United Microelectronics

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

Business model. UMC is a dedicated ("pure-play") wafer foundry: it manufactures integrated circuits to customers' designs and never competes with them on end products. Revenue is "primarily from the manufacture and sales of wafers fabricated at our foundries," plus a small slice of wafer-probe, mask-tooling, and subcontracted assembly/test. Pricing is per-wafer or per-die, reviewed quarterly; because costs are largely fixed, "fluctuations in average selling price historically have had a substantial impact on our margins".

Scale (FY2025). Operating revenue NT$237,553M (US$7,573M), +2.3% YoY; 3,870 thousand 12-inch-equivalent wafers shipped (+12.3% vs 3,446k in 2024). So volume grew double digits while revenue barely moved — the tension that defines UMC right now (see Lens 5).

Customers. Two archetypes: fabless design houses (MediaTek, Realtek, Novatek) and integrated device manufacturers (Texas Instruments, Intel). Wafer sales split ~81% fabless / ~19% IDM in 2025 (fabless 78.3→84.3→80.9% over 2023-25). Top-10 customers = 57.0% of revenue in 2025 — concentrated but not single-customer-dependent (contrast TSMC's ~25% Apple).

Contract structure. Historically spot/short-cycle, but the strategic pivot is toward multi-year supply agreements underwriting capacity ("our expansion projects will be supported by customers who have signed multi-year supply agreements" ) — a take-or-pay-like de-risking of the capexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. it does commit.

What it actually is: not a growth-tech name but a fixed-cost utility for legacy and specialty silicon — power-management ICs, RF, display drivers, MCUs, automotive, IoT — whose earnings are a leveraged bet on capacity utilization and node/product mix.

Supply Chain

Map: equipment & materials vendors → UMC fabs → fabless/IDM customers → OEM end-products (phones, PCs, autos, IoT, AI servers).

• Upstream inputs. Silicon wafers, photomasks, process chemicals/gases, and the capital-equipment chain (litho, etch, deposition). UMC subcontracts mask-tooling and assembly/test out. It is a price-taker on WFE (wafer-fab equipment) but is now flexing buy-side power: it notified all suppliers of a ≥15% price cut effective Jan 1 2026 to defend margins ahead of the pricing war.
• The fabs (chokepoints named). 12-inch (300mm): Fab 12A (Tainan, Taiwan — 136,279 wpm, the crown jewel), Fab 12i (Singapore — 57,207 wpm), Fab 12X / USCXM (Xiamen, China — 31,500 wpm, now 100%-owned), Fab 12M / USJC (Kuwana, Mie, Japan — 39,767 wpm, ex-Fujitsu, power/auto with DENSO). 8-inch (200mm): six Hsinchu fabs (8A/8C/8D/8E/8F/8S) + Fab 8N (Suzhou, China). Plus 6-inch Wavetek.
• Chokepoint / single-source risk. The 12-inch base is overwhelmingly Taiwan-concentrated (Fab 12A is the single largest node) — the geopolitical single point of failure that the Singapore Fab 12i P3 greenfield (30k wpm, 28/22nm, production H2 2026) and the US initiatives are explicitly designed to diversify.
• Downstream customers. Fabless (MediaTek/Realtek/Novatek) and IDMs (TI/Intel) → their chips land in smartphones, comms infrastructure, PCs, autos, and — the 2026 swing factor — power-management ICs for AI servers.
• US/geographic diversification (new). Intel collaboration (Intel's Ocotillo, Arizona fabs make the joint 12nm node — capital-light US footprint for UMC) and a Polar Semiconductor MOU (Dec 2025) for US-based 8-inch.

Chain verdict: UMC sits in the middle of the value chain with genuine buy-side leverage over materials suppliers but real sell-side exposure to Chinese foundry overcapacity at the mature end (Lens 3/13).

Competitive Advantages (moats)

Where the moat is real:

• Specialty process breadth + IP library. RF-CMOS/RF-SOI, embedded flash (eNVM), BCD (power), eHV (display), and now silicon photonics — the "high-value mature" strategy. 16,700+ patents (7,490+ US), cross-licenses with IBM and Broadcom, TIPS AAA IP-management certification. This is a switching-cost moat: once a customer's design is qualified on UMC's specialty PDK, re-porting to a rival is costly and slow.
• Scale & geographic diversity. Among the largest capacities of any foundry, spread across four jurisdictions — a resilience/sourcing-choice pitch that matters more every year of US-China friction.
• Cycle time / service. UMC leans on turnaround speed, yields, and the "MyUMC" online supply-chain layer as service differentiation.

