WeRide

Phase A — Understand the business

Company Overview

WeRide sells and operates purpose-built L4 autonomous vehicles and the software/compute stack that drives them. Four product lines + an ADAS licensing arm:

• Robotaxi (flagship, GXR platform on HPC 3.0). Deployed across China + internationally.
• Robobus (built with Yutong and Golden Dragon), Robovan (JMC-Ford, Ecar Tech), Robosweeper (Yutong, Ecar Tech).
• ADAS / R&D services — L2+ WePilot 3.0 sold through Bosch (WeRide supplies the tech, Bosch sells to OEMs and takes volume royalties); AD R&D services to Nissan.

How it makes money — the crucial nuance. Revenue is (i) vehicle sales (+ sensor suites), (ii) recurring operational/technical-support fees, (iii) milestone/service fees, and (iv) ADAS development fees + royalties. It explicitly does not yet make money on robotaxi rides: "We have generated an insignificant amount of revenue from the offering of robotaxi rides through WeRide Go since 2020". So the "robotaxi" story is today a hardware + data + ADAS business, not a per-mile network business. Overseas it runs asset-light — local partners handle dispatch/cleaning/maintenance; WeRide provides tech + ops expertise (with Uber, Grab, ELEVATE Slovakia, etc.).

Scale (FY2025 / latest): revenue RMB684.6M (US$97.9M); global fleet 1,089 (end-2024) → 2,113 (Mar 23, 2026), of which 1,125 robotaxis; deployed in 40+ cities across 12 countries. Registered China robotaxi users +900% YoY in Q4 2025.

Customers/suppliers/competitors: customers are OEMs, Tier-1 suppliers, public-transport/sanitation operators, and (increasingly) ride-hailing partners. Suppliers are the OEM manufacturing partners above + compute (Nvidia DRIVE, in-house HPC). Competitors below (Lens 3/7).

Supply Chain

Map: compute + sensors → WeRide stack → OEM co-manufacture → WeRide (operate/sell) → partner-run fleet → rider/city/OEM.

• Compute: in-house HPC 3.0 domain controller built on NVIDIA DRIVE AGX Thor (>2,000 TOPS); GXR robotaxi runs NVIDIA DRIVE Hyperion. Nvidia is both a compute supplier and an ecosystem/early investor. Lenovo provides automotive-grade computing + supply chain (expanded 2026 pact to co-deploy "200,000 L4 vehicles over 5 years" — aspirational headline).
• Vehicle OEMs (chokepoints): Geely Farizon (GXR robotaxi, factory pre-installed — eliminates retrofit), Yutong + Golden Dragon (robobus), JMC-Ford + Ecar Tech (robovan), Yutong + Ecar Tech (robosweeper), Chery/GAC/Bosch (ADAS channels).
• HD mapping (single-source + related-party): WeRide buys surveying/mapping services from Guangzhou Yuji — an entity controlled by Mr. Ming Han, the CEO's sibling — RMB111.5M/90.1M/66.8M (US$9.6M) in 2023/24/25. See Lens 10.
• Chokepoints: proprietary compute (self-designed, "no commercial alternative met our requirements"), Nvidia silicon dependency, and OEM co-manufacturing relationships (many partners are also shareholders — Yutong, GAC, Renault-Nissan). Names present ✔.

Competitive Advantages (moats)

• Data moat (real): "the only player globally with an extensive library of real-world data collected under L2-to-L4 use cases from diverse vehicle types," 9+ years of operational data, complemented by synthetic data from WeRide GENESIS (a generative simulation world-model). Four-way product spread (taxi/bus/van/sweeper) genuinely gives more scenario diversity than single-product rivals.
• Regulatory/first-mover moat (strongest differentiator): AV permits in 8 countries (China, UAE, Saudi, Singapore, France, Belgium, Switzerland, US). World's first city-level fully-driverless commercial robotaxi permit outside the US (Abu Dhabi, Oct 2025) and first-ever driverless passenger permit in Europe (Switzerland FEDRO, Nov 2025). This international breadth is the single hardest thing for a rival to replicate quickly.
• Distribution moat via partners-as-shareholders: Uber (its first-ever global "Autonomous" ride category launched on WeRide), Grab, Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi, Yutong, GAC — commercial + equity aligned.
• Cost curve: HPC 3.0 cuts AD-suite cost ~50% and (per 2026 marketing) lifecycle TCO ~84% vs HPC 2.0; 2025 total cost of ownership cut up to 38% YoY.
• Bargaining power — weak today: revenue is tiny (~$98M) and it needs OEMs and cities more than they need it. Moat is technological + regulatory, not yet commercial pricing power. IP: 646 issued + 444 pending patents in China; 15 issued + 20 pending overseas (Dec 31, 2025).

