Korea Electric Power

Phase A — Understand the business

Lens 1 · Company Overview

Business model in plain terms. KEPCO is the single buyer and sole retailer of electricity in South Korea. The parent company does almost no generation itself; it (a) buys power from its own generation subsidiaries and independent power producers (IPPs) through the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) at a cost-based wholesale price (the System Marginal Price, SMP), and (b) sells that power to ~25M end customers at a retail tariff set by the government, not by KEPCO. Its profit is the spread between a wholesale cost it does not control (driven by imported LNG/coal) and a retail price it is not allowed to set. That single sentence explains its entire history.

Structure (the 2001 unbundling). In 2001 Korea restructured its power sector, splitting KEPCO's generation into six wholly-owned subsidiaries while KEPCO the parent retained the transmission, distribution and retail monopoly:

• Generation subsidiaries (GenCos): Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP — all 24 domestic PWRs, ~25 GW nuclear + ~2 GW hydro), plus five thermal gencos — Korea South-East Power (KOSEP/KOEN), Korea Midland Power (KOMIPO), Korea Western Power (KOWEPO), Korea Southern Power (KOSPO), Korea East-West Power (EWP).
• Service subsidiaries: KEPCO Engineering & Construction (KEPCO E&C), KEPCO Plant Service & Engineering (KEPCO KPS), KEPCO KDN (ICT), KEPCO Nuclear Fuel (KEPCO NF).
• Through these subsidiaries KEPCO accounts for 96% of Korea's electricity generation (2023).

Customers. ~100% domestic Korea: residential, and — critically — heavy industry (Samsung Electronics, SK Hynix, POSCO, Hyundai, the petrochemical belt). There is no customer choice — you buy from KEPCO or you self-generate/PPA at the margin. Industrial users (>300 kW) are now the price-setting cohort: their rates rose ~70% over 2022–2024 and surpassed household rates for the first time in December 2024 at ₩173,260/MWh. customers.csv is empty on the shelf — customer concentration is therefore n/a beyond the qualitative structure.

Contract structure / payment terms. Retail = regulated tariff, no take-or-pay, set quarterly by the government via a fuel-cost adjustment mechanism (see Lens 3). Wholesale purchases from gencos/IPPs = cost-based SMP + capacity payment through KPX. KEPCO bears the entire timing mismatch between when fuel costs move (immediately, at SMP) and when the government lets retail rates move (with a political lag, or not at all).

Lens 2 · Supply Chain

Map the physical chain, every named stakeholder:

Upstream fuel Generation Grid / Retail End load
───────────── ────────── ───────────── ────────
Imported LNG ── (KOGAS, Qatar, KHNP (nuclear 24 PWR ~25GW) Industry:
 US, Australia cargoes) ───────────► KOEN/KOMIPO/KOWEPO/KOSPO/EWP ──► KPX (single ────► KEPCO ────► • Samsung (Yongin
Imported coal (Australia, Indonesia) (coal + LNG thermal) buyer pool, (T&D + 15–16 GW cluster)
Uranium (import; KEPCO NF fabricates) IPPs (SK, GS, Posco, private SMP pricing) retail • SK Hynix
Domestic hydro/solar/wind (small) LNG; renewables) monopoly) • POSCO, petrochem
 • 25M households

• Chokepoint 1 — imported fossil fuel. KEPCO's fleet is 39% coal / 22% LNG by capacity, only ~2.4% renewables (KEPCO-owned). Korea imports ~all of its LNG, coal and uranium. SMP is set at the margin by LNG, so KEPCO's wholesale cost is effectively a levered bet on the global LNG price — which is exactly what detonated it in 2022 and re-appeared as the Q1-2026 "LNG surge" headwind.
• Chokepoint 2 — the transmission grid KEPCO alone builds. Every new load (data center, fab, renewable farm) must physically connect through KEPCO's wires. A 345 kV line takes KEPCO ~13 years to build vs. 2–3 years to build the data center it serves; more than half of KEPCO's planned transmission projects are delayed by permitting and local opposition. This is the single most important physical fact in the whole thesis (see Lens 12).
• Single-source / political dependency: the price KEPCO can charge is single-sourced to one supplier — the Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment (formerly MOTIE; retail-market oversight moved to regulator KOREC in Oct 2025). Names or it didn't happen: the counterparty that determines KEPCO's margin is the Korean government / National Assembly, not any commercial buyer.