Where the moat is thin:

• No leading edge. 14nm and under = 0.0% of sales. UMC cannot serve the highest-value logic (AI accelerators, flagship SoCs) — that is TSMC's monopoly. UMC competes where processes are commoditizing.
• Bargaining power is asymmetric. Over materials suppliers: strong (the 15% cut). Over customers: weak-to-moderate — ASP fell 5.0% (2024) and 5.4% (2025) even as volumes rose, i.e. UMC could not hold price. That is the signature of a business without pricing power at the commodity end.
• The dangerous rival is structural, not a company. Chinese foundries (SMIC, Hua Hong) are flooding 28–90nm capacity, subsidized, and discounted Taiwan foundries up to 40% on mature nodes in late 2024. UMC's countermove — abandon the low-value commodity fight, climb to specialty/high-value mature — is the correct strategy but a concession that the low end has no defensible moat.

Moat grade: narrow and specialty-dependent. Durable in RF/eNVM/BCD/photonics niches; absent in commodity logic.

Segments

UMC does not report P&L by product segment; it discloses wafer-sales mix by process node and revenue by customer geography. Both from the 20-F:

Wafer sales by process technology (% of wafer sales):

. 28nm-and-below = 36.8% of foundry revenue in 2025 (up from 30.7% in 2023) — this is the mix-up story and the single most important segment trend. 28nm is where UMC has scale, where TSMC may cede share, and where the specialty growth sits.

Revenue by customer HQ geography (%):

. US-headquartered demand is shrinking as a share (26.6→22.0%) while Taiwan rises — worth watching against the "UMC as US-diversification play" narrative.

Trend cause: the mix shift to 28nm + the 2025 volume recovery (utilization 68.7→75.2%) lifted revenue only 2.3% because ASP fell 5.4% and NTD appreciated 2.9%. Volume and mix up; price and FX down — the four forces that net to near-flat 2025 revenue but a clear inflection into 2026.

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Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result

FY2025 (the 20-F print):

• Revenue NT$237,553M (US$7,573M), +2.3% YoY.
• Gross profit NT$68,906M (US$2,197M); gross margin 29.0% — down from 32.6% (2024) and 34.9% (2023). Three straight years of compression.
• Operating income NT$43,949M (US$1,401M); operating margin 18.5% (was 22.2% / 26.0%).
• Net income to parent NT$40,360M (US$1,287M), −17.3% YoY; net margin 16.9%.
• Basic EPS NT$3.30 (US$0.53/ADS); diluted NT$3.27.
• Utilization 75.2% (up from 68.7%) — the demand recovery is visible in the fab, but margin still fell because ASP −5.4% and depreciation surged.
• The margin killer is depreciation: NT$56,427M in 2025 vs NT$45,472M (2024) vs NT$37,758M (2023) — the P&L is now absorbing the cost of the 2022-24 capex wave (see Lens 9). Fixed costs are 70.8% of manufacturing cost, so margin lives and dies on utilization × ASP.

The 2026 inflection (post-20-F, all ):

• Q1 2026 (reported Apr 29): revenue NT$61.04B (+5.5% YoY, −1.2% QoQ), GM 29.2% (+2.5pp YoY), utilization 79%, net income NT$16.17B, EPS NT$1.29 — vs NT$0.85 consensus, a +48% beat and more than double the prior-year quarter. UMC also launched a new share buyback in Q1 — a capital-allocation shift (it bought back zero shares 2023-25 ).
• Q2 2026: revenue NT$68.73B (+12.6% QoQ, +17.0% YoY) — the highest since Q4 2022, ending a 15-quarter drought. June alone NT$23.1B (+22.85% YoY), a near-4-year monthly high. H1 2026 revenue NT$129.77B (+11.28% YoY).
• Drivers: communications recovery + power-management ICs for AI applications + stable computing/consumer/industrial.
• Market reaction: the stock is now sentiment-driven — it fell ~6% on the strong Q2 revenue (sell-the-news) and −8.78% on July 7 in a sector-wide AI/CPI selloff, yet is +216% YTD.

