliance).
• The company → ~9,000 employees; ~85% union craft labor. Labor IS the supply chain for a contractor — the binding input is skilled IBEW linemen and electricians, not parts. A Seeking Alpha bear piece explicitly frames the risk as a "labor trap".
• Downstream / end customers: investor-owned & public electric utilities and power-gen companies (T&D); hyperscaler/data-center developers, general contractors, facility owners, governmental agencies (C&I). Q1-2026 named datacenter awards in New Jersey, Arizona, California and Colorado.
• Chokepoints: (1) craft-labor availability and wage inflation; (2) long-lead electrical equipment (transformers/switchgear lead times are an industry-wide bottleneck the whole grid build is fighting); (3) the customer's own permitting/interconnect timelines, which determine when backlog converts. MYRG's mitigant is a highly mobile fleet that shifts crews region-to-region for weather events and project surges.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

This is a moderate-moat, scale-and-reputation business, not a structural-moat business. Durable advantages:

• Scale + breadth in a fragmented trade. MYRG is "one of the largest U.S. contractors servicing the T&D sector". In an industry of thousands of small electrical contractors, only a handful (Quanta, MYR, IES, Primoris, MasTec) can self-perform the largest, most complex T&D and mega-C&I (datacenter) jobs nationally. That bonding capacity, safety record and multi-region fleet are the real barrier — a hyperscaler will not hand a $200M datacenter electrical scope to a regional shop.
• Long-standing utility relationships under MSAs. Switching costs are relationship- and qualification-based, not contractual. Utilities re-award MSAs to crews who execute safely; MYRG cites relationships "originated decades ago". Real but not ironclad — MSAs are cancellable.
• Self-performed specialty capability + owned fleet. Vertical integration of tooling/fleet (it builds its own wire pullers and modifies equipment on-site) lowers cost and improves uptime versus rivals dependent on rentals.
• Bargaining power: weak over customers (utilities and hyperscalers are large, sophisticated, multi-source their work, and impose fixed-price terms), moderate over suppliers (it self-supplies tooling; commodity inputs are pass-through-ish on better contracts). The 2026 margin-guide raise (C&I 5-7.5%→6-9%, T&D 7-10.5%→8-11%) is management asserting improved bargaining power via "better terms and conditions" in a tight-capacity market — the most bullish structural data point in the file, but it is a cyclical pricing window, not a permanent moat.

Verdict on moat: real but shallow and cyclical. The moat is "you can't easily build a national, safety-credentialed, well-bonded electrical contractor overnight" — which protects the industry's top tier from new entrants, but does not protect MYRG from its direct large peers or from the fixed-price project risk that periodically torches contractor margins.

Lens 4 · Segments

All figures ``. MYRG does not break out EBITDA by segment; it reports Income from Operations by segment (corporate cost shown separately).

*FY2023 segment op income not cleanly extractable from the flattened 10-K table — FY2023 consolidated net income was $91.0M / EPS $5.40. (FY2024 segment op income derived as segment revenue − segment operating costs from the footnote: T&D 1,880.5−1,811.1=69.4; C&I 1,481.8−1,433.7=48.0.)

Trend & cause: Both segments collapsed in 2024 (T&D op margin to 3.7%, C&I to 3.2%) on "unfavorable clean energy projects in the T&D segment and one project in the C&I segment" plus labor/inefficiency cost overruns. 2025 was the recovery as those problem fixed-price jobs completed (T&D 7.9%, C&I 5.9%). Q1-2026 is acceleration to within the newly-raised target ranges (T&D 9.6%, C&I 8.1%). Geography: U.S. dominant; Canada is the drag — domestic pre-tax income was $181.1M in FY2025 while foreign (Canada) lost −$19.8M (and −$17.6M in 2024). Canada has been a persistent loss-maker — a quiet but real margin headwind and a candidate for restructuring/exit.

Backlog by segment (the forward read): Total backlog $2,824.3M (Dec-2025) → $2,843.5M (Mar-2026), T&D $980.7M, C&I $1,862.9M. C&I backlog (datacenters/water) is now ~65% of total and still growing; T&D backlog dipped slightly q/q but management expects large 765 kV transmission awards "probably mid next year".

