Renishaw

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

What it makes money doing. Renishaw is the UK's largest metrology company — a designer and in-house manufacturer of high-accuracy measurement and precision-manufacturing systems. Founded 1973 by Sir David McMurtry and John Deer after McMurtry, a Rolls-Royce engineer, invented the touch-trigger probe to measure the Olympus engine fuel pipes on Concorde. That single invention — a probe that trips a signal the instant it touches a surface — remains the DNA of the company: sell the sensor that lets a machine know exactly where it is, then sell the software and calibration around it.

The model is a razor/razorblade capital-equipment + consumables hybrid: high-value capital systems (CMMs, additive machines, gauging cells) plus a long tail of probes, styli, encoder read-heads and calibration artefacts that recur. Gross margin excluding engineering ran 58.8% in H1 FY2026 (61.5% prior year) — the margin signature of a differentiated component maker, not a systems integrator.

Three reporting segments (reorganised in FY2026 from the old two-segment "Manufacturing Technologies / Analytical & Medical" structure):

1. Industrial Metrology (IM) — £212.1m H1 FY2026 (58% of group): CMM systems (5-axis AGILITY), shop-floor gauging (Equator / Equator-X), machine-tool probes and tool-setters (NC4+ Blue), machine calibration (laser/ballbar, XK20), MODUS software.
2. Position Measurement (PM) — £110.5m H1 (30%): open optical + magnetic encoders (the core franchise), laser encoders (semiconductor wafer inspection), enclosed optical (FORTiS), and the new ASTRiA inductive encoder for defence/rugged applications.
3. Specialised Technologies (ST) — £43.0m H1 (12%): metal additive manufacturing (RenAM 500 series — the fastest-growing line in FY2026), Raman spectroscopy (new Strada microscope), and the residual, being-exited neurological business.

Customers / channels. Sells globally through a direct sales force across three regions (Americas, EMEA, APAC). End markets: semiconductor & electronics equipment builders, machine-tool OEMs, automotive & aerospace manufacturers, consumer-electronics subcontractors, defence, and medical/dental. No customer-concentration disclosure in the interim; the base is fragmented across thousands of manufacturers and equipment builders, which is a structural strength.

Contract structure. Predominantly transactional capital-equipment + consumables sales (not take-or-pay, not subscription). Cyclicality is the trade-off for that lack of lock-in contracts — but switching costs are high once a probe/encoder is designed into a customer's machine (see Lens 3).

Supply Chain

Renishaw is unusually vertically integrated — "world-class in-house manufacturing" is a stated pillar. Most R&D is in the UK; largest manufacturing sites are UK, Ireland and India.

Map (named stakeholders):

• Upstream inputs → precision optics and glass scales, rare-earth magnets (magnetic encoders), semiconductors/ASICs for read-head electronics, specialty metals & gas-atomised metal powders (for additive), machined castings. Renishaw makes many sub-components itself (scales, styli, castings) — a deliberate choke-point-avoidance strategy. Rare-earth magnets and specialty electronics are the residual external dependencies; metal-powder feedstock for AM is partly in-house.
• Renishaw (the value-add) → probe/encoder/gauge design + assembly, calibration to national standards (traceability is the product), embedded software.
• Downstream / who buys → the customer set is itself a supply chain of the frontier:
• Semiconductor-equipment builders (the equipment that makes AI chips) — Renishaw laser + optical encoders provide the nanometre stage positioning inside wafer-handling, inspection and lithography-adjacent tools. This is the AI-infra thread. (Renishaw does not disclose which OEMs; the category names — lithography/inspection/deposition tool builders — are the buyers.)
• Machine-tool OEMs (DMG Mori, Mazak, Makino-class builders) embed Renishaw probes and FORTiS encoders — historically the biggest, most China-exposed, and currently softest channel.
• CMM / automotive / aerospace metrology labs, consumer-electronics subcontractors (Apple-supply-chain gauging via Equator in APAC), defence primes (additive parts + ASTRiA encoders).
• Key chokepoint / single-source dependency: Renishaw's own encoder read-head + glass-scale line is itself a chokepoint for its customers — it is one of only two credible global suppliers of high-end open encoders. The company's own vulnerability is narrower: rare-earth magnets (China-sourced industry-wide) and the semicap demand concentration, not input scarcity.