Segments

No IFRS operating-segment table in the filing beyond product-vs-service (our figures empty). By revenue type:

The mix inverted in 2025: product (vehicle sales) went from 13.5% → 52.6% of revenue and now leads. Unit sales exploded — robotaxis 18→123, robobuses 14→156, robosweepers 49→91, robovans 10→28 (398 vehicles in 2025 vs 91 in 2024). Implied ASP ≈ RMB904K/vehicle (~US$129K). Service growth was driven by intelligent data services (+RMB103.8M) and ops/technical support (+RMB17.7M), offset by ADAS R&D services −RMB70.1M (a customized customer project completed in Q3 2024 — a one-off cliff worth watching). Geography: operations and "principal geographic markets are in the PRC"; a majority of revenue is RMB-denominated — international is where the fleet growth and headlines are, but not yet where the revenue is.

Phase B — Measure performance

Earnings Result

FY2025 (audited, IFRS):

• Revenue RMB684.6M / US$97.9M, +89.6% (product +310%, service +19%).
• Gross profit RMB206.8M / US$29.6M; gross margin 30.2% (product 29.5%, service 31.0%). Margin has compressed structurally: 45.7% (2023) → 30.7% (2024) → 30.2% (2025) as low-margin vehicle hardware became the majority of the mix.
• R&D RMB1,372.2M / US$196.2M = 200% of revenue (+25.7% YoY) — this is the whole story: it out-spends its entire revenue base 2:1 on engineering.
• Admin RMB596.1M (−47.7%, purely SBC roll-off from the IPO); Selling RMB73.6M.
• Operating loss RMB1,846.8M / US$264.1M.
• Net loss RMB1,654.9M / US$236.6M, "−34.2% YoY" — but that improvement is an accounting artifact: FY2024's loss carried a RMB465M non-cash preferred-share revaluation that went to zero post-IPO. The clean read is the company's own non-IFRS adjusted net loss: RMB801.9M (2024) → RMB1,246.7M / US$178.3M (2025), +55.5%. The real loss widened.
• Balance sheet: cash & equivalents RMB6,666.3M / US$953.3M, time deposits US$43.1M, FVTPL investments US$47.5M → ~US$1.04B liquidity. Total equity RMB7,900.2M. Accumulated deficit RMB10,286.3M. Notable flag: short-term bank loans jumped RMB30M → RMB324.3M despite a $1B cash pile (cheap onshore RMB working-capital debt vs offshore USD cash — see Lens 10).
• Cash flow: operating cash burn RMB1,321.7M / US$189.0M, up from RMB593.6M (+123%) — burn more than doubled, driven by real losses + working-capital build (trade receivables +RMB213.8M, inventories +RMB207.6M). CapexCapital expenditureMoney spent on long-lived things — buildings, machines, servers — rather than on running costs. US$35.5M. FCF ≈ −US$224.5M.
• Q1 2026 (unaudited, reported 2026-05-13): record revenue RMB114.1M, +57.6% YoY, gross margin 34.7% (improving off the FY2025 trough), operating loss narrowed slightly, cash + investments >RMB6.2B. Momentum intact; margin recovering.

Verdict on the print: top-line inflecting hard and margins turning up in Q1 — genuinely good. But the reported net-loss "improvement" is cosmetic; the cash engine is burning ~2× harder than a year ago, funded entirely by the Nov-2025 Hong Kong raise.

Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf (transcripts/ empty; IR "prepared remarks" are PDFs). From filing MD&A tone + Q1-2026 release: management's consistent drumbeat is "global first-mover" (permits in 8 countries, first driverless-commercial-permit-outside-US, first-in-Europe), asset-light international scaling (Uber/Grab), and cost-down (HPC 3.0, TCO −38%). What they emphasize is breadth of deployment and technology leadership; what they conspicuously do not foreground is per-ride revenue or a path to operating breakeven at the group level. The shift over the last year is from "we're a China robotaxi pioneer" to "we're a global L4 platform selling vehicles + ADAS + data" — a reframing that matches where the revenue actually is. Tone: confident, expansion-led, milestone-heavy. Sentiment: positive and consistent, but light on unit economics — a reader has to go to the filing to learn ride revenue is still "insignificant." (Confidence: MEDIUM — inferred from filing + release, not a transcript.)

Comps

Pure-play L4/robotaxi names are pre-profit, so P/E, dividend yield and 5-yr ROE are n/a (losses) across the peer set — EV/Sales is the only workable multiple, and even that is noisy on ~$100M revenue bases.

WRD valuation math: 1,005.77M ordinary ÷ 3 = 335.3M ADS; at ~$7.14 recent → market capMarket capitalisationThe share price multiplied by the number of shares. What the market says the equity is worth. ≈ $2.39B; at the $5.4 52-wk low, ~$1.8B. Net cash ~$1.0B → EV ≈ $1.4B → trailing EV/S ≈ 14x, P/S ≈ 24x; on FY2026E revenue ~$155M (+58% run-rate) → fwd EV/S ≈ 9x, fwd P/S ≈ 15x. Read: WRD trades at a rich double-digit sales multiple on a sub-$100M revenue base, but ~40–55% of the market capMarket capitalisationThe share price multiplied by the number of shares. What the market says the equity is worth. is cash. The cleaner peer signal is qualitative: Pony.ai's robotaxi ride revenue is actually growing (+395%) while WeRide's is still "insignificant" — Pony is monetizing the network; WeRide is monetizing the hardware. That is the peer gap that matters.

Stock-Price Catalysts

— WRD has only ~20 months of trading history (IPO Oct 2024 at $15.50). The tape: 52-week range $5.18–$12.55, currently ~$5.4–$8 (high-volatility) — down ~50%+ from its highs and near the low. What moves it:

• Robotaxi permit/launch headlines (Abu Dhabi/Dubai/Zurich driverless commercial launches with Uber; Riyadh; Slovakia; Singapore with Grab) — the up-catalysts.
• Partner/compute news — Nvidia DRIVE at GTC 2026, Lenovo "200,000 vehicles" pact, Geely Farizon GXR — pops.
• Earnings — Q1 2026 (+57.6% rev, GM 34.7%) was well-received.
• Down-catalysts / overhangs: the Nov-2025 Hong Kong secondary listing debuted −15% (dilutionDilutionIssuing new shares, so each existing share owns a smaller slice of the same company. + sentiment); US delisting (HFCAA) + the May-2025 House Select Committee military/forced-labor referral (Lens 10) is the structural lid on the multiple; broad China-ADR risk-off. Pattern: the stock reacts to deployment/permit milestones and geopolitics far more than to the (still-tiny) income statement — it trades as a policy-sensitive option on global L4 adoption.

Phase C — Judge people & books

Management

• Dr. Tony Xu Han (49) — Founder/Chairman/CEO. Ex-Chief Scientist of autonomous driving at Baidu (2014–17); tenured associate professor (computer vision/ML) at U. Missouri; PhD ECE, U. Illinois Urbana-Champaign; original contributor to DeepSpeech2 (MIT Tech Review "10 Breakthrough Technologies 2016"). 6.7% economic / 27.5% voting via Class B super-voting shares; voluntary 3-year lock-up from Oct 28, 2025 (a genuine skin-in-the-game/alignment positive).
• Dr. Yan Li (51) — Co-founder/CTO. Ex-Facebook (Meta) senior engineer, ex-Microsoft researcher, PhD ECE Carnegie Mellon; 5.0% economic / 10.9% voting.
• Jennifer Xuan Li (37) — CFO & Head of International. Ex-SenseTime investment director, ex-Baidu strategic investment, ex-Deutsche Bank/UBS IBD — a capital-markets/deal profile, fitting for the international-expansion + dual-listing agenda.
• Board: Alliance Ventures (Renault-Nissan) directors J-F Salles + I. Futakawa; independents Huiping Yan (ZTO CFO/US CPA), David Tong Zhang (ex-Kirkland & Ellis partner), Tony Fan-cheong Chan (ex-KAUST/HKUST president, US NAE member) — a credible, internationalized board.
• Founder-archetype, technical-first. Deep-pedigree research founders with super-voting control. Track record: built a genuine global-first-mover AV franchise from a 2017 start — impressive execution on deployment breadth. Capital allocation: disciplined on cash (raised at IPO + HK, sits on ~$1B), but the core "allocation" decision — spend 2× revenue on R&D indefinitely — is unproven on returns; ROE/ROIC deeply negative (loss-making). Red flags: the related-party mapping purchases from the CEO's brother's company (Lens 10) and a very large equity-comp overhang. Founder control is total (dual-class) — governance is founder-friendly, minority-light.
• Comp: FY2025 cash to all execs RMB39.2M (US$5.6M) — modest; the real comp is equity (SBC RMB450M in 2025, down from RMB1.19B).