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result (latest print: Q1-2026, reported 2026-04-29)

A clean, large beat and the inflection that re-rated the stock. All `` unless noted.

• Revenue $1,000.4M, +20.0% YoY (vs $833.6M Q1-2025) — first $1B quarter. Beat consensus (~$0.93B) by ~7.5%.
• Net income $46.8M, +100.8% YoY (vs $23.3M). Diluted EPS $2.99, +106% (vs $1.45) — crushed the ~$2.06 consensus by ~45%.
• Gross margin 13.4% vs 11.6% Q1-2025; consolidated operating margin 6.47% ($64.7M/$1,000.4M) vs 4.11% — a ~235 bp operating-margin expansion driven by both segments and completion of higher-margin work.
• Record EBITDA $81.5M.
• Guidance / tone: management raised full-year 2026 to ~12% revenue growth (from "10-ish") and lifted operating-margin target bands (C&I 6-9%, T&D 8-11%), planning to run "mid-ish" in each. Tone shifted from "working through problem projects" (2024) to "well positioned for continued growth."
• Balance sheet: cash $163.2M (vs $150.2M at Dec-2025), operating cash flow $84.7M in the quarter, borrowings ~$47-58M — essentially net cash. No inventory/receivables red flag surfaced; FCF strongly positive.
• Market reaction: stock surged on the print and has continued to ~$501 (+114% YTD).

Unusual vs its own history: this is the best quarterly margin profile in years, and it is the mirror image of Q2-2024's net loss of −$0.91/share. The swing is real, but it is a recovery-to-strong-cycle swing, not a step-change in the business's structural economics.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

Transcripts/ is empty on disk; sourced from web transcripts, labeled ``. Tone arc across the last ~4 calls:

• Q3-2024 / FY2024: defensive — dominated by "problem projects," clean-energy T&D losses, the one bad C&I job, labor inefficiency; management guiding to completion "by year-end" and a return to "historical margin ranges".
• 2025 calls: stabilizing — "challenged projects completing," margins normalizing, backlog rebuilding on grid + data center.
• Q1-2026 (2026-04-30): confident/optimistic — "record" used repeatedly (revenue, net income, EBITDA, backlog); raised guidance; CEO Swartz attributing the improvement to "better contract management, better terms and conditions and then better execution… pre-fab, kitting our material, really being more efficient". COO Don Egan: "Data center projects and water, wastewater projects are driving the strongest growth."

Recurring phrases now: "disciplined bidding," "selective," "we don't want to be the first in on those projects," "we don't want 100% of our resources just doing data centers." Things they stopped saying: the apologetic "problem-project" language of 2024. Tell: the heavy emphasis on risk discipline and not over-indexing to datacenters is management implicitly acknowledging the sector's fixed-price danger — they got burned in 2024 and are signaling they won't repeat it. Credible, but unprovable until the next down-cycle.

Lens 7 · Comps

Peer set = the listed U.S. electrical/infrastructure self-perform contractors. Multiples are `` with source/date; where a clean figure isn't sourced it is marked n/a. Do not treat the cross-source P/Es as precise — they drift by vendor and date.

5-yr avg ROE: not sourced as a clean series — flagged n/a. Spot ROE: MYRG FY2025 net income $118.4M on ~$668M equity (retained $503.2M + APIC $165.2M + par/AOCI, less treasury ) ≈ **17.7% ; but FY2024 ROE was only ~4.5% ** — the ROE is highly cyclical, swinging with project margins, which is precisely why a peak-cycle multiple is dangerous.