Verdict on the chain: short, self-controlled upstream (a strength that protects the 59% gross margin); the risk is entirely on the demand side — semicap + China machine tools — not supply.

Competitive Advantages (moats)

Moat = design-in switching costs + patented sensing IP + brand-grade accuracy/traceability. Renishaw is the textbook "narrow-but-deep" precision moat:

• Switching costs (the primary moat). Once a Renishaw probe or encoder is designed into a machine-tool OEM's product or a fab's tool, changing it means re-qualifying the entire motion/measurement loop — expensive, slow, and risk-laden on a machine whose whole value is accuracy. This is why the established open-encoder and probe lines throw off 23%+ segment margins (PM adjusted op margin 23.4% H1 FY2026) even in a cyclical trough.
• Patented IP. The company is a serial patenter and litigant — the moat is legally defended (see Lens 10; historically Renishaw v. Marposs set UK patent-claim-construction precedent). Continuous new-product cadence (Equator-X, XK20, NC4+ Blue, Strada, ASTRiA, Tempus AM, PH20+) refreshes the patent estate.
• Brand / traceability. In metrology the product is trust — calibration traceable to national standards. Renishaw's name carries that in aerospace/automotive/semicap QA.

Bargaining power. Strong over customers for the differentiated encoder/probe lines (few substitutes); weaker in commoditising areas (some CMM/machine-tool sensors were "flat" and price-competitive ). Over suppliers: strong, given in-house manufacturing.

Where the moat is thinner than it looks. In industrial metrology systems (CMMs, gauging) Renishaw is a challenger, not the leader — Hexagon leads (~13.3% share 2025); the top-5 (Hexagon, Zeiss, Keyence, Mitutoyo, FARO) hold ~40.7%. In encoders, the durable moat, the binding rival is Dr. Johannes Heidenhain GmbH (private, German) — the incumbent Renishaw has spent decades displacing. The moat is deep in encoders/probes; it is a share-gain grind everywhere else.

Segments

Hard requirement — every figure `` (research-layer our figures is empty).

By product segment — H1 FY2026 (6 mo to 31 Dec 2025):

Read of the trend (and cause):

• Position Measurement is the crown jewel — 23.4% segment margin, accelerating on semiconductor/electronics encoder demand. Mix noise this half: laser encoders (semicap wafer inspection) dipped vs an "abnormally strong" comp; magnetic + FORTiS enclosed + new ASTRiA inductive picked up. Margin dipped 4.3pt YoY to 23.4% purely on FX + mix (still above the 22.5% FY2025 full-year level).
• Industrial Metrology is the ballast — steady 15% margin, driven by AGILITY 5-axis CMMs (Americas) and Equator gauging into APAC consumer-electronics; dragged by flat CMM/machine-tool sensors in EMEA autos.
• Specialised Technologies is the swing factor — losses cut from −£7.9m to −£0.6m in a year, a 21pt margin swing, almost entirely from additive-manufacturing operating leverage (metal AM the fastest-growing line, strong defence demand) plus the restructuring/closure of the loss-making neurological business. ST is the "get-to-breakeven-then-inflect" story.

By geography — H1 FY2026:

APAC (semiconductor encoders + consumer-electronics gauging) is ~half the business — this is the China/Asia cyclicality that drove the 2022-24 profit warnings. Americas surging on high-value capital sales (+ ~£5m tariff surcharges). EMEA the laggard — soft machine-tool/auto demand and a self-inflicted ERP-transition disruption to deliveries in Sept 2025 that partly reverses in H2.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result — H1 FY2026 (reported 11 Feb 2026)

The latest print is a clean beat on the adjusted line and a deliberately ugly statutory line:

• Beat vs. its own trajectory: Q2 revenue £194.8m was a record for any quarter, +14.1% on Q1 — a genuine order-book inflection, not a soft-comp artefact. Management explicitly raised the tone: "we enter H2 with momentum … confident of achieving strong growth for the year as a whole."
• What drove it: semiconductor + electronics encoders (APAC), 5-axis CMM + AM capital sales (Americas), additive-manufacturing operating leverage. Defence a repeated call-out.
• Margin bridge: +4.4pt organic (fixed-cost cuts + productivity + operating leverage; of which restructuring/neuro contributed 2.4pt), offset by −3.8pt of currency & tariff headwind (£8.0m lower forward-FX contract income + £5.2m adverse FX = −3.6pt; tariffs neutral to profit but dilutiveDilutionIssuing new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the same company. to margin). The margin problem is largely FX, not operations — a bullish tell for the 20% target if sterling stabilises.
• The £18.0m statutory hit = redundancy/impairment on previously-announced restructuring + drug-delivery closure + a "loss of office" payment + historical tax interest. This is the kitchen-sink of the Will Lee reset — it depresses statutory EPS and the 50.8x trailing P/E (see Lens 7), which flatters the apparent expensiveness.
• Balance-sheet flags: cash & deposits £240.9m (down from £273.6m at FY2025 YE) — dividend (£44.6m final paid), £14.6m restructuring cash out, working-capital build. Inventories up £5.4m to £164.9m — but deliberately, to serve the record order book (bullish, not a demand-miss signal). Receivables down slightly to £126.1m. Net cash, no debt. Cash conversion 68% (below 70% target) on the WC build.
• Market reaction: shares are ~£51.75 in July 2026 vs a 2021 peak in the mid-to-high-£60s — the stock has recovered hard off the 2023-24 trough but has not reclaimed the takeover-era high, so the beat is being rewarded but not euphorically.

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the research shelf — sentiment read from primary company disclosures.

Trajectory of management tone across the cycle:

• FY2022 → FY2024 (McMurtry-era tail, semicap/China bust): defensive. May 2022 profit warning (China Covid lockdowns); Oct 2023 Q1 FY2024 update — revenue −9% YoY, adj PBT −30% — "trading conditions remain challenging due to subdued demand" in semiconductors.
• FY2025 (Will Lee reset): pivot from "weathering the cycle" to "self-help." The language becomes about cost reduction, the 20% margin target, restructuring the neurological business, and ROIC.
• H1 FY2026 (11 Feb 2026) → CMD (16 Jun 2026): unmistakably more confident. Recurring new phrases: "record Q2," "growing order book," "momentum into H2," "emerging product lines gaining traction," "structural growth drivers." Management now leads with semiconductor/AI, defence and additive as the three drivers.
• What they stopped saying: the China-weakness hedging that dominated 2022-24 is gone from the headline; EMEA softness is now framed as isolated + self-inflicted (ERP), not structural.

The honest caution they kept: at the CMD they explicitly said they "don't know how long the AI-related cycle will last" — a refreshingly non-promotional admission for a name now leaning on the AI narrative.

Comps

* Spectris is a live takeout (Advent/KKR bidding war, 2025) — its multiple reflects a bid, not a clean trading comp; use with caution.

Read: on a trailing statutory P/E (50.8x) Renishaw looks eye-watering — but that's distorted by the £18m restructuring charge crushing statutory EPS. On ~33x forward adjusted it sits in line with UK quality-compounder Halma (33.5x) and below Keyence (46x), above Hexagon (21.6x fwd). The market prices Renishaw as a quality compounder, not a cyclical — which is precisely the debate (Lens 12/13): it has cyclical semicap/China revenue but compounder-grade IP. The re-rate gap to close is toward Hexagon if it disappoints, toward Keyence if the 20% margin lands.

Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~5-year pattern)

• Mar 2021 — +sharp spike: founders McMurtry & Deer put their combined 53% stake up for sale (£2.5bn); shares surged to the cycle high on takeover hope.
• Jul 2021 — −drop: Board withdrew the sale — Hexagon, Schneider, Siemens all passed on the steep price; no bid met "all stakeholders". De-rate began.
• May 2022 — −profit warning: cut FY guide on China Covid lockdowns (adj PBT £155-170m vs £157-181m).
• Oct 2023 — −profit warning: Q1 FY2024 revenue −9% YoY to £164.5m, adj PBT ~£28m (−30% YoY); semiconductor downturn. Trough of the cycle.
• 2025-2026 — +recovery: semicap/AI capexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. turn + self-help restructuring; record Q2 FY2026; CMD reframes as AI-infra/defence/additive.