Lens 3 · Competitive Advantages (moats)

The moat is a legal monopoly — and that is precisely the trap. KEPCO owns essentially all of Korea's T&D and retail; there is no bypass. Switching cost = infinite (you cannot buy electricity from anyone else at retail). Scale = national. On paper this is one of the deepest moats in any listed company.

But bargaining power runs the wrong way. A normal monopoly extracts rent from customers. KEPCO cannot: its retail price is set by a counterparty more powerful than it is (the state), whose objective function is consumer-price inflation and industrial competitiveness, not KEPCO's ROE. So:

• Over suppliers (gencos/IPPs): moderate — it buys at cost-based SMP, and even its own gencos are ring-fenced subsidiaries.
• Over customers: nil pricing power — the tariff is exogenous. The moat protects KEPCO's volume (you can't leave) but not its margin (the state can zero it).
• The durable edge that is real: (1) the grid rate base — if Korea ever adopts a proper regulated-return framework (as the IEA and RAP have recommended ), the T&D asset base becomes a growing, returns-earning moat, the classic regulated-utility compounder; and (2) nuclear engineering/export capability via KHNP + KEPCO E&C + KEPCO NF (Lens 5/12), a genuinely scarce global competence.

Structural-reform risk to the moat: in May 2026 Korea signalled it will scrap the RPS and open the transmission grid to the private sector, and the IEA/RAP recommend unbundling KEPCO's functions. The monopoly is not guaranteed to persist unchanged.

Lens 4 · Segments

KEPCO reports along its corporate structure: electricity sales (parent), nuclear generation (KHNP), thermal generation (5 gencos), plant maintenance & engineering (KPS / E&C / NF / KDN), and other/overseas. segments.csv is empty on the shelf, so precise segment revenue/EBIT splits are n/a this run; the directional read below is ``.

• By product/segment (Q1 2026 direction): "stronger operating earnings in electricity sales and nuclear generation, partly offset by weaker profitability in thermal generation; plant maintenance and engineering posted both higher sales and profit". The trend is exactly what you'd expect: nuclear (low, stable fuel cost) is accretive, thermal (LNG/coal exposed) is dilutive when fuel spikes — the whole company is a bet on the nuclear-vs-fossil mix.
• By geography: ~99%+ domestic Korea. Overseas is small — nuclear O&M (Barakah UAE), the new Czech project (KHNP), and legacy overseas plants/IPPs that KEPCO is actively selling under the self-rescue plan (e.g. a Philippines solar plant). Overseas investment returns hit a record ~$207M in 2024 — real, but a rounding error against a ~₩97tn revenue base.
• Generation mix (national context, 2024): ~31% coal, ~28–31% nuclear, ~27% gas, ~7–8.6% renewables; renewables' share rose from 4.7% (2019) to 8.6% (2024). The 11th Basic Plan (2024–2038, finalized Feb 2025) raises nuclear to 31.8% by 2030 and 35.6% by 2038, capacity 24.7 GWe (2023) → 28.9 (2030) → 35.2 (2038).

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Phase B — Measure performance

Lens 5 · Earnings Result

The five-year P&L is one of the most violent swings in any large-cap utility on earth — a fuel-shock loss the size of a national deficit, then a two-year mean-reversion back to record profit:

Latest print — Q1 2026 (reported 2026-05-13, preliminary/unaudited). Consolidated operating revenue ₩24,398bn (vs ₩24,224bn YoY), operating income ₩3,784bn (vs ₩3,754bn), net income ₩2,519bn (vs ₩2,362bn), net income to owners ₩2,493bn.

• Vs consensus: EPS ~₩3.88K beat the ₩3.82K estimate (+1.58%), but revenue ₩24.40tn missed the ₩24.81tn estimate. A quality-of-earnings mixed print, not a clean beat.
• What drove it / the flag: the ₩3.8tn profit was "overshadowed by an LNG surge and a deficit warning". This is the single most important line in the quarter: the exact 2022 mechanism (LNG cost up, tariff frozen) is twitching again, on a balance sheet with no cushion left.
• Guidance/tone: management guides 2026 power-sales-volume growth (economic expansion) with nuclear rising and coal/LNG declining, i.e. mix-shift toward the accretive fuel — but flags coal-tax-grace expiry and tariff/pricing-reform uncertainty as risks.
• Balance-sheet flags: interest expense is the story — ₩4.34tn in 2025 (~₩11.9bn/day), up from ₩3.42tn in 2024. Record operating profit barely clears 3× interest expense — and that's at the top of the fuel cycle.