Read: MYRG at ~43x forward is richer than IESC (~38x) and PRIM (~31x), cheaper than PWR (~80x) — but PWR is the $100B sector king with a far longer, more diversified, more proven track record. MYRG is being valued closer to the bellwether than to its direct-size peers, on the strength of one recovery year. The PRIM blow-up the very same month is the comp the market is choosing to ignore.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves MYRG >5%)

Mostly ``. The 5-year pattern is dominated by margin surprises on fixed-price project execution and, lately, the datacenter/grid narrative:

• 2024 down-leg: Q2-2024 and Q3-2024 earnings misses/loss on clean-energy T&D + one C&I problem project → multi-quarter de-rating to the low (~$110-170 area).
• 2025-2026 up-leg: the recovery prints (margin normalization) + every incremental datacenter/grid-capex headline. Stock +114% YTD 2026, +204% market cap YoY, 52-wk low-to-high $171.51 → $502.08.
• Q1-2026 earnings (2026-04-30): the +45% EPS beat + guidance raise = the single biggest up-catalyst; "stock surge after earnings beat".
• Tuck-in M&A: Valley and Comet Electric grid-capability deals were positively received.

What the market actually reacts to: (1) segment operating-margin direction (beat = re-rate, miss = crush — this is a margin-surprise stock); (2) datacenter/grid thematic flow (it trades as an AI-infrastructure derivative even though datacenters are ~6% of revenue); (3) backlog records. It does not trade on dividends (none) or buybacks primarily. The thematic premium is the fragile part — it can compress fast if the AI-capex narrative cools or a peer (see PRIM) reminds the market of execution risk.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO Richard "Rick" Swartz, Jr. — CEO since January 2017 (~9.25 yr tenure), a long-time MYRG insider; total comp ~$6.39M, 85% variable/equity. CFO Kelly Huntington (SVP & CFO); COO T&D Brian Stern, COO C&I Don Egan; Chair Bradley M. Johnson, majority-independent board.
• Track record: Swartz steered MYRG through a long growth run (revenue ~$1.4B in 2017 to $3.66B in 2025), but also presided over the 2024 clean-energy project blow-up (net income collapsed to $30.3M / EPS $1.83 from $91.0M / $5.40) — and the 2025-2026 recovery. So: capable operator, with one self-inflicted execution failure squarely on his watch, now corrected. The honest read is "recovered well from a wound he helped cause."
• Skin in the game: Swartz holds ~160,238 shares (~1.05%), ~$54M at $501 — meaningful in dollars, modest as a % (this is a professional-manager, not a founder-owner). Single-class, one-share-one-vote — clean governance, institution-friendly.
• Capital allocation: disciplined and conservative. FY2025: $75M of buybacks (639,207 shares @ $117.33 avg — bought back ~4x cheaper than today's price, a genuine value-add); ~$94M capex; near-zero net debt; cash built from $3.5M (Dec-24) to $150.2M (Dec-25) to $163.2M (Mar-26). On the Q1 call, Swartz framed the cash as optionality for acquisitions or more buybacks and guided capex up to ~3% of revenue for prefab capacity. ROIC/ROE is cyclical (17.7% FY25 vs ~4.5% FY24 ) — capital allocation is prudent; the returns swing with the project cycle, not with allocation skill.
• Red flags: none material. No related-party deals surfaced; comp is mostly performance-based; no strategy whiplash; no promotional behavior (management was, if anything, under-promotional through 2024). Canada's chronic losses are an unaddressed operational sore.
• Archetype: seasoned professional manager running a conservative, well-bonded contractor. The right archetype for this business; the risk is execution on fixed-price scope, not stewardship.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst on the filings:

• Revenue recognition (the #1 area): MYRG recognizes revenue over time (cost-to-cost percentage-of-completion) on construction contracts, with 57% of revenue fixed-price. This is inherently estimate-driven — the 2024 losses were precisely a percentage-of-completion estimate failure (cost overruns on clean-energy jobs recognized late). The 10-K/10-Q disclose recurring changes in estimates: in one period a favorable change added net income $5.6M / $0.36 EPS; in another $6.3M / $0.39; FY-level changes were material in 2023 ($96.9M NI / $5.86 EPS cited). This is the structural soft spot — earnings quality depends on the reliability of forward cost estimates on long fixed-price jobs, and history proves those estimates can be wrong by enough to swing a quarter to a loss.
• Cash vs earnings: favorable divergence currently — FY2025 operating cash flow $326.6M vs net income $118.4M (cash >> earnings, driven by working-capital release); Q1-2026 OCF $84.7M vs NI $46.8M. No earnings-quality red flag; if anything cash conversion is strong.
• Receivables/inventory vs revenue: no flagged outrunning; contract assets/retainage are normal for the trade (a contractor carries large contract receivables and costs-in-excess-of-billings — monitor, but not anomalous).
• SBC: modest; net income is GAAP, not a non-GAAP-flattered figure (the EPS beats are GAAP diluted).
• Goodwill/intangibles: Goodwill ~$115.3M (T&D + C&I + $25.8M C&I, FX-adjusted); amortizable customer relationships ~$40-46M, backlog intangible fully amortized; total intangibles ~$72.5M net. No impairment flagged despite the 2024 losses — reasonable given the recovery, but watch Canada.
• Leverage/leases: low. Borrowings ~$47.4M on a $490M revolver (avail $408.3M), finance leases ~$2M, working capital $265.5M. Off-balance-sheet exposure is mainly letters of credit ($34.3M) and surety bonds — normal for a bonded contractor.
• Joint ventures: backlog includes ~$167-176M proportionate unconsolidated JV share — a small area where one-month-in-arrears reporting and equity-method treatment reduce transparency. Minor.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC Litigation Releases: None — "No LR found for this company" via EDGAR EFTS since 2021-06-30.
• SEC AAERs: None.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web): no material FTC/DOJ/EPA/OSHA enforcement action against MYR Group surfaced in search. (For a heavy-construction/utility contractor the live regulatory exposure is routine OSHA safety and environmental/cleanup liability, disclosed as ordinary-course, not as a specific enforcement action.)
• 10-K Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): MYRG discloses only ordinary-course litigation — "named as a defendant in lawsuits, claims and other legal proceedings that arise in the ordinary course of business" seeking personal-injury/breach-of-contract/property damages, with management citing "strong defenses… and insurance coverage" — no specific material proceeding identified.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (LR, AAER), web search, and 10-K Item 3 as of 2026-06-30. The genuine forensic risk here is not fraud — it is percentage-of-completion estimate risk on fixed-price contracts, which is an earnings-volatility risk, not an integrity red flag.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection (EPS, FY2026 → FY2028)

Built bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + management's raised FY2026 guidance. Output `` with arithmetic; inputs labeled. Base year FY2025 actual: revenue $3,657.9M, diluted EPS $7.53, ~15.6M dil. shares.

Anchor inputs:

• Mgmt FY2026 guide: ~12% revenue growth → ~$4.10B (matches sell-side $4.09B); op-margin bands C&I 6-9%, T&D 8-11%, "run mid-ish".
• Share count ~flat-to-down (buyback offsets dilution; 639k repurchased in FY25).
• Sell-side consensus: FY2026 EPS $9.47 (range $8.37-$10.43), FY2027 EPS $10.94 (range $9.10-$12.85).

• Base derivation: $4.10B × ~6.3% blended op margin ≈ $258M op income; less ~$5M net interest, ~24% tax, /15.6M sh ≈ **$9.4 EPS ** — in line with the $9.47 consensus. FY2027/28 extend ~12-15% EPS growth on continued grid/datacenter volume + the higher margin bands holding.
• Bear logic: the entire uplift is operating-margin-driven; if even one large fixed-price clean-energy/datacenter job goes bad (the 2024 playbook, the 2026 PRIM playbook), blended margin reverts toward 5% and EPS stalls or falls even with revenue growth. The bear case is not "revenue disappoints" — it's "margins normalize/regress," which is the more likely failure mode.

Valuation cross-check (the punchline): at $501, base FY2026 EPS $9.40 → ~53x trailing-style / ~43x this-year earnings; even on the bull FY2028 $15.50, that's ~32x out two years. Sell-side price targets ($287-320) imply ~30-34x the $9.47 — i.e. the analysts think fair value is ~40% below spot. To justify $501 you need bull-case margins to hold for years and multiple persistence. (Forecast NOT logged via forecast.ts per --watchlist rules — no Brier commit in breadth mode.)