Read: the operational trough is behind UMC. 2026 is a real recovery year (utilization ~79%, revenue breaking multi-year highs, margins stabilizing near 30%). The question the tape is asking is not "is it recovering" (yes) but "how much recovery is already in the price" (a lot — Lens 7/8/12).

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty); this is -derived and thinner than a transcript-grounded read would be.

• Tone shift 2025 → 2026: From cautious/defensive (guiding to price discipline, flagging Chinese overcapacity, cutting supplier costs) to constructive. On the Q1 2026 call management guided high-single-digit % QoQ wafer-shipment growth for Q2, GM near 30%, continued pricing discipline, and "robust demand in communication, consumer, and AI-related segments".
• Recurring phrases (2026): "specialty," "high-value mature," "22/28nm," "power management for AI," "pricing discipline," "geographic diversification," "12nm with Intel," "silicon photonics."
• What they stopped saying: the 2023-24 language of "inventory correction," "sluggish demand," and "utilization headwinds" has receded.
• New in 2026: explicit AI-adjacency framing (PMIC for AI servers, silicon photonics/CPO for AI datacenter I/O) — management is actively repositioning the equity story from "cyclical value foundry" to "AI-infrastructure participant," which is precisely what the multiple is now discounting.

Sentiment trend: improving and increasingly AI-narrative-forward. Caveat: without transcripts on the shelf this is the lens with the weakest grounding — a refresh should ingest the Q1/Q2 2026 calls.

Comps

The whole mature/China-foundry complex has re-rated to extraordinary multiples in the 2026 AI cycle. Multiples are (dates/sources noted) or n/a; no multiple below is fabricated.

UMC-specific derived multiples: roughly net cash (~NT$45B / ~US$1.4B: cash NT$110,660M vs bonds NT$50,228M + LT bank loans ~NT$15.3B ), so EVEnterprise valueWhat it would cost to buy the whole company: its market value plus its debt, minus the cash you would get with it. Often very different from market cap. ≈ $61.1B. On FY2025 revenue $7.573B and operating income $1.401B: EV/Sales ≈ 8.1x, EV/EBIT ≈ 43.6x. ROE FY2025 ≈ ~10–11% — roughly a third of TSMC's historical ~30%.

The one line that matters: UMC — a mature-node foundry with no leading edge, GM 29%, ROE ~10% — trades at ~38.5x trailing, higher than TSMC's ~29x (the leading-edge monopoly, 72% share, GM ~59%, ROE ~30%). You are paying more per dollar of UMC's shrinking-then-recovering earnings than per dollar of TSMC's compounding earnings. On forward 2026 numbers the gap narrows (UMC ~26x vs TSMC low-20s) but the anomaly stands: UMC is priced at least as richly as the best asset in the industry.

Stock-Price Catalysts (what moves >5%)

52-week range $6.56 → $28.96, currently $24.86, +216% YTD 2026. The 2026 melt-up is the dominant fact. Pattern of >5% moves:

• The 2026 re-rating (multi-hundred-%): chip-cycle recovery + AI narrative. Specific legs: Q1 2026 +48% EPS beat; the Wedbush "2026's biggest overlooked winner" call including the thesis that if TSMC reallocates 28nm wafers, UMC is the largest direct beneficiary; the imec silicon-photonics/CPO license (Dec 2025); Intel-12nm "on schedule for 2027"; reports of planned H2 2026 wafer price hikes.
• Jun 20–21 2026: +10.66% (2-day).
• July 7 2026: −8.78% — sector semiconductor selloff on CPI/AI concerns.
• Q2 revenue print: ~−6% despite record revenue (sell-the-news).
• Historical (pre-2026): foundry-cycle inflections, utilization/ASP data points, Chinese-foundry pricing headlines, and the 2018-20 Micron/DOJ overhang (Lens 10) were the swing factors — plus the dividend, when UMC was a yield stock.