Lens 6 · Earnings Calls (sentiment trend)

No transcripts on the shelf; this is ``-derived from filings summaries and press across the last ~4 reporting periods:

• FY2024 results (Feb 2025): relief/vindication — "return to profit after four years," self-help "exceeding targets by 110%," dividend resumed. Tone: turnaround delivered.
• 9M 2025 (Nov 2025): confidence — operating income ~doubled YoY to ₩11,541bn, net ₩7,328bn on lower fuel + higher nuclear utilization. Tone: momentum.
• FY2025 record (Feb 2026): triumph immediately met with its own threat — record ₩13.5tn profit "reignites electricity-rate-cut debate". The tone shift here is the key sentiment signal: success is dangerous because it invites confiscation.
• Q1 2026 (May 2026): defensive — profit "overshadowed," "deficit warning looms," LNG surge.

The arc: relief → momentum → triumph → braced for reversal. Management's recurring themes have shifted from "we survived" to a new narrative — CEO Kim's "global energy platform company" transformation (KEPCO Tech Holdings, CES 2026 booth) — which reads partly as a genuine strategy and partly as changing the subject away from the tariff-and-debt cage it cannot escape.

Lens 7 · Comps

• KEPCO EV/EBITDA ``: EV ≈ market cap ₩24.4tn + interest-bearing debt ~₩130–140tn (from total liabilities ~₩206tn, D/E 297.56% ⇒ equity ~₩69tn) ≈ ~₩155tn; EBITDA ≈ FY25 operating profit ₩13.5tn + D&A ~₩12–14tn (utility with ~₩200tn PP&E) ≈ ~₩26–28tn ⇒ EV/EBITDA ~5.5–6x. Directionally cheap on EV too, though the leverage means EV/EBITDA understates how cheap the equity is.
• P/B ``: ₩24.4tn ÷ ~₩69tn equity ⇒ ~0.35x book. A T&D monopoly with a national grid trading at roughly one-third of book value.
• The qualitative read that matters: KEPCO trades at a fraction of every premium regulated-return peer (NextEra, Yangtze Power routinely double-digit P/E) — because those utilities earn a guaranteed return on capital and KEPCO does not. The 2.7x P/E is not a mispricing to be arbitraged away casually; it is the market correctly pricing earnings that the majority owner can and does redistribute to consumers. The bull case is that this discount is cyclically (not structurally) permanent.

Lens 8 · Stock-Price Catalysts (>5% moves, ~5 yr)

Pattern of what actually moves this name:

• 2021–2022 collapse: fuel-cost shock + capped tariff → record loss; stock de-rated hard. What moved it: the LNG price and the government's refusal to pass it through.
• 2023 tariff hikes (Q1/Q2/Q4): each government-approved rate increase was a positive catalyst; losses narrowed. What moved it: political tariff decisions.
• 2024 return to profit + Feb-2025 dividend resumption: first profit in 4 years; first dividend in 4 years (₩214/share, ~1% yield) — market weighted the resumption signal over the tiny amount.
• 2025 "quiet rally" — AI power demand + Czech nuclear deal: the stock ran to a 52-week high of ~₩69,500 on the AI-grid narrative and the June-2025 KHNP Czech contract.
• 2026 pullback: back to ~₩36,250 (2026-06-23), roughly half off the high, −11.6% m/m — driven by the Feb-2026 rate-cut debate, the Q1-2026 revenue miss / LNG surge / deficit warning, and "AI demand vs. Strait of Hormuz" macro cross-currents. Still +22.67% YoY.

What the tape reveals: KEPCO trades on two variables above all others — (1) the LNG price and (2) government tariff/rate-cut decisions. Earnings beats do not durably re-rate it (Q4 2025 was strong and the stock fell −2.75% premarket); policy does. It is a policy stock wearing a utility's clothes.