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case. The U.S. grid is entering a multi-year, possibly multi-decade super-cycle: electrification, AI-datacenter load (FMI: datacenter starts +~100% YoY), aging T&D assets, reshoring, and 765 kV inter-regional transmission. MYRG is one of the few national contractors with the scale, bonding and safety record to win the largest jobs, now executing with restored discipline ("better terms and conditions"), raising margin guidance, sitting on net cash with optionality for M&A/buybacks, and management that bought back stock at $117 (¼ of today's price). Record revenue, EPS, EBITDA and backlog, all inflecting up. If the new 6-11% segment margin bands are the new normal (not a peak), EPS compounds mid-teens and the stock grows into the multiple. Earnings-surprise upside is structurally to the upside in a tight-capacity market.

Bear case (2-3 permanent-impairment-ish risks). (1) Fixed-price execution risk is endemic and recurring — 57% of revenue is fixed-price; MYRG already proved in 2024 it can swing to a quarterly loss on clean-energy project overruns, and Primoris just lost 40% of its market cap in June 2026 on the identical renewables failure mode + a COO exit. This is not a tail risk; it's a cycle feature. (2) Margin mean-reversion — the bull case capitalizes peak-cycle margins; contractor margins are cyclical and competition in datacenter/clean-energy is rising (management itself flags "increased competition"). (3) The thematic multiple is the fragile asset, not the business — MYRG trades as an AI-infrastructure derivative at 43x forward on ~6% datacenter revenue; if AI-capex sentiment cools or a peer stumbles, the multiple can halve while the business is fine.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): It's late 2027. MYRG took a large write-down on a fixed-price datacenter or 765 kV clean-energy job (cost overruns + labor inefficiency — the 2024 movie, re-run), one quarter printed a margin miss, the AI-datacenter narrative had already cooled, the 43x multiple compressed to ~20x on the now-lower forward EPS, and the stock is back in the $250s — exactly the sell-side target. Nothing fraudulent happened; the market simply stopped paying a software multiple for a construction business after one reminder of what construction risk is.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on any historical or peer-relative basis. MYRG's own end-2025 P/E was ~28.8x; it now trades ~55x trailing / 43x forward — roughly double its recent self and above same-size peers IESC/PRIM. The 5-yr ROE is cyclical (sub-5% to ~18%). A 4-6% operating-margin business at 43x forward requires either margins to permanently re-rate higher or the multiple to compress.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see): the market is treating MYRG as a secular AI-infrastructure compounder and pricing it like one, while the company is — by its own filings and its own 2024 history — a cyclical, fixed-price, labor-constrained electrical contractor whose margins just happen to be at a multi-year high. The contrarian, falsifiable claim: the next fixed-price project scare (in MYRG or a visible peer) re-anchors the multiple toward the contractor range (15-25x), and the stock de-rates 30-45% even if revenue and backlog keep growing. PRIM in June 2026 is the dress rehearsal.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case:

• How the money breaks: 57% fixed-price revenue means one mis-estimated mega-job (datacenter electrical scope or a clean-energy/765 kV line) can vaporize a quarter's profit via percentage-of-completion catch-up — demonstrated in 2024 (net loss quarter) and demonstrated at Primoris in June 2026 (−40% in a day). The bulls are paying 43x forward for a business model whose single largest line item carries unhedged cost-overrun risk.
• Revenue concentration / shift: the growth is concentrated in C&I datacenter + water (and the thematic premium is concentrated in datacenters specifically). If hyperscaler capex digests/slows, the highest-growth, highest-multiple part of the story stalls — and C&I is already 65% of backlog.
• Moat weaker than bulls think: the "moat" is bonding capacity, safety record and relationships — replicable by Quanta (10x larger), IES, MasTec and PRIM, all chasing the same datacenter/grid dollars. Pricing power is a current tight-capacity phenomenon, not a durable barrier. When capacity catches up, the 6-11% margin bands compress.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: Quanta (PWR) — vastly larger, more diversified, deeper utility relationships, and able to outbid/outresource MYRG on the biggest jobs while absorbing a bad project without printing a loss. Also IES (38.5% ROE) on the C&I/datacenter side.
• Worst capital-allocation / accounting concerns: none egregious — but watch the recurring "changes in estimates" that swing EPS by $0.36-$0.39 a quarter (and far more annually); these are the legal, GAAP mechanism by which fixed-price optimism flatters or hammers a print. Canada's chronic losses ($-19.8M FY25) are value destruction left unaddressed.
• What must hold for $501: (a) the new 6-11% margin bands are permanent, not peak; (b) no large project write-down through 2027; (c) the AI-datacenter capex theme stays hot and the market keeps paying a 40x+ multiple; (d) revenue compounds ~12%+. All four must hold. Break any one and the sell-side $287-320 (or worse) becomes the gravity.
• If growth disappoints 20-30%: revenue ~$3.3-3.5B with margin reversion to ~5% → EPS back toward $6-7 (FY2024-ish territory); at a re-rated 20-25x contractor multiple that's a $120-175 stock — a 65-75% drawdown from $501. That is the asymmetry the current price ignores.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a multi-hundred-million fixed-price datacenter or clean-energy job that goes catastrophically over (litigation + reputational hit with a hyperscaler) in a cooling-capex environment — plausible enough that it has a recent precedent in the company itself and a same-month precedent in a direct peer. Not base case, but materially more likely than a 43x multiple implies.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (15, ordered by information value)

1. Of the new 6-9% (C&I) and 8-11% (T&D) operating-margin bands, how much is durable structural improvement (terms, prefab, kitting) versus a cyclical tight-capacity pricing window — and what do those bands look like if industry capacity catches demand in 2027-28?
2. What is your largest single fixed-price project by contract value today, in what end-market (datacenter? 765 kV clean energy?), and what is the worst-case P&L exposure if it overruns — i.e., how do you ensure 2024 (or Primoris's 2026) does not repeat?
3. Walk through exactly what failed on the 2024 clean-energy T&D and C&I problem projects — root cause — and which specific controls now make that a one-time event rather than a cycle feature.
4. What precise % of revenue and of backlog is data center today, and what is your hard ceiling on datacenter concentration given you said you "don't want 100% of resources just doing data centers"?
5. Canada has lost money two years running (−$19.8M FY2025). What is the plan — fix, shrink, or exit — and by when?
6. With $160M+ net cash, rank your capital-allocation priorities at today's $500 share price: organic capex, M&A multiples you'd pay, or buybacks (you bought at $117 — would you buy here)?
7. How much of the FY2026 12% revenue guide is in backlog/contracted versus dependent on book-and-burn and not-yet-awarded large transmission?
8. On the "765 kV opportunities mid next year" — what is the realistic award size, timing, and your win-probability, and how concentrated is the risk in a single owner/utility?
9. How are you pricing/structuring fixed-price datacenter scopes differently now (escalators, shared-risk, T&E conversion) to avoid taking commodity/labor inflation on the chin?
10. What is craft-labor availability doing to your ability to convert this record backlog — is the binding constraint now linemen/electricians rather than awards (the "labor trap")?
11. How should we think about normalized ROIC/ROE through a full cycle, given it ran ~4.5% in 2024 and ~18% in 2025?
12. What share of contract receivables is retainage/costs-in-excess-of-billings, and how is collection risk trending with hyperscaler vs utility vs GC counterparties?
13. How exposed is the cost base to copper/steel/transformer lead times, and what's contractually passed through vs absorbed?
14. What's your M&A pipeline ("high-quality companies") — what capabilities or geographies are you buying, and at what EBITDA multiples, without overpaying into a hot market?
15. What would have to go wrong for FY2027 EPS to come in below FY2025's $7.53 — i.e., what's the realistic downside scenario you plan against?

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