What the pattern reveals: this stock trades on (1) the semiconductor/China capex cycle and (2) event risk around the founder stake. Item 2 is now largely removed — the Nov-2025 Deltam consolidation locks the family in as long-term holders (Lens 9), taking the takeover-lottery premium and overhang off the table. So forward, RSW.L is a cleaner semicap-cycle + margin-self-help instrument. Earnings/guidance and semicap datapoints (not M&A) will drive it.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

• CEO — Will Lee (since 2018; first non-founder CEO). Track record: internal engineer-turned-CEO who inherited a founder-run, under-managed-for-margin business and is executing the first real efficiency reset in Renishaw's history — 20%+ margin target, ~£23m annualised cost-out, headcount 5,347→4,975 in six months, closure of the Edinburgh research site and the loss-making neurological/drug-delivery business. He is doing the unglamorous work founders rarely do. Quantified delivery so far: took ST from −£7.9m to −£0.6m and lifted group ROIC to 13.2% — but margins are still ~16% vs the 20% target he set, and has been "within reach" for two years. Credible operator; not yet proven he can land the 20%.
• Tenure & skin in the game: the defining feature. Founder families own 50.25% via Deltam Holdings Ltd (established 25 Nov 2025 to consolidate the McMurtry estate + John Deer holdings for generational transfer). This is enormous aligned ownership — but held by the founding families, not management. Camille Deer (John Deer's granddaughter) joined the Board Sept 2025 — a deliberate next-generation succession signal.
• Capital allocation: conservative-to-a-fault. Net cash, no debt, heavy in-house capex now tapering (FY2026 PP&E ~£40m, down from the recent build-out in Miskin UK + India). Steady progressive dividend (~78p, ~1.5% yield). No buybacks, no transformational M&A — the founders' culture is organic, patient, R&D-funded compounding. Historically this built the moat; the open question is whether £240m of idle cash should be working harder.
• Red flags: low. The governance transition is the watch-item, not a scandal — simultaneously: new permanent CFO search (Allen Roberts retired Dec 2025; Rob Macdonald interim), search for an independent Non-executive Chair, and an additional independent NED. A founder-controlled board professionalising itself mid-cycle. The £18m of one-offs includes a "loss of office payment" — normal for a reset, worth watching it doesn't recur.
• Archetype: transitioning from founder-run institution (McMurtry, d. Dec 2024, was executive chairman until June 2024) to professional management under family ownership — the Roche/Swatch model. For this stage (a quality asset that was run for engineering excellence over shareholder margin), a competent professional manager with the family's patient capital behind him is the right archetype — if he delivers the margin.

Forensic Red Flags

Accounting quality is high and conservative — this is a clean set of books, with the usual adjusted-vs-statutory caveats:

• Adjusted vs statutory gap (the one thing to police): H1 statutory PBT £46.0m vs adjusted £64.1m — an £18.0m add-back. Composition is disclosed and defensible (redundancy/impairment on announced restructuring, drug-delivery closure, loss-of-office, historical tax interest). It is genuinely non-recurring if the restructuring is a one-time reset. Verify it doesn't become an annual "adjusting item" habit — the single most important line to watch each print.
• Revenue recognition: capital-equipment + consumables, point-in-time on delivery — low aggressiveness risk. No long-dated take-or-pay or percentage-of-completion games.
• Working capital vs revenue: inventories +£5.4m to £164.9m ahead of revenue — flagged by management as a deliberate build for the H2 order book, not channel-stuffing (receivables actually fell). Benign, but confirm it converts in H2.
• Cash vs earnings: adjusted cash conversion 68% — below the 70% target on the WC build; not a divergence red flag, but not a clean tick either.
• SBC / non-GAAP flattering: minimal — this is not a tech name leaning on stock-comp add-backs.
• Goodwill/intangibles: modest; R&D largely expensed (engineering 12.1% of revenue runs through the P&L), not capitalised aggressively — conservative, and a hidden earnings-quality positive.
• FX complexity: the one genuine analytical hazard — forward currency contracts materially swing the reported line (£8.0m of the YoY "growth gap" was lower forward-FX income vs a favourable 2022 mini-Budget-era hedge book). Constant-currency is the truer operating read; reported can mislead in both directions.