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Phase C — Judge people & books

Lens 9 · Management

• CEO: Kim Dong-cheol — appointed September 2023, ~2.4-yr tenure. A government-appointed SOE chief (not a founder), which is the defining fact: KEPCO's CEO answers to the majority-owner state, and the levers that matter most (tariffs, dividend policy, the bond ceiling) are not his to pull.
• Track record: presided over the turnaround from −₩4.57tn (2023) to +₩13.5tn (2025) operating profit and the self-rescue plan "exceeding targets by 110%" — but candidly, most of that swing is exogenous (LNG normalization + government-granted tariff hikes), not management alpha. What is his: the self-help asset-sale/cost-cut execution and the "global energy platform" pivot — KEPCO Tech Holdings (energy-unicorn incubation, June-2026 launch), the CES-2026 booth (first utility ever), grid-innovation branding.
• Skin in the game: minimal — SOE executives hold negligible equity; insider-transactions.csv absent. The real "insider" is the Korean government (51.10%), whose interests (inflation control, industrial policy) are partly adverse to minority shareholders.
• Capital allocation: heavily constrained by the state. Dividends suspended 2021–2024 then resumed at a token ₩214; capex (grid + nuclear) is policy-mandated; the bond ceiling had to be raised by legal amendment because the company blew through its statutory cap. ROE/ROIC swung from deeply negative to positive purely on the fuel/tariff cycle. IEEFA's blunt verdict: "poor investment choices and corporate governance continue to cloud KEPCO's outlooks" and it calls for a "rethink of the composition of management and the board".
• Archetype: political/professional administrator of a policy instrument, not a value-maximizing operator. Implication: judge this equity on political economy, not on management quality.

Lens 10 · Forensic Red Flags

Acting as a forensic analyst — every figure ``, no filing on the shelf to quote directly.

• The regulatory-asset question (the single biggest forensic issue). KEPCO carries large "unadjusted fuel-cost adjustment charges" — the cumulative gap between the fuel-cost pass-through the formula would allow and what the government actually let it charge. In a US-style regulated utility this would be a recoverable regulatory asset trued-up over time. Korea has no such guaranteed true-up — retail rates are political, not formulaic-with-recovery. So this deferred under-recovery is economically closer to a permanent loss than a recoverable asset, and its accounting treatment (asset vs. expense) is the number an analyst should interrogate first. accumulated losses still approach ₩50tn — a retained-earnings deficit that dwarfs the market cap.
• Cash flow vs. earnings. Record ₩13.5tn operating profit, yet net debt still ~₩205–206tn and rising interest (₩4.34tn/yr) — earnings are not yet translating into deleveraging at scale because grid + nuclear capex is enormous and mandated. Watch FCF, not operating profit.
• Balance-sheet leverage: D/E 297.56% (2025-06-30); total liabilities ~₩206.2tn ($139.2B). Bonds issued ~₩80tn = 5× capital+reserves (₩17.5tn), and the company hit a bond maturity wall of ~$39B across 2024–2025 and its statutory issuance cap. The balance sheet is at its legal limit.
• SBC / goodwill: not a material distortion for an SOE utility (immaterial stock comp; no acquisitive goodwill of note) — n/a.
• Green-bond / ESG governance flag: IEEFA notes KEPCO's green bond "failed the ESG market test" and it relies on buying RECs rather than investing in renewables — recurring opex over strategic capex. A governance/quality flag, not a fraud flag.

Regulatory findings (required sub-section).

• SEC (EDGAR LR + AAER): None. Per regulatory-findings.md on the shelf: KEPCO has no CIK and is not required to file with the SEC, so no EDGAR enforcement search is possible; total_sec_findings: 0.
• Item 3 (Legal Proceedings): no 10-K on the shelf (web-only run) — the KEPCO ADR's 20-F Item 8 legal-proceedings disclosure was not fetched this run; n/a.
• Non-SEC / Korean enforcement (web search): no material securities-fraud or accounting-enforcement action surfaced. The principal legal/social exposures are (1) transmission-line siting disputes — the Miryang 765 kV conflict (protests from 2008, two protester suicides, ~20 injured in the 2014 sit-in clearance), now partially addressed by the Special Act on Expanding National Core Power Grids (March 2025) with resident subsidies + simplified hearings; and (2) an "ongoing KHNP-related dispute" flagged as a risk factor — historically the Westinghouse IP claim over APR reactor technology that shadowed the nuclear-export campaign. These are ESG/operational/commercial liabilities, not securities-fraud red flags.
• Verdict: No material securities-regulatory or accounting-enforcement findings — verified via the shelf's SEC EFTS search (0 findings, no CIK) and web search as of 2026-07-10. The genuine forensic issue is not fraud — it is that "record profit" sits on top of a ₩50tn accumulated deficit and a ₩206tn debt load the equity holder ultimately underwrites.