Forensic Red Flags

Ground: + regulatory/regulatory-findings.md.

1. Reported loss "improvement" is cosmetic. Net loss −34% YoY is entirely the RMB465M preferred-share revaluation rolling to zero post-IPO. Non-IFRS adjusted loss WIDENED +55.5% to US$178.3M, and operating cash burn more than doubled to US$189.0M. Any narrative citing the shrinking headline loss as "improving profitability" is wrong.
2. Working-capital / receivables outrunning revenue. Trade receivables +83% (RMB252.6M → 462.1M) vs revenue +90%, and inventories +57% — receivables now ≈ 67% of annual revenue, a high DSO for a company selling to governments/OEMs. Management attributes it to "strong year-end sales"; watch for collection/channel-stuffing risk. Impairment allowances are, notably, falling (RMB40.2M→28.7M→16.6M) even as receivables balloon — the ECL provision is getting thinner against a larger, faster-growing book. Worth scrutiny.
3. Related-party mapping purchases from the CEO's sibling. WeRide pays Guangzhou Yuji (controlled by Ming Han, brother of CEO Tony Xu Han) for HD-mapping/surveying: RMB111.5M/90.1M/66.8M (US$9.6M) in 2023/24/25. Declining and disclosed, and WeRide states no economic/voting interest — but a ~$10M/yr sole-source purchase from the CEO's brother is a textbook governance flag.
4. Onshore RMB debt against offshore USD cash. Drew RMB324.3M short-term bank loans while holding ~$1B, of which 78.5% is held outside mainland China and 89.3% USD-denominated. Implication: the offshore cash is hard to repatriate into PRC opex under capital controls, so they borrow onshore RMB to fund PRC operations — a structural liquidity friction the $1B headline hides.
5. Massive equity-comp dilution overhang. 2018 plan: 95.25M options + 36.17M RSUs outstanding; new 2026 plan authorizes 102.73M more Class A shares. Combined ≈ 234M ordinary (~78M ADS) vs ~336M ADS out → ~20%+ potential dilution. SBC will keep the cash-vs-reported gap wide.
6. Revenue-recognition = KPMG's Critical Audit Matter — multiple revenue streams with separate recognition processes; auditors flagged sufficiency-of-evidence on revenue. Clean unqualified opinion + PCAOB-audited internal controls, but revenue quality is the audit's own focus area.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section):

• SEC: No Litigation Releases and no AAERs naming WeRide (EDGAR EFTS LR+AAER, 2021-07-10→2026-07-10).
• 10-K/20-F Item 8 Legal Proceedings: "We are currently not a party to any material legal or administrative proceedings". Clean.
• Non-SEC — the material finding: the US House Select Committee on the CCP (letter to SEC Chairman Atkins, May 2, 2025) named WeRide as "commercially entangled with core nodes of the Chinese military-industrial complex and state-run forced labor apparatus" — citing a WeRide CCP branch in "Red Alliance Co-construction" with Guangzhou officials, and manufacturing partner Yutong Bus's reciprocal ties to Yutong Heavy Industries (a military contractor identifying the PLA as "primary customer"), with WeRide having purchased >RMB75M of goods from Yutong Heavy Industries in 2022, and Yutong-Bus supply-chain links to UFLPA Entity-List firms (Camel Group, Shanghai Huayi). This is the single sharpest risk in the dossier — it raises the odds of a US "Chinese military company" (NDAA §1260H) designation, UFLPA/import scrutiny, or investment restriction, on top of HFCAA delisting risk. WeRide's mitigants: it dual-listed on HKEX (0800) in Nov 2025 as a delisting hedge, and disclosed Yutong was "not a related party in 2025." Not litigation, but a genuine policy-tail that the ADR wrapper carries and the HK line partly escapes.