Regulatory findings:

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): none, and none possible — Renishaw has no CIK; it is UK-listed and not an SEC filer.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search — FTC/DOJ/FDA/consent-decree/fine/penalty): no material findings surfaced for 2023-2025.
• Litigation: no material current proceedings found. Renishaw is a serial IP litigant by design — historically Renishaw v. Marposs (a landmark UK patent claim-construction case) and encoder-patent skirmishes vs Heidenhain-linked entities. This is offensive moat-defence, not a liability.
• Conclusion: No material regulatory or legal findings — verified via SEC EDGAR EFTS (no CIK / not applicable), web enforcement search, and company disclosures as of 2026-07-10. (Note: the UK-primary equivalent of a 10-KForm 10-KA company’s audited annual report to the US regulator. The most complete thing it publishes. Item 3 — the FY2025 Annual Report legal/principal-risks section — was not on the shelf; principal risks per company are: geopolitical uncertainty, low-price competition, product innovation, industry fluctuations, non-compliance with laws, capital-products growth, cyber, exchange rates, IT transformation, people.)

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection

Anchored on management's own explicit FY2026 guidance:

• FY2026 revenue: £740m – £780m · Adjusted PBT: £132m – £157m. (H1 already banked £365.6m rev / £64.1m adj PBT; H2 is seasonally stronger.)

Base / bull / bear adjusted-EPS path (fiscal years end 30 June; ~72.7m shares; ~21.8% tax) — every output ``, arithmetic shown:

The whole thesis reduces to the margin bridge. Revenue growth is the easier variable (structural drivers + guidance); the swing between the £1.40 bear and the £2.30 bull FY2028 EPS is almost entirely whether the 20% margin lands. At ~£51.75, ~33x FY26e / ~27x FY27e forward adjusted, the price already assumes the base-to-bull margin path.

Per --watchlist rules, no our model create logged (breadth mode). If promoted to a call, log the Brier forecast: "RSW.L FY2028 adjusted operating margin ≥ 18%," p≈0.55, resolves 2028-08-31.

Bull vs Bear

Bull case. Renishaw is a wide-moat precision-sensor franchise finally being run for margin, sitting on three genuine structural tailwinds it did not have to invent: (1) AI-infrastructure semicap capex — semiconductor is now >20% of revenue and its encoders are the position-feedback organ inside the tools that build AI chips; (2) defence rearmament — ASTRiA inductive encoders + additive-manufactured parts, a step-change new channel; (3) metal additive manufacturing inflecting to profit — the fastest-growing line, just crossing breakeven with big operating leverage. Overlay the first serious cost-reset in company history (£23m out, neuro exited, ROIC rising) and a 20% margin target that is 3-4pt of FX recovery + operating leverage away, not a fantasy. The TAM is expanding (£6bn→£7bn ). And the ownership overhang is gone — Deltam locks the family in. If sterling stabilises and semicap runs, this compounds high-single-digit revenue into mid-teens EPS growth with a fortress balance sheet.

Bear case (2-3 permanent-impairment / de-rate risks).

1. The 20% margin has been "within reach" for years and keeps slipping — currency is the excuse, but a business that structurally can't get past ~16% through-cycle is a cyclical industrial, not a compounder, and deserves Hexagon's ~21x fwd, not Halma's ~33x. That de-rate alone is −30%+.
2. Semicap/China concentration cuts both ways — APAC is ~49% of revenue and the AI-encoder tailwind is a cycle management itself won't date ("don't know how long it lasts"). A 20-30% capex digestion (2023-24 rhymes) takes revenue and the multiple down together, as it did to £30s in 2023.
3. Structural challenger position in the biggest segment — in industrial-metrology systems it fights Hexagon/Zeiss/Keyence from behind; the deep moat is only the encoder/probe core.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): it's early 2028; the AI/semicap encoder cycle rolled over in mid-2027, APAC revenue fell double-digits, FX stayed adverse, margin never cleared 17%, and a second "restructuring" adjusting-item appeared — the market re-rated a "quality compounder" back to a "£3bn cyclical UK industrial" at ~20x, and the stock is back in the £30s.

Contrarian view (what the market is refusing to see): the market is anchored on Renishaw as a China/machine-tool cyclical (its 2022-24 scar tissue) and is under-appreciating that the revenue mix has quietly migrated to AI-infra semicap + defence + additive — the same pick-and-shovel thesis it pays 40x for elsewhere. If the margin lands, the re-rate is up, toward Keyence, not down.