What the market reacts to for this name has changed: it used to trade on utilization, ASP, and dividend (a value/cyclical). In 2026 it trades on AI-narrative flow and momentum — which cuts both ways and explains the violence of the 52-week range.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

• Leadership (just changed). Jason Wang became sole CEO on Feb 25, 2026, ending the Wang + SC Chien co-president model in place since 2017; Ming Hsu became President & COO; SC Chien exited to chair Unimicron (a UMC-invested substrate company). Chairman Stan Hung (34 yrs, ex-CFO, also Chief Strategic Officer); CFO Chitung Liu (25 yrs, ex-UBS MD). The streamlining is framed as faster decision-making/execution — a governance positive, though it concentrates power as the equity story turns aggressive.
• Track record. The Wang/Chien duo drove UMC's decade-long turnaround: the 2018 decision to stop chasing the leading edge (walking away from 14nm→10nm) and reallocate to specialty/mature is the reason UMC has ~20% operating margins and net cash today rather than the balance-sheet stress of a sub-scale advanced-node also-ran. That is a genuinely good capital-discipline call, quantified by three years of ~18–26% operating margin.
• Skin in the game. Directors & officers own just 6.62% of shares — professional managers, not founder-owners. UMC is widely held (largest holders are Taiwanese dividend ETFs: Capital Tip 5.17%, Cathay 4.31%, Yuanta 3.34%) and explicitly not controlled by any person, corporation, or government.
• Capital allocation. Historically dividends over buybacks — but the dividend is declining with earnings: NT$3.60 (2023) → 3.00 (2024) → 2.85 (2025) → 2.60 proposed (2026); FY2025 payout ~79% of EPS. Capex was cut hard: NT$94.1B (2023) → 91.1B (2024) → 50.6B (2025) — the build cycle is over, which is why 2025 FCFFree cash flowCash left after paying to run and maintain the business. Unlike profit, it is hard to flatter with accounting choices. was strong (~NT$52.1B / ~US$1.66B ). And in Q1 2026 UMC launched a share buyback — a new lever, sensible while the cash pile (US$3.5B) is idle, ironic while the stock is +216%.
• Red flags (governance). Notable circular cross-holdings typical of Taiwan Inc: UMC owns 17.99% of Silicon Integrated Systems (SIS), whose representative is CEO Jason Wang, and SIS owns 2.12% of UMC; UMC owns 36.49% of Hsun Chieh Investment, which owns 3.51% of UMC and is represented on the board by COO Ming Hsu. Related-party foundry sales to SIS + Faraday were NT$4,387M (US$140M) in 2025. Common in Taiwan, arms-length per the filing, but a web an outside investor should see.

Management grade: capable, disciplined, professional (not owner-operators). The turnaround thesis is real; the incentive alignment is modest.

Forensic Red Flags

Grounded in the 20-F + regulatory/regulatory-findings.md + web.

• Earnings quality: clean. Operating cash flow (NT$99,864M) exceeds net income handily, driven by the large non-cash depreciation add-back (NT$59,259M D&A) — the opposite of the classic red flag (earnings running ahead of cash). No sign of receivables/inventory outrunning revenue in the disclosed data; expected-credit-loss provisions are negligible (NT$2M).
• The real accounting risk is depreciation timing, not manipulation. Margins are hostage to a depreciation wave from the 2022-24 capex; non-GAAP flattery is not the issue (UMC reports IFRS), but reported GM understates cash margins because ~71% of COGS is fixed/depreciation. Watch for any switch in useful-life assumptions that would flatter margins as the AI story is sold.
• Related-party web (Lens 9) — SIS/Hsun Chieh/Faraday cross-holdings and NT$4.39B related-party foundry sales. Disclosed, arms-length per management, immaterial to the P&L, but a standing governance item.
• Bargain-purchase gain on gaining significant influence over SIS flowed through non-operating income — a non-recurring, non-cash item to normalize out of any "earnings quality" read.

Regulatory findings (required):

• SEC: regulatory-findings.md reports 0 Litigation Releases and 0 AAERs naming UMC in the 2021-2026 window (EDGAR EFTS).
• 10-K/20-F Item 8 (Legal Proceedings), the company's own disclosure: "these disputes have not had any material adverse impact… nor are there any other material litigation or non-litigation matters required to be disclosed" — i.e. no material pending litigation disclosed.
• Non-SEC enforcement (web search): the one material historical item — UMC pleaded guilty (Oct 2020) to one count of receiving/possessing a stolen trade secret (Micron DRAM technology, to benefit Chinese SOE Fujian Jinhua) and paid a US$60M fine; DOJ dropped the economic-espionage and broader conspiracy counts and the $400M–$8.75B damages claims, and UMC assisted DOJ against Fujian Jinhua. Resolved and now historical (not in current Item 3), but a forensic analyst must weight it: it is a real IP-integrity/governance blemish with a China nexus, directly relevant to the "UMC as trusted US-diversification foundry" narrative it is now selling. The DDoS attack on UMC's website (Oct 2024) caused no data loss.