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Phase D — Project & stress-test

Lens 11 · Forward Projection

No forecast.ts create this run (watchlist/breadth mode — projections are not logged as tracked forecasts here). EPS is modelled off actuals. Fiscal years FY2026–FY2028.

Anchors ``: FY2025 operating profit ₩13.5tn, net income ~₩8–9tn, EPS TTM ₩13,567; ~642M shares. Interest expense ₩4.34tn/yr and rising. Q1-2026 already flagged LNG-cost pressure.

The projection is dominated by two political/exogenous switches, not operating detail — so it is a scenario tree, not a point estimate:

• BASE (muddle-through) — FY26 EPS ~₩10,000–12,000 ``. LNG normalizes-to-flat, tariffs held (no cut, no big hike), volume +1.7%/yr, nuclear mix-shift accretive, interest creeps up. Operating profit fades modestly from the FY25 record as the fuel windfall matures. EPS down YoY off a peak-cycle base. Implied P/E at ₩36,250 ≈ ~3–3.6x.
• BULL (tariff normalization) — FY26 EPS ₩14,000–18,000+ ``. The state accepts that the AI/grid buildout must be funded, moves toward a regulated-return framework (IEA/RAP path), grants further industrial hikes, LNG stays benign. Op profit holds/grows; deleveraging accelerates; dividend steps up materially. This is the re-rating scenario — a 2.7x utility earning a guaranteed return does not stay at 2.7x.
• BEAR (2022 rerun) — FY26 EPS ₩2,000–5,000 or a swing back toward loss ``. LNG spikes (the Q1-2026 warning) into a populist tariff freeze/cut (the Feb-2026 rate-cut demand wins), the spread collapses, interest coverage breaks, dividend is cut again. Op profit halves or worse; the deficit warning materializes.

The honest output: point EPS is n/a — not model-able with useful precision because the dominant variable (the government's tariff decision into the next LNG move) is a political coin-flip. What is model-able: at ₩36,250 the market is paying ~2.7x on peak-of-cycle earnings, i.e. pricing something between BASE and BEAR. Analyst consensus 12-month target ₩54,019 (high ₩92,000 / low ₩28,000; 14 buy / 2 sell; ~+50% upside) prices something between BASE and BULL.

Lens 12 · Bull vs Bear

Bull case (narrative). KEPCO is the unavoidable toll-road for Korea's entire AI and semiconductor strategy. The government has committed >₩1,000tn (~$651B) to semiconductors/AI/data centers (June 29 2026); the Yongin cluster alone needs 15–16 GW — a quarter of Seoul-metro demand — against <2 GW of local supply. Data-center load rises 6× (5→31.6 TWh by 2040). None of it connects without KEPCO's grid. Meanwhile earnings have mean-reverted from −₩32.6tn to +₩13.5tn, the dividend is back, KHNP just won an $18–19B Czech nuclear contract with i-SMR and domestic new-build behind it, and the equity trades at 2.7x earnings / ~0.35x book / near-sovereign (AA / Aa2) credit. If Korea reforms tariff-setting toward a real regulated return — which its own AI ambition may force — this is a violent re-rating. President Lee has said rates are "bound to rise" for the energy transition. That's the tell.

Bear case (narrative). The tariff is a political instrument and the state confiscates every recovery. Record 2025 profit immediately reignited rate-cut demands (Feb 2026); Q1-2026 already shows the 2022 mechanism twitching (LNG up, tariff frozen, "deficit warning"). Underneath sits ₩206tn debt, D/E ~298%, ₩4.34tn/yr interest, a ₩50tn accumulated deficit, and a statutory bond cap already breached. And the AI demand it's supposed to monetize is a liability it may not be able to fund: >half of transmission projects delayed, 345 kV lines take 13 years, Miryang-style opposition — the IEEFA "death spiral" (more mandated capex → more debt → capped tariff → value destruction). Structural reform (grid opening, unbundling) could strip the monopoly. Multiples aren't too high — they're low for a reason.

Pre-mortem (18 months out, thesis broke). LNG spiked again through 2026–27 (Q1-2026 was the warning shot). Facing an election and the industrial lobby (who won the Feb-2026 rate-cut argument), the government froze or cut tariffs into the fuel spike. KEPCO's spread collapsed, operating profit halved back toward zero, the dividend was cut again, and the AI-grid capex forced another bond wave into a balance sheet already at its statutory cap. The 2.7x P/E turned out to be 2.7x on peak-cycle earnings the state promptly redistributed to consumers and chipmakers.