Multiple verdict: ~33x forward adjusted is full, not absurd — justified only if the 20% margin and the AI-capex durability both hold. It is not a margin-of-safety price.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

• What structurally breaks the model: a synchronised semicap capex digestion + China machine-tool relapse — ~half the revenue is APAC, and the encoder up-cycle is explicitly cycle-dependent by management's own admission. 2023-24 already showed adj PBT can fall 30% in a quarter.
• Revenue concentration: APAC ~49%; semiconductor >20% of group; the AI-encoder demand is concentrated in a handful of semicap-equipment builders Renishaw won't name. Lose a design socket or a fab-capex air-pocket and PM (the 23%-margin crown jewel) de-rates the whole group.
• Why the moat is weaker than bulls think: it is deep but narrow. Strip out encoders/probes and Renishaw is a sub-scale challenger to Hexagon/Zeiss/Keyence in systems, and additive manufacturing is a brutally competitive, historically-loss-making category (it took years to reach −£0.6m).
• Most dangerous under-rated competitor: Heidenhain (private, no quarterly scrutiny, can price patiently through a cycle to defend encoder share) — and Keyence, whose 38% net margin and sensor-automation reach could commoditise Renishaw's gauging/sensing adjacencies.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance items: a founder-controlled 50.25% block (Deltam) means minority holders are permanent price-takers on strategy — the 2021 "for sale then not for sale" saga showed the family will act in the family's interest, and simultaneous CFO + Chair vacancies mid-reset is real key-person/governance fragility. £240m idle cash earns a return the equity doesn't need.
• What must hold for today's price: 20% margin lands and AI/semicap capex persists and sterling doesn't stay a headwind — three independent bets, all priced.
• If growth disappoints 20-30%: on a ~33x forward multiple, a growth and margin miss is a double-compression — a plausible path back to the £30s (−35 to −40%), exactly the 2023-24 playbook.
• Single permanent-impairment scenario (and plausibility): low. Renishaw's core encoder/probe IP is genuinely durable; the realistic bear is a multi-year de-rate + earnings air-pocket, not a broken business. Permanent impairment (moat destroyed) is a <15% tail; a painful 30-40% cyclical drawdown is a very live 30-40% scenario.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. The 20% adjusted operating-margin target has been "within reach" since FY2024 — what is the specific, quantified bridge from 15.7% to 20%, and how much of it requires FX to reverse versus structural cost/mix you control?
2. How durable is the semiconductor-encoder demand — what share of the >20% semicap revenue is AI-datacenter-driven, and what did you see in the 2023 downturn about how fast that reverses?
3. Given ~£240m net cash and a stated 15% ROIC target you're missing at 13.2% — why no buyback, and what M&A or organic bar would you fund with the balance sheet?
4. On the exit of the neurosurgery business — are you selling it, closing it, or spinning it, and what's the residual cash/impairment tail after the drug-delivery closure?
5. Additive manufacturing just crossed breakeven — what revenue and margin does AM need to reach for Specialised Technologies to be structurally profitable, and by when?
6. With the CFO seat interim and a new independent Chair being recruited under 50.25% family control via Deltam — how do you guarantee independent minority-shareholder representation in strategy and capital allocation?
7. EMEA fell 5% partly on a September-2025 sales-ERP transition — is that fully behind you, quantify the H1 revenue lost, and what does the IT transformation cost before it pays back?
8. Heidenhain remains the encoder incumbent — where are you gaining and losing share against them, and does ASTRiA inductive open a category they don't hold?
9. Position Measurement margin (23.4%) is double Industrial Metrology (15.2%) — what's the through-cycle mix-shift plan, and does group margin structurally rise as PM/encoders grow faster?
10. Restructuring produced an £18m statutory charge this half — what is your commitment that "adjusting items" won't recur annually, i.e. when does statutory converge with adjusted?
11. Defence is a repeated growth call-out — what's the revenue run-rate and pipeline, and how exposed is it to specific national budget cycles?
12. On tariffs — you offset ~£5m with US surcharges this half; what's the FY exposure and can pricing hold if tariffs escalate without demand destruction?
13. Consumer-electronics gauging (Equator into APAC) is tied to a small number of large device programs — how concentrated is that revenue and how do you see it evolving?
14. Capex is tapering to ~£40m after the Miskin/India build-out — what's normalised through-cycle capex intensity, and does the recent investment support the next doubling of revenue?
15. Five years after the withdrawn 2021 sale and with Deltam now consolidating the family stake — is a future sale, IPO of a division, or full independence the base case for the next decade, and how should minority holders think about that optionality?

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