Forensic verdict: books are clean and cash-backed; the single historical black mark (Micron/Jinhua) is resolved but reputationally live given the US pivot.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection

Bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + 2026 prints + guidance. Output; no our model logged (watchlist/unattended rule). Fiscal years = calendar years.

Anchor actuals: FY2025 basic EPS NT$3.30; Q1 2026 EPS NT$1.29; H1 2026 revenue +11.3% YoY, Q2 record NT$68.73B; guidance GM ~30%, high-SD% Q2 shipment growth.

• Base (most likely). 2026 is a clean recovery: utilization ~78-80%, GM ~29-30%, ASP flattening as H2 price hikes offset China pressure. FY2026 revenue ~NT$270-280B (+14-18%). Quarterly EPS ~NT$1.29 → ~1.55 → ~1.6 → ~1.6 → FY2026 EPS ≈ NT$6.0/sh (~US$0.95/ADS). FY2027 ≈ NT$6.5 (12nm/Intel begins to contribute, specialty grows, China caps ASP). FY2028 ≈ NT$7.0-7.5 (silicon photonics + 12nm ramp). → forward P/E on 2026E ≈ 26x at $24.86.
• Bull. AI-specialty super-cycle + TSMC 28nm spillover + pricing power returns + photonics revenue by 2028: FY2026 ≈ NT$6.5, FY2028 ≈ NT$9+.
• Bear. 2026 is a restock peak; China overcapacity re-crushes mature ASP in 2027; AI-PMIC demand normalizes: FY2026 ≈ NT$5.5 then flat-to-down NT$5.0-5.5 FY2027-28.

Even the bull FY2028 EPS (~NT$9/sh = ~US$1.43/ADS) at today's $24.86 is ~17x — so today's price already prices the bull case three years early. The base case (~26x forward 2026) is rich for a mature-node cyclical whose 10-year-normal multiple is ~12x.

Bull vs Bear

Bull case (narrative). UMC is the mispriced pick-and-shovel of the AI-and-recovery cycle. The chip cycle has turned (Q2 broke a 15-quarter revenue drought); utilization is back to ~79% and rising; the mix is climbing to high-value 28nm/specialty (36.8% and growing). Three optionality legs the market is starting to pay for: (1) silicon photonics / CPO — the imec iSiPP300 license puts UMC into 12-inch PICs for 800G/1.6T optics into AI datacenters, a genuinely new TAM as copper interconnect hits its limits; (2) Intel 12nm — a capital-light way to add a 12nm node and a US footprint, on schedule for 2027; (3) TSMC 28nm reallocation — if TSMC vacates 28nm for leading edge, UMC is the #1 beneficiary (Wedbush). Net cash, ~US$1.7B FCF, and a fresh buyback. If AI keeps pulling mature/specialty capacity tight, 2026 earnings re-rate the whole story.

Bear case (2-3 permanent-impairment risks). (1) Chinese overcapacity is structural, not cyclical — SMIC + Hua Hong are adding subsidized 28-90nm capacity faster than demand; UMC's own ≥15% supplier price cut and three years of ASP erosion (−5.0%, −5.4%) say it has no pricing power at the commodity end, and "high-value mature" is a smaller pond than the equity now assumes. (2) The AI legs are optionality, not earnings — photonics is at risk production (2026-27), 12nm is 2027 production, and neither moves 2026-27 EPS; the market is capitalizing them as if they already ship. (3) The multiple itself — +216% YTD to ~38.5x trailing, above every sell-side target, on a business with ~10% ROE. Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): 2026 was a restock peak; H2-2026/2027 mature ASP rolls over under Chinese supply; the AI-PMIC pop normalizes; photonics/12nm slip or come in low-margin; the stock mean-reverts toward the $11-16 analyst targets — a 35-55% drawdown with earnings still up YoY (a pure multiple de-rate). Contrarian view the market is refusing to see: UMC's 2026 is a real cyclical recovery, but the price has decoupled from a mature-node foundry's normalized earnings power — the tape is trading a TSMC-grade multiple onto a business that deliberately chose not to be TSMC.