Phase D — Project & stress-test

Forward Projection

Bottom-up from FY2025 actuals + Q1-2026 run-rate. This company is loss-making; the meaningful projection is revenue + cash runway, not EPS (EPS stays negative on every path). No our model logged (watchlist rule). All, inputs labeled.

Revenue path (US$M):

• Base: FY2025 $97.9M → FY2026 ~$155M (+58%, = Q1 run-rate) → FY2027 ~$225M (+45%, decel) → FY2028 ~$305M (+35%). Driver: vehicle-sales volume + intelligent-data services; ride revenue still immaterial.
• Bull: FY2026 ~$170M → FY2027 ~$290M → FY2028 ~$450M — requires per-ride robotaxi revenue finally inflecting (Middle East "approaching unit-level profitability") + Lenovo/Uber volume landing.
• Bear: FY2026 ~$130M → FY2027 ~$155M → FY2028 ~$175M — the ADAS-R&D-services cliff repeats, vehicle ASPs fall on competition, one large customer lapses (top customer was still 11.4% of revenue).

EPS/loss: negative throughout. Base-case FY2026 adjusted net loss ~US$190–210M. Runway: ~$1.04B liquidity ÷ ~$220M FY-burn (accelerating) → ~3–4 years of visibility, freshly topped by the Nov-2025 HK raise — comfortable near-term, but the burn is rising, so a further raise before group-breakeven is likely (more dilution).

Forecast to track (not logged): "WRD reports positive group operating cash flow (any quarter) by FY2028-end" — my p ≈ 0.25. The likelier path is continued burn funded by equity. Alternatively the cleaner scoreable line: "WRD FY2026 revenue ≥ US$150M" — p ≈ 0.6 (Q1 already annualizes there).

Bull vs Bear

Bull. The most internationally diversified L4 franchise on earth — permits in 8 countries, the first driverless-commercial permit outside the US (Abu Dhabi) and first passenger permit in Europe (Switzerland), Uber's exclusive-feeling global "Autonomous" launch partner in the Gulf. A ~$1B cash fortress (≈40–55% of market cap) funds a real data + simulation (GENESIS) + compute (HPC 3.0) moat while revenue inflects (+90% FY25, +58% Q1'26) and gross margin turns up (34.7%). If robotaxi ride economics cross breakeven in the Middle East and the asset-light Uber/Grab/Lenovo model scales, the ~$1.4B EV on a business targeting "tens of thousands of robotaxis by 2030" is a cheap option. Sell-side agrees loudly: 13 analysts, consensus "Strong Buy," targets ~$11.80 (BofA) to ~$14 vs a ~$5–7 tape.

Bear (2–3 permanent-impairment risks). (1) Policy tail: a US House Select Committee has already referred WeRide to the SEC over military-industrial and forced-labor supply-chain ties; HFCAA delisting + a possible §1260H/UFLPA designation could strand the ADR wrapper permanently. (2) The revenue isn't rides: it sells vehicles + ADAS + data; per-ride robotaxi revenue is "insignificant" and Pony.ai is out-executing on exactly that axis (+395% robotaxi revenue). If autonomy commoditizes into a hardware/BOM business, 30% gross margins on $100–300M revenue don't support the multiple. (3) The burn is accelerating, not narrowing — adjusted loss +55%, op cash burn +123% — so dilution is structural and control sits entirely with the founder (dual-class).

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke): the SEC/Treasury acted on the House referral → index/ETF exclusion + forced ADR selling; simultaneously a China robotaxi price war (Apollo Go, Pony, Baidu) crushed vehicle ASPs, the ADAS-services line cliffed again, and a dilutive raise landed at a lower price. Stock halves again.

Are multiples too high? For a profitless ~$100M-revenue name, ~24x P/S is only defensible as an option — and the option's strike is guarded by a US-China policy fence. Contrarian view the market is missing (either direction): the market is treating WRD as a monolithic "China robotaxi ADR" and pricing the policy fence; it is under-weighting that WeRide has quietly become a Gulf/European operator with an HKEX escape hatch — the geography of its fleet is de-Sinifying even as its cap-table wrapper stays stuck in the crossfire. The value unlock is legal-structure, not technology.

Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

You are dismantling the bull case. What breaks the money machine: it doesn't have one — it's burned RMB10.3B of accumulated losses to reach $98M of low-margin hardware revenue, and the "robotaxi" ride business that justifies the story makes insignificant money. Concentration: top customer still 11.4%, top-5 40.5% of revenue; the +19% service growth leaned on one "intelligent data services" line (+RMB103.8M) that could prove lumpy, right after a −RMB70M ADAS-services cliff showed how fast a single project rolls off. Weak moat: three better-capitalized Chinese rivals (Baidu Apollo Go — already Wuhan unit-profitable — Pony.ai, plus Tesla/Waymo globally) are converging; WeRide's edge is permits and breadth, not defensible unit economics. Most dangerous competitor bulls underrate: Baidu Apollo Go — #2 globally, 1,000+ vehicles, disclosed unit profitability in Wuhan, and a parent balance sheet WeRide can't match. Worst governance: related-party mapping spend routed to the CEO's brother; dual-class founder lock; a fresh 102.7M-share comp plan. Assumptions the price needs: that per-ride economics inflect and the US-China policy fence never bites and margins hold as hardware dominates — three independent bets. If growth disappoints 20–30%: on a pure sales multiple with no earnings anchor, a de-rate to ~5x P/S (still generous) implies material downside from $2.4B market cap. Single permanent-impairment scenario: a US §1260H "Chinese military company" designation or UFLPA import ban — plausibility meaningfully non-zero given the House referral already exists — which would sever the ADR from US capital and could force index/ETF liquidation regardless of operating results.

Management Questions (ordered by information value)

1. Robotaxi ride revenue has been "insignificant since 2020." What is the quarter and the fleet size at which per-ride robotaxi revenue becomes a reported, material line — and what is the target per-vehicle daily revenue and utilization?
2. Given the House Select Committee's May-2025 referral, what concrete steps (supply-chain re-sourcing away from Yutong Heavy Industries, entity-list screening, HK-listing contingency) are you taking to protect ADR holders from a §1260H/UFLPA/HFCAA outcome?
3. Adjusted net loss rose 55% and operating cash burn doubled in 2025. What is the group's path to operating-cash-flow breakeven, and at what revenue level — and will you need another raise before then?
4. You claim the Middle East is "approaching unit-level profitability." Show the per-robotaxi P&L (vehicle cost, remote-ops cost, insurance, partner split) at Abu Dhabi maturity.
5. Why does WeRide purchase ~$10M/yr of HD-mapping from Guangzhou Yuji, controlled by the CEO's brother? What was the competitive/arms-length process, and when does this in-source or re-tender?
6. Trade receivables grew 83% and now equal ~67% of revenue while your ECL provision shrank — walk through the collectability of the year-end sales spike and the counterparties.
7. Product gross margin is 29.5% and falling as vehicles dominate the mix. Where does hardware gross margin structurally settle at scale, and does the model ever look like software?
8. The Lenovo "200,000 vehicles over 5 years" and "tens of thousands of robotaxis by 2030" — what are the binding volume commitments vs aspirations, and the capital required?
9. R&D is 200% of revenue. At what revenue does R&D fall below 50% of sales, and what's the minimum absolute R&D to stay competitive with Baidu/Pony?
10. How much of 2025's service revenue was the single "intelligent data services" customer, and how recurring is it after the ADAS-R&D-services cliff?
11. Post-Yutong-declassification, who are your top-5 customers today, and how concentrated is the vehicle-sales book by government vs commercial?
12. With 78.5% of cash offshore and onshore RMB borrowing, what's the true deployable-in-PRC liquidity, and the plan if capital controls tighten?
13. What's the fully-diluted share count after the 2018 + 2026 plans fully vest, and the expected annual SBC and net dilution through 2028?
14. Waymo and Apollo Go lead on driverless miles/rides. What is WeRide's cumulative fully-driverless mileage and disengagement rate, and how do you close the ride-volume gap?
15. Under what conditions would you fully re-domicile the primary listing to Hong Kong and wind down the US ADR?