Contrarian view (what the market refuses to see). The consensus prices KEPCO as a broken, indebted fossil utility. What it under-weights: as power becomes the binding constraint on compute, the political economy of the tariff may have to invert — from "suppress rates to fight inflation" to "raise rates to fund the grid the national AI strategy depends on." Samsung/SK Hynix are the crown jewels of the Korean economy and they cannot run without KEPCO. The moat that looks like a hostage situation could become pricing power if and only if the state decides the grid must be funded. That is the entire investable question.

Lens 13 · Devil's Advocate (short-seller)

Dismantling the bull case.

• Revenue is 100% concentrated in one politically-set price. No geographic diversification, no product pricing power, no customer choice. Nuclear exports (Czech $18–19B over a decade) are a rounding error against ₩97tn/yr revenue. There is nowhere to hide when the one variable (the tariff) goes against you.
• The moat is the trap. A monopoly you can't leave is a monopoly the state can set the return on to zero — and has, three years running (2021–23). The most dangerous "competitor" isn't another utility; it's the National Assembly and the consumer-price index.
• The AI-demand bull thesis requires the state to let KEPCO keep the profit from demand it's forced to serve — and every historical data point says the opposite. Feb 2026: record profit → cut-rate demand. That's the base rate.
• Worst capital-allocation reality: it isn't fraud — it's that management can't allocate; the state does, and it directs capex to policy goals (grid, nuclear) while capping the revenue to recover them. Result: ₩206tn debt, ₩50tn deficit, bond cap breached.
• Break-the-model scenario: a sustained LNG/coal shock coinciding with a populist tariff freeze — exactly 2022, but now on a balance sheet with zero cushion and interest coverage already thin at the peak. If growth (volume) disappoints 20–30% or the tariff is cut 10%, the ₩13.5tn operating profit halves and interest coverage approaches 1×. Plausibility: moderate-to-high — it has happened once this decade already, and the Q1-2026 print is the early tremor.
• The valuation "cheapness" is a value trap unless the political regime changes. 2.7x forever is a rational price for earnings the owner redistributes.

Lens 14 · Management Questions (15, ordered by information value)

1. What is your explicit, written commitment from the government on tariff-setting mechanics — is there any path to a guaranteed regulated return on invested capital, or does retail pricing remain fully discretionary/political?
2. Of the ~₩50tn accumulated deficit / "unadjusted fuel-cost charges," how much do you carry as a recoverable regulatory asset vs. permanently expensed, and on what recovery assurance?
3. What tariff level (₩/kWh) do you need to fully fund the AI/data-center grid buildout and deleverage — and have you been granted it?
4. You've hit your statutory bond-issuance cap once already; what is the funding plan for the next ~₩30–50tn of grid + nuclear capex without another cap amendment or equity dilution?
5. >Half of your transmission projects are delayed. What is the realistic connect-date for the Yongin cluster's 15–16 GW, and what happens to the fabs if the grid isn't ready?
6. How do you protect the equity from the "record profit → rate cut" reflex that appeared in Feb 2026? What's different this cycle?
7. What is your hedging / pass-through protection against the next LNG spike — the Q1-2026 surge suggests 2022 could recur; is the fuel-cost adjustment mechanism actually functional now, or still suspended by decree?
8. Quantify the economics of the KHNP Czech project and the export pipeline: expected margin, cash-flow timing, financing, and downside if Westinghouse/IP or Czech political risk re-emerges.
9. What is the through-cycle ROIC target for the grid rate base, and when do you expect FCF (not operating profit) to turn durably positive?
10. How real is the grid-unbundling / private-transmission reform (May 2026), and what would it do to your T&D monopoly and rate base?
11. Dividend policy: what payout formula governs it now, and does the government (majority owner) or the board decide it?
12. What is the capex and cost path to the 11th Plan's nuclear ramp (35.2 GWe by 2038) + i-SMR, and how is it funded?
13. On the coal-tax grace-period expiry flagged as a Q1-2026 risk — what's the P&L impact and can it be passed through?
14. What is your renewables/decarbonization capex plan, given IEEFA's critique that you buy RECs instead of building — and how does it compete with grid capex for capital?
15. What does "global energy platform company" (KEPCO Tech Holdings, CES) contribute to earnings within 5 years, or is it a narrative overlay on a domestic regulated utility?

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