Are multiples too high? Yes, on any through-cycle or peer-normalized basis — though within the (insane) 2026 mature/China-foundry peer set (SMIC 84x, Tower ~100x, Hua Hong 34-92x, GF 48x) UMC's 38.5x is not the most extreme.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull:

• Where revenue concentrates and what breaks it. ~81% fabless, top-10 = 57%, heavy in communications/consumer — exactly the end-markets most exposed to a 2027 inventory correction after a 2026 restock. A single large fabless customer trimming orders swings utilization, and utilization is the margin.
• The moat is weaker than bulls think. UMC's differentiation is "specialty + service + geography." But SMIC/Hua Hong are climbing the same specialty ladder (BCD, RF, PMIC) with state backing and are raising prices in 2026 precisely because they, not UMC, increasingly set the marginal mature-node price. UMC took a −5.4% ASP hit while volumes rose — that is not a moat, that is a price-taker.
• Most dangerous competitor bulls underestimate: not TSMC (different league) but Hua Hong / SMIC — subsidized capacity that can run at cash-cost through a downturn and structurally cap UMC's "high-value mature" pricing.
• Worst capital-allocation / governance: the Taiwan cross-holding web (UMC↔SIS with the CEO as SIS's rep; UMC↔Hsun Chieh with the COO as its rep), and — reputationally — the 2020 Micron/Fujian-Jinhua guilty plea, which undercuts the "trusted Western-diversification foundry" pitch the Intel/Polar deals depend on.
• What must hold for today's price: a durable AI-driven mature/specialty super-cycle and the AI optionality (photonics, 12nm) converting to real margin by 2027-28 and Chinese overcapacity not re-crushing ASP. If growth disappoints ~20-30%, EPS lands near the bear NT$5.0-5.5 and a 38.5x multiple is indefensible — ~50%+ downside on a de-rate alone, with sell-side already at $11-16.
• Single scenario that permanently impairs: a Taiwan Strait geopolitical shock — the 12-inch base (Fab 12A) is Taiwan-concentrated; the Singapore/US diversification is years and single-digit-% of capacity away.

Short verdict: the company is not broken — the price is the trade. This is a valuation/expectations short, not a fraud or a structural-collapse short.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Of your 2026 revenue upside, how much is restock/pull-forward vs. structural — and what is your evidence it is not a 2027 inventory-correction setup?
2. On 28nm ASP: with SMIC/Hua Hong adding capacity, what is your realistic 2026-28 pricing path, and where do you actually have pricing power vs. where are you a price-taker?
3. Silicon photonics (imec iSiPP300): what revenue and gross margin do you underwrite for 2027 and 2028, and how many customers are past risk-production to committed volume?
4. Intel 12nm: what economics accrue to UMC (vs. Intel) — is this a royalty/licensing stream, a capacity call, or a go-to-market fee — and what does it add to EPS in 2027-28?
5. If TSMC reallocates 28nm, quantify the share you can actually win given your capacity and qualified customers — is the Wedbush thesis real or hopeful?
6. Your stock is +216% YTD and above every analyst target — how does that change your buyback logic; would you rather return cash or hoard it for the next down-cycle?
7. The dividend has fallen four years running; is UMC still a yield story, or are you formally reallocating to buybacks/growth?
8. Capex fell from ~NT$94B to ~NT$50B; what is the normalized 2026-28 capex, and does the depreciation wave peak in 2026 (i.e. does reported GM inflect up)?
9. What share of 2026 "AI-related" PMIC demand is durable design-win vs. spot allocation that reverses when GPU supply loosens?
10. On the Micron/Fujian-Jinhua history: how do you satisfy Intel, Polar, and US customers on IP integrity and export-control compliance?
11. Fab 12i P3 Singapore (H2 2026): who are the anchor multi-year-supply customers underwriting it, and at what utilization does it earn its cost of capital?
12. Your China fabs (Xiamen, Suzhou): how do you manage US export-control and customer-diversification risk as the US footprint grows?
13. What is the normalized through-cycle ROE you are managing to, and how do you get from ~10% back toward the high-teens?
14. What ended the co-president model, and what decisions will now be made faster or differently under a single CEO?
15. Which single business line would you exit or divest in the next three years, and why?

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